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   Abstract 
 
 
Structural separation in the electronic communications market. Factors 
that may influence the actions of regulators and competition authorities 
in Europe.  
 
 
This thesis analyses structural separation in the electronic 
communications market. It examines the factors that may lead competition 
and sectorial regulators to consider structural separation. It argues that the 
European Commission, when called upon to apply a sanction and choose a 
behavioural or structural remedy, should take into consideration the positive 
effects that, under certain conditions, may derive from structural separation in 
terms of (i) prevention of abuses and deterrence of such abuses and (ii) 
enhancement of competition.  
 
The thesis begins by setting out both exploitative and exclusionary abuses in 
the provision of electronic communications services provided through 
vertically-integrated structures (chapter II).  
 
It then (chapter III) considers alternative remedies to structural separation 
namely ex ante remedies available (i.e. price caps; recently introduced 
provisions on functional separation to prevent refusal to supply, margin 
squeeze, cross-subsidisation etc.); and looks at how, and with what results, ex 
post remedies have been imposed until now (chapter IV).  
 
The thesis examines functional separation as introduced by the BT Group 
creating, under OFCOM’s supervision, a separate access division 
(‘Openreach’)2. Following this model, Art. 2 of Dir. 2009/140/EC amended the 
                                            
2 J. Whalley & P. Curwen, ‘Equality of access and local loop unbundling in the UK broadband 
telecommunications market’ (2008) 25 Telematics and Informatics 280-291. It provides an 
account of the initial phases of implementation of BT’s functional separation. 
14 
 
Access Directive 2002, making functional separation one of the remedies to be 
proposed by the regulators to the Commission for approval (the directive also 
introduces art. 13(b) on voluntary ownership separation of the local access 
network assets as a more radical, but voluntary, form of separation). The 
question is whether the enforcer can go a step further, even in the presence of 
functional separation as a regulatory remedy, imposing structural separation in 
the presence of abuses of dominant position. 
 
On a strictly legal point of view the recent cases Deutsche Telekom and 
Telefónica at European level have demonstrated that the Commission (and 
the National Competition Authorities),  in their enforcement activity, can go 
beyond regulatory provisions that may not be sufficient to avoid the most 
subtle forms of anticompetitive behaviours, such as margin squeeze. In other 
words, the compliance by the incumbent to the provisions of the sector 
regulator in setting, for instance, retail and wholesale prices, for the European 
Commission and the European Courts was not considered a sufficient reason 
to exclude the infringement of Article 102 TFEU putting in place margin 
squeeze practices.  
 
Once it is established that the incumbent might be still able to put in place 
exclusionary abuses even in the presence of ex ante (regulatory) measures, 
the thesis examines the modest impact that (i) pecuniary fines and (ii) 
functional separation have had in preventing abusive conducts.  
 
Both cases are linked to examples of recidivism. Examining pecuniary fines 
specifically, the thesis shows that on a quantitative point of view, these fines 
often represent an infinitesimal percentage of the total turnover of the 
telecommunications incumbents.  
 
Functional separation, either as an ex ante or ex post remedy, has proven not 
to be as effective as expected. This is evidenced by a study of  the 
implementation of functional separation in the UK in the electronic 
communications sector which takes into consideration criticisms put forward 




by competitors in the Energy Sector Enquiry of 2007, stressing the importance 
of adopting structural remedies in both the gas and electricity generation and 
transmission markets.  
 
In Chapter V the role of commitments is discussed in order to establish what 
lessons can be learnt from the experience of structural separation in the 
energy sector. This is currently the category with the most relevant case-law at 
the European level. The discussion is underpinned by extensive literature and 
an analysis of the experience (cases E.ON Electricity3, RWE4 and ENI5, in 
particular). 
 
Therefore, chapters I to V provide the legal background (also in comparative 
terms, using examples from the energy sector) that could support the 
applicability of structural separation as a pro-competition remedy in the 
electronic communications sector. 
 
On the basis of existing case-law and experience, recourse to a sectorial 
comparative analysis drawn from the energy sector, the thesis shows that, in 
the presence of recurrent abuses and comparable foreclosing exclusionary 
effects, also in the electronic communications sector structural separation as 
an enforcement remedy should be also taken into consideration, going beyond 
the tradition pecuniary sanctions or functional separation (both as an 
enforcement remedy or as a new regulatory tool). 
 
The second part of the thesis demonstrates how structural separation can be 
considered not only ‘legally possible’ but also beneficial to competition. 
                                            
3 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ 
C36/8 of 13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
4 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf 
 
5 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 






In Chapter VI the possibility of introducing structural separation in the 
electronic communications sector is examined in analogy to the energy sector 
in Europe, using the US experience of structural separation represented by the 
AT&T case (1981-1984)6 as an example. The division in the doctrine about the 
effects structural separation had on competition in the USA is highlighted. 
More importantly, the conclusion that the experience of local (or regional) 
vertical separation was tailored to the specific nature of the US 
communications market and is only partially applicable to Europe, where de 
facto local separation is already a reality, considering the fact that the 
electronic communications operators networks reflect the partition of Europe in 
28 States. Though not directly applicable to the European scenario, it is 
nevertheless the first most relevant example of structural separation in the 
electronic communications sector and could not be ignored. 
 
After having analysed the various forms of separation identified by the doctrine 
(taking into consideration the examples collected by the OECD in the last 
thirteen years, in chapter VII), the thesis focuses in the conclusive chapter VIII 
on two very recent examples of structural separation in the electronic 
communications sector that can be applicable at the European level: one is 
the case of structural separation of Telecom New Zealand (2011) the other is 
currently under implementation in Australia, through structural separation of 
the national incumbent, Telstra. In both cases, structural separation takes 
place between network and services, and partially reflects the model of 
structural separation already implemented in the energy sector in Europe in 
the above-mentioned cases (E.ON, RWE and ENI). The fact that in New 
Zealand and Australia (where the government will deploy the New Broadband 
Network, once separated by the incumbent Telstra from 2018) structural 
separation has been considered beneficial to competition, represents a strong 
point in favour of structural separation as an enforcement remedy at European 
level.  
 
                                            





Two further elements reinforce the conclusion, acknowledging the benefits of 
structural separation.  
 
(i) The similarity in terms of anticompetitive effects between 
electronic communications and energy sectors (demonstrated in 
chapters II, III, IV and V of the thesis), underpin the argument that 
structural remedies adopted in the E.ON, RWE and ENI 
commitments decisions could be applied in the electronic 
communications sector;  
 
(ii) The fact that the European Courts in the Deutsche Telekom and 
Telefónica cases have reaffirmed the independence of the enforcer 
over the regulator demonstrates that, from a legal point of view, the 
Commission can go beyond the regulatory measures established by 
the regulator (including, on the basis of European Directive 
2009/140/EC, also functional separation among these measures) 
imposing the most suitable remedy, including structural separation. 
 
All these factors underpin the conclusion. Once the form of structural 
separation that could be applicable in the European context has been 
identified (structural separation of the network from the companies providing 
electronic communications services being the most realistic) the European 
Commission (or the national competition authority) should not hesitate to take 
into consideration structural separation as a remedy, as per Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003/EC.  
The deterrent effect on the former incumbent; the fact that vertical structural 
separation erodes the position of strong market power of the vertically-
integrated incumbent, and the fact that it may lead to more competition with 
regards services provision (possibly over a New Broadband Network deployed 
by the State, as in the Australian case from 2018) can be considered important 












































          CHAPTER I 
 
Infrastructure and services between regulation and competition in 
vertically-integrated firms. The electronic communications sector.  
 
 
‘Europe is moving at a slower speed than the US. A 
number of obstacles reduce the capacity of industry in 
Europe to innovate and generate value added in the digital 
sphere: […], the lack of high-speed transmission 
infrastructure and the lack of digital skills. Many of these 
obstacles point to a simple cause: a lack of a digital single 
market’7. 
 
Mario Monti, former European 




1. Preamble: the ‘thesis’ question’ addressed by the thesis 
 
 
The thesis seeks to analyse what competition law remedies are most suitable 
in dealing with recurrent network-related abuses of dominant position in the 
provision of electronic communications services such as fixed telephony and 
broadband communications. On the basis of the scientific literature gathered, 
comparison and application of legislative tools in actual cases, the 
jurisprudence of the European Courts and the practices of the European 
Commission and national competition authorities (hereinafter, ‘NCAs’), but 
also on the basis of theoretical reasoning, my conclusion is that the European 
Commission and/or the NCAs (or the Regulators with competition law 
enforcement roles) when called to impose a sanction and to choose between a 
behavioural or structural remedy should take into consideration also the 
positive effects that, under certain conditions, may derive from structural 
                                            
7 Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market – At the Service of Europe’s Economy 
and Society, Report to the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 




separation in terms of (i) deterrence and prevention of abuses and (ii) 
increased competition (for instance, the purchaser of the separated network 
may be a new strong competitor entering the market). 
 
The first chapter aims at establishing the key-concepts of: (i) vertically-
integrated industry, (ii) how the network works in the telecommunications 
industry and (iii) what comparison can be made from a technical, economic 
and legal point of view between telecommunications and other network-based 
vertically-integrated firms.    
 
 
1.2. Introduction.  
 
The thesis aims at showing that among the competition law remedies, at the 
level of EU law, structural separation in certain circumstances, in the presence 
of recurrent abuses of dominant position in the provision of electronic 
communications services, can be considered beneficial. The modification in 
2009 of three of the directives of the so-called ‘Telecommunications Package 
2000’8 by Directive 2009/140/EC9, introducing vertical functional separation as 
an ex ante remedy, convinced me to consider how remedies, either ex ante or 
ex post, work in dealing with abuses of dominant position in vertically-
integrated firms, and in the electronic communications, in particular. 
 
                                            
8 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities, [2002] OJ L 108/7 (the ‘Access Directive’); Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council 2002/20/EC 7 March 2002 on the authorization for the networks and the 
services of electronic communications, [2002] OJ L 108/22 (the ‘Authorisation Directive’); 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, [2002] 
OJ L 108/33 (the ‘Framework Directive’); Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ right relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, [2002] OJ L 108/51 (the ‘Universal Service 
Directive’); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, [2002] 
OJ L 201/37 (the ‘Data Protection Directive’); and the Radio Spectrum Decision, [2002] OJ L 
108/1. 
 
9Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, 




Therefore, this thesis goes a step further beyond simply requiring functional 
separation as a regulatory tool introduced by Directive 2009/140/EC, and to 
look at the impact that ex post competition law remedies, namely fines, 
behavioural (and, among behavioural lato sensu, functional remedies) or 
structural remedies based on Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC10, may have, 
both in terms of deterrence and of enhancement of competition11.  
 
Vertical functional separation has been defined as ‘a remedy that can be 
applied in certain situations where competition is restricted as a result of 
vertical integration’12. The OECD Report 2011 on ‘Experiences with structural 
separation’ is particularly useful to recall the most accepted definition of 
separation. It is based on the famous classification elaborated by Prof. Martin 
Cave, and will be discussed more in depth in the part of the thesis dealing with 
the various forms of separation. In brief, separation focuses on the ‘assets that 
cannot be replicated’13 and that can take various forms ranging from 
behavioural to structural measures. The OECD Report 2011 lists the following 
forms of separation  
 
‘Accounting separation constitutes the weakest form of separation 
available, and ownership separation14 the strongest. In between 
these poles, ‘six degrees’ of functional (or operational) separation 
options have been identified: (i) creation of a wholesale division; (ii) 
virtual separation; (iii) business separation; (iv) business separation 
with localised incentives; (v) business separation with separate 
                                            
10 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 [2003] OJ L 1/1 (the ‘Modernisation 
Regulation’). 
 
11 For a recent outlook on remedies imposed by the European Commission, see I. Llianos, 
‘Competition Law Remedies, in Search of a Theory’, CLES working papers series, April 2011, 
accessible at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles_3_2011. 
 
12 B. Moselle and D. Black in ‘Vertical Separation as an Appropriate Remedy, (2010) Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 84.  
 
13 OECD Report 2011 ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, OECD pub. 2012, p 
10, accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf 
 




governance arrangements; (vi) and legal separation involving 
separate legal entities under the same ownership’15. 
 
The OECD Report 2011 reaches the quite broad conclusion that the optimal 
decision about what form of separation should be adopted needs to be based 
on the evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages both from a 
competition law point of view and from an economic efficiency point of view. 
 
This thesis tries to go a step further. It analyses in depth the functioning and 
the impact that a structural remedy such as structural separation may have on 
competition. I consider how structural separation works or might work in the 
electronic communications sector and I carry out a number of comparisons 
with other regulated markets in which structural separation has already taken 
place. Theoretical reasoning may also be useful to foresee what impact a 
draconian remedy may have in the short and in the long term on the 
competitive scenario, bearing in mind the impact that it might have in terms of 
short and long-term consumer welfare and quality of the service, but also in 
terms of costs and prices. 
 
Chapter I provides some key definitions such as the meaning of abuse, the 
difference between ex ante and ex post remedies, the meaning of behavioural 
and structural remedies, and the meaning of structural separation, as opposed 
to functional separation. It identifies the context of the analysis; the aims and 
the objectives of the thesis; the methodology; how the thesis critically 
evaluates the primary and secondary sources; and a short summary of the 
chapters. I will also explain on what evidence I base my reasoning, and how I 
will reach my conclusions.  
 
Chapter I explains (i) the meaning of ‘vertically-integrated’ firms and networks, 
(ii) providing fundamental definitions of infrastructure, core backbone, access 
network in the electronic communications sector and explaining how the 
infrastructure works in the electronic communications industry.  
 
                                            
15 M. Cave, ‘Six Degrees of Separation: Operation Separation as a Remedy in European 
Telecommunications Regulation’, (2006) 4th quarter, 64 Communications and Strategies, 1-15. 
23 
 
I  conclude Chapter I by arguing that  the experience of structural separation 
made in other vertically-integrated firms (e.g. electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution, gas extraction, transformation, transmission and 
distribution, as per the above-mentioned E.ON, RWE and ENI commitments 
decisions) could be used to underpin on a legal point of view the claim that the 
European Commission (and the National  Competition Authorities) are entitled 
to apply structural separation  also in the electronic communications sector. 
 
In the following chapter I will also discuss the clear position taken by the 
European Commission in recent access-related abuses of dominant position 
decisions as in the Deutsche Telekom16 and Telefónica17 cases, affirming the 
possibility, for the European Commission to impose Art. 7 Regulation no. 
1/2003/EC remedies (fines in particular) independently from national 
regulatory authorities’ remedies already in place (such as access prices set by 
regulators).  
The definition of the technical framework of the analysis (what an electronic 
communications network is and how it works) should facilitate the 
understanding not only of the abuses that are carried out with respect to the 
access to the network (the topic of the following chapter) but also to define the 
structural remedies and separate them from behavioural (and especially 
functional) boundaries of the behavioural (and especially the functional) as 






                                            
16 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9; on appeal, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, Case T-271/03, [2008] 
ECR II 477; before the ECJ, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, 
[2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
17 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 







1. Summary of the research topic and its importance 
 
The research topic is to analyse the difficulty that competition authorities, at 
European and at national levels, may encounter in adopting the most suitable 
sanction in the presence of recurrent abuses of a dominant position.  
 
The thesis is mainly centred around abuses of dominant position carried out 
by vertically-integrated firms in the electronic communications sector, in 
particular with respect to traditional abuses, such as refusal to supply access 
to the network controlled by the incumbent, either charging excessive prices or 
through more subtle forms of abuse such as margin squeezes and indirect 
refusal to supply through non-innovation of the networks they control. 
 
The research topic is important because through the analysis of case-law and 
comparison with remedies adopted in the presence of commitments signed to 
address the European Commission’s concerns vis à vis alleged abuses of a 
dominant position, I want to show that in certain circumstances structural 
separation may be not only legally applicable (also on the basis of the most 
recent orientation expressed by the EU courts stressing the wide room of 
manoeuvre of the European Commission with respect to national regulators in 
dealing with Art. 102 TFEU infringements) but also a more effective remedy 
than mere financial sanctions or behavioural remedies. Within the category of 
behavioural remedies particular focus will be devoted to functional separation 
as an ex ante remedy that in 2009 was ‘codified’ by Directive 2009/140/EC18 
as one of the possible remedies aimed at boosting competition.  
 
                                            
18 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 





This form of separation, adopted for the first time in the United Kingdom in 
2006 by the British Telecom Group (BT Group) under the supervision of the 
British communications authority OFCOM, represented the starting point of my 
research into other forms of separation, including the most invasive forms, 
such as that deriving from the divestiture of the electronic communications 
network, either in its entirety or in sections, at sub-national (inter-regional), 
regional or local levels.  
 
The thesis will take into consideration relevant case-law in which various forms 
of remedies, either behavioural or structural, were adopted in relation to 
commitments signed by the management of vertically-integrated firms in 
sectors other than the electronic communications, such as in the gas and 
electricity  generation and transmission (the above-mentioned cases E.ON19, 
RWE20  and ENI21).  
 
First of all it discusses the difficulty of choosing the best remedy, weighting 
legal and economic arguments in favour and against each prospected 
measure (advantages and disadvantages of both behavioural and structural 
remedies).  
 
Having argued that structural separation, among the structural remedies, in 
the presence of certain pre-conditions can be considered a suitable form of ex 
post sanction, a further problem is the choice of the point or level of the 
network where the ‘cut’ (break-up) should take place. In fact it must be 
undertaken at a level that represents a sufficient loss for the abuser and, at the 
same time, offers a viable asset for the (suitable) purchaser. The divestiture 
must be applied with the aim of enhancing competition, and not simply with the 
idea of sanctioning the abusive behaviour. At the same time, structural 
separation applied in one country cannot always be ‘exported’ as a good 
model of reference into completely different contexts: the reference here is at 
                                            
19  E.ON, [2009] OJ C36/8. 
 
20 RWE, [2009] OJ C133/10.  
 




the AT&T22 example of local vertical separation, which presents the legitimate 
question whether it might represent an example that could be directly applied 
in the European context or not. 
 
This further aspect (at what level and where the ‘cut’ should take place) will be 
analysed bearing in mind the difficulties for NCAs or for national regulatory 
authorities23 enforcing competition law of implementing the measure.  
 
 
2. Key definitions: abuses, structural separation, ex ante and ex post 
remedies 
 
In the first chapters (I and II in particular) the thesis analyses some key 
definitions on which the reasoning is built-up. Chapter I focus on the definition 
of vertical integration, as a common characteristic of both electronic 
communications firms and other public utilities firms, such as those providing 
electricity, gas, oil, water distribution services.  
 
Chapter II focuses, in more detail, on the definition of network-related abuses, 
and is based on a comparative approach between abuses in the electronic 
communications and similar abuses in the electricity and gas production and 
distribution sectors.  
 
Chapter III focuses on the analysis of the remedies, including regulatory and 
competition law enforcement remedies. This chapter is an important step in 
the thesis because introduces the issue of mandatory functional separation 
and voluntary structural separation as new regulatory tools as per Directive 
2009/140/EC.  
 
Functional separation is defined as the remedy that is behavioural in nature 
but with features specifically aimed at modifying the functioning of the firm in 
                                            
22MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
 
23 Hereinafter, ‘NRA’. 
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order to facilitate the pre-conditions for effective competition. An example is 
the creation of a separate entity, within the same company group, that by 
statute deals with the access to the network. The fundamental precedent is 
represented by the creation in 2006 of the separate access division called 
Openreach within the BT Group.  
 
Functional separation differs from structural separation that consists in a more 
invasive remedy, aimed at breaking the unity of the undertaking allegedly 
abusing of its dominant position through divestiture of the network (or of 
relevant parts of it) or through the separation of the services companies from 
the network company belonging to the same group.  
 
Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of ex post remedies as per Art. 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003/EC, and in particular (a) fines, (b) behavioural remedies 
and (c) structural remedies. It aims at analysing the advantages and 
disadvantages that these remedies have, on the basis of empirical evidence, 
based on reasoning, analysis of existing case-law, literature review. It is also 
the chapter that tries to compare the electronic communications sector with 
other vertically-integrated utilities markets, such as those related to production, 
transmission and distribution of electricity and gas.  
 
This chapter as well as Chapter V will be based on the experience that can be 
drawn from the analysis of commitments signed between the European 
Commission and E.ON (electricity), RWE (gas) and ENI (gas), in 2008, 2009 
and 2010 respectively. From the empirical demonstration of the advantages 
and disadvantages deriving from the network (partial) divestiture deriving from 
those commitments, I will try to demonstrate that structural separation as a 
remedy as per Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC should not be considered an 
‘antitrust taboo’ but rather a highly pro-competitive remedy. Chapter IV 
concludes that it is a tool that the Commission, going beyond the limit imposed 
on regulators by Directive 2009/140/EC (functional separation), should be 




In Chapter VI I carry out an analysis of the AT&T case of structural separation 
mandated on the 8th January 1982 in the US on the basis of a consent decree, 
is aimed at showing how the first example of structural separation in the 
electronic communications sector took place, even though I will argue that the 
local vertical structural separation of AT&T cannot be applied, as such, at 
European level, where geographic fragmentation of electronic communications 
networks with respect to the boundaries of each single EU Member State is a 
reality since the creation of the European Union 
 
Chapter VII analyses the institutional approach of the OECD as an 
intergovernmental organisation. On the basis of the doctrine of the various 
layers of separation elaborated by Prof. Martin Cave, the OECD published two 
reports in 2001 and 2011 showing the difficulty of adopting, on both a legal 
and economic point of view, a univocal position vis á vis the choice of the best 
remedy.  
 
The final chapter VIII I uses the evidence gathered in the body of the thesis to 
conclude that structural separation in the electronic communications sector, as 
well as in other vertically integrated industries, is legally possible on the basis 
of the statutes and of the recent position expressed by the European 
Commission and the European Courts in cases such as Deutsche Telekom 
and Telefóonica with respect to the margin of autonomy of the European 
Commission in adopting the most suitable competition law remedy, 
irrespective of pre-existing regulatory remedies (such as access prices). The 
chapter goes further looking at the recent experience of two cases of structural 
separation in the electronic communications sector in Australia and in New 
Zealand, showing that in those realities the competition authorities must have 
concluded that structural separation should have a positive effect on 
competition in the short as well as in the long run.  
 
It will demonstrate that the impact is twofold: one the one hand structural 
separation can constitute a serious deterrent for the incumbent; on the other 
hand it might lead to a reduction of prices, an increase in the quality of the 
services provided, and higher consumer satisfaction. The conclusion is based 
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on the analysis of the effects that structural separation had in the E.ON, RWE 
and in the ENI commitments cases, but also on the consequences that 
structural separation is expected to have in those countries where it is already 
a reality. The two examples of structural separation adopted in the electronic 
communications sector in Australia (of incumbent Telstra24, effective from 
2018) and in New Zealand (of the incumbent New Zealand Telecom25), show 
that vertical structural separation is expected  to have pro-competitive effects  
that are still  underestimated at European level, above all if compared with the 
limited impact in terms of deterrence, enhancement of competition and long-
term consumer welfare that pecuniary fines may have26. 
 
3. Context: EU legislation and role of the European Courts. Practice of the 
European Commission. Reference to European national primary and 
secondary legislation. Reference to EU member States case-law, 
legislation and practice of national competition authorities and 
regulators. Comparative analysis with the US case-law and legislation. 
 
                                            
24 On 29 July 2011 Telstra submitted a structural separation undertaking and draft migration 
plan to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the basis of Sections 
577A and 577BDA of the Telecommunications Act 1997. After a supplement of negotiation, 
the ACCC accepted on the 27 February 2012 Telstra’s structural separation undertaking and 
approved the draft migration plan. On the 6 March 2012, Telstra’s Structural Separation 




25 For an overview of New Zealand Telecom structural separation and the creation of the 





26 However, at least at national level in Europe the debate on the opportunity of enacting 
further forms of structural separation in particular in the energy sector is particularly alive. On 
the 27 March 2014 OFGEM, the energy regulator in the United Kingdom, announced to have 
proposed a reference to the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate the energy 
market, also considering that the ‘CMA has powers, not available to OFGEM, to address any 
structural barriers that would undermine competition. Now consumers are protected by our 
simpler, clearer and fairer reforms, we think a market investigation is in their long-term 
interests’. See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/ofgem-proposes-reference-cma-
investigate-energy-market. The investigation could prelude to structural separation at gas and 
electricity supply and distribution level. OFGEM has already asked NGT (National Grid 
Transco Group) to work on a paper recently published on ‘Structural separation between 





The dissertation is mainly based on the European legal system, as it is built-up 
on European primary and secondary legislation (and soft-law) and on the 
practice of the European Courts.  
 
Having analysed the evolution of European legislation in the last three 
decades, during the entire process of liberalisation of the electronic 
communications markets, focusing on the European directives of the so-called 
‘Telecommunications Package’ mentioned in Section 1.1 above adopted in 
2002 and on Directive 2009/140/EC27 that introduced mandatory functional 
separation and voluntary structural separation among the most recent 
regulatory tools introduced with the aim of facilitating the liberalisation process 
and of enhancing competition.  
 
In terms of primary legislation the main provision to be recalled is Art. 102 of 
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union on abuse of dominant 
position, and two key provisions of Regulation no. 1/2003/EC, in particular, art. 
7 on remedies and art. 9 on commitments). 
 
On the basis of these provisions, an analysis of the practice of the European 
Commission and the role played by the European Courts in defining the 
boundaries of the main forms of access-related abuses is provided which 
includes; the conditions for the application of the essential facilities doctrine; 
the duty of the dominant undertaking to favour competition; the margins within 
which the dominant undertaking can refuse to provide access to competitors. 
  
The analysis of the relevant practice of the European Commission will be 
mainly focused on three cases in which commitments were proposed, by 
E.ON28 and RWE29 in 2008 and by ENI30 in 2010 in order to address serious 
competition law concerns, aimed at removing alleged situations of abuse 
                                            
27 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
 
28 E.ON, [2009] OJ C36/8. 
 
29 RWE, [2009] OJ C133/10.  
 
30 ENI, [2010] OJ C352/8. 
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mainly related to insufficient capacity (for instance, capacity withdrawal and 
deterrence of investments on the network in the E.ON case) or systematic and 
constructive refusal to supply (in the ENI case). Cases in which the European 
Commission closed the investigation on the basis of the proposal of divestiture 
put forward by the incumbents in Germany and Italy.  
 
These decisions are particularly useful, considering the absence of European 
Commission’s decisions, based on Art. 102 TFEU and Art. 7 of Reg. 
1/2003/EC, imposing structural separation as a sanction.  
 
The dissertation is also based on the relevant practice of national competition 
authorities in dealing with the problem of network-related abuses, and on the 
soft-law issued by the sector regulators at Member States level.  
 
Reference is also made to other jurisdictions, as for instance to the important 
precedent represented by structural separation of AT&T in the US in the early 
1980s. The analysis of the US case-law cannot be separated from an analysis 
of US legislation and practice of the FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission), in order to understand the framework in which matured the 
decision of divesting part of AT&T network in order to favour competition at 
regional level.  
 
 
4. Aims and objectives of the thesis 
 
This thesis aims at showing how structural separation can be a suitable 
remedy to deal with recurrent abuses of dominant position in the provision of 
electronic communications services. The conclusion is that the European 
Commission when called to apply a sanction and to choose a behavioural or 
structural remedy should take into consideration the positive effects that, in 
certain conditions, may derive from structural separation in terms of (i) 
prevention of abuses and deterrence, (ii) possibility of enhancing competition, 
(iii) possibility of enhancing quality of service and (iv) possibility of reducing 




While focusing on both exploitative and exclusionary abuses in the provision of 
electronic communications services provided through vertically-integrated 
structures, the thesis first (i) takes into consideration the available ex ante 
remedies (i.e. price caps; recently introduced provisions on functional 
separation to prevent refusal to supply, margin squeeze, cross-subsidisation 
etc.); then (ii) it looks at ex post remedies as per Art. 7 of Reg. 1/2003. Finally 
(iii) it discusses the role of commitments to see what lessons can be drawn 
from empirical experience, bearing in mind that at the European level the most 
relevant case-law at present falls within this category. I will also discuss two 
examples of structural separation in the electronic communications sector 
adopted by the Australian and New Zealand competition authorities in order to 
show that the idea of separating the company ruling the network from the 
companies providing the services is already a reality.  
 
Once demonstrated that recurrent fines per se may not succeed in avoiding 
both exploitative and exclusionary abuses, the thesis analyses how functional 
and structural remedies operate, and which type remedy could be more 
suitable. On a legal point of view I will stress how the recent judgments of the 
European Courts in the above-mentioned cases Deutsche Telekom and 
Telefónica confirm that the European Commission has considerable ‘room of 
manoeuvre’ when called to enforce competition law, above and beyond the 
regulatory tools already present in the single Member States. 
 
On the basis of the existing case-law and experience and through the 
recourse to comparative analysis, the thesis reaches the conclusion that, 
under certain conditions, in the electronic communications sector structural 
separation should be preferred to functional separation. In certain cases, the 
proposed model of functional separation (either ex ante or ex post remedy) will 
not always be effective (in particular, due to lack of sufficient monitoring). This 
conclusion is underpinned by extensive literature and by the analysis of the 
experiences, both at the EU level (review of the cases E.ON electricity, RWE 
gas and ENI gas, in particular) and at EU member states level (the UK 
Openreach experience of functional separation). Thus (vertical) structural 
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separation as an enforcement remedy as per Art. 7 of Reg. 1/2003/EC should 
not be seen as an extreme remedy.  
 
On the one hand, structural separation of the entities related to the wholesale 
provision of relevant access products can have a relevant deterrent effect on 
the former incumbent; on the other hand, structural separation may favour 
the erosion of the position of monopoly of the incumbent, and may lead to 
more competition both at upstream (network) and downstream (retail) level.  
All positive aspects that the European Commission and the national 
competition authorities should take into consideration when called to choose 
the most suitable form of sanction vis á vis the recurrent abuser. The thesis 
also discusses the long-term effects that a structural remedy may have, in 
particular in terms of long-term consumer welfare. More competition may 
mean more pressure to conquer larger market shares. Innovation on the 
separated infrastructure may consolidate the presence of new competitors at 
national or regional level, therefore triggering an indirect incentive to innovate.  
 
 
1.4  Regulation and competition with respect to ‘vertically-integrated’ 
firms. In particular, the electronic communications networks.  
 
Regulation and competition are the two main fields on which the present thesis 
is based. The two fields can be considered interlinked to the point that some 
tools or remedies (i.e. price caps, functional and structural remedies; as well 
as commitments and undertakings31), from the field of regulation are often 
‘borrowed’ by the field of competition enforcement to address identical 
concerns. 
 
The present work will tackle the different approaches adopted by the 
European Commission to prevent or to deal with abuses of dominant position 
in relation to access to electronic communications networks. The aim is to 
                                            
31 To use the wording of the UK Enterprise Act 2002, Undertakings in lieu of reference to the 
Competition Commission are a form of commitments as per Section 154 of the Enterprise Act 




analyse the remedies available to deal with this specific form of distortion of 
competition, and to establish or, at least to foresee, what ex post remedy could 
be best placed to deal with recurrent abuses and to prevent future distortions, 
while also bearing in mind the targets of facilitating innovation, enhancing 
consumer satisfaction and also reaching long-term public interest targets, such 
as that of bridging the so-called ‘digital divide’ in the European Union territory.  
 
In the thesis, a wide range of remedies will be discussed aimed at facilitating 
the role of regulators32 (ex ante approach) and enforcers33 (ex post approach) 
from time to time will be identified in the course of the present work. In some 
cases the same remedy, for example functional separation, may be applied 
either as an ‘ex ante’ remedy aimed at creating a ‘frame’ that should favour 
competition (as per the provision of the recently adopted Telecom Directive 
2009/140/EC); or can be applied ex post, in presence of recurrent 
infringements of competition law principles, as one of the measures that may 
be imposed as per Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC when mere pecuniary fines 
appear to be not sufficient to address competition law concerns.  
 
The thesis will also demonstrate how, on the basis of recent margin squeeze 
cases such as the Deutsche Telekom34 and Telefónica35 cases, the European 
Courts have reaffirmed that the national incumbents are subjects to the duties 
deriving from competition law even in the presence of regulatory provisions 
that the companies could try to use to justify their anticompetitive behaviours.  
 
                                            
32 ‘Regulators’ here stands for the administrative sectorial authorities supervising the 
functioning of the public utilities: i.e. electronic communication authority (OFCOM in UK, 
AGCOM in Italy, FCC in the US), energy authorities, transports authorities, etc. 
 
34 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9; on appeal, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, Case T-271/03, [2008] 
ECR II 477; before the ECJ, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, 
[2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
35 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 




Before analysing in depth the panoply of regulatory and enforcement tools 
aimed at dealing with the restrictions to effective competition in the provision of 
communications services through the incumbent’s network, a few sections will 
be devoted to the definition of ‘network’ and to the concept of vertical 
integration through which dominance may be leveraged to abuse within the 
meaning of Art. 102 TFEU.  
 
1.5. Vertical integration 
 
Vertical integration represents the situation in which an undertaking operates 
in more than one successive stage of the production process. In the 
manufacturing sector this could happen, for example, when the producer is 
also the retailer of the products it has materially produced. This model can be 
transferred to the electronic communications sector, where the owner of the 
infrastructure is also the ‘reseller’ of electronic communications services. For 
instance, the electronic communications incumbent operator can have a 
monopoly over access to residential customers: it is usually a vertically-
integrated company that owns the backbone and of the local loop and, until 
the beginning of the process of liberalisation, is the sole supplier of the 
services. The problem in regulatory and competition law terms arises when 
competitors require access to the same local loop in order to provide 
telephony or broadband services36. 
 
Figure 1 explains graphically the described situation: 
 







Figure 1.1: Source: B. Moselle and D. Black, ‘Vertical Separation as an 
appropriate remedy’, (2010) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 85. ‘W’ is the wholesale input.  
 
Even though vertical integration is not necessarily an indicator of monopoly, it 
is nevertheless a serious factor in determining the existence of a dominant 
position (see, for instance, the conclusion reached by the Court in United 
Brands with respect to vertical integration)37. 
 
Vertical integration, as a structural factor, has to be seen both in its static and 
dynamic dimension. On the one hand, it represents the static dimension of the 
market structure; on the other hand, it represents a process of market 
                                            
37 Case C-27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para 58: ‘The Commission 
bases its view that UBC has a dominant position on the relevant market on a series of factors 
which, when taken together, give UBC unchallengeable ascendancy over all its competitors: 
its market share compared with that of its competitors, the diversity of its sources of supply, 
the homogeneous nature of its product, the organisation of its productions and transport, its 
marketing system and publicity campaigns, the diversified nature of its operations and finally 
its vertical integration’. See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (4th edn, 2011), p 344. 
37 
 
structure adaptation38. However, the dynamic dimension is probably the most 
relevant to underpin findings of dominance. As Scherer and Ross note  
 
‘firms integrating upstream, or backward, undertake to produce raw 
materials and semi-fabricated inputs that might otherwise be 
purchased from independent producers. Firms integrating 
downstream, or forward, move toward further finishing 
manufactured goods in the hands of consumers’39. 
 
At first glance, it might appear logical that a vertically-integrated supplier could 
try to restrict the supply of the input to its competitors in order to maximise 
profits in the downstream market40. Some scholars argue that there is 
sufficient economic evidence that vertically-integrated undertakings usually 
make rational choices, maximising both their own interests and consumers’ 
interests, as since a vertically-integrated firm controls a ‘bottleneck’ monopoly, 
it can maximise its own profit without maximising care of consumers’ welfare41. 
For these scholars such an undertaking seems to be ‘condemned’ for its 
efficiency42. 
 
Others vice versa argue that discrimination or other forms of abuse by 
vertically-integrated firms might not be a rational strategy, since increases in 
profits at the retail level (i.e. through excessive prices) might be outweighed by 
                                            




40 B. Moselle and D. Black, ‘Vertical Separation as an Appropriate Remedy, (2010) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 84 ff. See in particular p 88: ‘the requirement to 
provide an input at cost to a downstream competitor may incentivise a firm to use various non-
price discrimination methods to prevent competition eroding margins in the downstream 
market’.  
 
41 Argument reported by the 2011 OECD Report, cited, p 12. Fundamental literature on the 
dilemma between incentive or not to abuse in vertically-integrated industries: F. Lafontaine 
and M. Slade, ‘Vertical integration and firm boundaries: the evidence’ (2007) 45(3) Journal of 
Economic Literature, 629-685; P.L. Joskow, Ch 11, ‘Vertical integration’ in ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, Issues in Competition Law and Policy, Vol. I (2008, ABA pub., Chicago) pp. 
273-292. 
 




losses at the wholesale level (since the dominant firm might be reluctant to 
offer wholesale access to competitors)43.  
 
If vertical integration is one of the factors determining dominance, intervention 
against vertical integration may represent a way of reducing dominance at the 
same time as enhancing competition and, possibly, enhancing consumer 
welfare (at least in the long term). However, ex ante or ex post intervention on 
vertical integration is not always easy to put into practice. In vertically-
integrated undertakings the local distribution network may represent a natural 
monopoly that is difficult to attack (see, for instance, in the electricity, gas and 
water distribution sectors where the same monopoly could have been 
maintained though restricting (or precluding) the access of competitors in the 
market44. 
 
The OECD Report 2011 stresses how  
 
‘an issue of increasing importance, in the context of the debate 
regarding [network] structural separation, is the impact of such 
arrangement on investment incentives, in particular relating to 
infrastructure development […]. On the other hand, where vertical 
integration remains in place, there is a risk that the integrated firm 
will engage in strategic under-investment in its infrastructure, in 
a bid to circumvent access obligations. In such circumstances, the 
decision to separate may lead to greater investment in 
infrastructure development’45. 
 
In other sectors, such as electricity, gas or water distribution, intervention 
might have no pro-competitive effects at all: i.e. in the high-voltage 
transmission or in regional distribution for electricity; in national and regional 
distribution for gas industry; in track and stations infrastructures in the railways 
                                            
43 D.W. Carlton ‘Should ‘price squeeze’ be a recognised form of anticompetitive conduct?’ 
(2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 271 (p 275), recalling the Cournot’s 
theorem of ‘one monopoly profit’ (i.e. a monopolist can extract only one premium for being a 
monopolist). 
 
44 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p 212. 
 




sector; or for the main infrastructure in the water distribution sector46, even 
though in recent times the European Commission has accepted commitments 
by dominant undertakings such as E.ON (2008), RWE (2009) and ENI (2010) 
in which structural divestiture of their generation (E.ON) and transmission 
networks (RWE and ENI) was one of the key features. 
 
To argue about what remedy would be more suitable to address competition 
concerns with respect to vertically-integrated firms, also requires looking at the 
reasons behind vertical integration. Vertical integration may present, from an 
economic point of view, positive features that may outweigh the negative 
impact that vertical integration may have on free competition. 
 
On this respect the various schools of economics are divided.  
 
For instance, the neoclassical approach to explain vertical integration looks at 
the single firm on a micro-economic point of view, before analysing the 
aggregate effect on the market that vertical integration may have. A 
neoclassical explanation for vertical integration is that the enterprise will 
minimise its inefficiencies that arise when market power is present both in the 
upstream and downstream level. In terms borrowed from economics, in a 
vertically-integrated industry ‘market prices will be greater than the marginal 
costs of production in both upstream and downstream markets as firms 
exercise market power’47. 
 
Vertical integration in a neoclassic perspective is seen as the best tool to avoid 
the problem of ‘double marginalisation’, i.e. the risk of setting the final price 
including the monopoly prices at both upstream and downstream level. The 
problem of ‘double marginalisation’ can be easily explained considering that 
the upstream monopolist will charge the downstream retail company with a 
price that should cover its upstream marginal cost (P M > c) for the single unit. 
                                            
46 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, ibid, p 214. The case-law reported in the following chapters will 
show the different forms of separation implemented with respect to single markets (i.e. gas 
distribution, energy generation). 
 




Similarly, the downstream retail monopolist takes the price P M as a cost and 
will charge a retail price P RM > P M48.  The phenomenon of double 
marginalisation is linked to such a combination of two monopoly ‘mark-ups’ to 
the production costs, charging the final consumer with a price that is higher 
than the price that a vertically-integrated company could charge considering 
the cost of the upstream input only once. This is one of the main reasons why 
vertical integration is considered positive also for the final consumer. As P. L.  
Joskow underlines 
 
‘if we assume that vertical integration is costless, the 
aggregate profits of the upstream and downstream 
monopolies will increase if they merge because the distortion 
from double marginalisation will disappear’49. 
 
The problem of double marginalisation can be removed only if the downstream 
market is perfectly competitive. In this case the downstream retail firm does 
not have incentive to charge twice the upstream monopoly price (P M). It will 
simply ‘pass-on’ that price on the consumer.  
 
An important aspect of vertical integration, linked to the price chain, is the ratio 
of value-added to sales50. If the first element of the production chain (the 
producer or the first buyer of raw materials) detains the higher value-added 
ratio (in the range of 0.5), the further elements of the production chain see 
their value-added ratio decreasing each step downstream. To make an 
example, the distributor ratio is calculated in 0.33. As Scherer and Ross point 
out ‘the nearer the raw materials end of the production stream a specialist 
firm’s (or industry’s) operations are, the higher its value added/sales ratio 
tends to be, ceteris paribus’51. 
 
                                            




50 Scherer and Ross, cited, p 95. 
 




What really matters for the aim of this thesis is to understand the link between 
vertical integration and market structure. Vertical integration is often joint with 
and further strengthens market power, one of the key preconditions for super-
dominance and monopoly (even though high market power and monopoly are 
not necessarily synonymous).  
 
These aspects will be further considered when in the following chapters which 
tackle the problem of the choice of the optimal regulatory or competition 
enforcement remedy to grant effective competition in vertically-integrated 
firms, when regulators or competition authorities are called to make a choice 
between (i) maximisation of short term consumer welfare through the 
preservation of structural unity of the dominant undertaking, opting for 
functional remedies, or (ii)  enhancement of competition among competitors 
through structural separation. 
 
In those chapters the various forms of behavioural remedies, as well as types, 
modalities and consequences of functional and structural separation will be 
also discussed more in detail. 
 
 
1.6. Vertical integration in the electronic communications market.   
 
I must now focus on vertical integration in the electronic communications 
sector and vertical integration with respect to comparable network-based 
undertakings.  
 
By comparable network-based firms I mean those vertically-integrated firms 
providing their services through networks. In this respect, I need to show how 
electronic communications services, gas transformation, transmission and 
distribution, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, water 
distribution, to take a few examples, can be compared due to some common 
features: the presence of a network; the position of natural monopoly that 
usually the owner of the network possesses; the applicability, in specific 
circumstances, of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine in favour of competitors 
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aiming to enter a market protected by its position of natural (and often legal) 
monopoly. 
 
Comparison among different firms can be carried out only with extreme 
prudence. However some common structural features among different firms 
can be identified, as well as some common abusive conducts (here I think of 
predatory pricing, margin squeeze, direct or indirect refusal to supply, for 
instance).  
 
The application of vertical behavioural or structural remedies can be taken as 
a model from other vertically-integrated firms to the electronic communications 
sector; the same exercise can be carried out modelling remedies already 
applicable in the electronic communications sector (I think here of functional 
separation as per Directive 2009/140/EC) on abusive or otherwise 
anticompetitive scenarios in other vertically-integrated firms. 
 
(i) Definition of communications network. 
 
Art. 2 (a) of the Directive 2002/21/EC ‘Framework’52 provides a first useful 
definition of ‘electronic communications network’ as those  
 
‘[…] transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or 
routing equipment and other resources which permit the 
conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other 
electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- 
and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial 
networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are 
used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for 
radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, 
irrespective of the type of information conveyed’. 
 
The network is often considered as constituted by (i) the ‘principal network’ 
(the ‘core network’, i.e. the network that links together the individual main parts 
of the network) and (ii) the ‘access network’ (i.e. the secondary network that 
                                            




connects the final consumers to the principal network, also defined 
‘backbone’). 
 
‘Downstream’ (or ‘access’) networks use transmission systems of various 
types. The most common access networks are based on the fixed copper 
network, made by the ‘twisted metallic pair’ normally used for the telephone 
wire. In the last decade revolutionary efforts were made to enhance the quality 
of the (bit-stream, or bit-rates) data that can be transmitted through metallic 
wires. 
 
This dichotomy has to be borne in mind to identify the most suitable 
competition law remedies to favour the enhancement of the quality of the 
infrastructure in the long-term.  
 
In fact the wires may be (i) those of the twisted metallic pair normally used for 
the voice telephony systems, or (ii) those of the co-axial cables (connecting 
the television cable to the cable modem). In the most advanced economies, 
they have been progressively replaced by optic fibres (normally used by 
business users)53, while in certain cases, to bridge long distances in areas 
where it is impossible or too expensive to deploy fibre cables the most 
common transmission systems are represented by ‘point-to-point’ radio 
connections54. 
 
The evolution from analogical services to digital services based on packet-
switched communications and the need of increasing the capacity of transfer 
of digital data per second has led to radical changes towards forms of 
communications that will be based on networks substantially different from the 
present infrastructures. The demand of broadband services will necessarily be 
                                            
53 The technical, physical, difference between fibre or cupper/cable networks is at the origin of 
the current debate on how to facilitate innovation through private, public, or competition law 
based intervention. 
 
54 For an extensive and clear description of ‘core networks’ and ‘access networks’ as well as 
the progressive ‘fixed-mobile’ substitution, see I. Walden, cited (3rd edn, 2009), pp 5 ff and, in 
particular the Section ‘Technology and Terminology’ drafted by L. Cuthbert, head of 
department of Electronic Engineering at Queen Mary, University of London.  
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higher with an exponential growth in the number of non-professional 
consumers. It is possible, at this early stage, to assume that a large part of the 
broadband services will be provided through the so-called New Generation 
(core and [A]ccess) Networks (abbreviated, respectively, in ‘NGN’ and 
‘NGAN’55). 
 
The network can be technically and logically separated into two main parts: 
the core network and the local loop (or, access network)56.  
 
The first, also called ‘trunk’ or ‘backbone’, is the main structure that usually 
has a regional, national or continental extension.  
 
The ‘local’ part of the trunk is defined as the ‘local loop’, or ‘the last mile’, 
considering the distance between the local switch (or exchange) and the end 
customer. 
 
The core network, in the electronic communications field in particular, can be 
easily duplicated today as a physical infrastructure, both in terms of quality 
(quality of service, or ‘QoS’) and capacity (quantity of analogue or digital units 
that may be transferred in a fraction of time).  
 
On the other hand, the local-loop can be examined from two perspectives. The 
local loop (or ‘last-mile’, from the switch to the end customer premises), and 
the sub-local loop, that is the part of the network connecting the street 
exchange (‘cabinet’) with the premises of the end customer. 
 
 
                                            
55 New Broadband Network (‘NBN’) in the Telstra case discussed in Chapter VIII. 
 
56 Definitions of core and local access networks can be found in some key Commission 
Decisions. For instance for the definition of long-distance networks (‘backbones’) see also the 
Commission Decision Worldcom/Sprint (Case COMP/M. 1741) of 28 June 2000, [2003] OJ 
300/1 with respect to a proposed merger among two of the main global communications 
operators (paras 16-17 expressly mention the ‘backbone’ infrastructures for the provision of 
electronic communications at global level and the provision of connectivity to Internet to end 




ii. Different degrees of regulatory and/or ‘technical’ unbundling of the 
local loop in Europe. 
 
Once provided the definition of ‘core’ (or ‘backbone’) and ‘access network’, it is 
worth explaining briefly the concept of ‘unbundling’. Unbundling is the term 
that indicates the physical separation of the last mile of wire (cable) from the 
incumbent, in order to allow a competitor to provide a service using that 
specific part of the network57. To give an example: NTL58, a UK fixed 
telephony operator and Internet services provider, required the unbundling of 
the local loop, historically owned by British Telecom (hereinafter, ‘BT’), to 
connect the ‘last-mile’ to its own switches.  
 
The UK government for a long time tried to hinder the unbundling (either 
mandatory or forced) of the local loop, because it deemed that it would have 
discouraged new competitive investments in the infrastructure. Through 
asymmetric regulatory measures, it rather tried to create and maintain the 
duopoly BT/Mercury, based on an artificial network competition of their 
infrastructures. BT and Mercury on their networks (different in size) were 
prevented from providing broadcasting services, while the cable operators 
‘were allowed to exploit that economy of scope’59. 
 
The Italian, French and German governments, on the other hand, favoured a 
different approach, and instead forced the incumbent (respectively, Telecom 
Italia, France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom) to unbundle the local loop. At 
                                            
57 I. Walden (ed), Telecommunications Law and Regulation, (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
2009), p 407ff.  
  
58 NTL Internet, known since February 2007 as Virgin Media, a company involved in television, 
Internet, mobile phone, and fixed-line telephone services, especially in the United Kingdom. 
 
59 M. Cave and I. Vogelsang ‘How access pricing and entry interact’ (2003) 27 
Telecommunications Policy 720ff. The idea was that only the incumbent, through the revenues 
deriving from the provision of its services (including wholesale data capacity) but also through 
the lease of its infrastructures, would have been able to innovate and invest on its own 
network, at the various levels of the network scale. In other words, excessive competition was 




European level the Resolution on Unbundling of Local Loop no. 2887/00/EC60 
represented more than a decade ago the first piece of soft-law adopted by the 
European Commission aimed at enhancing down-stream competition among 
incumbent and new competitors. 
 
In principle, pure competition law remedies would not have been able to force 
BT to offer its local loop; but regulatory measures actually did. The fact that 
the developments in DSL technology in the last decade (in particular in the 
ADSL61 technology) allowed BT to provide not only telephony services but also 
broadcasting services through the same local infrastructure, convinced the 
regulator (OFTEL, the legal entity that preceded as sector-regulator OFCOM62, 
before December 2003) to force BT to unbundle its local loop. The decision 
was adopted because also the two competing broadcasting networks, NTL 
and Telewest, were able to provide the same services (broadcasting, voice 
telephony, data) along their co-axial and fibre cable, but to provide full voice 
telephony/data services they needed the access to the local loop. Therefore to 
increase competition between BT, NTL and Telewest, the regulator forced the 
incumbent to open its local loop63. 
 
Today in the entire United Kingdom there are more than 8.2 million unbundled 
lines (January 2012)64. This factor has enormously increased competition and 
did not at all impede further investments by the incumbent in the creation of 
the so-called ‘New Generation Network’. OFCOM is satisfied with the greater 
choice and lower prices that the British consumers pay. In fact it is possible to 
                                            
60 See Regulation 2887/00/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2000 on the unbundled access to the local loop, [2000] OJ L 336/4, as well as fn 36 on the 
access to the sub-loop. 
 
61 Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line. 
 
62 Office of Communications, created on the basis of the Communications Act 2002 Chapter 
11 (available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/11/contents), adopted the 19 March 
2002 by the British Parliament. 
 
63 I. Walden and J. Angel, cited (2nd edn, 2005), s 8.3.5. ‘Local Loop Unbundling’, pp 301-302. 
 
64 Source: OTA2 Update for 2012, accessible at 





state that unbundling of the local loop is the first, indirect, less expensive, 
regulatory (ex ante) way of enhancing competition65.  
 
In reality, in many other European countries the diffusion of unbundling has 
been slower and narrower than expected.  Limited unbundling means reduced 
competition, with the well-known consequences in terms of rigidity of prices 
and reduced choice and quality of services provided for the end consumers. 
 
A few words must also be devoted to the analysis of a different aspect of 
unbundling: the so-called ’sub-loop’ unbundling (‘SLU’)66 that is the unbundling 
of the last ‘ten meters’ between the terminal switch of the national 
telecommunications operator67 before the premises of a building and the 
customer premises. 
 
The sub-loop unbundling is defined as the possibility of access to the sub-loop 
frequency-capacity along the terminal network, using the available spectrum of 
the twisted pair wires. This is technically obtained by placing a further small 
street cabinet with a DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer, 
allowing telephone lines to make faster connections to Internet) next to the 
telecom operator local copper aggregation cabinet (also called SAI, Serving 
Area Interface), using a ‘tie-cable’ to connect the last part of the local loop 
(sub-loop) with the customer premises. This technique allows faster Internet 
connections that in those obtained through normal Unbundling of the Local 
Loop. It may lead to the complete exclusion of the main electronic 
communications operator from the customer’s premises (unless the operator 
                                            
65 On the technicalities of local loop unbundling through BT Openreach access division, see 
http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/home/products/llu/llu.do. On the evolution of Local Loop 
Unbundling in the main European countries and in the United Kingdom, see R. Cadman, 
‘Invention, Innovation and Diffusion of Local Loop Unbundling in the UK, Center for 




66 A ‘Sub-Loop’ is any portion of an ‘Unbundled Local Loop’ that is accessible at terminals 
located in a company’s outside plant, including inside wiring. Accessible terminals are any 
points on an Unbundled Local Loop where technicians can access the copper wire or fibre 
within the cable without removing the splice sheathing.  
 




installs a DSLAM in its cabinet allowing Internet Protocol-level access). The 
sub-loop cabinet is connected with the main point of presence of the 
incumbent through long-range wireless (i.e. Wi-Max) or through fibre 
connections. 
 
When considering the different technical approaches described above to 
obtain the unbundling of the local loop, it is evident that the incumbent may or 
may not lose the direct control of its former customers. Therefore, not only at 
the regulatory level but also at the competition law enforcement level the 
authorities may adopt decisions that may lead to enhanced competition (i.e. 
favouring solutions that may lead to sub-loop unbundling), or that may simply 
sanction the incumbent for anti-competitive conducts, without removing the 
technical factor that materially may lead to future recurrent abuses68. Hence, 
the question that will be answered by the present thesis is: can structural, 
more intrusive, remedies, leading for instance to the separation of local (at 
‘local loop’ and ‘sub local loop’ level), regional or even State-wide portions of 
the network have a positive outcome in term of new investments and 
innovation of the network? Might expropriation of part of the infrastructure, as 
a consequence of structural separation as a competition enforcement remedy, 
at the same time ‘punish’ and create the conditions for effective competition, 
enhancing, in the long term, consumer welfare? The importance of identifying 
and defining the various portions of the network resides in the different role 
and functionality that these portions may have for the competitor or 
competitors aiming to provide electronic communications services in 
competition with the incumbent. The competitors may have an interest in 
having access to the sub-loop portion of the network (i.e. installing a separate 
‘street cabinet’ with their own switches) taking the direct control of the last 
portion (last ten meters) of the network.  
 
Also the State might be involved in the process of structural separation of 
network, at national, regional or local level, for instance in a preliminary phase, 
                                            
68 A further form of unbundling is that obtained through the so-called ‘shared-access’, offered 
by the incumbent both at local or sub-loop level to the competitor, using the no-local frequency 




when a new network should be rolled out. The example provided by structural 
separation of Telstra in Australia promoted by the Australian Competition and 
Consumers Commission (‘ACCC’), with the parallel creation of a structurally 
separated New Broadband Network (‘NBN’) funded by the Australian 
government to be completed by 2018, seems to go exactly in this direction69. 
 
 
This action may result, in practice, in the vertical structural separation of the 
network at various levels (from the separation of the back-bone, for instance, 
to the separation at regional or local level of the portion of the network closer 
to the final users), with completely different consequences in terms of 
ownership.  
 
As we will discuss later, the incumbent may have the option to be ‘functionally’ 
(rather than ‘structurally’) limited in the control of the access network. This 
possibility, less invasive in terms of ‘expropriation’ of part of the network by the 
competitors, will be discussed in the chapter dedicated to the ‘functional 
separation’ alternative. In fact both approaches, functional and structural 
separation of the access networks, will be discussed in a regulatory and 
competition law enforcement perspective among the various remedies that 
can be adopted to favour competition but also with the ultimate purpose of 
enhancing what I will define as ‘long term’ consumer welfare. 
 
The Commission and the national competition authorities’ practice as well as 
the European Courts’ jurisprudence show how difficult is the choice of the 
most suitable remedy, in particular when technical obstacles may lead to 
disruptions that might damage the final consumer. 
                                            
69 The Guidelines of the European Commission on State Aids to develop broadband capacity 
in Europe69 stress the importance of developing new broadband access networks (New 
Generation Access Networks) going beyond the traditional model characterised by the 
traditional incumbent owner at the same time of the fibre ‘backbone’ and of the copper wire 
local (and sub-local) loop, encouraging the creation of most advanced forms of local access 
network, in which the fibre directly reaches the premises of the final customers (with the so call 
‘Fibre to the home’ or ‘FTTH’ technology. See Communication from the Commission – EU 
Guidelines for the application of state aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of 
broadband networks, C(2012) 9609/2 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/broadband_guidelines_en.pdf 




1.7.    Comparison with other vertically-integrated network firms. 
 
As anticipated in Section 2 on vertical integration, in showing how structural 
remedies in the electronic communications sector could under certain 
circumstances, be preferred to behavioural remedies, another preliminary 
step, , is to clarify whether the electronic communications firms can be 
compared to other vertically-integrated network-based firms.  
 
To put it simply, I should identify the analogies, within the wider category of 
vertically-integrated firms, between the electronic communications sector and 
other vertically-integrated firms providing services of general public interest, 
otherwise called ‘utilities’. In such a way, it would be possible to compare the 
outcome, in competition law terms, that structural remedies (such as 
divestiture of assets) had with respect to other vertically-integrated firms, and 
argue whether those remedies could be applied in the electronic 
communications sector. 
 
Some basic characters of vertically-integrated firms, irrespective of the fact 
that their services are delivered to the final consumer through the network or 
not, are in common.  
 
(i) One reason for vertical integration, as I anticipated in Section 2, is to 
reduce costs70. Upstream integration, in the example offered by Scherer-
Ross71, ‘can help ensure that supplies of raw materials will be available in time 
of shortage and protect the user from a price squeeze by monopolistic 
suppliers’72.  
 
                                            
70 Scherer and Ross, cited, p. 94. 
 
71 Scherer is an expression of the Harvard School of Economics. His studies on market 
structure, level of concentration, monopoly and behaviour of the dominant undertakings are 
fundamental to understand how the intervention on market structure may address monopoly 
and oligopoly-related competition distortions. 
 




With respect to oil production and distribution (therefore, an example of 
vertical integration through distribution network) they note that  
 
‘the major petroleum refiners are highly integrated, and control 
extensive crude oil reserves, refining facilities, the downstream 
pipelines through which  crude oil and refined products are 
transported, and in many instance networks of company-owned 
retail gasoline stations’73.  
 
From a different perspective, Chicago School’s scholar R. H. Bork argued how 
vertical integration (achieved through vertical mergers) is aimed at creating 
and enhancing efficiency, not of ‘injuring competition’74. For Bork vertical 
integration should be seen as a simple organisational tool, without anti-
competitive implications (for instance, as a tool for facilitating predation). For 
Bork, ‘the world ‘integration’ means only that administrative direction rather 
than a market transaction organises the cooperation of two or more persons 
engaged in a productive or distributive activity’75. He stresses how vertical 
integration as a consequence of a vertical merger should be seen as a way of 
cutting ‘sales and distribution costs, facilitate the flow of information between 
level of the industry, create economies of scale in management (…)’76.  
 
Bork rejects the critiques that a vertically-integrated firm may offer at a lesser 
price to its own vertically-integrated entity its own products or services. He 
argues that the cost for the firm of such a policy would be equal to the loss 
incurred for not having sold at a full price the product or service to a neutral, 
non-vertically-integrated, buyer77. 
 
The doctrine on this specific point, as I will discuss more in depth in the 
following chapters, is divided.  
                                            
73 Scherer and Ross, ibid. 
 
74 R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself. Free Press 1993 (1st edn 
Basic Books 1978), p 226. 
  
75 ibid, p 227. 
 







The economist M. H. Riordan, among others, investigated how the dominant 
firm’s cost advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher 
prices on social welfare78. This author, in particular, stresses how in the last 
decade of 20th century new attention was paid to the anticompetitive concerns 
that vertical integration may create, in particular taking examples from the 
mergers’ area of competition law. Using a paper of M. W. Klass and M. A. 
Salinger of 199579, Riordan points out that the anticompetitive effect of vertical 
integration was particularly evident in the telecommunications sector. The 
most obvious observation to support the anticompetitive effect of vertical 
integration derived from the demonstration of the ‘raising rivals’ costs’ theory 
of vertical market foreclosure80. This theory is fundamentally based in showing 
that the efficiencies in terms of costs management deriving from vertical 
integration do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects for the competitors and 
the social-welfare as a whole. 
 
These are all topics that will be developed in the following chapters, in order to 
focus the reasoning around the idea that vertical structural separation, on the 
model of vertical divestiture of assets as a remedy in merger control, or in 
commitments signed in order to address Art. 102 TFEU concerns, should not 
be a priori excluded in competition law enforcement. 
 
(ii) Another common trait to many vertically-integrated firms, in particular 
for those providing their services through a network, is the presence of 
regulation aimed at favouring the passage from monopoly to competition, a 
characteristic of the process of liberalisation of the last two decades of the 20th 
century in the European Union.  
 
                                            
78 M. H. Riordan, ‘Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm’, in (1998) vol. 88, 
no. 5, American Economic Review, 1232 ff. 
 
79 Klass, M. w. and Salinger, M. A., ‘Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound 
Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases’? (Fall 1995) vol. 40, no. 3 
Antitrust Bulletin, 667-98.  
 
80 Theory developed by S. C. Salop and D. T. Scheffman in 1993 in ‘Raising Rivals’ costs’ in 




Looking at the US experience, Scherer and Ross point out how competition in 
the electronic communications sector, but also in ‘transportation, electrical and 
gas utilities, is controlled and restrained by formal public regulations’81. They 
underline how ‘oligopoly is the predominant market structure in railroading, air 
transport, intercity bus lines, parts of water transportation, and highway freight 
carriage between less densely travelled points, while large number of firms 
operate on the high/volume trucking routes and in inland water transportation’ 
and how ‘in electricity and gas distribution and local telephone service, natural 
monopoly has been the rule, although under regulations implemented during 
the 1980s’82. 
 
If we look at the above-mentioned vertically-integrated firms, we can say that 
another key common feature is in fact the presence of a network, either 
physical (telecommunications, oil, gas or electricity generation, transmission 
and distribution) or organisational (truck distribution network, banks network, 
etc.).  
 
One of the tasks of the thesis is to look carefully at the process of regulation of 
vertically-integrated firms, irrespective of the type of service or product 
delivered to the final consumer, and to look at its successes and failures at 
European level, in order to go a step further and ask whether the competitive 
arena could benefit by more structural and invasive ex post remedies, going 
beyond the regulatory tools that the European directives have introduced in 
the last decades to favour the process of liberalisation.  
 
(iii) Another feature to analyse is the impact that structural separation can 
have in terms of ownership. The thesis question is whether focussing on the 
structure of the monopoly, such as on the vertical integration of a company, is 
possible to tackle competition distortions intervening on the ownership of the 
network though divestiture to facilitate competition. Therefore the next step is 
to look at the impact that ownership separation had in other sectors. 
 
                                            





If the structure of the company is the starting point for market power, certainly 
divestiture of the network will considerably reduce market power. The question 
is whether structural separation in the electronic communications, or in other 
comparable vertically-integrated firms, may lead to a transfer of the monopolist 
position in the separated infrastructure, simply shifting some of the problems 
(e.g. abuses such as refusal to supply, strategic under-investments) from one 
network owner to a new one; or rather to solve at least part of the problems 
(as, for instance, excessive prices, by increasing the number of competitors 





This introductory chapter first of all sets out the thesis’ question. Can we see 
structural remedies, rather than behavioural, or rather than fines, as best 
positioned to address electronic communications network access-related 
abuses of a dominant position? 
 
From a methodological point of view, I have first explained how the presence 
of a network and vertical integration of the firm are joint features. I therefore 
explained why   prohibiting vertical integration it is often considered as not 
cost-effective.  
 
Going more in depth into the analysis of vertical integration through the control 
of electronic communications network. I devoted a few sections to explaining 
how the network works in the electronic communications, before devoting 
another section to the comparison with other vertically-integrated firms 
supplying their services through the.  
 
If, on an economic and functional point of view, the comparison between 
different vertically-integrated firms is well grounded, it would be possible to 
analyse how distortion of competition as a consequence of access related 
abuses have been dealt in other vertically-integrated firms (e.g., power 
generation and distribution, gas and oil extraction and distribution, water 
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distribution, etc.) in order to apply the same remedies to the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
The analysis of the most frequent access-related abuses of a dominant 
position will be the topic of the next chapter; this will pave the way for the 
analysis of the remedies applicable, supported by empirical evidence of the 
positive or negative effects that these remedies have had in recent years at 





























     CHAPTER II 
  
‘Network-based’ abuses in the electronic communications sector and 





Chapter I provided an overview on vertical integration in the electronic 
communications sector. I focused mainly on the notion of network, defining the 
various structural levels on which networks for electronic communications 
operate.  
 
In chapter I the concept of vertical integration was analysed acknowledging 
that a relevant part of the doctrine is against the idea of vertical structural 
separation of an integrated firm.  
 
With respect to vertically-integrated firms providing electronic communications 
services, I took as an example a widely accepted model of separation, in 
which the network company and the services companies belong to the same 
group are separated as a consequence of an external intervention by the State 
(either as a regulator, or as an enforcer). Using the words of P.W.J. Bijl, this 
most obvious form of separation takes place between ‘the company owning 
the local access network, providing wholesale access (the network operator), 
and the rest of the company, providing retail services, and possibly operating 
those parts of the network that do not create problems of anticompetitive 
behaviour, such as long-distance networks (the service provider)’83. However, 
it must be borne in mind that other forms of separation are possible. These will 
discussed looking at the experience made both in the electronic 
communications sector and in other regulated sectors (electricity, gas, 
railways sector to make a few examples).  
 
                                            
83 Paul W.J. de Bijl, ‘Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets’, in 




In chapter I, I also clarified that at regulatory and competition law level the 
problems with access to the local network can be related to two forms of 
access sought by competitors who do not own their own network: 
 
a) They can have access to the network purchasing capacity from 
the incumbent and reselling is to end-users in order to offer voice 
telephony services (‘Carrier Select’ services84), or 
 
b) Their entry can be based on ‘local loop unbundling’85, deriving 
from the physical ‘separation’ of part of the local network (usually 
in highly populated, metropolitan, areas) in order to allow 
competitors to offer their services through the unbundled lines.  
 
Before discussing in the following chapters at what level and in what form 
functional and structural separation may occur in the electronic 
communications sector, in chapter I, I also briefly recalled the ‘technicalities’ of 
the local loop unbundling, identifying three different section of the network: the 
‘backbone’, the local loop and the sub-local loop. I provided fundamental 
definitions that facilitate the understanding of how and at what level structural 
separation, as the most invasive pro-competition remedy, can be implemented 
(answering the basic questions ‘why, where and how should we put in place 
the cut?’).  
 
Beyond the anticompetitive foreclosure effect of abusive conducts, I asked 
myself whether the enforcement policy should also deal with the problem of 
innovation of existing electronic communications networks. This is particularly 
relevant considering the current public policy issue, at European Union level, 
of the need for national incumbents to roll out the so-called New Generation 
Networks (NGN), and New Generation Access Networks (NGAN).  
 
                                            
84 ibid, 96. 
 




In other words, I asked myself whether, in the presence of recurrent abuses of 
dominant position carried out by the incumbents with respect to the access to 
the network, the Commission and the national enforcement authorities should 
contemplate the possibility of imposing structural separation (i.e. divestiture) 
as an enforcement remedy as per Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC. This has 
never been imposed in Europe in the electronic communications sector but 
might provide an ‘opportunity’ to address competition concerns, by removing 
the anti-competitive conducts and effects (for instance, increasing the number 
of operators within the same geographic market) as a measure that might 
favour the required investments to innovate the network.  
 
To answer the two sub-questions (‘if’ and ‘when’), I will look at the traditional 
forms of abuse of a dominant position in the electronic communications sector, 
such as excessive pricing, predatory pricing, margin squeeze in the provision 
of wholesale access services, direct refusal to supply. I will also look at their 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects, focusing on the problem of under-
investments on local and sub-local loops, as a form of indirect refusal to 
supply. 
 
The answer to question (i) (can a structural remedy be suitable to remove  
competition law concerns?) is more likely to be given by looking at the 
deterrent effect that the threat of structural separation may determine; while 
the answer to question (ii) (in the presence of what type of abuses and 
anticompetitive effects should a structural remedy be imposed?) is much more 
difficult, due to very limited case-law, mostly deriving from commitments 
decisions adopted in the last few years in the electricity and gas generation 
and transmission. The choice of the best remedy (imposition of pecuniary 
fines; imposition of specific behaviours, with functional or even structural 
effects; or divestiture tout-court) is usually made on a case-by-case basis, 
balancing (i) competition law concerns with (ii) the economic cost (and 
opportunity) that the measure may entail. 
 
As I will discuss later in the thesis, the high costs of a structural separation 
usually lead the enforcer to opt for more traditional sanctions (for instance, 
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pecuniary fines). However I will argue that the perspective of imposing a 
structural remedy might represent a serious threat that may favour the 
adoption of less invasive remedies (for example, the alleged abuser may 
decide to propose undertakings such as that of putting in place functional 
separation of its own network), adopting a measure under the supervision of 
the regulator, as per Directive 2009/140/EC. However, the possibility of 
adopting structural remedies may also dissuade other abusers at EU level. 
The analogy with the existing case-law in the energy sector (under the form of 
commitments as per Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003/EC), discussed in chapter 
V, may help to reach univocal conclusions. In that chapter I will look at abuses 
put in place in the electricity generation and transmission markets, and in the 
gas transmission market, with a particular focus on the anti-competitive effects 
that such conducts have.  
 
If the analogy on the foreclosure effects that the abuses in different vertically-
integrated industries (energy and electronic communications) is well grounded, 
it might be possible to argue that   structural separation should have the same 
procompetitive effect of increasing the number of competitors enhancing 
competition in the long-run, outweighing the cost/opportunity concerns of the 
enforcer. 
 
After some preliminary remarks on the notion of ‘incumbent’ in the electronic 
communications sector (Section A), I will discuss in Section B how the legal 
definition of ‘dominance’ must also take into consideration ‘structural criteria’.  
 
In Section C I will go through the main forms of abusive conducts with a focus 
on the electronic communications sector. I will keep the distinction between 
‘exploitative’ and ‘exclusionary’ abusive conducts, according to the most 
consolidated literature, and I will look at their most common anticompetitive 
effects.  
 
The study of the main cases of refusal to supply is aimed at identifying the 
common traits of the European Commission practice and of the European 
Courts in cases such as Oscar Bronner and Magill, showing how the adoption 
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by the European Commission of the 2008 Guidance on the prioritisation of the 
enforcement of Art. 102 TFEU exclusionary conducts with its references to 
economic efficiency and to the ‘consumer welfare imperative’ does not exclude 
that competition among competitors remains a vital target of European 
competition policy, in line with the Ordo-Liberal tradition.  
 
Under the heading ‘exclusionary conducts’ will focus on the origin and the 
evolution of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine. I will examine cases that do not 
come directly from the electronic communications sector, but that both in the 
US and in the EU paved the way for tackling margin squeeze and refusal to 
supply as two of the main abuses that a vertically-integrated undertaking may 
put in place having direct control over the so-called ‘bottle-neck’. I will then 
recall two recent cases of margin squeeze, Deutsche Telekom86 and 
Telefónica87, focusing on their anticompetitive foreclosure effects and on the 
very clear position taken by the Commission and by the European Courts on 
the room of manoeuvre that the Commission has in adopting remedies aimed 
at full enforcing competition law, and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in particular, 
even in the presence of ex-ante regulatory remedies that have evidently 
shown their inadequacy in creating the conditions of perfect competition. 
 
In terms of foreclosure effects, the analogy with the energy sector will be self-
explanatory. It is in the energy sector that the European Commission as an 
enforcer has favoured the adoption of structural remedies in consideration of 
the particularly negative impact not only on competitors’ performance, but also 
on consumer welfare as a whole, even though, as I will discuss, such 
remedies were object of Art. 9 of Reg.1/2003/EC commitments, more than 
remedies imposed as per Art. 7 of the same regulation. 
 
                                            
86 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
87Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55.On appeal at the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see recent 
opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 2013).  
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This chapter paves the way for the analysis, in chapter III of various regulatory 
and competition-law enforcement remedies that at European and US level 
have been adopted in the last decades to deal with network-related abuses of 
dominant position.  
 
 
2.2. The incumbent in the electronic communications sector and forms 
of abuse of a dominant position.  
 
Before analysing the forms of abusive conducts I need to define the economic 
entity which will be subject to regulation, on the one hand, and to competition 
enforcement, on the other. In other words, I must identify and define the 
‘incumbent’ in regulatory terms and the ‘dominant undertaking’, in 
‘enforcement’ terms.  
 
The word ‘incumbent’ is borrowed from the regulatory world and usually refers 
to State-owned utilities operator. The notion of incumbent is therefore common 
to the so-called natural monopolies (providing water distribution services, gas 
transmission and distribution services, electricity generation and transmission 
services, railways and postal services). Looking at the wording from a 
competition law perspective, the notion of ‘dominant undertaking’ cannot be 
separated from the concept of dominance, as that subjective condition that 
allows the firm to behave independently of its competitors, customers and final 
users88. 
 
The subjective characteristics of the author of the abuse cannot be separated 
from the conduct itself. Its position of dominance has to be taken into 
consideration to analyse its performance as a whole.  
 
Since the 1930s the Harvard School of Economics has been focusing on the 
importance of market structure and on the level of concentration (and of 
                                            
88 As I will stress later, the concept of dominance will be fundamental to identify when an 
undertaking has ‘significant market power’ (also shortened in ‘SMP’), definition introduced by 
the Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 




integration in a specific economic sector) before dealing with the enforcement 
of the anticompetitive conducts. Anticipating the topic of chapter III of the 
thesis, I can recall here the theoretical reconstruction made by Professor E.S. 
Mason of Harvard University who, in his seminal work ‘Price and Production 
Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise’89 discussed how the dimension and the 
level of concentration of the dominant undertakings, through their conduct, 
ultimately influence general economic performance. 
 
Scherer and Ross90, in line with the teaching of Mason, stress how market 
structure, conduct and performance are strictly related, and how it would be 
impossible to achieve an optimal economic outcome (product and allocative 
efficiency, progress, full employment and equity) without first solving the 
problem of market structure (i.e. number of sellers and buyers, product 
differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structure, vertical integration, 
diversification)91. 
 
For these authors, a high level of the concentration of a specific industrial 
sector, high or very high market shares, may lead to ‘conducts’ (pricing 
behaviour, product strategy and advertising, research and innovation, plant 
investment, legal tactics) that need the intervention of the State in order to 
keep the enterprise in the ‘river bed’, through its statutory tools (i.e. regulatory 
tools, antitrust enforcement, price controls, taxes and subsidies, etc.)92.  
 
Other authors, in particular those influenced by the Chicago School of 
Economics, put in doubt the relevance of this paradigm and, in particular, the 
importance of the endogenous factors (basic structure and market structure). 
This simplification (we must look at the subjective structure of the dominant 
                                            
89 E.S. Mason ‘Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise’ (1939) 29 American 
Economic Review 61-74, but see also, of the same author, ‘The Current State of the Monopoly 
Problem in the United States’ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 1265-1285. 
 
90 F. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), pp 4ff. 
 
91 ibid, p 6. 
 




undertaking, or rather at its economic performance as a whole?) helps clarify 
the terms and boundaries of the debate. As I will show, (i) incumbent, with its 
high market shares, (ii) its conduct, in competition law terms, (iii) the impact on 
the overall economic performance and the anticompetitive foreclosure effect 
as categorised by the Guidance on the Prioritisation of the enforcement 
activity vis á vis exclusionary conducts, and (iv) when and how the ‘controller’ 
may be called to intervene (not only on the conduct, but also on the firm’s 
structure), altogether form not only the ‘hat rack’ of any regulatory or 
competition law initiative93, but also the steps that will lead us to the conclusion 
on the choice of the most suitable enforcement remedy. 
 
Yet other authors, with a background in law and economics, define dominant 
undertakings as those enterprises able to raise prices ‘above the competitive 
level without attracting new entrants and without losing sales to competitors so 
rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded as 
substantial (or significant) market power (SMP)’94. In fact, Section 2 of the US 
Sherman Act considers as dominant a firm that has the power to control prices 
or that can exclude competition (through ‘monopolisation’ or ‘attempt to 
monopolise’)95. However, all these definitions of dominant undertaking are still 
not in line with the EU law definition.  
 
The EU position is much more focused on the direct relationship of the 
dominant undertaking with its competitors and third parties (the consumers) 
than by the subjective characteristics of the firm. If competitors or consumers 
have an alternative to the product or service of the dominant undertaking, the 
impact of the abusive behaviours of the dominant firm is drastically contained. 
An undertaking will be considered dominant only if ‘its conduct is not 
                                            
93 F. Scherer and D. Ross, ibid, p 6. 
 
94A. Jones – B. Sufrin, cited, 4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011, p 285 ff. The authors 
recall W. Landes and R. Posner ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’ (1980-81) 94 Harvard Law 
Review 937.  
 
 95Jones-Sufrin recall US fundamental case-law to define dominant firm: Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911); United States v. E I du Pont de Nemours & 




constrained96 by the existence of competitors producing competing products 
and services so that it is able to raise prices and reduce inputs’97. 
 
In line with this premise, in EU competition law, dominance was defined by the 
practice of the European Courts (paraphrasing fundamental judgments that I 
will examine in the next section) as that position of ‘economic strength’ which 
enables an undertaking to (i) prevent effective competition (ii) by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently98 of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers. 
 
 
2.3. Dominance and its ‘legal’ definition. The importance of structural 
criteria. 
  
There is no definition of dominant position within the Treaty establishing the 
European Communities (as well as in the subsequent versions of it), even 
though the author of the abuse must be necessarily dominant to be ‘captured’ 
under Article 102 TFEU. 
 
The approach to the correct definition of ‘dominant position’ is twofold. On the 
one hand, the Commission decisional practice, some pieces of ‘soft law’ (such 
as the DG COMP’s Discussion Paper on Art. 10299 and the Guidance on the 
prioritisation of the application of Art. 102 100), as well as the jurisprudence of 
the European Courts, play altogether a fundamental role in defining the 
                                            
96 Emphasis added. 
 
97 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited, p 286. 
 
98 Emphasis added.  
 
99 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses–Public Consultation, Brussels, December 2005, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf (hereinafter, 
‘Discussion Paper’). The 107 replies to the public consultation are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/article_82_contributions.hml. 
 
100 Communication from the Commission ‘Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 




concept of dominance within the framework of Art. 102101. On the other hand, 
the doctrine and the scientific literature also contribute to define this concept. 
  
A definition of the dominant position can be extracted from several judgments 
of the ECJ defining dominance as that position of economic strength which 
allows a company ‘to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of final consumers’102. 
 
More than ten years after the 1997 Commission’s notice on the definition of 
the relevant market103 the Discussion Paper and the Guidance Paper provided 
new interpretative tools to establish the existence of a dominant position with 
respect to a specific market.  
 
The Discussion Paper stressed how for European case law ‘dominance is a 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers’104, recalling the 
‘pillars’ on dominance theorisation provided by the cases Michelin I, Centre 
Belge d’Etudes de Marché–Télémarketing, United Brands or Hoffmann-La 
Roche (‘Vitamins’)105. In fact the Discussion Paper underlines that such a 
                                            
 
101 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 
179ff. 
 
102 See Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin NV v Commission of the 
European Communities [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282, [1985] FSR 250, para 30; 
Case 311/84 Centre Belge d’Etudes de Marché–Télémarketing (CBEM) SA v. Compagnie 
Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion SA (CLT) [1985] ECR 3261, [1986] 2 CMLR 558, para 16; 
Case 27/76 United Brands Co. v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, para 65; 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission (‘Vitamins’) [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 
3 CMLR 211, [1980] FSR 13, paras 38-39. 
 
103 European Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes 
of [EU] Competition Law [1997] OJ C372/5, para 2. 
 
104 Discussion Paper, cited, para 22. 
 
105 The case law recalled ranges from Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin 
v Commission (Michelin I), to Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1993] 
ECR II-755, from Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia v Commission [1998] ECR II-2937, to Case T-
228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969 and Case T-203/01 Nederlandsche 
Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) [2003] ECR II-4071 
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definition of dominance is threefold: (i) the economic strength in a particular 
market; (ii) which prevents effective competition being maintained on that 
market by (iii) affording it the power to behave independently to an appreciable 
extent106. 
 
The Guidance Paper places a special focus on the concept of market power 
as a synonym of dominance. In particular it recalls one of the main 
conclusions of the case law: to hold a dominant position ‘confers a special 
responsibility on the firm concerned, the scope of which must be considered in 
the light of the specific circumstances of each case’107. It goes beyond the 
traditional approach, by stressing how three further factors shall be taken into 
account to define the ‘competitive structure’ of the market: (i) the constraints 
imposed by the existing supplies from, and the position on the market of, 
actual competitors (the market position of the dominant undertaking and its 
competitors); (ii) the constraints imposed by the credible threat of future 
expansion by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors (expansion 
and entry); (iii) the constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the 
undertaking’s customers (countervailing market power). However, even 
considering the importance of these further factors, in reality the Discussion 
Paper and the Guidance Paper confirm the crucial role of the European Courts 
jurisprudence to define dominance.  
 
In their reasoning and in their wording, they recall United Brands108 with its 
consolidated definition of dominance as that ‘[…] position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately 
of its consumers’.  
                                            
 
106 Discussion Paper, cited, para 21. 
 
107 Guidance Paper [2009] OJ C45/7, cited, para 9. 
 
108 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, cited above. As known, 
this definition for a few years (1976-1981) became the benchmark in many subsequent 
applications of Article 102 TFEU, and is today considered ‘genetically’ part of the same 




The ECJ’s definition of dominance specifies that a dominant undertaking must 
be able to act independently ‘to an appreciable extent’ and to hinder the 
maintenance of ‘effective competition’. It is clear that not all competition has to 
be eliminated for an undertaking to be in a dominant position109. 
 
When the market share level and ‘dependence’ criteria are not sufficient to 
determine the dominance of the undertaking alleged to abuse its position, the 
ECJ and the European Commission use additional structural criteria to 
establish if an undertaking is in a dominant position. Some of these criteria are 
considered fundamental and include: 
 
 vertical integration between enterprises; 
 rigid and strict production quality control; 
 technological lead over competitors; 
 strong brand name due to large-scale advertising campaigns; 
 highly developed sales network; 
 absence of potential competition; 
 presence of the undertaking on a wide range of markets; 
 advanced position of the undertaking in the market, and 
 the firm’s financial (‘deep pockets’) and technological resources110. 
 
Looking at economic-efficiency oriented schools of economics such as the 
Chicago School, the only real barrier to entry can be considered efficiency, in 
                                            
109 Ibid, paras 113-117. 
 
110 See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (3rd edn, 2008), pp 342ff. These authors point out that 
‘[t]he superior technology of an undertaking has often been found to be a factor indicating 
dominance. This can be seen from the extracts set out from United Brands, Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Michelin, Eurofix-Bauco (Hilti) and Tetra Pak. It is, however, questionable from an 
economic point of view to hold that an undertaking’s technological superiority operates as a 
barrier to entry per se. It is true that expenditure on technological development can be a sunk 
cost of entry but it is also true that a new entrant on to the market may not have to spend the 
same resources on research and development as the incumbent on the market: there is no 
need to reinvent the wheel’. On the same point see V. Korah ‘Concept of a Dominant Position 
Within The Meaning of Art. 86’ (1980) 17 Common Market Law Review 395, 408 and 410; D. 
Harbord and T. Hoen ‘Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Commission Policy’ (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics 411 and 419; C. Baden Fuller ‘Article 86 EEC: 
Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Dominant Position’ (1979) 4 European Law Review 




particular where an undertaking is progressively excluded from the market by 
consumer’s choice, with no need for authoritative intervention or other 
exogenous factors111.  
 
The European Courts and the Commission have kept a more formalistic 
approach, and defined in a number of judgments and decisions the concept of 
dominant position using the market shares test rather than a more volatile 
concept of dominance based on the efficiency of the investigated company112. 
This formalistic approach has attracted severe criticism towards European 
institutions for having underestimated the economic approach in assessing 
dominance, and for having left apart the concept of market power113. In fact, 
market shares taken per se, without further economic analysis (for instance to 
assess the weight of existing or potential barriers to entry) in some occasions 
may have led to wrong conclusions114.  
 
The Discussion Paper and Guidance Paper shed new light on barriers to entry 
as an important factor to argue that an undertaking is in a dominant position. 
The Guidance Paper115 is clear in showing that barriers to entry, such as 
technological superiority or the possibility of leveraging control over the 
network in order to exclude potential competitors, can be easily taken into 
consideration to establish dominance. At the same time the Guidance Paper 
                                            
111 On the point see also R.H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A policy at war with itself (2nd edn, 
The Free Press Paperbacks, 1993), pp 195-196. It is worth quoting: ‘[…] If everything that 
makes entry more difficult is viewed as a barrier, and if barriers are bad, then efficiency is an 
evil. That conclusion is inconsistent with consumer-oriented policy. What must be proved to 
exist, therefore, is a class of barriers that do not reflect superior efficiency and can be erected 
by firms to inhibit rivals’.  
 
112 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (2nd edn, 2004), p 338. In particular they write ‘Neither the 
Court not the Commission appears to have any particular school of economic thought, and 
they certainly do not adhere to the Chicago view […]’. 
 
113 The European Commission since its creation followed the so-called ‘Ordo-Liberal’ 
approach, more based on the need of granting the survival (or, at least, the co-presence) of 
the largest number of companies within the European ‘common market’, than the prevalence 
of one company over the competitors.  
114 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (4th edn, 2011), p 326: ‘[…]The Court has placed great 
reliance on market shares although […] economic theory holds that in the absence of barriers 
to entry high market shares are not themselves indicative of dominance’.  
 




says that the entry of potential new competitors must be ‘likely, timely and 
significant’ to represent a serious limit to the position of the dominant 
undertaking116. 
 
The first lines of paragraph 17 of the Guidance Paper list the forms that 
barriers to entry can take: 
 
‘They may be legal barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, or they may 
take the form of advantages specifically enjoyed by the dominant 
undertaking, such as economies of scale and scope, privileged 
access to essential inputs or natural resources, important 
technologies or an established distribution or sales network. They 
may also include costs and other impediments, for instance 
resulting from network effects, faced by customers in switching to 
a new supplier. The dominant undertaking’s own conduct may also 
create barriers to entry, for example where it has made 
significant investments which entrants or competitors would 
have to match117, or where it has concluded long-term contracts 
with its customers that have appreciable foreclosing effects. 
Persistently high market shares may be indicative of the existence 
of barriers to entry and expansion’118.  
 
 
If we can draw well-grounded analogies between network-related abuses put 
in place by different vertically-integrated firms, basing the comparison on the 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects that the abuses have, it might be possible 
to argue that in certain conditions the initiatives adopted by the competition 
authorities with respect to the subjects of the abuses in similar situations (for 
instance in the electricity generation or gas distribution) can be replicated in 
the electronic communications sector.  
 
The analysis will focus not only on the demonstration of the positive effects 
that actual structural initiatives have had with respect to comparable vertically-
                                            
116 ibid, para 16. 
 
117 Emphasis added. 
  




integrated firms, but also with the deterrence effect that the threat of similar 
remedies may have, for instance with the aim of negotiating and implementing 
less invasive form of intervention (for instance, functional separation).  
 
 
2.4. Abuse of dominance and typologies of abuses in vertically 
integrated industries (in particular, exploitation and exclusion). 
 
In the previous sections I detailed the fundamental features of dominance and 
the ‘criteria’ usually applied in order to establish whether an undertaking can 
be considered dominant or not, showing how the legal definition (degree of 
‘independence’) or economic measurement (level of the ‘market share’) of 
dominant position should also take into consideration the existence of 
structural factors.  
 
These preliminary remarks allow us to tackle in more depth the various forms 
of abuse, making explicit reference, when possible, to conducts carried out by 
vertically- integrated companies in the electronic communications sector.  
 
The Guidance Paper, with the purpose of ‘reshaping’ the priorities of 
intervention of the Commission, seems to suggest that Art. 102 TFEU should 
be first of all applied when an abusive conduct has a direct impact on 
consumer welfare, in line with the ‘effect based’ approach derived from the 
Chicago School of economics. 
 
Both the Discussion Paper and Guidance Paper identify consumer welfare as 
one of the key objectives that must be taken into consideration when the 
Commission has to decide whether to intervene in the presence of an alleged 
abuse of dominant position or not. Quite apart from the doctrinal discussion 
whether the Guidance Paper, as a form of ‘soft law’, may tackle such a crucial 
and substantial aspect as the ‘consumer protection’ issue (putting it on a 
higher level with respect to the traditional target of ensuring competition 
among undertakings, in line with the principles of the Ordo-Liberal school), it is 
evident that the past decade has inaugurated a new frontier for the 
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intervention of the Commission in those cases that may not only hamper pure 
competition among undertakings, but also restrict the opportunities for  final 
consumers119.  
 
The doctrine defines consumer welfare as ‘the difference between the price a 
consumer is willing to pay and the price he actually pays for a good or 
service’120. This definition is encapsulated in the Discussion Paper where it 
says ‘with regard to exclusionary abuses the objective of Article 82 is the 
protection of competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources’121. 
 
With different wording, omitting the reference to the efficient allocation of 
resources, the Guidance Paper states 
 
‘the aim of the Commission’s enforcement activity in relation to 
exclusionary conduct is to ensure that dominant undertakings do 
not impair effective competition by foreclosing their rivals in an 
anticompetitive way and thus having an adverse impact on 
consumer welfare’122. 
 
Even though there is no clear definition of consumer welfare, both the 
Discussion and the Guidance Paper identify it through the impact and the 
                                            
119 See L.L. Gormsen, cited, p 158. She says ‘[t]here is a difference between (i) adopting 
priority guidelines stating that the Commission will focus its limited resources on cases where 
it believes consumers are harmed, and (ii) issuing substantive guidelines stating that the 
objective of Article 82 is consumer welfare if this is not supported in case law’. She recalls the 
position taken by Advocate General Kokott a few months after the release of the Discussion 
Paper in the British Airways case. She said ‘even if [the Commission’s] administrative practice 
were to change, the Commission would still have to act within the framework prescribed for it 
by Article 82 EC as interpreted by the Court of Justice’. In other words, the practice of the 
European Courts is what really matter when deciding if the Court shall intervene or not. 
 
120 H. Hovenkamp ‘Legislation, Well Being and Public Choice’ (1990) 57 University of Chicago 
Law Review 63 and 72. See also the contribution of O. Dayagi-Epstein in Article 82 EC: 
reflections on its recent evolution, edited by A. Ezrachi (Hart Publishing, 2009), ch 4, ‘The 
Evolution of the Notion of Consumer Interest in Light of the Modernisation of Article 82 EC’, pp 
74ff. 
 
121 Discussion Paper, cited, para 4. 
 




effects that the abusive conducts may have on prices, quality, consumer 
choice, innovation and growth123.  
 
What is really crucial for our purposes is that after the review on the 
application of Art. 102 TFEU, there is now a more clear perception of the 
impact that abusive conduct may have on consumers (in the two forms of 
intermediate consumers acting also as competitors, and of final consumers), 
reaching a higher level of awareness of the ultimate anticompetitive 
foreclosure impact that certain types of conducts (exclusionary, in particular) 
may have in terms of consumer welfare124. 
 
This is not the place to predict how the European Commission and the 
national competition authorities will enforce effective competition in the future. 
The European Courts are not bound by these pieces of soft-law, as they have 
shown in the last years having continued to apply competition law in line with 
their own precedent formalistic approach125. However, bearing in mind this 
new awareness of the ultimate effects of abusive exclusionary conducts on 
final consumers, I can now recall the main forms of abuse focusing, for our 
purposes, on those conducts that are likely to be carried out by vertically-
integrated undertakings.  
 
What is important to point out is that the competition authorities may be 
tempted to impose punitive measures aimed at addressing consumer welfare 
concerns or pro-competitors measures with an eye to a short-run impact, while 
omitting to adopt, or threaten to adopt, more radical measures such as 
structural separation. A large part of the doctrine, at least in the electronic 
                                            
123 As correctly points out O. Dayagi Epstein, cited, p 77. 
 
124 Ibid, p 86. 
 
125 See, in particular, the Case British Airways, in which the ECJ followed the settled principles 
deriving from the Continental Can jurisprudence: the practice that may harm the competitive 
structure of the market shall be punished per se, and there is no need of showing harm to 
consumers (case C-95/04 P British Airways [2007] ECR I-2331, [2007] 4 CMLR 982). Another 
case that will be analysed more in depth ultra is Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA (formerly 
Wanadoo Interactive SA) v Commission, [2007] ECR II-107, where the predatory pricing 
practice was considered illegal despite the demonstration that in the short run the pricing 




communications sector, still considers structural separation as detrimental for 
the incumbent in the short run, but looking at recent case-law with respect to 
other vertically-integrated firms in the energy sector, more draconian remedies 
may remove the anti-competitive foreclosure effects, with a particularly 




(i) Excessive pricing. 
 
Before analysing the most complex forms of price-related abuses, it is worth 
starting with excessive pricing as the most obvious form of exploitative abuse, 
though often difficult to prove. 
 
It is tackled by an express provision of Art. 102 TFEU that, at paragraph 2, 
point (a), establishes that an abuse may consist in ‘directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’. 
 
As I will discuss in the following chapter, with the aim of limiting the power of 
the undertakings providing in a monopolistic position services to public 
otherwise defined as ‘public utilities’, pricing policy is at the heart of any 
regulatory ex ante activity. To take an example, as stated by the Commission 
in the Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, ‘excessive pricing for access, 
as well as being abusive in itself, may also amount to an effective refusal to 
grant access’126. 
 
Article 102.2(a) TFEU is based on the assumption that a dominant 
undertaking, acting independently from its customers and its competitors, will 
try to fix the price of its goods and services at the highest level in order to 
maximise its profits. 
 
                                            
126 Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the 




Excessive, or simply high or very high, prices may simply be an index of 
scarcity or of technical excellence. Prices may be high and still remain fair. 
Intervention by the competition authorities without solid evidence of an abusive 
conduct or abusive aim might turn into a boomerang; competition authorities 
are not supposed to act as ‘price regulators’. As stated in the European 
Commission’s 1994 Competition Report, adopted in the middle of the 
liberalisation process of public utilities,  
 
‘The existence of a dominant position is not itself against the rules 
of competition. Consumers can suffer from a dominant company 
exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices 
higher than would be found if the market were subject to effective 
competition. However the Commission in its decision-making 
practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of 
prices as such127. Rather it examines the behaviour of the 
dominant company designed to preserve its dominance, usually 
directed against competitors or new entrants who would normally 
bring about effective competition and the price level associated 
with it’ 128. 
 
The approach of the European Commission and of the ECJ vis à vis the 
excessive prices practice is best described by the case Scandlines Sverige AB 
v Port of Helsingborg129 of 2004. It was the first time that a case focused not 
only on the direct relation price/cost, as derived from the United Brands130 
precedent, but also on the unfairness of the (excessive) price.  
 
                                            
127 Emphasis added. 
 
128 XXIV Report on Competition Policy (Commission, 1994), Brussels-Luxembourg, 1995 
(available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-
Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=CM9095283), para 207. 
 
129 Commission Decision Scandlines Sverige v. Port of Helsingborg (Case COMP/36.568), 
[2006] 4 CMLR 1298 (also available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36568/36568_44_4.pdf). 
 
130 Commission decision United Brands [1976] OJ L 95/1, [1976] 1 CMLR D28, section II, 
letter A, point 3, letter c). In this case the Commission concluded that ‘[…] United Brands’ 
prices are excessive in relation to the economic value of the product supplied. This is 
confirmed by the substantial difference of 30 to 40 per cent between the prices of unbranded 
bananas sold by UBC and those sold under the Chiquita brand, although the quality of 




Scandlines Sverige v. Port of Helsingborg is a decision dealing with the 
excessive prices charged by the Port Authority at Helsingborg in Sweden to 
the operators operating between that harbour and Elsinore in Denmark. In line 
with the United Brands case131, the Commission had to ascertain  
 
‘Whether the difference between the costs actually incurred and the 
price actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this 
question is in the affirmative, to consider whether a price has been 
charged which is either unfair in itself or when compared to other 
competing products’132. 
 
The Commission could not rely exclusively on ascertaining that the final price 
was just above the costs. Other non-cost related factors had to be taken into 
account. Paragraph 171 of the Commission decision Scandlines Sverige v 
Port of Helsingborg confirms that the reference to the prices of competing 
products is crucial to determine the unfairness of the price 
 
‘According to case law and the decisional practice of the 
Commission, the contested price may however be compared to (i) 
other prices charged by the dominant company on a market 
different from the relevant market or (ii) prices charged by other 
firms providing similar products/services on other relevant 
markets’133. 
 
However this decision also points out that before establishing the unfairness of 
the price, the effective value of the goods or services must be considered and 
calculated with respect to their cost, in order to determine whether the price is 
or not excessive. At the same, the decision refers that the decision United 
Brands did not provide evidence to determine the real ‘economic value’ of the 
goods or services provided134.  
 
                                            
131 Ibid, para 252.  
 
132 R. Whish - D. Bailey, cited (7th edn, 2012), p 722. 
 
133 Commission decision Scandlines Sverige v. Port of Helsingborg, para 171. 
 





‘[…] even if we were to assume that there is a positive difference 
between the price and the production costs exceeding what [the 
company] Scandlines claims as being a reasonable margin 
(whatever that may be), the conclusion should not necessarily be 
drawn that the price is unfair, provided that this price has a 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product/service 
supplied. The assessment of the reasonable relation between the 
price and the economic value of the product/service must also 
take into account the relative weight of non-cost related 
factors’135.  
 
Such a reasoning led the Commission to conclude that 
 
‘As a consequence, finding a positive difference between the price 
and the approximate production costs exceeding what Scandlines 
claims as being a reasonable margin, would not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that the price is unfair, provided that this price 
has a reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product/services supplied’136. 
 
Unfairness (in competition law terms) reveals itself to be a crucial factor also in 
assessing other forms of abusive behaviours, particularly in the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
For instance, in the margin-squeeze abusive conduct, even in the presence of 
a regulatory-imposed price cap, the incumbent may operate unfairly, and force 
competitors to leave the market, as I will discuss with respect to the Deutsche 
Telekom case137 analysed more in depth later in this chapter (alongside with 
                                            
135 Ibid, para 228. Emphasis added. Concept further stressed in the conclusion of the decision 
(para 232): […]. The economic value must be determined with regards to the particular 
circumstances of the case and take into account also non-cost related factors such as the 
demand for the product/service’.  
136 Ibid, para 233 (emphasis added). See also the conclusions by the United Kingdom 
Competition Appeal Tribunal in the Case Attheraces Ltd v. The British Horseracing Board Ltd, 
[2005] EWHC 3015, [2005] UKCLR 757. 
 
137 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 





the case Telefónica138), where the unfairness of prices (irrespective of the role 
played by the sector regulators in setting those prices) is the central point of 
the decision. 
 
Excessive, or unfair, pricing conduct in the electronic communications sector 
has been primarily dealt with regulatory tools. The imposition of a price-cap 
represents one of the first ways of preventing this form of abuse.  
 
Account separation represents a further regulatory step, first recommended, 
then imposed by the most recent pieces of legislation not only in the electronic 
communications industry, but more generally in any vertically-integrated 
industries in which competitors seek access to the incumbent’s downstream 
network. 
 
Chapter III focuses on functional separation of the ‘access division’ from the 
other divisions of the incumbent in the electronic communications sector. This 
is now considered to be one of the most advanced regulatory tools aimed at 
preventing this form of abuse (as well as any other access-related abusive 
practices). 
 
Here comes back the thesis’ question: whether in the presence of excessive 
and unfair prices the competition authorities, beyond the regulatory 
(unsuccessful) intervention, may go beyond functional separation, imposing 
(or threatening to impose) structural separation or, rather, whether structural 
remedies can be justified only in specific circumstances, such as in the 
presence of exclusionary conducts with vertical foreclosing effects.  
 
The answer is twofold. Not only on the basis of the most recent decisions and 
judgments of the European Courts in the cases Deutsche Telekom and 
Telefónica, it is now clear that the enforcement authorities can go beyond the 
‘intervention’ of the regulatory authorities (in setting prices, but also in 
accepting functional separation as a remedy to enhance competition) if the 
                                            
138 Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6; Case T-336/07 Telefónica. At present on appeal at the Court 
of Justice, Case C-295/12. 
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‘remedies’ appear to be insufficient to grant a level playing field of competition 
and if the incumbent is still able to put in place an abuse; but also carrying out 
a comparative analysis of very recent Art. 102-based case-law regarding 
commitments decisions in the energy sector (the mentioned cases E.ON, 
RWE and ENI that will discussed in chapter V), it is now clear that structural 
remedies can be imposed in the presence of vertical foreclosure effects.  
 
Unfairly excessive pricing is often combined with price discrimination, which is 
the subject of the next sub-section. 
 
 
(ii) Price discrimination. 
 
Article 102, para 2, let. c), TFEU provides that an abuse may consist in ‘[…] 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’139. This form of 
discrimination can be enacted by charging different prices for goods and 
services of the same quality and quantity in the same geographical market, 
where these differences are not justified by reasons of production, transport or 
means of offer to the public. Also for this form of abuse the above-mentioned 
Commission’s decision United Brands140 is considered a leading case.  
 
The prohibition of charging prices in a discriminatory manner pursuant to 
Article 102 TFEU can be also considered an application of the European Law 
principles of ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘equality of treatment’ in the pursuit of 
economic activities, as per Title IV, Free movement of persons, services and 
capital (Part III, Union policies and internal actions) of the TFEU141. 
 
                                            
139 Treaty of Lisbon, [2007] OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
 
140 United Brands [1976] OJ L 95/1, [1976] 1 CMLR D28. 
 
141 The problem of EU law principles underpinning the application of Art. 102 TFEU is tackled 
in depth by R. Nazzini. See in particular, cited, ch 4 (pt B, s 3, sub s b) ‘Internal market and 




The principle of non-discrimination is one of the key concepts on which the 
European directives on electronic communications were modelled since the 
beginning of the process of liberalisation, in particular with respect to the 
access to networks 
 
Article 10 of the ‘Access Directive’142 stresses that ‘a national regulatory 
authority may, in accordance with the provision of Article 8, impose obligations 
of non-discrimination, in relation to interconnection and/or access’143.  
 
More recently, Directive 2009/140/EC144 amending, among others, the Access 
Directive 2002, recalls the principle of non-discrimination in various parts of 
the preamble, for instance with respect to the introduction of technology and 
service neutrality145; to the negotiation of terms and conditions of access to the 
networks with pricing arrangements that may depend on volumes or length, 
provided that they are non-discriminatory146; to the role of functional 
separation with the specific objective of reducing the margin for discrimination 
to third parties seeking access to the incumbent’s network147). 
 
In this respect, on the one hand the NRAs play a crucial role in determining 
whether and how electronic communications networks’ owners interact with 
their competitors, being obliged to keep fair and non-discriminatory access 
conditions. However, even in the presence and in full observance of access 
rates established by the NRA, the competition law enforcement authorities (at 
                                            
142 Dir. 2002/19/EC [2002] OJ L108/7. 
 
143 Second part of Article 10 of Dir. 2002/19/EC [2002] OJ L108/7 states: ‘Obligations of non-
discrimination shall ensure, in particular, that the operator applies equivalent conditions in 
equivalent circumstances to other undertakings providing equivalent services, and provides 
services and information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as it 
provides for its own services, or those of it subsidiaries or partners’. 
 
144 Dir. 2009/140/EC [2009] OJ L337/37. 
 
145 ibid, recital 40. Principles recalled also by M. Monti in his work ‘A New Strategy for the 
Single Market’, cited, n 1, with respect to the importance of network and technological 
neutrality.  
 
146 Ibid, recital 55. 
 




national and at EU level) may find that the conditions imposed on competitors, 
for instance in the negotiation of network access agreements or in buying 
bandwidth from the incumbent, may have been discriminatory148. This 
particular form of discrimination will be analysed in more detail below along 
with the exclusionary conducts, under the category of the ‘margin squeeze’ 




(iii) Predatory pricing. 
 
Another form of abuse of dominant position in electronic communications and, 
more generally, in vertically-integrated industries, through pricing practices 
consists in charging goods or services at prices below cost, for the time 
necessary to discourage competitors to enter the market or simply to force 
them to leave it.  
 
Within the electronic communications sector, the Commission has determined 
that predatory pricing practices in the network access market exists in those 
cases where the incumbent charges rates of interconnection to its own 
subsidiaries below cost, so that its competitors are forced to leave the market. 
The Wanadoo case149, decided by the European Commission in 2003, is one 
of the most interesting applicable cases of predatory pricing affecting the new 
economy market in the last decade.  
 
                                            
148 See below the analysis of the Commission decision Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ 
L263/9 and the judicial review of the decision by the General Court and the ECJ, with respect 
to abusive conducts of ‘margin squeeze’ carried out by Deutsche Telekom even in presence of 
prices established by the German sector regulator. 
 
149 Commission decision Wanadoo Interactive (France Télécom) (Case COMP/38.2333)  of 16 
July 2003, [2005] 5 CMLR 120, IP/03/1025. See also R. Klotz and J. Fehrenbach ‘The 
Wanadoo Interactive case’ (2003) Competition Policy Newsletter no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 10. 
The case was upheld by the General Court in 2007: Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA v 
Commission of the European Commission, [2007] ECR II-107, FT’s appeal was dismissed in 




In this case, in particular, the Commission found that Wanadoo (a 72% owned 
subsidiary of France Télécom, hereinafter ‘FT’, specialising in ADSL services) 
during the period covered by the decision operated almost all the ADLS lines 
in France. The cable networks operators were not in a position to represent a 
serious competitive threat for FT, while any other electronic communications 
operators would not have been in a position, within that time-frame, to roll out 
an alternative network. Therefore, the position of dominance by FT was not 
disputed.  
 
The findings of the Commission were that Wanadoo sold its ADSL services at 
prices that were below the variable costs until August 2001, while after that 
moment the prices became at least approximately equivalent to variable costs, 
but still considerably below total costs.  
 
As a result of that practice Wanadoo operated at a loss until the end of 2002, 
in line with the strategy to pre-empt the market for high-speed Internet access. 
However, FT during that same time-frame made considerable profits in the 
market for wholesale ADSL services for Internet Services Providers (‘ISP’) 
(including Wanadoo). Wanadoo was obviously fully aware of the loss made, 
but did not interrupt its sale of ADSL services below cost, since its purpose 
was that of acquiring and maintaining a monopolistic position. Subsequently, 
the abuse came to an end when FT started selling its wholesale services 30% 
below on the previous prices charged. New ISPs were able to enter the market 
and, as a consequence, the number of new subscribers rose sharply in France 
after the end of the abuse. In the proceedings before the European 
Commission Wanadoo tried to demonstrate that what was considered an 
abusive conduct, was in reality a normal market strategy to conquer market 
shares, knowing that within a time-frame of five years those losses would have 
been recouped.  
 
The European Commission objected that such a strategy, carried out by a 
dominant undertaking such as FT through its subsidiary had to be considered 
abusive because even though it could appear a rational strategy, in reality was 
violating the basic duty of a dominant undertaking of behaving in a responsible 
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manner vis à vis its competitors. In other words, ‘[…] the recoupment of initial 
losses over a certain period of time is in the usual case the very objective of a 
predatory pricing behaviour […]. Admitting [the company’s] reasoning in this 
respect would have led to the conclusion that by essence predatory pricing 
can simply not exist’150 
 
As R. Klotz and J. Fehrenbach correctly pointed out when they published their 
article in 2003, ‘[f]rom a policy point of view, the intervention of the 
Commission in this case was all the more necessary as high-speed Internet 
access plays a key role in the achievement of the objectives of the Lisbon 
strategy’151. 
 
Obviously Wanadoo tried to object that its ‘below cost’ strategy was aimed at 
favouring and increasing the use of broadband services in France. However 
the Commission clearly objected that  
 
‘[….] Wanadoo Interactive's argument is deficient in one 
essential respect: there is no proof that the strategy pursued by 
the company would alone have made it possible to attain the 
desired objective of increased broadband use in France. The 
positive effects linked to market growth could have been 
brought about had the market developed under conditions of 
equilibrium among service providers. If it had really been the 
France Télécom group's intention to develop the high-speed 
market for the benefit of all operators, France Télécom could 
have priced all its wholesale products - from shared or full 
unbundled access to the local loop to IP/ADSL access and 
routing services - at low levels encouraging the entry of 
competitors. The France Télécom group chose instead to 
confine the losses associated with developing high-speed 
access to its retailing subsidiary, thereby diverting the market 
growth to its advantage. It cannot therefore cogently be 
maintained that the France Télécom group, and Wanadoo 
Interactive in particular, were guided by a desire to develop the 
market for the benefit of all stakeholders. If such had been the 
case, France Télécom could have applied much sooner the 
                                            
150 R. Klotz and J. Fehrenbach, cited (fn 172), 12. 
 




remedy that was finally proposed once proceedings had been 
initiated against Wanadoo Interactive’152. 
 
As Jones and Sufrin correctly note, this case was in reality a case of 
‘margin squeeze’, but considering the relationship between FT and its 
subsidiary (in the time-frame considered) it was instead analysed by the 
Commission as a case of predatory pricing153.  
 
I analyse in the following section (iv) the ‘margin squeeze’ pathology, 
while I will discuss in section (v) the more general category of ‘refusal to 
supply’, as per the most recent classification provided by the Guidance 
Paper154. 
 
 (iv)  Margin (price) squeeze. 
  
A more complex form of abuse of dominant position in the electronic 
communications sector is that deriving from the ‘margin (or price) squeeze’ 
practice, conduct usually carried out in vertically-integrated industries. The 
Commission ascertained that an undertaking performs a margin squeeze 
practice when the margin between prices charged to have access to the 
downstream (derived) markets (for instance to the local loop) and prices 
charged to have access to the principal market (for instance the services 
provided by the incumbent, owner of the local loop) does not allow the 
competitor (even as efficient) to perform its activities in the derived market with 
normal profit levels155. A similar conduct can be put in place with respect to the 
purchase of wholesale capacity, at a price that would not allow the 
competitor(s) to have sufficient profits, ultimately being forced to leave the 
market. 
 
                                            
152 Commission decision Wanadoo Interactive (France Télécom) (Case COMP/38.2333) of 16 
July 2003, [2005] 5 CMLR 120, (para 312. 
 
153 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (4th edn, 2011), p 408. 
 
154 Guidance Paper [2009] OJ C45/7, para 80. 
 




The Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities tackles margin squeeze and 
refusal to supply conducts under the same letter (Chapter IV ‘Specific forms of 
abuse’, letter D), an indication that this kind of abuse is strictly related to the 
access to facilities in vertically integrated industries. The analysis of margin 
squeeze conducts is crucial in understanding the target of the present thesis, 
aimed at showing how the choice of the optimal solution to enforce effective 
competition (i.e. through functional or even structural separation rather than 
through mere pecuniary fining), in cooperation with national competition 
authorities and NRAs, could possibly enhance the access and the provision of 
access-related services. 
 
Technically the benchmark to detect a margin squeeze abuse is the so-called 
‘Long-Run Average Incremental Cost’ (or ’LRAIC’)156 of a non-integrated 
competitor downstream.  
 
In Napier Brown/British Sugar157, the Commission stated: 
 
‘[…] Should British Sugar have maintained this margin in the 
long term, Napier Brown would have been obliged to leave the 
United Kingdom retail sugar market […]’. 
 
In the electronic communications sector the Commission already dealt with 
this form of abuse with its Notice on Access of 1998158. The Commission infers 
that  
                                            
156 To be distinguished from the Average Avoidable Cost (AAC). See the Guidance Paper, 
para 25. Quoting from the Guidance Paper: ‘The cost benchmarks that the Commission is 
likely to use are average avoidable cost (AAC) and long-run average incremental cost 
(LRAIC). Failure to cover AAC indicated that the dominant undertaking is sacrificing profits in 
the short term and that an as efficient competitor cannot serve the targeted customers without 
incurring a loss. LRAIC is usually above AAC because contrary to the latter (which only 
includes fixed costs if incurred during the period under examination), it included product 
specific fixed costs made before the period in which allegedly abusive conduct took place. 
Failure to cover LRAIC indicates that the dominant undertaking is not recovering all the 
(attributable) fixed costs of producing the good or services in question and that an as efficient 
competitor could be foreclosed from the market’. 
 
157 Commission decision Napier Brown-British Sugar [1988] OJ L284/41, [1990] 4 CMLR 196, 
para 66.  
 
158 Commission Notice on the ‘Application of the Competition Rules to the Access Agreements 
in the Telecommunications Sector-Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles’ [1998] OJ C 




‘A price squeeze could be demonstrated by showing that the 
dominant company's own downstream operations could not trade 
profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to its 
competitors by the upstream operating arm of the dominant 
company. A loss-making downstream arm could be hidden if the 
dominant operator has allocated costs to its access operations 
which should properly be allocated to the downstream operations, 
or has otherwise improperly determined the transfer prices within 
the organisation. The Commission Recommendation on Accounting 
Separation in the context of Interconnection addresses this issue by 
recommending separate accounting for different business areas 
within a vertically integrated dominant operator. The Commission 
may, in an appropriate case, require the dominant company to 
produce audited separated accounts dealing with all necessary 
aspects of the dominant company's business. However, the 
existence of separated accounts does not guarantee that no abuse 
exists: the Commission will, where appropriate, examine the facts 
on a case-by-case basis’. 
 
The analysis of the efficacy of the fine in dealing with this type of abuses, 
bearing in mind the seriousness of margin squeeze infringement, its 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects and its impact for long-term consumer 
welfare (to do not mention the impact on direct competitors), is at the basis of 
the question: could be a structural remedy more suitable than a functional 
remedy to guarantee the pursuit of effective competition? 
 
Did the national regulators fail to enhance competition through the application 
of ex-ante tools, therefore making necessary the introduction of the new tool 
(functional separation) introduced by EC Directive 2009/140/EC? If the new 
ex-ante remedy (functional separation) turns to be insufficient, why the 




(v) Analysis of margin squeeze cases. Margin squeeze in Germany and in 




In recent years at European level numerous cases of network-related abuses 
of dominant position in the electronic communications were detected in all the 
major Member States to the point that the doctrine has been arguing about the 
opportunity to deal with these behaviours with a more ‘forward-looking’ 
approach aimed at radically removing the functional or structural reasons 
rather than simply fining the companies for the same, recurrent, abusive 
conduct. 
 
This form of abuse, more than others, symbolises how a vertically integrated 
undertaking can carry out access pricing policies hardly detectable but equally 
detrimental for competition and, ultimately, for consumers.  
 
A definition of margin squeeze comes from the Guidance of 2008, which it 
states that:  
 
‘a dominant undertaking may charge a price for the product on the 
upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the 
downstream market, does not allow an as efficient competitor to 
trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis (a so-
called margin squeeze)’159. 
 
Margin squeeze as an abuse of dominant position can be directly compared 
with the refusal to supply abuse. However, the Commission also dealt with this 
abuse using the category of predatory pricing. 
  
The doctrine identified this further form of abuse taking into consideration 
dominant undertakings’ pricing policies only apparently not abusive, but 
determining exclusionary effects for competitors in the long term. Usually 
predation occurs when prices are set below the ‘average variable cost’; are 
presumed to be predatory where prices are set below the ‘marginal variable 
                                            
 
159 Guidance Paper, para 79. If ‘margin squeeze’ is seen as a form of indirect refusal to 
supply, it is worth mentioning that the Guidance identifies some cumulative circumstances that 
should lead the antitrust authorities to intervene in the event of an unjustified refusal. These 
are: (i) the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to 
compete effectively on a downstream market; (ii) the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination 
of effective competition on the downstream market; and (iii) the refusal is likely to lead to 




cost’ (of production factors such as energy, location, raw materials, 
manpower). While it is easy to determine whether any extra unit of a specific 
product or service is below the ‘marginal variable cost’, it is almost impossible 
to detect whether the cost of a single phone call is below that cost. In order to 
detect such a volatile form of abuse, the doctrine identified the so called long-
run average incremental costs (LRAIC), linking together the cost of each 
additional service to the additional cost of providing a further unit of 
capacity160. 
 
One of the most interesting cases of margin squeeze at European level is 
case of the Deutsche Telekom (‘DT’) fined by the European Commission161 in 
2003. The findings were that DT was dominant in the provision of both 
wholesale local loop access and in the downstream market for the provision of 
retail access services to end customers. Therefore DT, provider of wholesale, 
upstream, services for the access to the local loop, was also a direct 
competitor on the retail market of the purchasers of its services (in line with 
basic scheme depicted in Figure no.1 on vertical integration) 162. 
 
The abusive conduct in this case was identified in the subsidisation of DT’s 
retail activities with revenues made in the upstream market (wholesale 
provision of access to the local loop). The margin squeeze, in particular, 
consisted in the higher price that the competitors in the retail market had to 
pay in order to have whole access to DT’s local loop with respect to the lower 
price paid by DT’s subsidiary to provide the same retail service, therefore 
reducing to a minimum the competitors’ profits. 
 
DT appealed the Commission decision imposing a fine of EUR 12.6 million for 
abusing its dominant position through a margin squeeze conduct, arguing that 
                                            
160 E. Pitt and R. Morton-Fincham, cited p 458. 
 
161 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
162 E. Pitt-R Morton-Fincham, cited, p 460. 
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the wholesale access prices charged to competitors had been established by 
the German telecommunications authority. On appeal, the General Court and 
the Court of Justice confirmed that the competition law provisions take 
precedence over regulatory obligations163. 
 
This decision forms a particularly important part of the argument put forward in 
this thesis for two reasons. Firstly it represents a clear demonstration of the 
relevance of anticompetitive foreclosure effects in detecting an abuse in a 
vertically-integrated industry, even in the presence of access prices set by the 
regulator. It also shows that long-term efficiencies (or other long-term factors) 
have to be taken into consideration while applying Art. 102 TFEU. Secondly, it 
shows the various forms of access to the network in the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
The decision highlighted how the incumbent DT had control over the access to 
the network on which the competitors wanted to provide their own retail 
services. Alternatively, but at much greater expense, competitors could 
develop and use their own alternative networks (optical fibre, cable television, 
power lines, etc.)164. The decision points out how:  
 
‘new entrants do not have network infrastructures of their own that 
are as extensive as those of DT, and with traditional technologies 
they are unable to match the economies of scale and the coverage 
of the incumbent operator, which rolled out its local network over a 
long period under the protection of exclusive rights, and funded its 
investment out of monopoly rent’165. 
 
The decision, in its preliminary remarks, points out how there were two ways 
of access to the network at local level for the provision of telephone services:  
 
                                            
 
163 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom. See in particular Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom, 
paras 77-96. 
 
164 Commission Decision Deutsche Telecom AG, [2003] OJ L263/9, para 12. 
 




(i) Access could be obtained through the full local loop unbundling, or   
(ii) Through ‘line sharing’ (shared use of local loops).  
 
The decision points out how the charges would have been different for the two 
options and that it focused exclusively on the ‘fully unbundled access to DT’s 
local loop’166. 
 
Under the German regulatory regime, the German communications authority 
established a ‘price cap’ for the local loop interconnection rates, rather than a 
mere regulatory mechanism. Starting from the cost-orientation principle, the 
undertaking has a margin to fix the price, within the threshold of the ‘price 
cap’167. DT argued that the Commission should not have intervened to assess 
whether the ‘margin’ established by DT was infringing the competition law 
principle of ‘unfair pricing’ since the price cap had been set by the German 
regulatory authority and therefore the pricing policy of DT could not be 
considered unfair168.  
 
The Commission replied that  
 
‘contrary to DT’s view, however, the ECJ and the General Court 
have consistently held that the competition rules may apply where 
the sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it 
governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, 
restricts or distorts competition. This is particularly so in the case of 
complaints submitted to the Commission regarding possible 
violation of the EU competition rules. In such cases the Commission 
has a duty to investigate, and if necessary to order appropriate 
remedies169’170. 
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The Commission in particular argued that the imposition of regulatory 
tools does not preclude the undertaking from applying the principles of 
competition law171. Therefore it focused on the demonstration that there 
was an evident disproportion between wholesale’s charges and retail 
charges for access to the local network. Even though the charges in both 
cases (wholesale and retail) were subject to sector-specific regulation, 
DT had a commercial discretion which allowed it to restructure its tariffs 
further so as to ’reduce or indeed to put an end to the margin 
squeeze’172. The Commission found that having failed to do so, DT had 
carried out a practice of margin squeeze constituting the imposition of 
unfair selling prices within the meaning of Article 82 (a) of the Treaty. 
 
A definition of margin squeeze is given at paragraph 106 where is said that the 
abuse occurs where: 
 
‘the wholesale prices that an integrated dominant undertaking 
charges for services provided to its competitors on an upstream 
market and the prices it itself charges end-users on a downstream 
market are in a proportion such that competition on the wholesale 
or retail market is restricted’.  
 
And again in paragraph 107,  
 
‘there is an abusive margin squeeze if the difference between the 
retail prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the wholesale 
prices it charges its  competitors for comparable services is 
negative, or insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the 
dominant operator of providing its own retail services on the 
downstream market’. 
 
The definition of ‘anticompetitive pressure’ can be found in paragraph 108 of 
the decision, where the Commission states that it is ‘exerted on competitors’ 
                                            
171 Ibid, para 35 ‘[…] Given the detailed nature of the ONP rules and the fact that they may go 
beyond the requirements of Article 86 (now Article 82), undertakings operation in the 
telecommunications sector should be aware that compliance with the Community competition 
rules does not absolve them of their duty to abide by obligations imposed in the ONP context, 
and vice versa’: 
 




trading margins, which are non-existent or too narrow to enable them to 
compete with the established operator on retail access markets. An insufficient 
spread between a vertically integrated dominant operator’s wholesale and 
retail charges constitutes anticompetitive conduct especially where other 
providers are excluded from competition on the downstream market even if 
they are at least as efficient as the established operator’173.  
 
The conclusion of the European Commission was that DT had abused its 
dominant position in the relevant markets for direct access to its fixed 
telephone network, as per art. 102 (a) TFEU: such abuse in particular 
consisted in charging unfair prices for (i) wholesale access services to 
competitors and (ii) retail access services in the local network. The 
Commission found that DT was ‘in a position to end the margin squeeze 
entirely by adjusting its retail charges. [Later] DT could in any event have 
reduced the margin squeeze, by increasing the ADSL retail access charges 
not subject to the price cap system’174. However, it did not.  
 
The Commission’s decision was appealed before the General Court, but was 
entirely upheld. The Court considered that DT had had the opportunity to bring 
to an end, or to reduce, the margin squeeze deriving from the difference 
between the retail charges and the wholesale charges, if DT had applied to the 
German communications authority for a review of the charges. In failing to do 
so, the Commission was right in applying Article 102 TFEU to DT’s abusive 
conduct, even in the presence of price caps established by a sector regulator. 
The General Court  observed that ‘the decisions of national authorities in 
respect of Community telecommunications law do not in any way affect the 
Commission’s power to find infringements of competition law’175. 
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174 Commission Decision Deutsche Telecom AG [2003] OJ L263/9, para 199. 
 
175 Press release of the General Court no. 26/08 on the judgment of the Court of First Instance 




The General Court judgment in DT underlined the negative effects on the 
communications market on the whole, saying that margin squeeze ‘will in 
principle hinder the growth of competition in the downstream markets. If the 
applicant’s retail prices are lower than its wholesale charges, or if the spread 
between the applicant’s wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable 
an equally efficient operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying 
retail access services, a potential competitor who is just as efficient as [DT] 
would not be able to enter the retail access services market without suffering 
losses’176.  
 
The General Court pointed out that in Germany there was no alternative 
infrastructure than DT’s fixed network177. Therefore the margin squeeze 
conduct had hindered the access of new competitors in the retail access 
services, as potential competitors ‘as efficient as DT’ could not enter the retail 
access services market without suffering losses. The small market shares of 
the competitors acquired in that market (retail access services) were an index 
of the effect determined by DT practice178. 
 
As stated above, DT appealed against the Commission decision also on the 
ground that it did not have sufficient scope to avoid a margin squeeze179, 
claiming that ‘the applicant [DT] did not have scope to fix its charges for retail 
access either. As regard the period 1998-2001, any abuse by the applicant is 
precluded by the fact that RegTP [the German telecom regulator] alone – and 
                                            
176 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, para 237.  
177 ibid, para 236: ‘[i]n that respect it must be borne in mind that the applicant owns the fixed 
telephone network in Germany and, moreover, that it is not disputed that, as the Commission 
notes in recitals 83 to 91 to the contested decision, there was no other infrastructure in 
Germany at the time of the adoption of the decision that would have enabled competitors of 
the applicant to make a viable entry into the market in retail access services’ (emphasis 
added. 
178 See press release of the European Commission no. 26/08 of 10 April 2008 and para 239 of 
the General Court judgment ‘[f]urthermore, the small market shares acquired by the 
applicant’s competitors in the retail access market since the market was liberalised by the 
introduction of the TKG on 1 August 1996 are evidence of the restrictions which the applicant’s 
pricing practices have imposed on the growth of competition in those markets’. 
 




previously the BMPT – is responsible for the applicant’s charges for 
narrowband connections [..]’180. 
 
On appeal before the General Court, DT was very bold in stating that it could 
not be blamed for the contested behaviour (in particular for fixing the retail 
prices for narrowband connections in the period before 2002) simply because 
those prices had been established by RegTP; furthermore DT could not depart 
from those prices without being fined by the regulator181. More interestingly, in 
the judgment (para 79) the claimant stresses how even the German Court of 
Justice (Bundesgerightshof) on the 10 February 2004, setting aside the 
judgment of the court of Düsseldorf (16 January 2004) had agreed with DT’s 
claim that the RegTP usually has to check whether ‘a charge to which a 
request for authorisation relates is compatible with Article 82 EC and that 
responsibility for any infringement of article 82 EC can only exceptionally be 
ascribed to the undertaking which applied for the charge to be authorised. The 
applicant observes that RegPT itself has concluded on several occasions 
since 1998 that there is no margin squeeze to the detriment of the applicant’s 
competitors. Furthermore, the Budesgerichtshof expressly left open the 
question of the applicant’s responsibility under competition law on account of 
the regulated charges’182. 
 
The General Court replied to these objections saying that the practice of the 
Court had consistently gone in the direction of considering prevailing the 
weight of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU over the national legislation (including the 
regulators’ provisions) when this legislation ‘leaves open the possibility of 
competition which may be prevented, restricted or distorted by the 
autonomous conduct of undertakings […]’183. If the national legislation makes 
easier for the companies to infringe competition law, they are still subject to 
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Art. 81 and 82184. Therefore the General Court argued that it had first to 
ascertain whether the ‘German legal framework’ (presumably including also 
the provisions of the telecom regulator) would have left some margin of 
discretion to the undertaking or not185.  
 
The defence of DT went further, saying that the German telecommunications 
regulator was obliged, as per the German law, to verify and examine the 
conformity of the requested adjustment of charges ‘with […] other legal 
provisions’ (said by the applicant to include Article 82 EC) […]’ (para 112). In 
other words, DT tried not only to justify its conduct with the fact that aligned its 
behaviour within the range authorised by the German regulator, but also that 
the German regulator ‘had to act’, by law, in line with the European provisions. 
The Court correctly recall, on this respect, the famous case Consorzio Italiano 
Fiammiferi (CIF)186, and confirms the obligation of all the organ of the State to 
respect the provisions of the EC Treaty (para 113). However it goes further 
stating that  
 
‘the national regulatory authorities operate under national law 
which may, as regards telecommunications policy, have 
objectives which differ from those of community competition 
policy (see the Commission’s Notice of 22 August 1998 on the 
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector – framework, relevant markets and 
principles (OJ) 1998 C 265, p. 2), Paragraph 13)’187. 
 
The General Court stressed how the same RegTP found that ‘the competitors 
were not prejudiced with regard to their competitive opportunities in the local 
network by the slight difference between retail and wholesale prices at to 
make it economically impossible for them to enter the market successfully or 
even to remain in the market’ (para 117) somehow confirming that not only DT 
but also the German telecommunications regulator was not fully aware of the 
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anticompetitive consequences of DT’s conducts within a theoretically fully 
legal framework of tariffs set by the same regulator.  
 
The General Court in its judgment considered whether the Commission ‘has 
established to the requisite legal standard in the contested decision that the 
applicant has sufficient scope in the period from 1st January 1998 to 31 
December 2001 to [avoid] the margin squeeze (recital 164). In that respect, 
the Commission stated in the contested decision that the applicant ‘was in a 
position [during that period] to end the margin squeeze entirely by adjusting its 
retail charges’ (recital 199)’188.  
 
In other words, the General Court not only stressed that the EC Treaty 
provisions (articles 101 and 102 TFEU) had to be respected and applied by 
the national telecommunications regulator, but also confirmed that the 
Commission was the ultimate ‘watchdog’, guardian of the respect of those 
provisions by the national, indirectly carrying out its own scrutiny on the 
regulator itself.  
 
At para 140 of the judgment the Court expressly stated that  
 
‘It follows from all the foregoing that the Commission was entitled to 
find in the contested decision (recitals 164 and 199) that the 
applicant had sufficient scope during the period from 1 January 
1998 to 31 December 2001 to end entirely the margin squeeze 
complained of in that decision’189.  
 
Similar conclusion was reached with respect to the period from 1st January 
2002 with respect to the margin squeeze identified in that decision by 
increasing its charges for ASL access services190. 
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In other words, this judgment is fundamental to prove that the position of the 
European court is unequivocally in favour of the Commission enforcement 
activity aimed at addressing distortions of competition even in the presence of 
ex ante measures imposed by a national regulator that do not impede the 
national incumbent to adopt prices that at the end amount to an 
anticompetitive conduct (margin squeeze in the examined case).  
 
Nothing impede to think that a similar reasoning could have been applied in 
the presence of other ex-ante measures adopted by a national regulator, such 
as functional separation. If, in line with my hypothesis, the Commission is able 
to demonstrate that, even adopting a behaviour remedy authorised at national 
level by Directive 2009/140/EC such as functional separation, the incumbent is 
still able to abuse its dominant position, nothing should impede the 
Commission (or the NCA) to adopt structural remedies, going beyond 
ineffective regulatory measures191.  
 
The General Court judgment concluded that ‘while it is not inconceivable that 
the German authorities also infringed Community law –particularly the 
provisions of Directive 90/388/EC, as amended by Directive 96/19– by opting 
for a gradual rebalancing of connection and call charges, such a failure to act, 
if it were to be established, would not remove the scope which the applicant 
had to reduce the margin squeeze’192.  
 
The General Court judgment was upheld by the ECJ in December 2010, 
confirming the correctness of the General Court’s conclusions with respect to 
the duty of the incumbent to operate in line with the competition law principles, 
even in the presence of ‘éspace de manoeuvre’ established by the sector 
regulatory authority. The ECJ confirmed that even in the presence of specific 
approval by the national regulator of wholesale prices proposed by the 
incumbent, if it has the possibility of bringing to an end the margin squeeze 
practice, it is obliged to comply with Art. 102 TFEU:  
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‘According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is only if anti-
competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national 
legislation, or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself 
eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, that 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC do not apply. In such a situation, the 
restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions 
implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings. 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC may apply, however, if it is found that the 
national legislation leaves open the possibility of competition 
which may be prevented, restricted or distorted by the 
autonomous conduct of undertakings’193. 
 
The ECJ recalls the fundamental case-law showing that even though 
national provisions may actually induce companies to infringe Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, the companies (and the national legal entities) have 
a duty to comply with the Treaties’ provisions194.  
 
The ECJ stressed that the fact that the appellant (DT) ‘was encouraged 
by the intervention of the national regulatory authority such as REgTP to 
maintain the pricing practices which led to the margin squeeze of 
competitors who are at least as efficient as the appellant cannot, as 
such, in any way absolve the appellant from responsibility under 
Article 82 EC’195.  
 
The ECJ went a step further in stating (para 91) that ‘[a]dmittedly it is not 
inconceivable, as the appellant observes, that the national regulatory 
authorities may themselves have infringed Article 82 EC in conjunction 
with article 10 EC, and therefore that the Commission could have brought an 
action for failure to fulfil obligations against the Member State concerned’196. 
                                            
193 C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495, para 80. Emphasis added. 
 
194 Ibid, para 81, 82, 83. In particular the ECJ also recalls the Case 322/81 Michelin v 
Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 57, where it stresses that the dominant undertakings 
have a special responsibility not to allow their conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market.  
 
195 Ibid, para 84. 
 
196 Ibid, para 91 (emphasis added).  
98 
 
The ECJ (para 105 of the judgment) stressed how DT, in its appeal, reiterated 
the same arguments put forward before the General Court, in particular its 
‘good faith’ in complaining with  instructions received by the national 
telecommunications regulator (not challenged by the national courts). 
However, DT did not provide any further element to deduct that the General 
Court erred in law in claiming that the national regulators and the incumbent 
are both bound to competition law (articles 101 and 102 TFEU) and that the 
Commission complied with its duties investigating and finding that the 
company had abused of its dominant position. It must be noted that when the 
General Court on the 10 April 2008 filed its judgment on the Deutsche 
Telekom Commission decision, another case of margin squeeze had been just 
decided by the Commission in July 2007: the Telefónica case197.  
 
This second decision relating to margin squeeze is particularly interesting not 
only for the higher fine inflicted on the Spanish company (EUR 151 million), 
but also for the relevance given to the ‘effects on competition’ of the margin 
squeeze conduct. In this decision the Commission evidently took into 
consideration the Art. 102 TFEU review triggered with the Discussion Paper of 
2005. 
 
The Telefónica decision relates to abuse of a dominant position carried out 
through margin squeeze practices over a significant period of time (five years) 
with respect to wholesale broadband access market at national and regional 
level (it is not a local loop unbundling case).  
 
The company charged high broadband access rates to its competitors, 
keeping at very low levels the rates of access to its own retail broadband 
access services, forcing competitors to exit the market. This conduct not only 
damaged competitors for a long period of time (leading the Commission to 
                                                                                                                              
 
197 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
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Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 





severely fine the incumbent) but also impeded many companies from entering 
the market, consequently excluding the final consumers from having access to 
the broadband services198. 
 
The Commission pointed out how competitors, in order to provide DSL access 
services, had no other choice but to deal with the incumbent to get access to 
the ADSL enabled local loops, unless they decide to create a viable 
alternative network which is not economically 199. 
 
The decision pointed out that from 2002 the Spanish regulatory authority 
mandated wholesale access to the incumbent’s network at national and 
regional level in favour of the competitors (paragraphs 289-290). The access 
rates were established applying the so-called ‘retail minus price’ regime200, 
that has the following positive consequences: (i) it does not alter the recovery 
of the costs of wholesale access; (ii) it should avoid a situation of a margin 
squeeze between the incumbent’s wholesale and retail prices; (iii) productive 
efficiency is ensured i.e. a potential entrant enters only if it is viable, which 
occurs only if it is more efficient than the incumbent in the downstream activity 
and (iv) the system preserves the networks operators’ incentives (including the 
incumbent) to invest in their own infrastructure. 
 
Access based on similar price conditions was in line with both the liberalisation 
1998 regulatory framework201 and in line with the electronic communications 
                                            
198 Nellie Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition at the European Commission, pointed 
out that the Spanish consumers paid 20% more than the EU-15 average for broadband 
access, with a rate of penetration 20% below EU-15 average, and a growth of 30% lower that 
of the EU-15. See press release IP/07/1011 of 4th July 2007. 
 
199 See para 74 of the decision: ‘An undertaking wishing to provide broadband access to the 
end-users throughout the Spanish territory has no other option, save the economically not 
viable roll-out of an alternative nation-wide access network, but to contract one of the 
wholesale ADSL services available on the market, which are all built on TESAU’s access 
network consisting of ADSL enabled local loops’.  
200 Under the retail-minus system, the wholesale access charge is set at the vertically-
integrated operator’s retail price minus the incremental cost of providing downstream services 
and any network elements supplied by the access seeker. See W.J. Baumol-J.G. Sidak, The 
pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, (1994) 11 Yale Journal of Regulation, 196. 
201 As confirmed by the judgment given in preliminary ruling by ECJ on 13 December 2001 in 




regulatory package 2000 (in particular with the Framework Directive202 and the 
Access Directive203).  
 
In response to the European Commission’s statement of objections Telefónica 
tried to show that the conditions set in Oscar Bronner with respect to the 
impossibility of replication (non-replicability) of the network as a pre-condition 
for mandatory access on the basis of the essential facilities doctrine in this 
case were not applicable (paragraph 301). The Commission challenged this 
conclusion saying exactly the opposite, underlining that Telefónica had a duty 
to supply the upstream inputs called GigADSL and ADSL-IP. The decision 
stressed that the duty was established with a view to promoting competition 
(among down-stream undertakings providing competing services) and the 
consumer interest (without specifying whether short term or long term 
consumer interest). 
 
The decision at stake is particularly important for the relevance given to the 
exclusionary effects of the abuse on competition, in line with new 
perspective at the basis of the Discussion Paper and Guidance Paper204. The 
decision showed that the margin squeeze conduct ‘affected Telefónica’s 
competitors’ ability to enter into the relevant market and exert a competitive 
restraint on Telefónica’205. As a consequence of the margin squeeze conduct, 
Telefónica’s competitors, even as efficient as the incumbent, incurred in 
‘unsustainable’ losses, being ultimately forced to leave the competition and 
discouraged from innovating and investing in new infrastructures (impact on 
growth). 
 
                                            
202 Art. 8 of the Framework Directive. 
203 Art. 8 of the Access Directive. 
204 The Telefónica decision devotes a large part of the text to the impact assessment of the 
abusive conduct, from para 564 to para 618, showing high interest not only for the mere 
effects of the margin squeeze conduct on competitors and consumers but also, more 
generally, on the entire broadband market, the Spanish economy as a whole, and as part of 
the European construction. 
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Such a conduct resulted in a delay in the arrival of ADSL operators in many 
areas of Spain; they had no–incentive to create their own infrastructure or the 
use of the local loop unbundling. In the absence of margin squeeze conduct, it 
is very likely that consumers would have paid lower prices, would have had 
increased choice and access to more innovative products. The Commission 
stated that the entire broadband market in Spain suffered a drastic 
downsizing, and pointed out the low positions, below the EU-15 average, 
reached by the incumbent and its competitors in the broadband penetration on 
the Spanish territory206. 
 
An appeal against the decision was dismissed by the General Court in March 
2012207. In its judgment the General Court rejected the claim of the Spanish 
company that the Commission (i) had not taken into consideration that the 
infringement was committed in part through simple negligence by Telefónica, 
or (ii) had considered Telefónica’s negligence as ‘extremely serious’. The 
General Court confirmed that the company was dominant in the wholesale 
markets in relation to which margin squeeze was established and rejected 
Telefonica’s claim that the Commission had omitted to carry out a ‘margin 
squeeze test’ based on an optimal mix of available wholesale products.  
 
The Court also confirmed the approach already held in the Deutsche Telekom 
case examined above with respect to the balance between application of ex 
ante provisions and respect of EU competition law: compliance with the 
decisions taken by the national telecom regulator on the basis of the 
regulatory framework does not release dominant firms from their obligation to 
respect EU competition law208.  
                                            
206 See para 584 and 585, figure no. 19, with index of broadband penetration in Europe, 
excerpted by The ECTA broadband scorecard. See 
http://www.ectaportal.com/en/basic650.html. See also the OECD Report: ‘Benchmarking 
broadband prices in the OECD’, Working Party on Telecommunications and Information 
services Policies, 18 June 2004, p. 50 (see page Div-53 of the file): ‘Overall, broadband 
access prices available in Spain are relatively expensive in terms of the price and performance 
ratio’ (note 661 of the decision). 
 
 
207 Case T-336/07 Telefónica,SA – Telefónica de España,SA [2012] ECR-I 0000. Judgment on 
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I will further discuss the importance of this judgment when I will draw my 
conclusion with respect to the superiority of the enforcement action of the 
European Commission with respect to the measures imposed at regulatory 
level (not only prices, but also functional separation as per Directive 
2990/140/EC). Here, it must best stressed that the General Court (and, more 
recently, the Advocate General in the appeal proceedings before the Court of 
Justice) in March 2012 made clear that ‘Article 82 EC applies only to anti-
competitive conducts engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative. If 
anticompetitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if 
the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of 
competitive activity on their part, Article 82 EC does not apply’209; however,  
 
‘Article 82 EC may apply if it is found that the national legislation 
does not preclude undertakings from engaging in autonomous 
conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition’210.  
 
The Court also rejected the argument put forward by the appellant that ‘the 
Commission had at its disposal an ad hoc formal instrument of intervention 
resulting from Article 7 of the Framework Directive, which enable it to 
intervene in a situation such as that at issue in the present case’211. In other 
words Telefonica argued that the Commission should have followed rather a 
regulatory approach than adopting a decision imposing a pecuniary fine. The 
General Court, however, stated clearly that the ex-ante remedies do not 
exclude the intervention of the Commission when Article 102 TFEU is 
infringed: 
 
‘The existence of that measure [as per Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive] has no effect whatsoever on the powers which the 
Commission derives directly from Article 3(1) of Regulation no 
17 and, since 1 May 2004, from Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
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to find infringement of Articles 81 and 82 EC […]. Thus, the 
competition rules laid down in the EC Treaty supplement, by ex 
post review, the regulatory framework adopted by the EU legislature 
for ex ante regulation of the telecommunications markets […]’212. 
 
 
The judgment also rejected [paragraphs 296 ff] the claims of the appellant that 
the Commission would have infringed the principles of subsidiarity, 
proportionality and legal certainly ‘since [the Commission] interferes without 
good reason in the exercise of the power of the [Spanish telecommunications 
regulator]’. 
 
However, with respect to the principle of subsidiarity in particular, the Court 
stated that Article 5 EC provides that the Community (in this case the 
Commission) can intervene and take action ‘only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community [the Commission]’213.  
 
In other words, here the General Court confirmed once again, in line with the 
Deutsche Telekom judgments analysed above, the Commission’s competence 
in applying and enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU going beyond the range 
of action of the regulatory authorities of the Member States. The judgment 
stated that the Spanish regulator ‘is not a competition authority and it has 
never intervened to enforce Article 82 EC or adopted decisions relating to the 
practices penalised in the contested decision […].  The Commission cannot 
be bound by a decision taken by a national authority pursuant to Article 
82 EC’214. 
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The Court also recalled the judgment given in Deutsche Telekom v 
Commission215  where it stated ‘[…] notwithstanding such legislation, if a 
dominant vertically integrated undertaking has scope to adjust even only its 
retail prices, the margin squeeze may on that ground alone be attributable to 
it’216. 
 
The judgment of the General Court in the Telefónica case is therefore 
extremely important for the purpose of demonstrating that the Commission 
(and the Courts) have considerable room of manoeuvre in adopting remedies 
as per Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC (and, among those remedies, also 
the most suitable) going beyond the regulatory activity of the national 
telecommunications authority (but the same, as we will see in the next chapter 
can be said for the energy sector).  
 
The judgment has been appealed before the Court of Justice217. The Advocate 
General Melchior Wathelet has recently filed his opinion218 confirming the 
principle of unlimited jurisdiction of the European Court, and the possibility, for 
it, to cancel or to confirm a fine, but also to reduce or to increase it219. He also 
confirmed that the European Commission did not breach the duty of 
cooperation with Spanish telecommunications regulator, reaffirming the 
principle that, in line with Regulation no. 1/2003/EC, it does not have a duty of 
consultation with the national regulatory authorities220. He suggested that the 
claim, on appeal, of the company that the European Commission breached 
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219 The A G Wathelet also stated that the paragraphs of the General Court’s judgment in 
Telefónica with respect to the calculation of the fines does not contain a genuine analysis and 
recommended the General Court to conduct ex novo a full review of the Commission decision 
with respect to the amount of the fine.  
 




both the duty of loyal cooperation and good administration should be rejected. 
Similarly, the Advocate General recommended to reject the claim that the 
General Court did not take into consideration the company’s claim that it had 
in good faith relied on the conformity of its pricing practices with the scope of 
Article 102 TFEU221.  
 
As I will discuss in Chapter IV with respect to the imposition and effectiveness 
of fines, the Advocate General’s opinion filed in the proceedings before the 
ECJ recently stressed that the General Court had not correctly exercised its 
power of review of the Commission’s decision with respect to the fine, 
suggesting to annul the General Court judgment222. 
 
The judgments in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases are therefore 
particularly important not only for the definition and the ‘reconstruction’ of the 
conduct that may lead to a margin squeeze abuse, but also for having clarified 
the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to conducts that might have been put in 
place within the boundaries and the limits of regulatory provisions that, per se, 
are not sufficient to exclude the infringement by the incumbent. This is a key 
point in the thesis, since the position of the Commission, of the Courts and of 
the Advocates Generals as shown is unanimous in stressing that the 
European Commission is exclusively bound by the EU Treaty and its 
provisions (articles 101 and 102 TFEU) in analysing the behaviour of the 
companies, considering irrelevant ex ante remedies (including the imposition 
of prices aimed at favouring rather hindering competition) imposed, at 
regulatory level, on them.  
 
The position adopted by the Commission and the Courts in the last years 
confirms my argument that the Commission is, in principle, entitled to apply 
not only Article 7 of Regulation no. 1/2003 but that article in its entirety, going 
beyond the imposition of fines, applying not only behavioural but also 
structural remedies (such as structural separation), even in the presence of ex 
ante regulatory measures (such as pre-determined access prices) or 
                                            
221 Ibid, para 55. 
 
222 Ibid, para 175 ff. 
106 
 
behavioural remedies (such as functional separation as per Directive 
2009/140/EC) approved as per Article 7 of the Framework Directive 
2002/21/EC (as amended).  
 
I conclude the analysis of the recent cases of margin squeeze with the 
TeliaSonera case, a case referred by the Stockholm District Court to the 
European Court of Justice in 2009. In this case the European Court of Justice 
expressed serious concerns for the end-consumers (preliminary ruling 
judgment given on 14 February 2011)223. 
 
The case is relevant because the Commission, somehow departing from its 
own Guidance Paper, stressed that a margin squeeze conduct has to be 
considered harmful for the consumers without passing through the ‘refusal to 
supply test’, irrespective whether the abusive practice is carried out in 
presence of a pre-existing duty to deal. As stressed earlier, the Guidance 
Paper considered the margin squeeze conduct under the heading ‘refusal to 
supply’224, as an indirect form of abuse carried out by a dominant undertaking 
that in the particular market has a duty to supply the access to an essential 
facility. 
 
The Court confirmed its concern for the final consumers irrespective of the 
existence of all the pre-conditions that for the Commission’s Guidance Paper 
had been considered fundamental, in line with the existing and well settled 
case law. In TeliaSonera the Court stresses that  
 
                                            
223 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (Telia Sonera) of 17 February 
2011, [2011] ECR I-000, [2011] 4 CMLR 982, See also Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-52/90 
Telia Sonera.  
 
224 See on this point R. Nazzini, cited, pp 273-274. The Advocate General Mazák, R. Nazzini 
notes, with respect to refusal to supply suggested a different approach, in particular (i) to look 
at the margin squeeze as a form of vertical foreclosure tactic similar to that carried out by 
refusal to supply (ii) to take into consideration the risk that if there is not a duty to deal, ‘to 
impose a duty to charge upstream and downstream prices that allow as efficient downstream 
firm to compete effectively would reduce the dominant undertaking’s investment incentives’ 
and, most interestingly (iii) to take into consideration an  ‘a fortiori’, very subtle, argument: if 
the duty to deal is not a pre-condition, and the company in theory could refusal to supply, ‘why 
can it not harm them by charging upstream and downstream prices that make it difficult for 




‘in the absence of any objective justification, the fact that a vertically 
integrated undertaking, holding a dominant position on the 
wholesale market in asymmetric digital subscriber line input 
services, applies a pricing practice of such a kind that the spread 
between the prices applied on that market and those applied in the 
retail market for broadband connection services to end users is not 
sufficient to cover the specific costs which that undertaking must 
incur in order to gain access to that retail market may constitute 
an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU’225. 
 
More importantly, the Court underlines that any circumstances may be useful 
to determine whether the margin squeeze conduct is abusive, but certainly ‘it 
is necessary to demonstrate that, taking particular account of whether the 
wholesale product is indispensable, that practice produces an anti-competitive 
effect, at least potentially, on the retail market, and that the practice is not in 
any way economically justified’226. 
 
It is worth recalling that the opinion of Advocate General Mazák went in a 
different direction. For him margin squeeze had to be seen as a conduct 
analogous to refusal to supply; in both cases there are risks of over-deterrence 
that might discourage investments (for instance if the ‘as efficient competitor’ 
test is not correctly applied); if an incumbent can harm the competitors by 
refusing to supply, why (a fortiori) should not be able to set downstream and 
upstream prices at such a level to make impossible for the competitors to 
compete227? 
 
For our aims it is important to stress the list of factors that in 2011 the Court 
considered as not relevant to assess whether the undertaking abuses or not. 
In particular, the Court in TeliaSonera suggests to 
 
                                            
225 Case C-52/09 Telia Sonera [2011] ECR I-000, [2011] 4 CMLR 982, para 115 (conclusion). 
Emphasis added. 
 
226 Ibid, para 115 . 
 




(i) Not to look at whether ‘the fact that that undertaking does not also hold 
a dominant position in the retail market for broadband connection services to 
end users’, or 
(ii) Not to take into consideration ‘whether the customers to whom such a 
pricing practice is applied are new or existing customers of the undertaking 
concerned’, or 
(iii)  ‘the fact that the dominant undertaking is unable to recoup any losses 
which the establishment of such a pricing practice might cause, or 
(iv)  ‘the extent to which the markets concerned are mature markets and 
whether they involve new technology, requiring high levels of investment’228. 
 
R. Nazzini criticises the approach of the Court at this point, diverging both from 
the Prioritisation Guidance of the Commission and from AG Mazák’s opinion. 
He stressed the importance that the margin squeeze test should also include a 
‘refusal to supply test’ to be complete, while it seems that the Court had 
underestimated the importance of the existence of a duty to deal as a pre-
condition to establish whether the margin squeeze conduct can be considered 
an abuse of dominant position. This approach can be shared.  
 
However, I think that the Court (rapporteur Judge A. Tizzano) did not want to 
depart from consolidated case-law (such as Oscar Bronner). Probably the 
Court wanted to adopt an approach in which more generally re-stated the 
rationale of Michelin I, the duty for the incumbent to favour competition, in 
particular where the incumbent benefited in the past of the protection of 
‘exclusive rights’ and subsidisation by the State to create the infrastructure. 
Somehow the Court went a step further than in the Deutsche Telekom margin 
squeeze case. Putting aside the ‘indispensability’ criterion shows that is 
determined to uphold in the future Commission’s decisions aimed at 
discouraging not only refusal to supply, but also more difficult to detect 
practices by the former incumbents. It is also a step away from the US 
doctrine and jurisprudence on margin squeeze and essential facilities, less 
                                            
228 See the discussion carried out by G. Monti e J. Baker with respect to the Deutsche 
Telekom and the Telefónica cases, in which they rather stressed the importance to take into 




prone to sanction under Sect. 2 of the Sherman Act refusal to deal or other 
pricing practices in regulated sectors229. 
 
At this point, it must be stressed that the enforcement trend of the European 
Commission in the last three years have other incumbents being investigated 
or fined for network-related abuses of dominant position also in the new 
accession countries.  
 
 
(v) Two more cases of abuse of dominant position in the electronic 
communications sector fined by the European Commission. 
 
After having analysed the cases of margin squeeze Deutsche Telekom, 
Telefónica and TeliaSonera, in order to discuss and explain the 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects of those cases finding analogies with 
similar foreclosure effects in the energy sector (Chapter III), I wish to focus on 
two more recent cases of vertical foreclosure conducts investigated by the 
European Commission.  
 
In April 2009 the Commission opened two formal proceedings against the 
telecoms incumbents Telekomunikacja Polska S.A in Poland and Slovak 
Telekom230 in Slovakia. 
 
Later in June 2011 the Commission confirmed its finding that Telekomunkacja 
Polska S.A. (TP) had in various ways tried to obstruct access of competitors to 
                                            
229 See the case Verizon Communications, Inc. v Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004) (‘[…] Indeed, a detailed regulatory scheme such as that created by the 1996 Act 
ordinarily raises the question whether the regulated entities are not shielded from antitrust 
scrutiny altogether by the doctrine of implied immunity […] In some respects the enforcement 
scheme set up by the 1996 Act is good candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid 
the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the agency’s regulatory scheme that might be 
voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws’). The Supreme Court in 
Verizon underlined that it will be less prone to find a refusal to supply infringement in 
regulated industries when the regulator has adopted ex ante measures aimed at 
preventing conducts captured under antitrust laws. 
  
230 See MEMO/09/203 Brussels, 27 April 2009 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-09-203_en.htm. Inspections had been carried out in Poland in September 
2008 and in Slovakia in January 2009. 
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its infrastructure, and fined the former incumbent with a fine of EUR 127 554 
194231. The Commission found that the Polish company hindered competition 
between August 2005 and October 2009 by proposing unreasonable 
conditions in the draft contracts, delaying negotiations and refusing access to 
its network, subscriber lines and general information. The Commission 
decided to fine the company up to 10% of the annual turnover, stating that TP 
had carried out the contested abusive conducts with the express aim of 
excluding downstream competition.232. 
 
 
With respect to a telecom operator of one of the main EU ‘Big-Enlargement’ 
states such as Poland, Commission Vice-President J. Almunia stressed how 
this case ‘shows our determination to ensure that dominant telecom operators 
do not systematically hinder competitors who can make the real difference in 
the market to the benefit of consumers and businesses’. It is worth considering 
that Poland has one of the lowest broadband penetration rates in Europe, 
reaching only 13% in January 2010, far below the EU average of 24% for the 
same period of time233. 
 
Almost one year later, in May 2012, the European Commission also filed its 
statement of objections against Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom, its 
parent company234. In this case the product market in which the Slovak 
incumbent allegedly carried out the abuse is the wholesale broadband 
markets. In its Statement of objections the Commission stated that it takes the 
view that Slovak Telekom (i) would have refused to supply unbundled access 
                                            
231Commission Decision Telekomunikacja Polska (Case COMP/35.525) of 22 June 2011, 
[2011] OJ C 324/7 of 9 November 2011, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39525/39525_1916_7.pdf. 
 
232 Ibid, para 892. 
 
233 European Commission press release of 22 June 2011, IP/11/771. The Commission recalls 
how only 66% of the Internet access lines in Poland does not exceed the speed of 2Mbit/s 
compared to an EU average of just 15%, with monthly rates for the end users much higher 
than the prices in other Member States, and the second highest in the OECD area.  
 
234 Case Slovak Telekom COMP 39.523, statement of objection filed on the 8 May 2012, press 
release IP 12/462 accessible at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-462_en.htm. 
Deutsche Telekom has been considered co-responsible for the allegedly abusive conducts 
carried out by ST because it owns a majority stake of 51%. 
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to its local loops and wholesale services to competitors, alongside with (ii) 
imposing a margin squeeze on alternative operators by charging unfair 
wholesale prices. Once again, it emerges that the incumbent in Slovakia 
proposed unjustifiable and burdensome technical and commercial terms to its 
competitors, delaying and obstructing in various way the unbundled access to 
the local loop. In this case too, the incumbent tried to obstruct access to 
competitors through a double conduct, not only refusing or hindering the 
unbundling of the local loop, but also through the more subtle form of abuse 
carried out through margin squeeze on the broadband wholesale market. Also 
in this case, the main concern for the European Commission was that of fining 
the incumbents in order to force them to favour undistorted competition within 
the single market, following the same rationale adopted in its decisional 
practice in the last decade, generally upheld by the European courts. 
 
The analysis of these two further cases in the electronic communications 
sector, once again with respect to abusive conducts carried out with respect to 
the access to networks (margin squeeze, price discrimination and refusal to 
supply unbundled access) shows that abusive conducts in the electronic 
communications sector are recurrent and may lead to a reiteration of fining 
measures. In chapter V I will argue that the deterrence impact on the 
incumbents can be very limited, considering the exiguity of the fine in 
comparison to the annual (of the entire group or made in the relevant market 
in which the abuse was put in place) turnover. 
 
On the other hand, as I will discussed in Chapter IV, even regulatory 
intervention may lead to solutions that do not survive the competition law 
enforcement scrutiny: in that chapter I will discuss the reasons that on appeal 
led the European Courts to uphold the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica 
Commission decisions, confirming that even ex ante remedies may turn out to 
be inadequate to avoid forms of abuse of dominant position such as margin 
squeeze (nor constitute a justification for the abusive conduct). 
 
The question remains: do solutions based on mere fining provide the best 
outcome for the consumers in the medium and long run? Does the European 
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Commission’s current antitrust enforcement, putting consumer welfare and 
effective competition among competitors in the short-term as the main 
objective of its competition policy after the Guidance Paper, simply fining the 
incumbent really ensure full competition, fostering consumer welfare and 
innovation in the long term235? 
 
If the European Commission has, until now, preferred to deal with the above-
analysed conducts simply applying high (and in some cases recurrent) fines in 
order to address in the short term its competition concerns, are there other 
remedies that might be better positioned to foster innovation in the long term, 
at the same time sanctioning abusive conduct? 
 
There are examples both from the telecommunications sector and from other 
vertically-integrated industries that may encourage a different way of thinking 
in dealing with access-related abuses. 
 
In the next chapters I will take into account the lesson that the European 
Commission may draw from its own experience with the application of Article 9 
of the Modernisation Regulation in accepting commitments that have brought 
vertically integrated dominant undertakings such as E.ON and RWE in 
Germany in 2008 and ENI in Italy (2010)236 to divest part of their assets, 
technically enacting forms of vertical structural separation to address Art. 102-
based competition concerns. 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the European Commission ‘legislative’ policy has 
showed the ability to take important and successful lessons from the Member 
States antitrust practice. The ‘undertaking in lieu of reference to the UK 
Competition Commission (partially comparable to the commitments as per Art. 
9 of the Modernisation Regulation) that led to the creation of the separated 
                                            
 
235 The question was analysed in a seminal article of J. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: 
how antitrust fosters innovation, (2007) 74 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 575 ff that will be 
discussed more in detail later. 
 
236 For references, see fn 7, 8, and 9 here-above. 
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division Openreach within the BT Group materially enacted a form of vertical 
functional separation.  
 
The Commission found that experience so relevant from a regulatory point of 
view that, this form of vertical functional separation, became one of the pillars 
of the 2007 Reform of the electronic communications directives. The 
importance is proven by the fact that it is now one of the regulatory remedies 
aimed at preventing, or bringing to an end, access-related abusive conducts 
applicable at European level. 
 
In the next chapters I will discuss how structural separation already adopted in 
the energy sector on the basis of commitment decisions may become a model 
of reference for Art. 7 enforcement decisions, and may lead the Commission 
to (at least) threaten structural vertical separation in the electronic 
communications sector, with the aim of speeding up functional separation as 
an ex ante remedy. 
 
It is impossible to say a priori whether an example taken from one regulated 
industry (per example from the gas or electricity sectors) can be applied to 
another regulated industry (per example to the electronic communications 
sector). The ‘efficacy test’ and the ‘efficiency test’ that the Commission has to 
carry out before deciding whether to sanction the abusive conduct by imposing 
a fine or a functional or structural remedy lead to decisions tailored to the 
specific circumstances of the case. It might be argued that to address an 
access-related form of abuse (such as margin squeeze) ordering structural 
separation of the former incumbent’s network (or of the services divisions) 
might be disruptive, too invasive and not economically viable for the 
undertaking involved. Nevertheless, I believe that some criticisms to the 
current way of enforcing Art. 102 are well grounded, and can legitimize the 







(vi) Refusal to supply 
 
As the Guidance Paper underlines, refusal to supply can be determined by a 
wide range of practices, from refusing to supply products to existing or new 
customers to refusing to license intellectual property rights (i.e. interface 
information237). For the aim of the thesis, I must specifically focus on the 
incumbent’s refusal to supply the access to its infrastructure (network) by 
competitors238. 
 
A form of refusal to supply identified by the Guidance Paper is, for instance, 
the ‘constructive refusal’, that is the opposite of a ‘flat’ refusal: for instance, 
using the Guidance’s wording,  
 
‘unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the supply of the 
product or involving the imposition of unreasonable conditions in 
return for the supply’239. 
 
In vertically-integrated industries, a particular form of refusal to supply can be 
undertaken simply failing to invest to innovate the network, making more 
difficult the access by competitors240. 
 
In the last twenty years the European Commission adopted a series of 
decisions that have shown the crucial importance of such a form of abuse 
among all the various forms of abuse of dominant position. From the Magill 
case241 to Oscar Bronner242, from IMS Health243 to Microsoft244, the 
                                            
237 See Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, [2006] 4 CMLR 
311. 
 
238 Guidance Paper [2009] OJ C45/7, para 77. 
 
239 Ibid, , para 78.  
 
240 The 2010 Commission decision ENI accepting commitments proposed by the company 
provides an example of indirect refusal to supply, and will be discussed more in depth in the 
next chapter (section iv, role of commitments and other forms of undertakings). See, Summary 
of the Commission decision ENI no. COMP/39.315 of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 
of 23 December 2010, para 5. 
 
241 Commission decision Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE [1989] L 78/43, [1989] 4 CMLR 
757; Cases T-69-70/89 RTE, ITP, BBC v. European Commission (Magill) [1991] ECR II-485, 




Commission and the European Courts have progressively elaborated their 
own approach to what refusal to supply means. In fact, refusal to supply with 
respect to access to ‘essential facilities’ is one of the main expressions of this 
specific form of abuse.  
 
Analysing refusal to supply access to the incumbent’s network will pave the 
way to the analysis of one of the main competitive pathologies in the electronic 
communications sector that can be addressed with remedies such as 
functional and structural separation, topic that will be tackled, from a regulatory 
and competition enforcement perspective in a following chapter.  
 
 
(a) The US ‘essential facilities’ doctrine.  
 
The 1998 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to the 
agreements regarding the access in the telecommunications sector (‘The 
Access Notice’) at paragraph 68 provides a general definition of essential 
facility as follows 
 
‘The expression essential facility is used to describe a facility or 
infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or 
enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which cannot 
be replicated by any reasonable means’245.  
 
In reality, to understand the link between abuse of dominant position and 
infrastructure, it is necessary to define the concept of essential facility as it 
was outlined by the US practice and doctrine.  
                                                                                                                              
242 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791, [1999] 4 
CMLR 112. 
 
243 Case T-184/01 R IMS Health v Commission [2001] ECR II-3193, [2002] 4 CMLR 58 and 
Case C-481/01 P(R) IMS Health v Commission [2002] ECR I-3401, [2002] 5 CMLR 44. 
 
244 Commission Decision Microsoft of 24 March 2004 [2007] OJ L 32/23 (Microsoft I) and Case 
T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, [2006] 4 CMLR 311. 
 
245 Notice of the European Commission on the ‘Application of the Competition Rules to the 
Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector-Framework, Relevant Markets and 





The US doctrine defines an essential facility as that factual situation 
 
‘where facilities cannot be duplicated by would-be competitors, 
those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair 
terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the scarce 
facility’246.  
 
The case MCI Communications Corp. v AT&T247 provides us with a clear 
example of the approach held by the US antitrust authorities between the 
1970s and the 1980s248 in dealing with excessive rates de facto hindering the 
access of competitors to the telecommunications essential facilities (in 
particular, to the local exchange carriers owned by AT&T’s subsidiaries, the 
Bell Operating companies, impeding the access to operators competitors in 
the long-distance services). 
 
The US doctrine in the 1980s claimed that an infrastructure must be 
considered ‘essential’ only when it is necessary to allow a competitor to have 
access to the downstream market in conditions of full competition and the 
competitor’s presence is considered essential to ensure effective market 
competition. Furthermore, access by a competitor would cause a price 
reduction or at least an increase in production. Finally, even if all these 
conditions were met, any denial of access can always be legally opposed on 
the ground of valid reasons based on the production trends and the 
enterprises’ stability249.  
 
                                            
246 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), quoted from Pitofsky, 
‘Essential facilities doctrine under United States Antitrust Law’, submission to the European 
Commission in support of National Data Corporation in its case against IMS, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/pitofskyrobert.pdf.  
 
247 MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 
1983). See Pitofsky, cited, p 4. This case will be analysed more in depth in Chapter III, tackling 
the case law on ‘structural separation’. 
 
248 The first MCI’s complaint against AT&T was filed in 1974. 
 




In MCI Communications v American AT&T Co.250 the US Supreme Court 
established the conditions that must be satisfied in order to challenge a refusal 
to deal. I will discuss this case later on in more depth in the body of the thesis, 
since it represents one of the first forms of intervention of the State with 
respect to a vertically-integrated company in the communications sector251. 
These conditions can be summarised as follows: (i) a monopolist has control 
over the facility; (ii) the competitor needs to have access or to make usage of 
the service or product or other ‘protected’ good (i.e. Intellectual Property 
Rights) that can be duplicated only with considerable expense; (iii) the blank 
denial to the potential competitor of the use of the facility by owner of the 
facility; (iv) the possibility without excessive loss of providing access or to 
favouring the use of the facility itself252. 
 
The US Supreme Court in this decision made clear that when the costs for 
replicating an infrastructure are physically and economically impossible, the 
refusal to deal (or the denial of access) cannot be accepted without harming 
competition, the market and the consumers. 
 
If, conversely, the facility can be ‘easily’ duplicated, the US Courts keeps open 
the door for action to ensure that the (potential or actual) competitor is not 
encouraged to seek the ‘expropriation’ of the facility253.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the last few decades the US Courts, and 
the Supreme Court in particular, have reaffirmed the concept that the 
fundamentals of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine, on the one hand, and those 
affirmed by the Sherman Act, on the other, cannot go beyond the limit of 
                                            
250 708 F.2d. 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) 
 
251 As we will see Professor Areeda criticised in many respects the compression of the 
property rights born by AT&T in ‘Essential facilities: an epithet in need of limiting principles’, 
(1990) 58 Antitrust Law Journal 841. 
 
252 See A. Capobianco ‘The essential facility doctrine: similarities and differences between the 
American and the European approach’, [2001]26(6) European Law Review, 553 ff. 
 
253 See Alaska Airlines v United Airlines, 948 F.2d (9th Circ. 1984). As we will see in the next 
section, the European Court of Justice in the Bronner case also ruled out imposing a duty to 





imposing undue or unnecessary pressure on rational and sane competition. In 
the case Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 
LLP254, the US Supreme Court partially criticised the ‘essential facility’ 
doctrine, to the point of saying that Aspen was ‘near the outer boundary § 2 
liability255.   In Trinko the US Supreme Court stated that Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act ‘seeks merely to prevent unlawful monopolization’ and it 
represents ‘the Magna Carta of free enterprise, United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), […] but it does not give the judges 
carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alters its way of doing business 
whenever some other approach might yield greater competition’256.  
 
Verizon had been forced to provide full access to its local network on the basis 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which imposes upon an incumbent 
local exchange carrier (LEC) an ‘obligation under 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) to share 
its telephone network with competitors […] including provision of access to 
individual elements of the network on an ‘unbundled’ basis’257. However, in 
this specific case the Supreme Court stated that the activity of Verizon did not 
violate ‘pre-existing antitrust standards’258. In Aspen Skiing the Court 
recognised the dominant undertaking’s liability under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for refusal to deal with competitors. The defendant’s termination 
of a voluntary agreement with the plaintiff suggested a willingness to forsake 
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end. By contrast, in this case, 
the Supreme Court said that it was not demonstrated that Verizon had made 
                                            
254 Case Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko LLP 540 US 398, 124 
S.Ct. 872 (2004).  
 
255 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S. 398, 408 
decided by the US Supreme Court on the 13 January 2004. See on this point also Stratakis, 
‘Comparative Analysis of the US and EU Approach and Enforcement of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine’ [2006] 8 European Competition Law Review, 435. Stratakis underlines how the case 
Trinko ‘highlights in a categorical way that promotion of efficiency is the predominant 
consideration in the application of antitrust law, especially in the area in question [electronic 
communications]’(p 434, fn 3). 
 
256 Case Verizon v Trinko LLP 540 US 398, 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004), Conclusions of the writ of 
certiorari (certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), opinion 
delivered by Justice Scalia on the 13 January 2004, § IV.  
 
257 ibid, § I. 
 




agreements with its rivals. In Aspen Skiing, the defendant rejected the 
proposal of the plaintiff to buy the ski-pass at retail price, ‘suggesting a 
calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be higher’259. On the 
contrary, Verizon expressed reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate 
of compensation was not demonstrated. In other words, quoting from the 
conclusions of the ‘writ of certiorari’ in the Verizon case:  
 
‘In Aspen Skiing, what the defendant refused to provide to its 
competitor was a product that it already sold at retail […]’; [in the 
Verizon case] ‘the unbundled elements offered pursuant to [the 
Communications Act] exist only deep within the bowels of Verizon; 
they are brought out on compulsion of the 1996 Act and offered 
not to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable expense and 
effort’260. 
 
It is interesting to recall here the conclusion filed by the US Supreme Court in 
this fundamental case 
 
‘We do not believe that traditional antitrust principles justify adding 
the present case to the few existing exceptions from the proposition 
that there is no duty to aid competitors. Antitrust analysis must 
always be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of 
the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic context is an 
awareness of the significance of regulation’261. 
 
The importance of this judgment is also linked to the reference to regulatory 
remedies, which must be considered the first ‘protection’ of a competitive 
market: 
 
‘One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory 
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where 
such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by 
antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible 
that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny’262.  
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In other words, the US Supreme Court rejected any possibility of intervention 
to force Verizon to open its network, and re-stated the direct competence of 
the regulatory authorities in dealing with the access to electronic 
communications infrastructures. An approach radically different from the 
European competition law perspective, where the European Commission has 
a direct competition law enforcement competence above and beyond any 
existing regulatory measure foreseen by the European legislation. 
 
Focusing on the European side of the Atlantic, the following section will show 
that the European Community ‘essential facilities’ doctrine has been largely 
modelled on the above-mentioned US experience. Nevertheless, the outcome 
has been only partly similar. From time to time the Commission and, at 
jurisdictional level, the European Courts have adopted decisions and 
judgments that show particular attention for the economic existence (or, rather, 
survival) of competitors (as well as of the incumbents), attention which can be 
considered at least at the same level, if not above, of that paid to consumer 
welfare.  
 
In fact, in the electronic communications sector up to the present time there 
are no precedents for structural separation on the model of the AT&T’s 
remedy put in place in the US in the 1980s.  
 
Instead, for the time being at European level in the electronic communications 
the only form of vertical separation aimed at enhancing the access to an 
essential facility fully disciplined by a European directive is functional 
separation as a regulatory tool. This has been based on the model of the 
vertical functional separation voluntarily enacted by British Telecom in 2006 
through the creation of a separated access division called Openreach263, in 
which the British electronic communications regulatory authority (OFCOM) 
accepted ‘undertakings’ from British Telecom for which its access network 
                                                                                                                              
 
263 J. Whalley & P. Curwen, ‘Equality of access and local loop unbundling in the UK broadband 
telecommunications market’ (2008) 25 Telematics and Informatics 280-291. It provides an 




division would have been ‘functionally separated’ from the controlling entity to 
facilitate the access by competitors. The adoption of the Directive 
2009/140/EC264 introducing this form of separation is the demonstration that 
the European Union is ready to intervene where the access to the network is 
obstructed.  
 
However, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, in recent times more 
invasive remedies (such as structural separation) have also been adopted with 
respect to other vertically-integrated industries, through voluntary 
commitments, in particular in the energy sector.  
 
The cases E.ON265, RWE266 and ENI267, to make a few examples, represent 
the most interesting cases of divestiture of vertically-integrated assets with the 
aim of enhancing competition and, indirectly, favouring innovation and 
development of new facilities. For the analogy of the anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects with some exclusionary conducts put in place in the 
electronic communications sector, will be analysed in the next chapter. 
 
 
(b) The notion of ‘essential facilities’ under EU law.  
 
Theoretically, the essential facilities doctrine, as developed and applied by the 
US Courts, could have been applied in the same way on the European side of 
the Atlantic. Basic concepts such as ‘ 
                                            
264 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
 
265 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ 
C36/8 of 13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
266 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf.  
 
267 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010 (2010/C 352/10), 






non-duplicability’ of the network without excessive expense or ‘essentiality of 
the ‘facility’ are identical in the US and in the EU legal systems.  
 
In reality the application of the essential facility doctrine in the EU legal system 
in the last decades has been characterised by substantial differences.  
 
If in the US, at least in the last ten years, the rationale followed by the Courts 
has been that of trying to preserve the integrity of the property rights of the 
incumbent or of the owner of the essential facility, bearing in mind that the 
main target of any antitrust policy is consumer welfare more than the 
protection of the competitors, in the EU the application of the essential facility 
doctrine has been more prone to create a more competitive arena, with the 
ultimate (and indirect) aim of enhancing consumer welfare as a consequence 
of the creation of effective competition. 
 
A number of EC directives have established the obligation to grant access to 
electronic communications networks (from the Open Network Provision 
Directives of 1990 to the Telecommunications Package 2000 to the reform 
enacted in November 2009). At the same time, the Commission has taken a 
position in a number of decisions with respect to the applicability of the 
‘essential facilities’ doctrine.  
 
The analysis of the most recent cases of the European Courts with respect to 
refusal to supply is fundamental in understanding when a competition authority 
may decide to intervene to facilitate the access to the incumbent’s 
infrastructure.  
 
In fact, if a company is compelled to provide part of its services (or its raw 
materials, or intellectual property rights, as in the Magill or IMS cases) to a 
competitor in order to allow it to enter a specific market, a fortiori the relevant 
authority can decide to take functional (behavioural) or even structural 
remedies to break the monopoly of an undertaking to facilitate the downstream 




Indeed, there is a limit to the power of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine: if it is 
demonstrated that an undertaking can easily duplicate the infrastructure (or 
can easily get the service, or the raw materials, or the necessary data and 
information) necessary to enter the new market to provide a competitive 
product, or the costs of forcing the access to the infrastructure would outweigh 
the benefits, the essential facility doctrine should not be applicable268. 
 
At the European level, the ECJ in recent years has been adopting a number of 
judgments on the suitable balance between the prohibition of refusal to supply 
to facilitate access within a new market and the right for the incumbent to 
claim, within the boundaries of fair competition, the right compensation for the 
‘expropriation’ of its products or services. In some cases the right to protect its 
own intellectual property rights prevailed over the alleged need for the 
‘essential facility’. 
 
The 1998 Oscar Bronner case269 is one of the leading judgments in which the 
Court set out the limited circumstances in which access to a facility can be 
ordered.  
 
The Advocate General Jacobs did not exclude that  
 
‘the possibility that the cost of duplicating a facility might alone 
constitute an insuperable barrier to entry. That might be so 
particularly in cases in which the creation of the facility took place 
under non-competitive conditions, for example, partly through public 
funding. However, the test in my view must be an objective one: in 
other words, in order for refusal of access to amount an abuse, it 
must be extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking 
demanding access but for any other undertaking to compete. Thus, 
if the cost of duplicating the facility alone is the barrier to entry, it 
                                            
268 On the consequences of barriers to entry as an infringement as per Art. 102 TFUE, lett. (b), 
see J. Temple Lang ‘Reprisals and Overreaction by Dominant Companies as an Anti-
competitive Abuse Under Article 82(b)’ [2008] 1 E.C.L.R., pp 11-15. 
 





must be such as to deter any prudent undertaking from entering the 
market’270. 
 
The position of the Advocate General Jacobs in this case was one of extreme 
prudence with respect to the possibility of interfering with the economic activity 
of a dominant undertaking. In particular, he stressed the necessity of carefully 
balancing the interests of competitors with the interests of consumers, to the 
point of admitting that in the long term might be more in line with consumer 
interest not to interfere with the ownership of a[n essential] facility271.  
 
The precedent recalled by the Advocate General Jacobs and by the Court in 
which, conversely, data protected by intellectual property rights were 
considered an ‘essential facility’, is the Magill case (1995) 272in which the 
incumbent was forced to supply the data necessary to create a new product 
and provide a new service. 
 
In the Magill case, an Irish publisher wanted to publish a composite television 
listings magazine. However, the broadcasters, whose programmes could be 
received in Ireland, at the time refused to allow him to publish their schedules, 
which were protected by copyright under Irish law. The ECJ found that only in 
exceptional cases a refusal to supply material protected by an intellectual 
property right could be an abuse. The exceptional circumstances in Magill 
were that (i) there was no substitute for a weekly television guide, (ii) the 
refusal to supply had prevented the appearance of a new product for which 
there was consumer demand, (iii) there was no justification for the refusal, and 
                                            
270Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791, [1994] 4 
CMLR 112, AG Jacobs’ opinion, para 66. 
 
271 AG Jacobs (opinion in Oscar Bronner, para 58)) said that ‘the primary purpose of Article 86 
is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to safeguard the interests of 
consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular competitors. See on this point 
Capobianco, cited, 559. He points out how for instance ‘if access to a production, 
purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive 
for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus while competition was increased in 
the short term it would be reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant 
undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, simply 
upon request, able to share the benefits’.  
 
272 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, 




(iv) the refusal had excluded competition on a secondary market as a 
consequence of the denial of the access to the indispensable raw material273. 
 
This case anticipated the IMS Health274 saga, in which the ECJ, invested for 
preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt (the Court was required to 
ascertain whether or not to grant a license in a situation where a competitor is 
seeking access to the same geographical and product market could be 
considered an abuse) suggested the referring court to ascertain if the three 
conditions set out in the Oscar Bronner case (and re-called in Magill) to force a 
dominant undertaking to supply their ‘facilities’ to a competitor, were met or 
not. 
 
The ECJ, on the basis of the opinion provided by Advocate General Tizzano, 
set out the conditions in which a refusal to supply copyright is an abuse, but 
left the German court to decide whether these three cumulative conditions 
were satisfied in the situation before it. The conditions set out by the Court 
were: 
 
1) firstly, there must be a new product involved; 
2) secondly, access to the protected material must be ‘indispensable’ so that 
the refusal will exclude any or all competition on a secondary market; 
3) thirdly, the refusal must be unjustified275. 
 
Those conditions were certainly met in the Magill case. There the exceptional 
circumstances were constituted by the fact that the refusal to supply 
concerned a product the supply of which was indispensable to carrying on the 
business in question. As anticipated above, in that case it was possible to 
demonstrate that (i) without that information, the undertaking wishing to 
                                            
273 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, 
[1995] 4 CMLR 718, paras 52, 53, 54 and 56. 
 
274 Case T-184/01 R IMS Health v Commission ECR II-3193, [2002] 4 CMLR 58; Case C-
418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR I-5039, 
[2004] 4 CMLR 1453. 
 




publish a weekly TV guide would have been driven out of the market; (ii) such 
refusal prevented the emergence of a new product for which there was a 
potential consumer demand, (iii) it was not justified by objective 
considerations, and (iv) the behaviour was likely to exclude all competition in 
the secondary market.  
 
In the IMS case the Court did not provide further indications to the referring 
court. Nevertheless it stated pretty clearly that the only situation in which free 
competition can override the rights of the copyright holder is where the refusal 
prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers, concluding that the licence is not ordered to protect the competitor 
but to protect consumers through free competition276. 
 
However, considering that IMS Health and its competitor had started to 
cooperate the Commission already in August 2003 decided to do not proceed 
to a final decision, closing the case277. 
 
All these developments have been ultimately encapsulated in one of the key 
points of the Discussion Paper and in the Guidance Paper on Art. 102 TFEU. 
These both shed new light on the meaning of refusal to supply in line with the 
mentioned case law. 
 
On the one hand, the Discussion Paper focused on those ‘situations where a 
dominant company denies a buyer access to an input in order to exclude that 
buyer from participating in an economic activity (vertical foreclosure)’278, 
saying that the ‘excluded buyer’ could be only a customer and that the main 
form of ‘exclusion’ is where the buyer is potentially also a rival, a competitor, of 
the dominant undertaking in the economic activity for which the input is 
needed (i.e. access to a network as ‘essential facility’, or an obtainment of a 
                                            
276 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR 
I-5039, [2004] 4 CMLR 1453, para 48. 
 
277 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, cited (4th edn, 2011), pp 503-508. 
 




license intellectual property rights). These forms of refusal to supply were 
classified as ‘exclusionary abuses’279. 
 
On the other hand, the Discussion Paper also identified practices that do not 
necessarily consist of a flat and direct refusal to supply but rather in 
behaviours that might be considered equivalent, such as delaying strategies in 
supplying the required access or access-related services, imposing unfair 
trading conditions or charging prices so high that for the buyer would not be 
economically viable to continue its activity280. 
 
The Discussion Paper and the Guidance acknowledge how in vertically-
integrated firms it might happen that a company abuses in its downstream 
market, trying to exclude new competitors that at some point might challenge 
its dominant position also in the upstream market281.  
 
The concerns identified by these interpretative tools are of key importance in 
understanding how the intervention of the antitrust authorities may play a 
crucial role, depending on the type of remedy adopted to redress the 
competition concerns.  
 
To make an example of the new horizons of intervention identified by the 
Commission when the Discussion Paper was adopted, I can mention the new 
light shed on the importance of efficiency as one of the criteria that the 
Competition Authorities must bear in mind in deciding when to intervene 
choosing the best remedy. 
 
Paragraph 214 of the Discussion Paper explicitly says:  
                                            
279 Ibid, para 210. 
 
280 Ibid, para 209.  
 
281 Ibid, , at para 213, says ‘[i]f the downstream market is necessary as an outlet for a product 
or service from the upstream market, by eliminating competition in the downstream market the 
owner of the input may make it less attractive for potential rivals to challenge its position in the 
upstream market. Furthermore, eliminating competition in the downstream market can also 
eliminate the possible competition from a product in the downstream market which is or may 




‘any obligation to supply pursuant to Article 82 [102] can be 
established only after a very close scrutiny of the factual and 
economic context; the factors which go to demonstrate that an 
undertakings’ conduct in refusing to supply is abusive are highly 
dependent on the specific economic and regulatory context in which 
the case arises’282.  
 
The question is whether the suggestion to carry out ‘a very close scrutiny of 
the factual and economic context’ when dealing with a case of refusal to 
supply, if can be considered valid having as a target the protection of an 
indefinite number of consumers ‘pictured’ in the short term, may still be 
considered well-grounded looking at the interest of the consumers in a long 
term perspective.  
 
The analysis of these cases of refusal to supply, applicable also to network-
related abusive conducts, requires us to focus on the Guidance Paper and the 
role that played to underline the importance of looking at the effects that 




2.5. The role of the Commission’s Guidance Paper with respect to 
refusal to supply as an abuse. Importance of an ‘effect-based’ 
analysis, 
 
The thesis is aimed at finding whether structural remedies as per Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003/EC may be applied in vertically-integrated firms, particularly 
in the electronic communications. The lessons learned from the 
implementation of ex ante regulatory remedies (in particular, by the functional 
separation experiment) should be borne in mind as well as the outcome that 
structural ex post enforcement remedies had in the past in the US (in the MCI 
v AT&T case), even though, as I will discuss in chapter VII and VIII, that form 
of local vertical structural separation is not applicable in the EU context.  
 
                                            




The objective of the thesis is also to discuss and show how the various ex post 
remedies may have a different impact in the long-run depending on whether 
the enforcer has as a target the ‘competitors welfare’ or the ‘consumer 
welfare’, and whether the ‘consumer welfare’, in particular, can be seen from a 
short and even a long term perspective. This is why before analysing the 
regulatory and enforcement remedies I have been focusing until now on the 
types of network-related abuses, their impact, their ‘functioning’ from a legal 
point of view, always bearing in mind the dichotomy (i) impact on the 
competitors and (ii) impact (real effect) on consumers as final users. 
 
At European level, the years from the publication of the Discussion Paper 
(2005) to the adoption and publication of the Guidance Paper (2008-2009) 
have certainly enhanced the awareness of the dilemma whether competition 
law policy with respect to abuse of dominant position has as a target the 
protection of competitors or rather the enhancement of consumer welfare. 
Looking closer at these documents we can draw some preliminary conclusion 
particularly useful for the following chapters. 
 
In respect of the refusal to supply and margin squeeze the Guidance 
represents an important step in the perception that the Commission’s 
intervention may lead to distortions in applying article 102 TFEU when it does 
not take into consideration the ultimate consumer interest and the final effect 
on the affected market.  
 
This is clearly stated at paragraph 74 of the Guidance where it says 
 
‘[…] The existence of such an obligation - even for a fair 
remuneration - may undermine firms’ incentives to invest and 
innovate and, thereby, possibly harm consumers. The knowledge 
that they may have a duty to supply against their will may lead 
dominant undertakings – or undertaking who foresee that they may 
become dominant – not to invest, or to invest less, in the activity in 
question. Also, competitors may be tempted to free ride on 
investments made by the dominant undertaking instead of investing 
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themselves. Neither of these consequences would in the long run 
be in the interest of consumers’283. 
 
The Commission seems to say: before looking at a remedy (punishment) to 
enhance competition among incumbent and competitors, let’s look at the 
consumer welfare (and economic efficiency) too.  
 
From a methodological point of view, the Guidance refers to various forms of 
refusal to supply, putting together the refusal to supply products to existing or 
new customers with refusal to licence intellectual property rights, or refusal to 
grant access to an essential facility or a network284.  
The Guidance Paper outlines the cumulative circumstances to be borne in 
mind by the Commission when dealing with the prioritisation. In particular, (i) 
the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be 
able to compete effectively on a downstream market; (ii) the refusal is likely to 
lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market; and 
(iii) the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.  
 
 
The Guidance Paper stresses the importance of taking into consideration on 
the one side the consumer harm and, on the other, the potential efficiencies 
that a refusal to supply may or may not entail. In other words, in both cases, 
the Commission is called on to ascertain whether the remedy (order the 
access to the facility, oblige a company to supply a product) and, within the 
possible remedies, what remedy, is preferable for the final consumer. 
 
Theoretically, under an economic point of view, the ‘efficiencies’ for the final 
consumer may, in fact, outweigh the negative consequences of a refusal to 
supply: in terms of economic efficiency, it is argued that in certain cases a 
refusal to supply may (paradoxically, and in contrast with my thesis) lead to an 
                                            
283 Guidance Paper [2009] OJ C45/7, para 74. 
 




increase of investments in research and development, for the creation, for 
instance, of a new network, or a new product285.  
 
These factors will determine an inversion of the burden of proof, where the 
incumbent will be requested to demonstrate what efficiencies may be reached 
through the allegedly abusive refusal to supply286. 
 
However, if the prioritisation criteria are relevant to provide guidance to the 
enforcers on when to intervene, they still do not seem to provide much 
guidance on how to intervene.  
 
Still, which remedy is preferable is left to the discretion of the enforcer which 
might be conditioned by a variety of immediate concerns (i.e. survival of the 
competitor; short-run consumer welfare) that do not have any relation with 
long term consumer welfare concerns.  
 
In other words, the Guidance Paper tells us that if the Commission has as its 
target the enhancement of consumer welfare through the protection of 
effective competition, perhaps a ‘sanction’ that preserves the structural 
integrity of the incumbent (if the preservation of the structural integrity satisfies 
the immediate and short-term ‘consumer welfare imperative’), should be 
preferable to any other remedy that might increase competition (among 
incumbent and competitors) but could jeopardise, at least in the short-run, 
consumer welfare.  
 
                                            
285 However, on this delicate point it is worth mentioning the recent Case C-209/10 Post 
Danmark v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR-I 0000 [not yet reported] of 27 March 2012. In this 
case, centred on an alleged abuse of dominant position performed by the Danish postal 
incumbent ‘practising a target policy of reductions designed to ensure its customers’ loyalty’ 
[para 8], the Court stated that the fact of charging lower (below cost) prices to retain 
customers cannot be considered per se as determined by the will of excluding the competitors 
[‘it could not be established that Post Denmark had deliberately sought to drive out that 
competitor’, para 29]. The Court, in line with the more economic efficiency-oriented approach 
of the Guidance Paper, states that ‘such an undertaking may demonstrate […] either that its 
conduct is objectively necessary […] or that the exclusionary effect produced may be 
counterbalanced, outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit 
consumers (Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, para 86, and 
TeliaSonera Sverige, para 76).  
 
286 Guidance Paper [2009] OJ C45/7, paras 88 and 89. 
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The question to be tackled in the next chapters is whether a draconian remedy 
such as structural separation, favouring competitors and enhancing 
competition might rather have a positive impact in the long-run, somehow 
satisfying other aspects of a probably more complex and multifaceted 
definition of consumer welfare. 
 
One of the key aspects that emerged from the 2008 review on the 
enforcement activity of the Commission vis á vis exclusionary abusive 
conducts is the focus on ‘effect analysis’. This could provide us with a further 
powerful logical tool: that of analogy.  
 
If we compare vertically-integrated firms conducts, and how the European 
Commission dealt with exclusionary abuses through negotiation of 
commitments in recent times, we might be able to draw direct analogies 
among abuses (for example refusal to supply, withdrawal of capacity) but with 
an eye not only to the conduct per se but rather to the anticompetitive effects 
that that conduct might have had. In other words, a comparative analysis of 
the effects in the existing recent European case-law in both the electronic 
communications sector and in the energy sector (electricity and gas in 
particular) might represent one of the crucial arguments, the argument a 
fortiori, to justify vertical structural separation as an applicable remedy.  
 
 
2.6. The Guidance Paper and the importance of effects analysis. 
 
The Guidance Paper is adamant is stating that the Commission should 
prioritise its enforcement activity focusing on those practices that have serious 
anticompetitive effects on the market287.  
 
The case-law of the last decade, from Microsoft (tying abuse288) to 
Telefónica289 (pricing practices) and Deutsche Telekom (margin squeeze 
                                            
287 R. Whish – D. Bailey, cited, p 200 ff.  
 




practices), the Commission went beyond the analysis of the abusive conduct, 
looking at the anticompetitive effects determined by those conducts, in terms 
of restriction of overall competition, harm of competition and consumers290. 
 
If the new approach indicated in the Guidance Paper is simply reported as a 
suggested practice to be followed by the European Commission (and the 
Courts), the European Courts in two important decisions, Deutsche 
Telekom291 and TeliaSonera292, ‘expressly stated that potential anti-
competitive effects must be demonstrated before a margin squeeze is 
condemned as unlawful’293. In the TeliaSonera case the Court stated that ‘in 
order to establish whether [a margin squeeze] is abusive, that practice must 
have an anti-competitive effect on the market’294.  
 
If this new ‘effects analysis’ trend is taken in conjunction with the Guidance 
Paper, it is crucial to look at the existing case law where structural separation 
as a remedy was adopted (even though on the basis of commitments 
decisions) to see whether the Commission had looked not only at the conducts 
(as per the traditional Art. 102 enforcement approach) but also at the 
anticompetitive effects that those conducts had determined in the relevant 
markets.  
 
                                                                                                                              
289 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 
2013 accessible at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
09/cp130117en.pdf.  
 
290 Commission decision Telefónica, paras 543-618. 
 
291 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-955, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
292 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonea Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, [2011] 
4CMLR 982.  
 
293 R. Whish – D. Bailey, cited, p 201. 
 
294 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-955, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495, paras 250-261; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR 




The presence of those same anticompetitive foreclosure effects in both the 
energy and in the electronic communications sectors could then be taken as a 
non-negligible point in common, opening the door for the application of the 
analogy tool.  
 
Also reasoning a contrario we can reach similar conclusions. Looking at 
anticompetitive conducts in the energy sector which had a lower impact in 
terms of foreclosure effect, the Commission opted for behavioural remedies 
rather than structural, showing the existence of a ‘scale’ of potential remedies 
available, of intensity variable in relation to the anticompetitive effect295.  
 
 
2.7. Concluding remarks on the differences of approach between the 
US and the EU in dealing with abuse of dominance. 
 
An interesting further issue that must be further stressed is the existing 
dichotomy between the US and European approach vis-à-vis behaviours that 
may constitute forms of abuse of a dominant position. US antitrust law does 
not in general protect competitors from hard or tough competition; from the 
District Courts up to the Supreme Court it has been said that the main aim of 
any antitrust law is to protect final consumer welfare296.  
 
On the European Union side, it can be said that Article 102 TFEU both covers 
all the cases captured by Article 2 of the Sherman Act, and any abuse by a 
dominant firm, ‘including uses of power that may not increase power’297 at all, 
because the dominant undertaking is structurally per se more efficient. In other 
                                            
295 R. Nazzini, arguing of the search for a single abuse test for exclusionary, exploitative and 
discriminatory abuses, writes that ‘in framing a test, not just the type and magnitude but also 
the likelihood of anti-competitive effects should be taken into account. Therefore, practices 
should be treated differently if the likelihood of them having anti-competitive effects is different 
[…] ‘[p]ractices are treated more leniently because they have a lower potential for anti-
competitive effects […]. See R. Nazzini, The foundations of European Union Competition Law. 
The objective and principles of Article 102, (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp 53-54. 
 
296E. Fox, Abuse of dominance and monopolization: how to protect competition without 
protecting competitors, Eight Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, European 
University Institute, Fiesole (Florence), 6-7 June 2003, pp 1ff. 
 
297 ibid, p 2. 
135 
 
words in the European system, a dominant firm first has the duty not to harm 
competitors.  
 
Such a difference of approach can be seen in the above-mentioned case 
United States v Microsoft (1999), in which the District Court recognized that 
Microsoft would have harmed the competitor (Netscape in particular) and, 
finally, also the end consumers; while the Court of Appeal, recognising that not 
all the conducts examined could be considered anticompetitive in respect to 
the competitors, substantially ‘lowered the bar’, imposing a settlement 
between Microsoft and Netscape.  
 
In the British Telecom case298 filed in 1983 with the ECJ, the telecom 
incumbent BT, at that time still a State-owned undertaking, impeded the 
private telecom operators from forwarding international calls. The European 
Commission approach, under Article 102 TFEU, forced BT to remove such a 
restraint, in the interest of the competitors299. The US Court, more likely, would 
have not sanctioned such a conduct except in the presence of final consumer 
harm300.  
 
Between the two poles of ‘harm to competition through a direct damage to the 
consumers’ and ‘harm to competitors’, should be added a further pole of 
analysis that is the business conduct that ‘unnecessarily blocks competition on 
merits’301. This last is particularly important for former State-owned controlled 
                                            
 
298 Case C 41/83, Italy v Commission (British Telecom) [1985] ECR 873. 
 
299 However it must be noted that the European Commission adopted a decision mirroring the 
approach held in those same years in the US in the MCI v ATT&T case, where in the interest 
of the competitors the break-up of AT&T had been ordered.  
 
300 See on this point E. Fox, cited, pp 2ff. It is cited the Case GE/Honeywell, in which the US 
authorities cleared a merger that at the same time was rejected by the EC Commission with 
the consequence that several commentators underlined how the US protect competition, while 
the European Union protect competitors. Interesting the comment of Bork in ‘The antitrust 
paradox: a policy at war with itself’ that observed how ‘improper exclusion is always 
deliberately predatory and inefficient, [even though] rare; otherwise, the exclusion is the 
product of superior efficiency’. 
 




economies, as the Italian one, as former Competition Commissioner Mario 
Monti noted  
 
‘Enshrined in the Treaty […] [is] an open market economy with 
free competition. Since its adoption more than 40 years ago, the 
Treaty acknowledges the fundamental role for the market and of 
competition in guaranteeing consumer welfare, encouraging the 
optimal allocation of resources and granting to economic agents 
the appropriate incentives to pursue productive efficiency, quality 
and innovation’302.  
 
Some EU Member States equipped with solid competition law still have ‘State-
granted privileges and weak capital markets [so that t]hey must keep a 
watchful eye on entry conditions and contestability of markets’303. In these 
economies, antitrust law should go beyond the finding of harm to competition 
deriving from a direct harm to consumers also by looking for the ‘road-blocks’ 
that impede full and fair competition among competitors. In other words, in 
Europe the NCAs ought to look for competition on merits, granting that the 
expansion of the market is ultimately based on consumer demand. In other 
words, they should permit the highest level of fair competition, with the 
removal of any obstacle to innovation, adopting those remedies (including 
structural measures) which may facilitate long-term growth and development.  
 
The words of John Temple Lang304, back in 1995, on the importance of 
carefully balancing the property rights of the incumbent with the consumer 
interest might be used as conclusion of this first part of the thesis  
 
‘[b]roadly, any company, even if dominant, has a right to compete 
actively by all methods that are normally permitted. It thus is 
normally entitled to keep and use to the maximum any competitive 
advantage that it has largely acquired, even if its competitors do 
                                            
302 M. Monti, European Competition Policy for the 21st Century, in International Antitrust Law & 
Policy (Fordham Corp. L. Inst., Barry Hawk editions, NY, 2001), Ch. 15, p 257. Emphasis 
added. 
 
303 E Fox, cited, p 11, and Fingleton, Fox, Neven and Seabright, ‘Competition Policy and the 
Transformation of Central Europe’, Centre for Economic policy Research 1996, pp 15-16. 
 




not have any such similar advantages (and may not realistically be 
able to obtain them). Legitimate competition included obtaining 
and keeping exclusive access to, e.g., patents or physical facilities 
that confer competitive advantages. However, competition law 
also says that when a dominant company owns or controls a 
facility access to which is essential to enable its competitor to 
carry on business, it may not deny them access, and it must grant 
access on non-discriminatory basis, in certain circumstances. In 
these circumstances, it must not use its powers as owner to give 
itself advantages as a competitor. The needs of its competitors, 
and the interests of consumers and the public in free competition, 
override the interests of the dominant company in having exclusive 
use of the facility which it had acquired’305. 
 
It is a difficult task to draw a line between the interest of the incumbent, on one 
hand, and the interest of competitors and, ultimately, of consumers as 
European citizens not only in the short term but above all in the long term, on 
the other hand. The analysis in the next chapter of a few recent commitments 
decisions in the energy sector will provide some interesting examples on how 
the Commission, taking action also in response to the findings emerged from 
the Energy Sector Inquiry of 2007, adopted behavioural and structural 
measures aimed at bringing to an end exclusionary and exploitative conducts.  
These cases show that the Commission was particularly prone to accept 
structural remedies in the presence of particularly serious anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects, while accepted the proposal of behavioural remedies in the 









                                            
305 J. Temple Lang, ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: companies’ duties to supply competitors, 
and access to essential facilities’ (Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Kluwer International, The 
Hague, 1995), ch 12, p 245. 
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    CHAPTER III 
 





3.1.  Introduction. 
 
Chapters I and II were aimed at providing the key-tools to allow informed 
discussion of the topics that form the central chapters of the thesis: ex ante 
and ex post remedies to address competition law concerns in dealing with 
abusive conducts in the electronic communications sector.  
 
I firstly established the boundaries of the analysis, explaining that the thesis is 
aimed at showing which remedies might be more suitable in dealing with 
recurrent exploitative and exclusionary abuses in vertically integrated 
industries, particularly in the electronic communications sector. In Chapter I, I 
defined the notion of electronic communications networks, both under a 
regulatory point of view and through the analysis of the European Commission 
decisional practice and of the European Courts judgments. In Chapters II and 
III I looked at some examples of ‘network-related’ abuses of dominant position, 
both in the electronic communications and in the energy sector, so as to 
compare different types of vertically-integrated firms. I focussed firstly on the 
notion of ‘incumbent’ as undertaking in a dominant position in a ‘regulated 
scenario’; then on the recent evolution of the notion of dominance and abuse 
in line with the Guidance on the prioritisation of the enforcement activity of the 
European Commission in dealing with Art. 102 TFEU abuses. The analysis of 
the Guidance Paper led to focus on the exclusionary conducts, and to the 
importance of identifying anticompetitive foreclosure effects in order to 
prioritise the enforcement action of the European Commission according to the 
urgency and seriousness of the infringement.  
 
In Chapter I, I referenced the problem of the ultimate scope of competition law 
enforcement. If the ultimate scope is to enhance ‘consumer welfare’ through 
139 
 
effective competition among competitors, I asked myself whether in choosing 
the best (regulatory or enforcement-related) remedy the Commission and the 
regulatory and competition national authorities have to look at the target of 
enhancing consumer welfare in a ‘short-term’ perspective, or do they have to 
aim at a long-term perspective of individual and collective welfare.  
 
The impulse recently given by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, puts the European 
citizen at the hearth of European legal system. This seems to coincide with the 
intuition that in the coming years perhaps the choice of the best enforcement 
remedy will be guided not only by the idea of (i) enhancing consumer welfare 
(ii) and assuring at the same ‘effective competition (‘competition law test’) in 
what might be seen as a ‘short term’ perspective, but also by the possibility 
that a structural remedy such as vertical separation of the network may favour 
the choice of a solution that might enhance individual and collective ‘welfare’ in 
the long-run perspective. A structural remedy may not only satisfy ‘competition 
concerns’ in the short term (per example through its deterrence or punitive 
effect) but may also enhance satisfaction for the final consumers in the long 
term, for instance increasing the number of players in the electronic 
communications arena, either as network services or as communications 
services provides within the same geographic market.  
 
As I will discuss in chapter V, the 3rd package of liberalisation measures in 
both the gas and electricity sectors is based on the 2009 directives that 
establish vertical structural unbundling separating the producer from the 
transmission company, going a step beyond mere functional separation.  
 
In the energy sector, I will discuss some recent commitments decisions aimed 
at implementing purely structural remedies (cases E.ON in 2008, RWE in 2009 
and ENI in 2010). 
 
This chapter is aimed at analysing the traditional regulatory remedies in the 
electronic communications, and how in certain circumstances they were not 




It will therefore analyse first the most basic regulatory remedy: ‘price cap’ as a 
measure to prevent ‘excessive pricing’ or ‘unfair pricing’. I will then discuss 
more sophisticated regulatory remedies introduced by the 
Telecommunications Package 2000 which comprises accounting separation 
as the most basic form of ‘separation’. This preludes to the recently 
introduced, more complex, ‘functional separation’, the answer of the European 
Commission to overcome the difficulties still present in process of liberalisation 
of the electronic communications sector, in line with other forms of (more 
radical, structural) separations introduced in the energy sector. 
 
Having discussed the Commission’s 2003 Recommendation and the problem 
of ‘barriers to entry’, the second section of the chapter deals with the 2007 
reform of the Telecommunications Package 2000 that led to the adoption of 
the Directive 2009/140/EC306 introducing at European level the remedy of 
functional separation as an important ‘regulatory’ step forward in preventing 
network-related abuses. 
 
Chapter IV will build on the analysis of the ex ante remedies discussing the 
effectiveness of fines and of behavioural remedies, recalling how 
commitments showed a way of addressing the enforcer’s competition 
concerns through negotiated solutionS. The analysis of a particular form of 
commitments at UK national level, as the ‘undertakings in lieu of reference to 
the Competition Commission for market investigation’ will help to explain the 
origin of functional separation as a regulatory tool, but will also give the 
opportunity to argue that the remedy has still completely addressed all the 






                                            
306 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 




3.2.  The regulatory approach. Ex ante remedies in the electronic 
communications. 
 
Why are ex ante (regulatory-based) or ex post (enforcement-based) remedies 
are required to grant and vitalise competition, in particular with respect to 
those services that are considered of ‘general economic interest’? 
 
The main reason is that from late 19th century onwards in the most 
industrialised countries the provision of services of economic general interest, 
such as post and telecommunications, transmission of electricity and gas, 
distribution of water, or supply of transport services, were almost exclusively 
provided (i) by the State; (ii) in a regime of (natural, then legal) monopoly307. 
 
The single Member State was the sole entity in a position to invest 
considerable sums of money into the deployment of networks308 required to 
provide the services, also considering the long period of time to reach the 
‘break even’. 
 
These investments had to be ‘protected’ by granting public ownership (legal 
monopoly) to the State. The State could then transfer part of its rights to 
concessionaires, who could then make (monopolistic) profits.  
 
From mid-1980s in the United Kingdom and the early 1990s in the rest of 
continental Europe, many of these national champions (to use a recent 
terminology) faced at least two ‘natural’ enemies.  
 
Firstly, technological evolution. Electronic communications networks, for 
instance, had to evolve and required new investments to be competitive and 
efficient. As I. Walden points out  
                                            
307 See F. Di Porto ‘La Regolazione ’geneticamente modificata’: c’è del nuovo in tema di 
rapporti tra regolazione e concorrenza’ (2006)6 Riv. Ital. Dir. Pubblico Comunitario, 947 ff. 
 
308 For instance copper lines, for telecommunications; bridges and railways, for 
transportations; plants and grids for energy production and distribution; pipelines, for gas and 





‘the provision of a modern telecommunications infrastructure 
requires massive capital investment, a funding burden which 
governments are no longer prepared to shoulder. Attracting 
some degree of private sector finance is generally seen as the 
only feasible mechanism for meeting the policy objective of 
modernizing this strategic economic sector’309. 
 
 
Secondly, evident inefficiencies of the State-intervention model in the 
economy might have influenced some European Member States, particularly 
the United Kingdom, towards privatisation. Scholars of the Chicago’s School of 
Economics have certainly played an important role in influencing governments, 
based on the key principle that economic efficiency should be the driver for 
optimal industrial choices. 
 
When the process of privatisation began (during the 1980s in the United 
Kingdom, but only in 1990s in Italy, to make two examples) the ‘national 
champions’ had to be bound by rules or, more legally, regulated. As a 
consequence, the State ‘owner’ (or State ‘administrator’) transformed into be 
State ‘regulator’310.  
 
At the same time many Member States adopted national legislations in order 
to enforce the main competition law provisions of the Treaties to grant a level 
playing field of competition in accordance with the competition law rules 
against the risk of collusion or potential abuses of a dominant position311. 
Alongside privatisation, the European Commission proposed a number of 
directives aimed at favouring the process of liberalisation, in line with the idea 
that economic efficiency could be maximised only in the presence of a clear 
‘framework’ of rules favouring the fairness of the competitive game of 
                                            
309 I. Walden, Telecommunications Law and Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
2009), p 10. For Walden a second reason that led to privatisation can be found in the 
concerns that a state-owned incumbent might inhibit market entry (ibid).  
 
310 F. Di Porto, cited, p 949.  
 
311 To make an example, Italy adopted its Competition Law Act in 1990: Law no. 287 of 10 




economic actors312. The balance and proportion between regulation and free 
competition is not rigidly set: when considering the different economic 
backgrounds and the different industrial development paths, the proportion of 
regulatory measures and free competition at European level may vary 
considerably from one State to another. The doctrine identifies at least four 
different balances among regulators and competition authorities313.  
 
The first approach is defined of ‘mutual exclusion’, as suggested by the US 
Courts. Enforcers do not intervene in those areas that might be better 
disciplined by sector-regulators (for instance the case Verizon v. Trinko314 in 
which the US Supreme Court ruled that the regulatory authority was ‘best 
positioned’ in making a decision with respect to the access to Verizon’s 
network). The US Supreme Court stated in that occasion that in the presence 
of a ‘regulatory structure […], the additional benefit to competition provided by 
antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the 
antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny’315. The Court deems that if 
a regulator showed its capacity of preventing anticompetitive anomalies, there 
is no reason for further intervention by the courts316. The above-mentioned 
case Verizon v. Trinko317 decided in 2004 by the US Supreme Court, ruling the 
exclusive competence of the communications authority in a case dealing with 
interconnection and access to the local loop, can be taken as a clear example 
                                            
312 In the electronic communications sector the first piece of European legislation aimed at 
liberalising the sector is the so-called ‘Terminals’ Directive 88/310/EEC of the European 
Commission of 16 May 1988, on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal 
equipment. It was followed by the Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 
(‘Services’), liberalizing the added value services.  
  
313 See an excellent overview of the main schools of thought with respect to the balance 
between competition and regulation outlined by F. Di Porto, cited, p 951 ff. 
 
314 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 124 S. Ct. 
872 (2004), decided on 14 January 2004 by the US Supreme Court. See syllabus (from the 
writ of certiorari), accessible at http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/540/02-682/. 
 
315 Syllabus from the certiorari of Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 
LLP, above, p 2. 
 
316 F. Di Porto, ‘La regolamentazione ‘geneticamente modificata’: c’e’ del nuovo in tema di 
rapporti tra regolazione e concorrenza’, (2006) no. 6 Rivista Italiana di Dir. Pubblico 
Comunitario, 955. 
 
317 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 124 S. Ct. 




of ‘antitrust immunity’ when dealing with an issue that could be better decided 
by the sector-regulator.  
 
On this specific point, I will discuss later how the European Commission 
enforcement action can be considered as independent from the regulators’ 
range of action, as demonstrated by the Deutsche Telekom318 case of 2003, in 
which the Commission fined DT for abuse of dominant position even though 
DT claimed of having fully complied with the tariffs’ scheme set by the German 
communications regulator. 
 
A second approach to regulation and antitrust enforcement can be defined ‘à 
la Littlechild’: named after the British professor who dealt with the privatisation 
and regulation of the British energy market in the 1980s. Regulation precedes 
antitrust enforcement: ‘regulation (…) is not a substitute for competition. It is a 
mean of ‘holding the fort until competition arrives’319. In a perfectly mature 
market, regulation should disappear. The prices, quality and quantity should 
be simply granted by pure competition forces320. 
 
The third approach can be summarised as a ‘complementary’ approach 
(Laffont and Tirole321). The authorities ‘strike the same rocks’322 at the end, 
each authority specialised in a different field but with the same final target: 
                                            
318 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
319 Stephen C Littlechild, Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability (London: 
Department of Industry, 1983), p 7. See also the First Report of the Select Committee of 
Regulators of the UK Parliament (Chapter VII ‘Competition and Competitiveness’), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldrgltrs/189/18910.htm.  
 
320 S. Littlechild literally said ‘Competition is indisputably the most effective means-perhaps the 
only effective means-of protecting consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is 
essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly; it is not a substitute for 
competition. It is a means of ‘holding the fort’ until competition arrives’. See L. Correa, ‘The 
Economics of Telecommunications Regulation’, in I. Walden, cited, Telecommunications Law 
and Regulation, p 59.  
 
321 K.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications (MIT Press, 2000), p 276ff. 
 




grant a level playing field for competition, ultimately enhancing consumers 
satisfaction. 
 
The fourth approach is defined as the ‘complementary balance’ approach. It is 
represented by the equilibrium between regulation and competition law, a sort 
of combination of the Littlechild’s and Laffont & Tirole’s approaches323. An 
example is given by the creation of the regulator for communications in United 
Kingdom, the Office of Communications (OFCOM) in 2003, an attempt at 
merging different authorities supervising the British ‘communications’ 
regulators galaxy (OFTEL, ASA, BBFC, BSC, ITC, PCC). 
 
The UK Communications Bill of June 2002324 suggested this new form of 
‘cohabitation’, combining regulatory with competition enforcement (application 
of the Competition Act 1998, hereinafter the ‘CA98’, rules on agreements and 
abuse of dominance) activities. 
 
It is worth recalling the exact wording of the Communications Bill 
 
‘as competition becomes more pervasive in the supply of 
communications services, it is expected that OFCOM will be able to 
rely increasingly on these general powers (antitrust), rather than 
powers specific to the sector (regulation), in addressing concerns 
about competition (consequentiality). However, many aspects of the 
sector specific framework, e.g. universal service provision, will 
remain necessary and will not disappear or become redundant in 
the foreseeable future (complementarity)’325. 
 
The European Commission adopted this ‘combined’ approach in the review 
process of the electronic communications at the beginning of the 2000s (which 
led to the adoption of the ‘Telecommunications Package 2000). 
                                            
323 F. Di Porto, cited, 957. The Author defines this type of relationship as ‘consequentially 
complementary’. 
 
324 F. Di Porto, cited, 958. 
 
325 Section 5.3.3.of the Policy document attached to the Draft Communications Bill, jointly 
submitted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and by the Ministry of British Culture, 
published the 7 May 2002. The Draft Communications Bill is available at 





Principles taken from antitrust doctrine and jurisprudence (such as the concept 
of dominance) were used in the new set of directives to integrate and 
transform the previous regulatory tools.  
 
The balance between regulation and competition will be analysed more in 
depth in the following sections.  
 
The regulatory and competition law enforcement approaches, as well as the 
different solutions adopted in different jurisdictions, has to be considered not 
only with respect to the short-term outcomes obtained or expected, but also 
with respect to their capacity of achieving long-term objectives, generically 
identified as general interest or public policy targets.  
 
This thesis aims to answer the research question, ‘can structural remedies in 
the electronic communications sector be applied?’, particularly with respect to 
exclusionary abuses. Looking at the way in which various forms if abuse have 
been dealt with in the recent years, the impression one gets is that both not 
‘invasive’ regulatory tools and enforcement measures (mainly pecuniary fines) 
may have been insufficient even though they achieved immediate outcomes 
(i.e. access to a facility; application of serious fines of the abuser).  
 
In chapter III I showed how the most recent directives (adopted in 2009) in the 
electricity and gas sectors have embraced the structural approach, in parallel 
with the commitments decision adopted by the European Commission in the 
aftermath of the Energy Sector Enquiry, between 2007 and 2010. In the 
presence of recurrent abuses of dominant position, sometimes within the 
same geographic market, and with respect to the same undertaking, serious 
questions on the effectiveness of the ex-ante measures applied may arise. As 
well as further doubts about the deterrence effect of ex post measures arise. 
 
Regulatory intervention, at least temporarily, may prevent some access-
related infringements of competition law, but may lack of forward-looking 
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perspective326. I will demonstrate the importance of reasons that may lead the 
competition enforcer, in full autonomy with respect to the measures imposed 
by the sector regulators, to adopt more invasive remedies in presence of 
network-related abuses. These may be disruptive in the short-term but have a 
potential of generate more competition in the long-term.  
 
I will analyse the pros and cons of the remedies adopted in recent times in 
different vertically integrated industries, and show the advantages of both 
functional and structural remedies, underlining the uncertainties that may 
follow the adoption of mere behavioural or functional remedies. A more 
invasive and draconian remedy such as a structural separation may in certain 




3.3.  Price-cap as a form of preventing ‘excessive pricing’ or ‘unfair 
pricing’ conducts. An example of price cap from the British experience.  
 
‘Price-cap’ is the most obvious form of a (temporary) regulatory measure that, 
in vertically-integrated industries, particularly in electronic communications, 
can directly prevent some of the most common forms of abuse, first of all 
excessive pricing.  
 
In an early stage of the privatisation process, with the aim of imposing a ceiling 
on the profits that the privatised incumbent could earn, the United Kingdom 
government adopted a ‘rate-of return’ oriented regulation, i.e. the prices had to 
be set in a way of allowing a ‘fair’ rate of return on the capital invested327. 
 
                                            
 
326 There are remedies such as functional separation (typical ex post remedy, as the more 
draconian remedy of structural separation) that may be now considered, after the last review 
of the Telecommunications Package 2000 carried out between 2006 and 2009, regulatory 
tools aimed at preventing anticompetitive distortions rather than ex post ‘punishments’. 
 
327 See L. Correa, ‘The Economics of Telecommunications Regulation’ in I. Walden (ed) 




This first means of capping prices (and, consequently, the profits of the 
incumbent) was progressively abandoned, since it emerged that the 
incumbent would augment capital investments raising the ceiling of profits, 
without particular concerns for diminishing costs328. This method turned to be 
inefficient both for the shareholders and customers. 
 
This regulatory approach was overtaken with another form of price-cap, 
calculated through the ‘RPI–X’ (‘retail minus’) formula, developed by Professor 
S. Littlechild329.  
 
Through this method a basket of incumbent’s prices is first taken into account 
(for the various services provided) over a period of four-five years. These 
prices can be increased annually subtracting from the RPI (Retail Price Index) 
the X factor, calculated taking into consideration (a) the presumed movements 
of productivity plus (b) the costs of the specific industry. This means that the 
final price can be increased each year by taking into account any increase in 
efficiency (for instance, reducing the costs, less will be deducted from the RPI, 
therefore the revenues will be higher). 
 
This second approach was particularly welcomed by economists, because it 
granted an increase of profits for the privatised incumbent, preserving the 
incentive of reducing the costs to a minimum.  
 
The price-cap as a first, intuitive, regulatory tool to grant a certain level of 
‘fairness’ of the incumbent’s pricing activity, encounters many operational 
difficulties. One of the main problems for the regulator is to gather all the 
information in order to establish a ‘fair’ price. As seen above, the X factor, in 
particular, requires complex speculation about the foreseeable growth of a 
certain sector, in addition to the ‘efficiency gains’ (cost-reduction oriented). 
The regulator, obviously, has limited access to information that only the 
                                            
328 ibid, 58. 
 
329 S. C. Littlechild, Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability: Report to the 
Secretary of State, London, Department of Industry, 1983, and S.C. Littlechild and M.E. 
Economics Beesley, ‘The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom’, in 
(1989) 20 RAND Journal of Economics, 454-72. 
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incumbent can have: a crucial problem called ‘asymmetry of information’ 
between the information owned by the regulator and the firm330. 
 
Asymmetry of information represents one of the main problems for regulators 
to adopt fully effective price-cap policies.  
 
Nevertheless, some regulatory instruments aimed at favouring the ‘symmetry’ 
of information can be adopted. One of the simplest ways of separating the 
information of various departments or branches of the incumbent is the so-
called ‘accounting separation’. On a different level, but with the same aim, 
other forms of separation can be adopted, further enhancing a new shape of 
market structure, symmetry of information, effective competition: as we will 




3.4.  Accounting separation as a tool to deal with price-related abuses 
in the electronic communications sector. The regulatory tools of 
the ‘Telecommunications Package’ 2000. 
 
With respect to the electronic communications sector, regard should be given 
to the fact that sometimes it is not easy to determine the ‘real’ costs (it being 
also difficult to distinguish the ‘sunk’ and the ‘fixed’ costs from the ‘variable’ 
costs)331. 
                                            
 
330 L. Correa, cited, 60-61. 
 
331 I will discuss late, in s. 4 of chapter VI, the criticisms expressed by the General Court in the 
the Case Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission T-336/07 [2007] OJ C269/55. 
The judgment of the 29 March 2012 expressly states that the Spanish regulator set the retail 
and wholesale prices on the basis of estimates of cost that did not reflect the historical, actual, 
costs borne by the incumbent. Furthermore, the Court confirmed the position already adopted 
in the Deutsche Telekom case, stating that the prices set by the regulator cannot exempt the 
incumbent from behaving according to the competition law principles. From the European 
Commission’s press release announcing the General Court judgment: ‘As regards the role of 
ex ante regulation, the Court confirms the position taken in the Deutsche Telekom judgment 
(case C-280/08 P of 14 October 2010) that national legislation concerning 
telecommunications– in this case, compliance with the decisions taken by the national telecom 
regulator CMT on the basis of the regulatory framework –does not release dominant firms 
from their obligation to respect EU competition law. In any event, Telefónica had sufficient 
discretion to determine its pricing policy. Importantly, the Court confirms that Telefónica must 
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In order to quantify the real costs of telecommunications services, in the Open 
Networks Provisions (OPN) directives the European Council and the 
Commission stated that the telecommunications operators have to keep 
separate their accounts for telecommunications services, on the one hand, 
from the accounts of the telecommunications infrastructures, on the other. This 
idea was ‘codified’ in the ‘Telecommunications Package’ directives adopted in 
2002,The ‘Access Directive’, in particular, established that the NRA  may 
impose obligations for accounting separation in relation to specified activities 
related to interconnection and/or access. In particular, the NRA could finally 
require a vertically-integrated company ‘to make transparent its wholesale 
prices and its internal transfer prices’ in order to prevent any form of 
discrimination or to prevent unfair cross-subsidisation332. 
 
 
With the same aim, the ‘Framework Directive’333 provided duties of accounting 
separation and financial reports in order to  
 
‘identify all elements of cost and revenue, with the basis of their 
calculation and the detailed attribution methods used, related to 
their activities associated with the provision of electronic 
communications networks or services including an itemised 




‘have structural separation for the activities associated with the 
provision of electronic communications networks or services’334. 
 
                                                                                                                              
have known that the regulator never examined the existence of a margin squeeze in relation to 
the regulated regional wholesale access product on the basis of the actual costs of the 
undertaking, but rather on the basis of estimates which had not in actual fact been confirmed 
by the developments of the market’. See Memo 12/233 of 29 March 2012, accessible at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-233_en.htm. 
 
332 Dir. 2002/19/EC [2002] OJ L108/7, art 10. 
 
333 Dir. 2002/21/EC [2002] OJ L 108/33. 
 
334 Dir 2002/21/EC [2002] OJ L 108/33, art 13. 
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Accounting separation (the so-called ‘accounting unbundling’) is one of the 
most efficient tools aimed at enhancing the financial and administrative 
transparency of electronic communications operators.  
However, in recent years the idea of granting transparency, fair prices (for 
competitors and consumers) and effective competition, through recourse to a 
more advanced form of behavioural remedy such as functional separation 
emerged. It represents a combination of both structural and accounting 
separation, and it is aimed at creating a ring-fenced division of the incumbent 
company dealing mainly with access and interconnection of competitors with 
the network335. 
 
This option is now part of the Access Directive as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC336. As per Article 2 of Directive 2009/140/EC, the Access 
Directive has now a new provision, Article 13 (a), authorising the functional 
separation of the division dealing with wholesale access to the network, in 
particular 
 
‘[w]here the national regulatory authority concludes that the 
appropriate obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed 
to achieve effective competition and that there are important and 
persisting competition problems and/or market failures identified in 
relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product 
markets’337. 
 
The NRAs are now entitled to impose an obligation upon the electronic 
communications incumbent under their own jurisdiction to ‘place activities 
related to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in an 
independently operating business entity’338. 
 
                                            
 
335 L. Correa, cited, 64. 
 
336 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
 






It aims at impeding bi-directional streams of information between the 
‘access/interconnection’ division of a company and the retail division of the 
same vertically integrated company, creating a system of firewalls between the 
various divisions of the same company and its highest decisional bodies.  
As mentioned above, the most interesting example of a separation of this type 
was adopted in United Kingdom in 2006 with the creation of a separate 
division of the British Telecom Group (BT) called ‘Openreach’. This emerged 
after a long process of consultation between the electronic communications 
operators, the incumbent and OFCOM. Since its creation it deals with the 
access to BT’s infrastructures and is aimed at granting the highest 
transparency and fairness during (and after) the negotiations between the 
incumbent and its own competitors.  
 
In line with the target of enhancing the ‘information symmetry’ between the 
regulator and the incumbent, the directive also amended Art. 13 of the Access 
Directive introducing a new paragraph establishing that  
 
‘[a] national regulatory authority may […]impose obligations relating 
to cost recovery and price controls, including obligations for cost 
orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost accounting 
systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection and/or 
access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack 
of effective competition means that the operator concerned may 
sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price 
squeeze, to the detriment of end-users’339. 
 
 
The problem of access to communications infrastructure has played a crucial 
role in the adoption of fundamental pieces of European legislation in the last 
two decades. After the fragmented approach of the late 1980’s and early 
1990s340, with a first set of directives aimed at liberalising some 
                                            
339 Dir 2009/140/EC [2009] L 337/37, art 2, para 9. Emphasis added. 
 
340 Note that the first liberalisation provisions dates back to 1984, the Council 
Recommendation 84/549/EEC concerting the implementation of harmonisation in the field of 
telecommunications, [1984] OJ L 298/49 (16 November 1984) (see I. Walden – J. Angel, cited, 




telecommunications sectors (for instance, non-voice telephony services)341, 
the most powerful attempt of harmonisation was made by the so-called 
Telecommunications Package 2000.  One of the key features of the 
Telecommunications Package 2000 was that of providing a systematic legal 
framework to the Significant Market Power (hereinafter, ‘SMP’) test, which was 
aimed at ascertaining whether an undertaking, within a specific 
telecommunications product and geographic market, holds ‘significant market 
power’ if it detains at least a 25% share of the relevant market342. If that 
threshold is triggered, then the communications regulatory authorities can 
impose specific behavioural obligations aimed at guaranteeing undistorted 
competition in that specific electronic communications market.  
 
To understand the evolution of the discipline of the SMP test, firstly one has to 
look at the Directive 97/33/EC343 on interconnection in the electronic 
communications sector that specified the characteristics that an undertaking 
must have in order to be forced to fulfil the duties established to guarantee the 
full and complete liberalisation of the market. Article 4 represents a key point 
in the process of liberalisation of the European telecommunications networks 
stating that: 
 
‘Organizations authorized to provide public telecommunications 
networks and publicly available telecommunications services […] 
which have significant market power shall meet all reasonable 
requests for access to the network including access at points other 
than the network termination points offered to the majority of end-
users. An organization shall be presumed to have significant 
market power when it has a share of more than 25 per cent of a 
                                            
341 See, in particular, the so-called ‘Services Directive’ 90/388/EC of 28 June 1990 on 
‘Competition in the markets for telecommunications services’, accessible at 
http://www.anacom.pt/template16.jsp?categoryId=59470 . See also the Council Resolution of 
22 December 1994 on the principles and timetable for the liberalisation of telecommunications 
infrastructures, in OJ C 379/4 of 31 December 1994.  
 
342 The SMP test had been first introduced into the European legal system since the 1990s, 
but only in the Telecommunications Package 2000 found a more systematic discipline. 
 
343 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 97/33/EC of 03 June 1997 on 
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provisions [1997] OJ No 




particular telecommunications market in the geographical area in a 
Member State within which it is authorized to operate’344. 
 
This provision was substantially amended after a long review process, 
accompanied by public consultations. The SMP notion was finally anchored to 
the competition-law concept of dominance as elaborated by the Commission’s 
practice and European Courts’ jurisprudence on Article 102 TFEU. To 
establish whether an undertaking detains SMP, the national regulatory 
authority will not simply ‘measure’ the 25% share held by an undertaking in a 
specific market, but rather will ‘measure’ its position in a particular market 
through a more complex assessment, bearing in mind the tools described in 
Chapter II of the present work to ascertain the existence of a ‘dominant 
position’ in competition enforcement proceedings. 
 
The Commission in drafting the above-mentioned directives adopted on 7 
March 2002 provided a new definition of SMP clearly modelled on the notion 
of dominance pursuant to Article 102 TFEU and the practice of the European 
Courts. In particular, Article 14, paragraph 2, of the Framework Directive345 
established that 
 
‘An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power 
if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position 
equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers’, 
 
                                            
344 It is also interesting to mention the third paragraph of Article 4: ‘NRAs may nevertheless 
determine that an organization with market share of less than 25 per cent in the relevant 
market has significant market power. They may also determine that an organization with a 
market share of more than 25 per cent in the relevant market does not have significant 
market power. In either case, the determination shall take into account the organization’s 
ability to influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its control 
of the means of access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and 
services in the market’. Emphasis added. 
 




in full accordance with the most consolidated practice of the European Courts 
on dominance. To make an example, in the above-mentioned case United 
Brands346 the dominant position was defined as 
 
‘[…]a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained 
on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers’347. 
 
The regulators will apply the same rationale to establish whether the 
company has SMP. 
 
Once it is established that an undertaking that has direct control of the access 
network also has SMP, the following obligations are automatically imposed to 
the incumbent: 
 
1 Mandatory access to specific network facilities; 
2 Transparency obligations; 
3 Accounting separation; 
4 Cost-oriented accounting and retail price regulation348. 
 
It must be noted that the ascertainment of the position of dominance for the 
aims of enforcing Article 102 TFEU is carried out with respect to past 
behaviours. The SMP test, by contrast, is carried out to decide whether an ex 
ante measure must be applied, therefore ‘past behaviour’ should not be taken 
into account. Rather, as Garzaniti correctly observed before the adoption of 
the new Telecommunications Package 2000, ‘the finding of SMP will mean a 
substantial amount of projections and assumptions on future development’349.  
 
                                            
346 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, CMR 
8429. 
 
347 Emphasis added. 
 
348 On this point see L. Garzaniti, Guidelines on Significant Market Power, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, Brussels, December 2001. 
 




In order to provide regulators with the necessary interpretative tools to apply 
ex ante a parameter (dominance) usually applied in ex post enforcement 
proceedings, the Commission adopted two further documents: (a) guidelines 
regarding the evaluation of SMP in relation to the markets of networks and 
services of electronic communication350, and (b) a first Commission 
recommendation (2003) regarding the relevant markets of products and 
services which could be subject to ex ante regulation pursuant to the 
Framework Directive351, listing 18 markets352, recently substituted by a second 
Commission Recommendation353 of 17 December 2007, reducing the 
relevant products and services markets from 18 to 8, in line with the objectives 
outlined at the beginning of the ‘Telecommunications Package Review’ 
process launched in June 2006.  
 
As per the 2002 Guidelines, one can say that an undertaking shall be deemed 
to have SMP and to be in a dominant position when it holds at least 50 per 
cent of the market. In specific circumstances, an undertaking with a market 
share over 40 per cent may be also considered as dominant, pursuant to the 
ECJ relevant jurisprudence354. In addition, other criteria are used to measure 
market power, such as technological advantages or superiority, economies of 
scale, vertical integration or absence of potential competitors. The adoption of 
                                            
350 Guidelines of the Commission for the analysis of the market and the evaluation of the 
Significant Market Power pursuant to the new EC regulatory framework for the networks and 
services of electronic communications [2002] OJ C 165/6 (11 July 2002) (‘Guidelines 2002’). 
 
351 Directive 2002/21/EC [2002] OJ L 108/33. 
 
352 Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 regarding the relevant 
markets of products and services of the electronic communications sector susceptible of an ex 
ante regulation pursuant to the Directive 2002/21/EC, [2003] OJ L 114/45 (8 May 2003) 
(‘Recommendation 2003’). 
 
353 Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC of 17 December 2007 on ‘Relevant product 
and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante 
regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services’, [2007] OJ 344/65 (28 December 2007) (‘Recommendation 2007’).  
 
354 For the concept of dominance determined looking at the market share (calculated on the 
basis of the volume or the value) of the undertaking in a dominant position, the fundamental 
case is Hoffman La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461; on dominance even 
with a market share lower than 40% (39.7%) see Commission Decision Virgin/British Airways 





this model of assessment of the dominant position within the electronic 
communications markets, and the consequences in terms of duties and 
obligations that new entrants had to satisfy within the liberalised and regulated 
market, seemed to have opened new perspectives of preventing abuses by 
the incumbent vis-à-vis its competitors seeking access to the networks355. The 
Guidelines suggested the assessment of an undertaking’s dominance on the 
basis of legal tools of competition law: 
 
i) the current jurisprudence of the General Court and of the ECJ 
with reference to the market definition and the concept of 
dominant position pursuant to Article 102 EC and Article 2 of the 
EC merger regulation356; 
ii) the Commission decisional practice and the criteria listed in the 
Annex II of the Framework Directive357;  
iii) the Communication of the Commission on the notion of relevant 
market; 
iv) the Communication of the Commission on the application of the 
competition rules to the agreements on the access in the 
telecommunications sector358. 
 
On the other hand, the Recommendation 2007 provided a list of relevant 
markets in the electronic communications sector which reflected the radical 
and fast changes which occurred in the past decade.  
 
                                            
355 The innovative nature of the 2002 Telecommunications Package could be captured by 
reading paragraph 24 of the Guidelines of 7 July 2002 where it states ‘in order to define the 
markets and to determine a Significant Market Power shall be applied the same 
methodologies used for the competition provisions’, quite unusual for a piece of legislation 
aimed at regulating a specific utility rather than enforcing competition law.  
 
356 Guidelines 2002, Sect. 3.1.2.1, para 89 ff. 
 
357 Ibid, Sect. 3.1.2.2., para 95 ff. Among the criteria listed in the Annex II of the Framework 
Directive it is worth recalling: mature market, stagnant or moderate growth on the demand 
side, low elasticity of demand, homogeneous product, similar cost structures, similar market 
shares, lack of technical innovation. 
358 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 





Finally, Recital 5 of the Recommendation 2007 lists three main cumulative 
criteria to define the relevant markets to which ex ante regulation must be 
applied: 
 
i) The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to 
entry359;  
(ii) The second criterion admits only those markets whose structure 
does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time 
horizon. The application of this criterion involves examining the state of 
competition behind the barriers to entry;  
iii) The third criterion is that application of competition law alone would 
not adequately address the market failure(s) concerned. 
 
Recommendation 2007 was aimed at playing a major role in terms of granting 
fair conditions of access to the relevant markets. With the application of the 
three cumulative (and rigid) criteria it was aimed at identifying a few markets 
where ex ante obligations must be imposed with a high level of certainty in 
order to enhance and grant effective competition. This would allow the existing 
operators to launch new products and services into the market without 
imposing excessive and discouraging regulation.  
 
Recommendation 2007 must be now read in conjunction with the new 
Directive 2009/140/EC, reforming Article 7 of the Framework directive, as 
discussed in Section 6, below. 
 
 
3.5. Price caps do not prevent exclusionary abusive conducts: the 
‘margin squeeze’ cases Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica.  
 
                                            
 
359 It adds: ‘These may be of a structural, legal or regulatory nature. However, given the 
dynamic character and functioning of electronic communications markets, possibilities to 
overcome barriers to entry within the relevant time horizon should also be taken into 
consideration when carrying out a prospective analysis to identify the relevant markets for 
possible ex ante regulation’. 
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In Chapter II (section 4, point v), I discussed how some abusive exclusionary 
conducts such as margin squeeze could be put in place even in the 
presence of price cap established by the national regulatory authority.  
 
As we have seen the Deutsche Telekom360 is all centred on the abusive 
conduct carried out by DT in the market of the leased lines for fixed 
telephony. The Commission focused on its pricing strategy for local 
access to the fixed telephony network, finding that DT put in place its 
margin squeeze activity ‘by charging new entrants higher fees for 
wholesale access to the local loop than what subscribers had to pay for 
retail lines’361. The investigation was triggered by the complaints filed by 
numerous new entrants in the German fixed-line telecommunications 
market.  
 
In this case, new entrants were not looking for technical local loop unbundling 
(local access lines), but rather to lease the lines at fair and non-discriminatory 
terms. It represents an example of intervention of the European Commission 
as an enforcer even in the presence of prices set by the German 
communications regulator (Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und 
Post - REgTP). As I said in chapter II, DT objected that ‘any margin squeeze 
must be the result of excessive wholesale prices or predatory retail prices, or a 
combination of the two’ and that simply modifying those set prices ‘it must be 
legally possibly to terminate the squeeze’362. 
 
The Commission objected that in this case the margin squeeze test was the 
relevant test, and that since de facto the new entrants were excluded from the 
German fixed telephony market because they could not make a sufficient 
                                            
360 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). 
 
361 R. Klotz-J. Feherenbach, ‘Two Commission decisions on price abuse in the 
telecommunications sector’, (2003) no. 3, Competition Policy Newsletter, European 
Commission, 8. 
 




margin of profit, therefore the margin squeeze test had to prevail, even in 
presence of regulated tariffs. 
 
The Commission demonstrated that DT under certain conditions could have 
avoided the margin squeeze, in particular by increasing the retail access 
charges for analogue telephony, ISDN and ADSL connections within the 
German price cap system. Between 1998 and 2001 the Federal Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications had given sufficient margin to DT to 
restructure its tariff system, allowing DT to increase the retail access charges, 
compensating such an increase with a reduction of the call charges. The 
Commission, in particular, showed how DT, even though could have set the 
retail access tariff at higher level, compensating the increases of the retail 
access tariffs with a reduction of the call charges, in reality did not undertake 
any increase of the charges for analogue and ISDN connections, therefore 
forcing the competitors (new entrants) either to leave or to do not enter the 
market.  
 
Without recalling here the findings of the General Court and the Court of 
Justice already discussed in chapter II, it is nevertheless important to stress 
how DT was able to put in place its margin squeeze conducts even in the 
presence of prices set by the regulator that gave it the possibility to rise the 
retail access tariffs by decreasing the call charges in order to balance that 
increase. The Court of Justice, in line with the position of the General Court in 
the same case, confirmed the applicability of Art. 102 by the Commission in 
those cases in which the incumbent is subject to national provisions that do 
not impose an anticompetitive behaviour but rather put the incumbent in the 
position of exercising its discretionary power, by simply soliciting or facilitating 
the adoption of anticompetitive behaviours363. DT was in the position of 
choosing whether to lower the wholesale access tariffs for the new entrants, or 
raise the prices for the final consumers, therefore increasing the margin of 
profit for the new entrants. None of these behaviours was put in place.  
 
                                            
363 G. Colangelo, ‘Margin squeeze in Europa dopo Deutsche Telekom e TeliaSonera’ in (2011) 




This raises the question: when, even in the presence of national provisions set 
by the NRA that would allow the incumbent to set the prices at such a level to 
ensure that the competitors can enter the market, the incumbent is able to put 
in place strategies aimed at excluding its potential competitors, such as margin 
squeeze practices, vertical (functional and structural) separation of the division 
dealing with wholesale and retails communications, on the one hand, from the 
access division, on the other hand364, could have impeded the margin squeeze 
conduct? This is what the reform carried out between 2007 and 2009 tried to 
address with the new formulation of the Framework Directive.  
 
As discussed later, functional separation has been introduced as a regulatory 
ex ante remedy by Directive 2009/140/EC365 to deal also with such abuses. 
The question is whether in case such as Deutsche Telekom (or Telefónica, 
also discussed in that chapter) functional or even structural separation could 
have been imposed as an enforcement measure. 
 
Here it is worth considering, the most realistic objection that structural 
separation would have faced. 
 
Should a competitor have acquired Deutsche Telekom’s or   Telefónica’s 
infrastructure, it would have become a competitor of the incumbent in several 
electronic communications services (for example, voice telephone, mobile 
telephony, broadband). As the 2006 OECD Report on Structural Separation 
noted ‘the telecom sector is somewhat distinct from the others in the sense 
that the non-incumbent operator seeking access and interconnection could be 
a competitor of the infrastructure operations of the incumbent’366.  
 
                                            
364 As in the Openreach case, to make an example of functional separation. 
 
365 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
 
366 OECD, Report on Structural Separation, (2006) vol. 8, no., 2 OECD Journal of Competition 




Structural separation, in this hypothetical scenario, seems to work only if the 
network is operated by a third party, in a position of complete neutrality vis á 
vis the former incumbent and the competitors, non-incumbents.  
 
The question is whether in those examples of margin squeeze, functional 
separation, introduced as a regulatory tool only in 2009, could have been an 
effective remedy to prevent the occurrence of this type of abuse.  
 
The genesis of functional separation as a regulatory tool is the topic of the 
next section. 
 
This section is important to remind that the position of the Commission and of 
the European Court in the past decade have confirmed that the Commission 
has a wide margin of action in order to enforce competition law. The regulatory 
measures, and their respect by the incumbent, are not sufficient to exclude 
their responsibility if Article 102 TFEU is infringed as a consequence of their 
pricing policies.  
 
This means that not only price cap but also functional separation as an ex ante 
remedy, in principle, is not the last frontier: the Commission is legally 
authorised, as per Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC and the recent 
jurisprudence, to go beyond. The point discussed in the next chapters is 
whether the Commission can decide to impose severe fines, or can also 
decide to go a step further, imposing structural separation, if both pricing 
measures and (or) functional separation do not work. 
 
 
3.6.  The 2007 Reform. Functional separation as a regulatory remedy as 
per Dir. 2009/140/EC 
 
Viviane Reding, former European Commissioner responsible for Information 
Society and Media, launched the ‘Review of EU Telecom Rules’367 in June 
                                            
367 See the Communication of the Commission on the Review of the EU Regulatory 
Framework for electronic communications networks and services COM (2006) 334 final of 29 
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2006, underlining the crucial role that regulatory tools have had in supporting 
the creation of a more competitive scenario in the telecommunications sector 
in Europe in the 1990s and from 2000 onwards.  
 
At the same time, she stressed the need to introduce new regulatory tools to 
boost competition, particularly between networks (based on optical fibres, 
cable and wires in particular, not excluding antennas for radio-waves 
communications).  
 
Seven years after the adoption of the Telecommunications Package 2000, in a 
27368 Member States European Union with an industrial environment partially 
changed (in certain aspects, more communications-oriented), one of the key 
points of the reform process was the review of the application of Article 7 of 
the Framework Directive procedure369.This is the principal instrument for EU 
regulation of electronic communications, establishing that the NRAs are 
required to analyse their national markets for electronic communications (so-
called ‘markets review’) in consultation with the industry and propose 
appropriate regulatory measures to address market failures. 
 
Under this article, national authorities notify the European Commission of their 
findings and propose the best remedies to address their competition concerns. 
The referral to the European Commission opens a ‘Phase I’ (and, if further 
investigation is required, a ‘Phase II’) in order to establish whether the 
proposed measure would or would not create a barrier to the single market.  
 
The regulatory measures that can be imposed are: 
 
                                                                                                                              
June 2006. See also the speech 06/422 ‘The Review 2006 of EU Telecom Rules: 
Strengthening Competition and Completing the Internal Market’ held by Viviane Reding on 27 
June 2006 in Brussels (available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-
422_en.htm). 
 
368 Today, 28 after the recent access of Croatia.  
 
369 Article 7 of the Framework Directive ‘Consolidating the internal market for electronic 
communications’, reported in Annex I of the thesis.  
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(i) for wholesale markets, they are aimed at enhancing 
transparency and non-discrimination, or to achieve accounting 
separation370, or may consist in access obligations371 and price 
control;  
(ii) for retail markets: the obligations may include requirements not 
to charge excessive prices, inhibit market entry or restrict 
competition by setting unsustainably low prices, or discriminate 
between end users. Only in exceptional circumstances has the 
Commission exercised its right of ‘veto’ and rejected proposed 
measure. The question is whether the measures that the single 
Member States had proposed until the reform were or were not 
sufficient to achieve the regulatory and competition law targets of 
the ‘single market imperative’.  
 
On 13 November 2007 a set of proposals372 for new electronic 
communications directives was filed by the European Commission. It was the 
result of a long process of consultation, aimed both at reforming the co-
operation between Member States and the Commission, and at further 
harmonising and facilitating the access to networks to enhance competition 
and development.  
 
At the end of 2009, the Council and the Parliament adopted the new directives 
aimed at enhancing (i) the harmonisation process for the electronic 
communications in general, in particular with respect to the access (to 
networks) procedures and related ‘remedies’ as well as (ii) to boost the use of 
                                            
 
370 Separation of accounts between various levels of business.  
 
371 Requirements to provide access to the SMP operator’s network. 
 
372 (i) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services, COM (2007) 697 final, Brussels 13 November 2007; 
(ii) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2002/22/EC and 2002/58/EC; (iii) Proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Market Authority, in COM(2007) 699 final, Brussels, 13 November 2007, 
[2007] OJ L 344/65 (28 December 2007).  
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radio-spectrum and the Internet Protocol (IP) as a tool of overtaking the 
barriers between single Member States373. 
 
To understand the importance of this reform it must be considered that growth 
and development as well as regulatory coherence and normative consistency 
are directly linked, as shown by several studies374. It is worth keeping in mind 
that the electronic communications sector represents 2 per cent of the EU 
GDP today and that the overall revenue growth of this sector out-paces the 
growth of the entire EU economy375. 
 
One of the key targets of the directives was to maximise the utilisation of the 
electric communications networks and enhance broadband penetration in the 
entire European territory. The chart below shows how at the time of the 
negotiation of the new directives, in 2007/2009, there were still a high number 
of ‘white spots’ (areas uncovered by broadband services) in the European 
territory376: 
                                            
 
373 See the speech of Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, ‘Airwaves 
know no borders. And the Internet Protocol has no nationality’ (13 November 2007, on the 
adoption of the new directive proposals), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
07-1677_en.htm. 
 
374 The reform process was anticipated in 2006 by experts reports filed at the European 
Commission which represent a valuable source of economic data, combined with detailed 
survey on the implementation, at European and global level, of several regulatory and 
competition law provisions. See, in particular, the reports of: (i) PriceWaterHouse & Coopers 
of London in conjunction with London Economics, ‘An assessment of the regulatory framework 
for electronic communications: growth and investment in the EU e-Communications sector’, 
July 2006; (ii) by the law-firm Hogan & Hartson and the consulting agency Analysis, ‘Preparing 
the Next Steps in Regulation of Electronic Communications - A contribution to the review of 
the electronic communications regulatory framework’, July 2006; and, (iii) by Professors Martin 
Cave, Tommaso Valletti and Ulrich Stumpf, ‘A Review of certain markets included in the 
Commission's Recommendation on Relevant Markets subject to ex ante Regulation - An 
independent report’.  
 
375 In 2006 the ICT sector was valued at EUR 649 billion; the investment in telecoms sector 
was of EUR 47 billion and the value of radio-spectrum-dependent services in the EU is of EUR 
250 billion (source: Why is there an EU responsibility for the telecoms sector, 13 November 
2007, at http://ec.europa.eu/ecomm). 
 
376 From Viviane Reding’s presentation of the directive proposals on 13 November 2007 
(source: Why is there an EU responsibility for the telecoms sector?, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/ecomm ). This concern led the European Union institutions to put aside, in 
January 2009, up to EUR 1 billion aimed at bridging the digital divide and bringing 100% of 
broadband coverage through the entire territory of the European Union within the non-realistic 








Figure 3 – Broadband penetration in the EU in 2007 (source: European 
Commission – DG InfoSoc) 
 
 
One of the most innovative amendments introduced by Directive 
2009/140/EC377 amending Directives 2002/21/EC (‘Framework Directive’), 
2002/19/EC (‘Access Directive’) and 2002/20/EC (‘Authorization directive’) 
was the introduction of functional separation of electronic communications 
                                                                                                                              
 
377 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
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operators as an additional ex ante remedy to grant a ‘level playing field’ of 
competition. This is homogeneously applicable in all Member States, in order 
to ensure equal treatment for all the operators within the single market378. 
 
The real scope of the reform was multi-faceted, ranging from the general 
objectives of the entire European construction (growth and development; 
harmonisation and creation of a homogeneous internal market) to the removal 
of technical or legal barriers (as those deriving from the un-necessary 
occupation of part of the radio-spectrum by a small number of undertakings, or 
those deriving from the joint management and control of both the network and 
the provision of the services provided through it). Another indirect positive 
effect of the reform of the 2002 directives was the simplification of 
administrative procedures, substantially cutting administrative costs. 
 
Apart from the more general purposes of the directive 2009/140/EC379, recital 
61 of its preamble introduces functional separation as a new ex ante remedy. 
It states that: 
 
‘the purpose of functional separation, whereby the vertically 
integrated operator is required to establish operationally separate 
business entities, is to ensure the provision of fully equivalent 
access products to all downstream operators, including the 
operator’s own vertically integrated downstream divisions. 
Functional separation has the capacity to improve competition in 
several relevant markets by significantly reducing the incentive for 
                                            
378 The Directive proposal 2007 was not in the direction of ‘ownership unbundling’. It was 
rather aimed at better defining the ‘Article 7’ procedure of the Framework directive. The 
preamble of the directive proposal, in particular, said that one of the main amendments was 
aimed at ‘improving the consistency of regulation of the internal market in electronic 
communications.. 
 
379 As an example of EC Treaty general principles recalled by the preamble of the directive 
proposal, it is worth to recall Recital (15) ‘In line with the objectives of the European Charter on 
fundamental rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, the regulatory framework should ensure that all users, including disabled end-
users, the elderly, and users with special social needs, have easy access to affordable high 
quality services. Declaration 22 annexed to the final Act of Amsterdam provides that the 
institutions of the Community shall take account of the needs of persons with a disability in 




discrimination and by making it easier to verify and enforce 
compliance with non-discrimination obligations’. 
 
More importantly, the preamble stresses how ‘[i]n exceptional cases, 
functional separation may be justified as a remedy where there has been 
persistent failure to achieve effective non-discrimination in several of the 
markets concerned, and where there is little or no prospect of infrastructure 
competition within a reasonable time-frame after the recourse to one or more 
remedies previously considered to be appropriate’. 
 
Thus the new directive modified key articles of the Framework and Access 
directives. For instance, on the one hand, Article 7 describes the new process 
of consultation among Member States’ regulatory authorities while, on the 
other hand, establishes the (simplified) exchange of ‘drafts’ between the 
Member State regulatory authorities and the Commission. Article 2 
(‘Amendments to Directive 2002/19 EC’) of the new directive also introduces 
two new articles in the Access Directive, 13a and 13b.  
 
Article 13(a) ‘Functional Separation’, first subparagraph, establishes that a 
NRA may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8380,  
 
‘impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to 
place activities related to the wholesale provision of access 
products in an independently operating business entity381. 
That business entity shall supply access products and services to 
all undertakings, including other business entities within the parent 
company, on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including 
those relating to price and service levels, and by means of the 
same systems and processes’. 
 
The directive also tackles the possibility, that the dominant undertaking might 
propose a ‘voluntary separation’ (ownership separation). Article 13b 
                                            
380 In particular, second subparagraph of Article 8.3. 
 




‘Voluntary separation by a vertically integrated undertaking’ establishes 
that  
‘[u]ndertakings which have been designated as having significant 
market power in one or several relevant markets in accordance 
with Article 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) shall 
inform the NRA in advance and in a time manner, in order to allow 
the NRA to assess the effect of the intended transaction, when 
they intend to transfer their local access network assets or a 
substantial part thereof to a separate legal entity under different 
ownership, or to establish a separate business entity in order to 
provide to all retail providers, including its own retail divisions, fully 
equivalent access products’.  
 
Focusing on the first of the two options raises the question of why the 
European Commission proposed a new behavioural remedy with functional 
features.  
 
The focus of the new directive on this remedy is strictly related to the 
observation of case-law of the last decade both at the European and US level. 
The recurrent presence of anomalies (such as ‘margin squeeze’ conducts382) 
in negotiating the process of access to wholesale services, on the one hand, 
and the increased awareness of the importance of granting fair and 
transparent access to ‘essential facilities’ (such as the communications 
networks), on the other, led the Commission to propose the amendments 
contained in directive 2009/140/EC. The aim was that of tackling the problem 
of access-related exclusionary or exploitative abuses with a remedy, functional 
separation, representing a further, more invasive, behavioural remedy.  
 
                                            
382 As discussed the relevant case law on margin squeeze is represented by the Commission 
Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), [2003] OJ L263/9   
(14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. 
Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche Telekom AG v European 
Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495; by the Commission 
Decision France Télécom/Wanadoo  of 16 July 2003 COMP/38.2333 [2005] 5 CMLR 120, 
IP/03/1025; Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Commission, 
[2007] ECR II-107; Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369); 
Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), appealed 
at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission 
[2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at the Court of 
Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 2013 accessible 




At the time of the negotiation of Directive 2009/140/EC383 the most important 
experience of functional separation was the remedy voluntarily proposed in 
2006 by British Telecom, under the supervision of OFCOM, with the creation 
of the separate legal entity within the same group called ‘Openreach’.  
 
This remedy represented the natural evolution of a discussion carried out by 
economists, international organisations (such as the OECD), law makers, 
regulatory and competition authorities. The argument centred around whether 
the draconian remedy of structural separation and the ‘softer’, behavioural, 
remedy of accounting separation, were better suited to provide transparency, 
fair prices (for competitors and consumers) and effective competition than 
recourse to functional separation. It represents a combination of both 
structural and accounting separation, and it is aimed at creating a ring-fenced 
division of the incumbent company dealing mainly with access and 
interconnection of competitors with the network384. 
 
On the basis of this precedent, Article 13 a, first subparagraph, introduced by 
Article 2 of the new directive into the Access Directive, not only authorises 
functional separation of the division dealing with wholesale access to the 
network, but also stresses how the remedy will be adopted  
 
‘[w]here the national regulatory authority concludes that the 
appropriate obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed 
to achieve effective competition and that there are important and 
persisting competition problems and/or market failures identified in 
relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product 
markets […]’385. 
 
Suffice to say that it aims at impeding bi-directional streams of information 
between the ‘access/interconnection’ division of a company and the retail 
division of the same vertically integrated company, creating a system of fire-
                                            
383 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009, [2009] OJ L 337/37. 
 
384 L. Correa, cited, p 64. 
 




walls between the various divisions of the same company and its highest 
decisional bodies. Sharp accounting separation is a consequence and an 
important component of this process.  
 
In line with the target of enhancing the ‘information symmetry’ between the 
regulator and the incumbent, the directive also amended Art. 13 of the Access 
Directive introducing a new paragraph establishing that  
 
‘[a] national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 8, impose obligations relating to cost recovery 
and price controls, including obligations for cost orientation of prices 
and obligations concerning cost accounting systems, for the 
provision of specific types of interconnection and/or access, in 
situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective 
competition means that the operator concerned may sustain prices 
at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the 
detriment of end-users’386. 
 
The analysis of the regulatory remedies that may be adopted to face network 
access-related abuses such as excessive pricing, price discrimination, margin 
squeeze, refusal to supply or ‘cross-subsidisation’ represents only one step 
into the variety of approaches adopted vis à vis the mentioned forms of abuse.  
 
This analysis cannot be disjoint by the study of the ex post enforcement action 
carried out by the European Commission in recent years, in particular with 
respect to abuses carried out by some of the major European electronic 
communications operators. 
 
The analysis in chapter V of some recent cases of Art. 102 infringements in 
the electronic communications sector (such as a few recent margin squeeze 
cases) complement the analysis carried out in chapter III with respect to the 




                                            





Chapter III was aimed at linking the first three chapters on (i) functioning of the 
electronic communications networks, (ii) dominance and abuse with respect to 
those networks with the part of the thesis in which I will discuss the  ex post 
enforcement activity and its effectiveness, arguing that in certain condition 
there should be the possibility of applying (or threatening to apply) structural 
remedies in the presence of exclusionary conducts with serious, 
anticompetitive, foreclosure effects. I will then, in chapter V, show how 
structural remedies have been implemented at least in the energy sector. 
 
Next chapter will focus on the enforcement activity of the European 
Commission also in dealing with margin squeeze conducts in recent years.  
This chapter centred on the regulatory action that the European Commission 
carried out in the last two decades in order to prevent network-related abuses. 
It was also aimed at showing how some regulatory, ex ante, remedies, proved 
not to be  completely apt to avoid certain forms of abuses, such as margin 
squeeze (Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases, discussed more in detail in 
chapter II). 
 
I analysed the most elementary forms of regulatory action, aimed at 
introducing price-caps and accounting separation in order to avoid excessive 
pricing or other discriminatory policies.  
 
I discussed how even in the presence of regulated tariffs (price cap) electronic 
communications operators such as DT and Telefónica were still able to fix 
their wholesale access prices (for the non-incumbent operators seeking the 
access) or their retail tariff (for their customers) at such a level as to make 
competition impossible in the long-run. The anticompetitive foreclosure effects 
(to use the Guidance Papers words) prevail on a conduct only apparently not 
harmful. 
 
The weakness of the price-cap system in vertically-integrated undertakings is 
evident, after three judgments (the fourth, in the Telefónica case, is still 
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pending) of appeal that confirmed the duty for the undertaking to exercise all 
the discretionary power to avoid the anticompetitive exclusionary effect, even 
in the presence of tariffs set by the communications regulator.  
One possibility of avoiding the negative effects of vertical integration combined 
with coordination among different divisions of the same company (dealing, for 
instance, with wholesale operations, retail operations and network access) 
would have been to separate the network access division from the ‘body’ of 
the corporation.  
 
In those same years the Commission had just launched the Discussion Paper 
(2005), aimed at investigating at European level how anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects should have been taken into account by the Commission in 
prioritising its own enforcement activity. It is interesting to see how the 
Guidance Paper (2008) was published in the aftermath not only of the 
implementation of functional separation of British Telecom, but also in the 
aftermath of important judgments such as Deutsche Telekom (and the 
Commission decision against Telefónica in 2007), in which the issue of the 
relevance of anticompetitive effects, more than the conduct per se, can be 
indirectly linked also to the same reasons that are behind the decision of 
functionally separate British Telecom. 
 
At the same time the reform of the electronic communications package 2002 
took place and part of this chapter discusses the regulatory reform carried out 
by the European Commission in 2007/2009 through the proposal of new 
European legislation who became Directive 2009/140/EC, introducing 
functional separation as an ex ante remedy applicable at European level. 
 
The central question in this chapter was whether functional separation can be 
considered sufficient to avoid network-related abusive conducts considering 
the difficulty, both for regulators and competition authorities, to detect the most 
subtle forms of abuse, such as margin squeeze.  
 
The creation of a separate division within the BT Group called Openreach, the 
first form of functional separation for a major electronic communications 
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operator in Europe, and the relative success that this remedy had in United 
Kingdom, seems to suggest that vertical separation might be the correct 
answer to deal with access-related abusive conducts.  
 
The question is whether more radical forms of separation, such as structural 
separation, either as an ex ante or as an ex post enforcement remedy is 
advisable in the electronic communications.  
 
In the next chapter I will analyse how the European Commission and the 
European Courts have been dealing with the anticompetitive conducts of 
major operators, arguing that the fines imposed did not constitute a serious 
deterrent.  
 
However, the recent evolution of the Courts (substantially upholding the 
finding and the decisions of the European Commission in the mentioned 
margin squeeze cases) shows not only an increased attention for network 
access-related abusive practices, but also a  very stringent approach. 
 
The cases of commitments in the energy sector that I will tackle in chapter V 
will show how in recent years the Commission adopted further important 
decisions in which proposals of vertical separation were accepted in order to 
suspend competition law enforcement proceedings.  
 
This might suggest that also in the electronic communications sector the 
European Commission theoretically could either negotiate commitments 
leading to similar forms of structural separation, or adopt decisions imposing 
structural separation. 
 
The doctrine has been largely hostile towards this extreme remedy. Why 
structural remedies as per Art. 7 of Regulation1/2003/EC were never imposed 
in the electronic communications sector? This is a question that will be 
discussed after having further analysed in the next chapter the enforcement 
activity of the Commission with respect to access abuses put in place by 
vertically-integrated undertakings. I will discuss what role could play, at least 
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     CHAPTER IV 
 
Ex post remedies as per Art. 23 and 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC in the 
electronic communications sector.  
 
PART A 
 Pecuniary fines with respect to abusive conducts with 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects in the electronic 
communications sector 




 Analysis of commitments and undertakings in vertically-integrated 
industries at the origin of forms of vertical functional separation 
 






4.1.  Introduction  
 
After having tackled in the previous chapter the legislative regulatory 
measures that the European Commission has been putting in place to address 
‘bottleneck’-related restrictions to competition, I will now analyse some cases 
discussed in Chapter II and III in which the European Commission intervened 
on the basis of Articles 23 and 7 of Regulation no. 1/2003/EC to deal with Art. 
102 TFEU abuses, imposing fines but also functional and structural remedies. 
The objective of this chapter is to argue whether the remedies adopted 
(pecuniary fines and functional separation, in particular) were effective, 





I will highlight some recent cases of margin squeeze and refusal to supply 
unbundled access to the local loop (Deutsche Telekom387, Telefónica388, 
TeliaSonera389, Telekomunikacja Polska390 S.A and Slovak Telekom391), 
showing the growing determination of the European Commission and of the 
European Courts to deal with margin squeeze and other forms of refusal to 
supply, linked to the control of the ‘bottle-neck’ access, restricting competition 
and reducing consumer welfare in the short and in the long run.  
 
In certain cases, as in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica decisions, the 
Commission fined the companies even though these objected that their 
behaviour (in particular, setting network access prices) was in line with the 
margin of discretion set by the respective national regulatory authorities.  
 
Margin squeeze, in particular, has the foreclosure anticompetitive effect of 
impeding direct competitors to survive in the medium and long run. 
Furthermore, such a practice indirectly affects also the level of broadband 
penetration in large parts of the European Union (as indicated, for instance, in 
paras 554 and 555 of the Telefónica Commission Decision392). 
                                            
387Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
388Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 
2013).  
 
389Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera. See in particular the Opinion of AG Mazák. 
 
390Commission Decision Telekomunikacja Polska COMP/35.525 of 22 June 2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39525/39525_1916_7.pdf. 
 
391 Case Slovak Telekom COMP 39.523 on an alleged abuse of dominant position (refusal to 
supply unbundled access to competitors); statement of objection filed on the 8 May 2012, 
press release IP 12/462 accessible at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-462_en.htm. 
 
392 Commission Decision Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6, paras 554, 555 ff. In these paragraphs 
is clearly stated the anticompetitive effect that the margin squeeze conduct had on competitors 
and end users: ‘(para 554) By imposing a margin squeeze on its competitors, Telefónica's 
conduct was likely to delay the entry and growth of competitors, and the achievement by those 
operators of a level of economies of scale which would have justified investments in their own 




I will also discuss the recent case of preliminary ruling TeliaSonera, examining 
how the Court partially departed from the opinion of Advocate General Mazák 
in dealing with a margin squeeze abuse, considering it sufficient to carry out 
the ‘margin squeeze test’ without including the ‘duty to supply test’, showing 
consistent determination in enforcing this type of abusive conduct. 
 
The analysis of functional separation as a behavioural remedy (with related 
discussion about its effectiveness) will be based on the analysis of the 
Deutsche Post case of 2001, entailing the operational separation of one of its 
divisions to address competition concerns (Sect. 6).  
 
I will then analyse the undertakings in lieu of reference to the Competition 
Commission at the origin of the creation in 2006 of Openreach as a separate 
access division within BT Group.  
 
The analysis in Chapter III of functional separation in the United Kingdom as a 
remedy to deal with ‘bottlenecks’-abuses put in place by vertically-integrated 
firms, can be seen in conjunction with the structural remedies adopted through 
commitments in the energy sector (cases E.ON393 of 2008, RWE394 of 2008 
and ENI395 of 2010, that will be discussed in the next chapter), showing that 
vertical structural separation realised through ownership divestiture may also 
be highly suitable to deal with vertical foreclosure,  enhancing competition,  
innovation of the network (one of the target of ENI commitments), ultimately 
maximising consumers’ welfare. 
                                                                                                                              
delay the moment competitors could threaten its dominance in the regional and national 
markets. This conduct was likely to exhaust financially its competitors (para 555).   
 
393Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ 
C36/8 of 13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
394Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf.  
 
395Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010 (2010/C 352/10), 





The scope of this chapter is that of evaluating the limits of pecuniary fines, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of functional separation as an enforcement 




4.2. Pecuniary fines with respect to abusive conducts with 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects in the electronic communications 
sector. Ineffectiveness of fines 
 
In Chapter II I analysed three major cases of margin squeeze (Deutsche 
Telekom396, Telefónica397, TeliaSonera398), one case of predatory pricing that 
was considered by the Commission as a case of margin squeeze (Wanadoo 
(France Télécom), as well as two recent cases of margin squeeze and refusal 
to supply unbundled access in two new accession countries, Poland and 
Slovakia.  
 
Except for the Slovak Telekom case (proceedings still pending), all these 
cases were fined by the European Commission with pecuniary fines as per 
Art. 23 of Regulation 1/2003/EC.  
 
In the same way, looking at case-law at national level in many European 
countries with respect to the same type of abusive conducts, imposition of 
pecuniary fines is the most recurrent feature of competition law enforcement 
proceedings. 
 
                                            
396 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
397 Commission Decision Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6, appealed at the General Court: Case T-
336/07 Telefónica, now on appeal at the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12. 
 





For instance, in Italy, between 1994 and 2013, a number of exclusionary 
conducts cases were all decided by the Italian competition authority (Autorita’ 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM) with the imposition of 
pecuniary fines. In some cases behavioural measures were imposed, but 
neither functional nor structural separation was ever discussed as an ex post 
remedy.  
 
To address the thesis question: what remedy, functional or structural, is most 
suitable to deal with network-related abuses, I need to answer another 
question. Were pecuniary fines sufficient to deter the major electronic 
communications operators in Europe since the beginning of the liberalisation 
process? 
 
This section is aimed at looking at what percentage of the annual turnover 
(total and/or of the affected market) made in the previous financial year was 
applied in order to fine the major operators of electronic communications. The 
aim is to show that pecuniary fines, in the presence of ‘deep pockets’ 
undertakings, do not seem to constitute a serious threat or deterrent for the 
abusers, when the fines form only a fraction of annual turnover. 
If we look at the new Guidelines for setting the pecuniary fines, applicable to 
infringements for which the statement of objections was filed by the 
Commission after 1st September 2006, first of all, the basic amount of the 
pecuniary fine is calculated as a percentage of the value of the sales (made in 
the previous business year) connected with the infringement, multiplied by the 
number of years the infringement has been taking place. 
The percentage of the value of sales is determined according to the gravity of 
the infringement (nature, combined market share of all the parties concerned, 
geographic scope, etc.) and may be as much as 30 % of the value of sales399. 
As per Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003/EC the pecuniary fine cannot 
trespass the threshold of 10% of the annual turnover of the company, bearing 
                                            





in mind that the 10% limit may be based on the turnover of the entire group to 
which the company belongs when the parent company of the group exercise 
decisive influence over the operations of the subsidiary during the infringement 
period400. 
 
At a European level we can start with the 2003 Deutsche Telekom401 margin 
squeeze case. As I discussed in Chapter II, in 2003 the company was fined 
with a pecuniary fine of EUR 12.6 million for abusing its dominant position 
through a margin squeeze conduct. 
 
The annual turnover of Deutsche Telekom in the market of fixed-network 
business in 2002 was of EUR 30,2 billion402. The Commission considered the 
infringement put in place by Deutsche Telekom as a serious one from 1998 to 
2000, and only a minor infringement until the beginning of 2002, considering 
the nature, scale and impact of the conducts403. 
 
The Commission suggested a starting amount to calculate the fine of EUR 
10,000,000404 (reaching the mentioned amount of EUR 12,6 million by virtue of 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances). If we look at the annual 
turnover of DT’s fixed-network business, the starting-point fine of EUR 10 
million was equal to 0,033%405, an infinitesimal fraction of that turnover. If we 
consider the total turnover of DT at global level, that fine is even smaller. It 
must be said that the initial amount on which the final fine was calculated was 
                                            
400 See Fact sheet on the imposition of European Commission fines, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/factsheet_fines_en.pdf. The most recent 
guidelines on the procedure to setting fines date September 2006 (Guidelines on the method 
of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 - 2006/C 210/02. 
They also set a 30% threshold of the annual turnover of the market concerned by the abuse.  
 
401 Commission decision Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ L263/9. 
 
402 ibid, para 205. 
 
403 ibid, para 204. 
 
404 ibid, para 200. 
 
405In the Deutsche Telekom case, the EUR 10,000,000 fine was increased by 40% for the long 




quite small also considering that it was the first time that the European 
Commission fined a telecom company for margin squeeze. 
 
However, similar conclusion can be reached with the 2003 Wanadoo 
Interactive (France Telecom406) case. It was dealt by the Commission as a 
case of predatory pricing (though, as mentioned in Chapter II, it could be 
considered as a case of margin squeeze). In this case the Commission 
imposed a fine of EUR 10.35 million407, starting from a starting amount of EUR 
9,00 million, equal to a very small percentage of the group’s turnover (the 
forecast for the financial year 2002 were EUR 34.4 billion)408. The Commission 
decision was appealed, but the European Court rejected the appeal as 
partially inadmissible and partially unfounded409.  
 
The Commission decision Telefonica of 4 July 2007410 led to a fine of EUR 
151 875 000 for infringing Article 102 TFEU. The decision was addressed to 
Telefónica S.A. (‘Telefónica’) and its 100% owned subsidiary Telefónica de 
España, S.A.U (‘TESAU’). According to the finding of the Commission, 
between September 2001 and December 2006 Telefónica abused its 
dominant position by imposing unfair prices in the form of a margin squeeze in 
the Spanish broadband market. In this case the proceedings had been 
triggered by a complaint of Wanadoo Espana alleging that Telefónica was 
engaging in a margin squeeze in the Spanish broadband internet access 
markets. According to the Commission Decision Telefónica (para 15), the 
                                            
406Wanadoo Interactive is part of the France Télécom group: 99.9% of its capital is held by 
Wanadoo SA. 
 
407 Commission decision Wanadoo Interactive (France Télécom) (Case COMP/38.2333)  of 16 
July 2003, [2005] 5 CMLR 120 
paras 404 and 414. 
 
408 The turnover of the group is in Annex 16 of the Commission decision Wanadoo Interqctive, 
but is redacted. An approximate amount of the entire group’s turnover can be found at 
http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=399093. 
 
409 On appeal, France Télécom SA (formerly Wanadoo Interactive SA) v Commission, Case 
T-340/03, [2007] ECR II-107. Judgment of the General Court appealed before the European 
Court of Justice: France Télécom v Commission Case C-202/07 P, [2009] ECR I-2369. 
 
410 Commission Decision Telefónica, appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 





worldwide revenues of the Telefónica group were € 52.9 billion in 2006411. In 
this case too it could be argued that the fine represents a very small 
percentage of both the relevant market in which the abuse was put in place, 
and the total turnover of the Telefónica group412. 
 
As anticipated in Chapter II, the General Court on the 29 March 2012 rejected 
the appeal filed by the company, confirming the fine. The company appealed 
the judgment before the ECJ. It must be noted that in September 2013 the 
Advocate General Melchior Wathelet filed his opinion stressing that the 
General Court did not correctly exercise its power of review of the 
Commission’s decision with respect to the fine. He argued that the General 
Court had made errors of law in analysing the respect of the principle of 
proportionality, of equal treatment and of the individuality of the fines (as well 
as the duty of motivation), recommending the Court of Justice General Court 
to annul the General Court’s judgment since had not re-examined the 
correctness of the fine imposed by the Commission413. It is therefore possible 
if the opinion of the Advocate General will be taken into account, the judgment 
will be annulled and, upon review, the fine will be substantially reduced.  
 
In the TeliaSonera case (preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice 
filed on the 17 February 2011) the Swedish national competition authority 
asked the referring court to fine TeliaSonera with SEK 144 000 000 (EUR 15.1 
million) for infringing national competition law and Article 102 TFEU for 
abusing ‘on the wholesale market by applying a margin between the wholesale 
price for input ADSL products and the retail price for ADSL services it offers to 
consumers which would not have been sufficient to cover TeliaSonera’s 
incremental costs on the retail market’414. TeliaSonera’s total turnover for 2010 
was SEK 106.5 billion (EUR 11.95 billion). Again the fine represents a very 
small percentage of the total turnover of the group. The Stockholm District 
                                            
411 Telefónica Trimestral Report December 2006, p 7. 
 
412 The financial data of Telefónica are accessible through its online prospectus at 
http://www.telefonica.com/en/about_telefonica/pdf/informes/2006/version_inglesa.pdf.  
 
413 Case C-295/12, opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 2013, para 175 ff. 




Court in December 2011 effectively fined with SEK 144 000 000 TeliaSonera, 
but a recent judgment on appeal given by the Swedish Market Court (in April 
2013) on the one hand confirmed the existence of the abuse, but on the other 
further reduced the fine to SEK 35 000 000, making the pecuniary fine much 
lighter415.  
 
Similar analysis could be carried out at national level, looking at the most 
recent cases of abuse of dominant position in the electronic communications 
sector, and in particular to exclusionary conducts with anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects.  
 
If, to make a national example, we look at the Italian scenario, between 1995 
and 2001, similar conclusions can be reached with respect to fines imposed at 
European level. 
 
One of the first cases of exclusionary conduct is the ‘Albacom/Telecom Italia–
leased lines’ case416 of 1997. The incumbent, Telecom Italia, was fined for 
having abused its dominant position not only by hindering the access to its 
network by a broad-band service competitor (Albacom) but more interestingly 
for not having put at its disposal the part of networks (dedicated circuits, or 
leaded lines) that would have allowed the competitor to provide high-capacity 
services up to 34 Mpbs. The Italian Competition Authority considered these 
infringements as particularly serious. However, the Italian competition 
authority fined Telecom Italia with a fine of EUR 490,702 equivalent to 1 per 
cent of the relevant annual turnover of the specific market (leased lines)417. 
                                            
415 The judgment reduced the fine also considering some mistakes made by the District Court 
in dealing with the standard of proof, making excessively burdensome for the competition 
authority to provide evidence supporting its claims. See Lars Henriksson, The Swedish Market 
Court Rules in an important margin squeezing case involving TeliaSonera, accessible at 
http://celec.info/?p=1168. A press release of the Swedish Competition Authority is accessible 
at http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsPage____8975.aspx on the website of the authority itself. The 
judgment of the Swedish Market Court is accessible at 
http://www.marknadsdomstolen.se/Filer/Avg%C3%B6randen/Dom2013-5.pdf. 
 
416 Italian Competition Authority delibera  no. 5428 (A178) - Albacom/Telecom Italia-Circuiti 
dedicati of 30 October 1997. 
 
417 Telecom Italia’s previous business year annual turnover for the lease lines market was LIT 




Considering that it is one of the first cases in the electronic communications 
sector, and the first case of exclusionary behaviours, the exiguity of the fine 
could be justified by the will of sanctioning the behaviour with a ‘symbolic’ fine. 
However, the sanctions did not increase a few years later. On 17 November 
1999 the Italian Competition Authority opened proceedings against Telecom 
Italia for an alleged abuse of its dominant position in supplying fast Internet 
service with ADSL technology. The complaint was filed by its competitor, 
Infostrada. On 27 April 27 2001 the Competition Authority issued a decision 
recognising that Telecom Italia abused its dominant position on the market for 
the supply of (i) local connectivity; and (ii) data transmission and Internet 
access services with the application of the ADSL and X-DSL/SDH broadband 
technologies to the public switched network. The Italian incumbent was 
charged with a fine of approximately EUR 59 400 000, one of the highest fines 
imposed on a telecommunications operator in Italy418. In 1999 the annual 
turnover of the entire group at global level was of Italian Liras 52 480 billion 
(EUR 271 billion), while the turnover of the internet division of Telecom Italia 
(TIN.it) was of Italian Liras 133 billion (EUR 68 million). Therefore also in this 
case the fine represents a very small percentage of both the annual turnover 
of the group and of the relevant market. 
 
Another case triggered in 2003 against Telecom Italia419 on the basis of a 
complaint filed by the major electronic communications operators for predatory 
pricing leads to identical conclusions with respect to the exiguity of the fine. 
The competitors alleged that Telecom Italia abused its dominant position by 
offering communications services on fixed networks to ‘business’ final users 
providing under-cost tailored services rates. As per the complaint, the final 
users and Telecom Italia had signed contracts authorising Telecom Italia to 
carry out monitoring activities on the final consumers of its own wholesale 
customers. 
 
                                            
418 See Italian Competition Authority delibera no. 9472 (A285) Infostrada/Telecom Italia – 
Tecnologia ADSL, cited. 
 
419 Italian Competition Authority delibera no. 12067/2003 (A 351) - ‘Abusive behaviours of 
Telecom Italia’ of 5 June 2003, in bulletin of the Italian competition authority no. 23/2003  
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On 16 November 2004 the Italian Competition Authority established that 
Telecom Italia had abused its dominant position, imposing a fine of EUR 152 
million. The global turnover of Telecom Italia for the previous year was equal 
to EUR 30,400 billion; as in other cases the fine represents a very small 
percentage of the global turnover. The Authority demonstrated that Telecom 
Italia had carried out its abusive conduct in the provision of fixed network 
telecommunications services for business customers and that the abusive 
conduct had to be considered part of a single strategy aimed at excluding 
competitors from the business end-users market for telecommunications 
services, in order to preserve its dominant position.  
 
The Italian Competition Authority’s decision was appealed before the 
administrative tribunal and quashed on the basis of several weaknesses found 
in the reasoning carried out by the Competition Authority. The judgment of the 
administrative tribunal was appealed by the Competition Authority before the 
Consiglio di Stato, which overturned the judgment, confirming the Competition 
Authority’s findings, slightly reducing the amount of the fines420.  
 
In this case too we can conclude that the amount of the fine is an infinitesimal 
percentage of the total turnover of the group. 
 
Along the same lines, we can analyse another case of abuse of dominant 
position, namely ‘Tele2/Telecom Italia Mobile, Vodafone, Wind’ (2004-2007). 
The investigation was launched on 23 February 2005421 by the Italian 
Competition Authority on the alleged violation of Art. 102 TFEU. The 
proceedings were closed on 3 August 2007 with a decision fining Telecom 
Italia with EUR 20 million (with a turnover in the mobile telephony of EUR 12.9 
billion in 2004) and WIND with EUR 2 million (with a global turnover of EUR 
4.5 billion in 2004)422.  
                                            
 
420 Consiglio di Stato, judgment of 10.03.2006, no.1271/06. 
 
421 Italian Competition Authority delibera no. 14045 (A357) Tele2/TIM-VODAFONE-WIND of 
23 February 2005, in bulletin of the Italian Competition Authority no. 8/2005. 
 
422 Italian Competition Authority delibera no. 17131 (A357) Tele2/TIM-VODAFONE-WIND of 3 




Again one can conclude that the amount of the fine is a small percentage of 
the total turnover of the companies involved in the abusive conduct.  
 
This section was aimed at showing how both at European and at a national 
level (taking a few examples from the national experience of Sweden and 
Italy) the pecuniary fines423 do not seem to have a major impact on the activity 
of the company and do not seem to have a deterrent effect, considering that at 
least at national level the abuses are recurrent and that Telecom Italia, in the 
last twenty-three years of activity of the Italian competition authority, appears 
to be recidivist.  
 
 
PART B  
 
 Analysis of functional separation as an ex post remedy (the  
Deutsche Post decision, 2001) 
 Analysis of commitments and undertakings in vertically-integrated 
industries at the origin of forms of vertical functional separation (the 
Openreach experience, 2006) 
 





4.3.  Cases at European level. Deutsche Post: a case of operational 
(functional) separation in a pre-Regulation 1/2003/EC scenario. 
 
One of the few cases in which the European Commission imposed functional 
operational separation, within the same group (de facto anticipating of a few 
                                                                                                                              
 
423 At European level calculated on the basis of criteria set in the Guidelines of the European 
Commission of 1998 and 2006. 
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years the voluntary functional separation of the BT/Openreachi case of 2006) 
is the Deutsche Post case of 2001424. 
 
The European Commission, after an investigation launched on the basis of a 
complaint filed by United Parcel Service (‘UPS’), found that Deutsche Post AG 
had abused its dominant position in the market for delivery of business parcel 
services by granting fidelity rebates and engaging in predatory pricing to the 
point of foreclosing competition. Functional (operational) separation imposed 
by the European Commission represented the most suitable solution to 
implement a system of transparent and market-based pricing operating 
between Deutsche Post AG and the new entity for the delivery of products and 
services.  
 
Such a form of safeguard was considered the most efficient way to ensure that 
Deutsche Post’s revenues from the monopoly in the letter market would not be 
used to finance the delivery of business parcels, hampering competition.  
 
The decision also condemned a long-standing scheme of fidelity rebates in mail 
order parcel deliveries, from 1974 to 2000. Deutsche Post granted substantial 
discounts to its large mail order customers on the condition that its customers 
would have used its services to deliver business parcels. This system was 
sufficient to impede any other competitor to reach a ‘critical mass’ of deliveries 
that would have made economically efficient to enter the market. The 
Commission also fined Deutsche Telekom with a pecuniary fine of EUR 24 
million.  
 
Mario Monti, commenting on this decision, made express reference to the 
difference between adopting a decision imposing a mere financial fine and a 
decision with a forward-looking approach: 
 
                                            
424 Commission Decision Deutsche Post AG (Case COMP/35.141) of 20 March 2001, [2001] 





‘Today's decision establishes clear rules on the issue of 'cross-
subsidies' that postal monopolies who are also engaged in activities 
open to competition must respect. The winner clearly is the public at 
large: pricing below cost must be paid by somebody and that 
'somebody' usually is the monopoly's customers. Moreover, pricing 
below cost forecloses market entry by efficient competitors and 
therefore prevents a wider offer at better prices and service 
conditions. I am particularly pleased that in this case we have not 
simply sanctioned anti-competitive practices but achieved a 
forward-looking result, in the form of Deutsche Post's 
commitments in the parcel delivery market which are of great 
importance to the development of electronic commerce’425. 
 
 
As stated in the conclusion of the decision, Deutsche Post AG was ordered to 
create a Newco that would have dealt with the delivery of business parcel, 
submitting ‘to the Commission a statement of the costs and revenue of Newco. 
In addition DPAG shall each year submit an itemised statement of the transfer 
prices paid by Newco for all goods or services procured from DPAG’426. 
 
It must be remembered that in the postal sector the case Oscar Bronner found 
one of its first applications. As referred by M. Cave,   
 
‘It is therefore not desirable to force the incumbent to provide 
access to its network. Compelling access could result in inefficient 
entry and cost increases for the incumbent provider and could 
impede sustainable competition and innovation. The postal sector 
does not, on the whole, have any insurmountable entry business or 
any structural characteristic that would restrict actual competition 
within a reasonable period’ 427.  
 
Prima facie the functional separation solution appeared to be the most 
efficient, and induced the doctrine to argue that when the hypothesis of 
                                            
425 Press release of the Deutsche Post AG Decision, IP/01/419.  
 
426 Commission Decision Deutsche Post AG (Case COMP/35.141) of 20 March 2001, [2001] 
OJ L125/27, para of the final dispositive. 
 
427 M. Cave, ‘Separation and access prices in postal services’, (2005) 6 Journal of Network 
Industries, 118, recalling a work of De Bijl, Van Damme and Larouche, ‘Towards a liberalized 




separation is at stake, the best approach is to consider each market and each 
case as an isolated situation in which the choice of the remedy requires 




4.4.  Functional separation at national level: the UK experience of 
Openreach.  
 
Having analysed the main network-related abusive conducts in Chapter II 
(electronic communications sector) and Chapter III (energy sector), Chapter IV 
was devoted to the evolution of regulatory tools at European level to favour a 
non-discriminatory access to network. The Electronic Communications 
Directives reform, enacted in 2009, identified functional separation as the most 
suitable remedy to deal with serious obstacles to network access.  
 
In the first part (Part A) of this chapter I analysed a few cases of abuse of 
dominant position with exclusionary (foreclosure) effects in which pecuniary 
fines were imposed. I briefly analysed the most interesting cases of 
competition enforcement activity carried out by the European Commission in 
the last decade in the electronic communications sector (cases Deutsche 
Telekom, Wanadoo- France Télécom, Telefónica), showing how access-
related abuses of dominant position were usually penalised with fines 
representing a very small percentage of the annual turnover of the incumbent.  
 
At a European level and with respect to the Italian scenario, it can be said that 
those fines (often reduced on appeal) did not represent a serious deterrent, as 
can be seen by (i) the exiguity of the pecuniary fines with respect to the 
turnover of companies fined, and (ii) the recurrence of the same type of abuse 
in two decades of competition law enforcement put in place by the same 
company (in the example of recidivism at national level taken in the previous 
section, Telecom Italia).  
 
                                            
428 Ibid, p 120. 
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In the next chapters I will discuss how, if an ‘advanced behavioural remedy’ 
such as functional separation negotiated by BT with OFCOM was taken by the 
European Commission as a model for modifying the regulatory framework at 
European level introducing a new ‘ex ante’ remedy (as discussed in Chapter 
IV), also structural remedies could be taken as successful examples. This time 
without  modifying existing regulations in order to introduce a new ex ante tool, 
but rather to suggest the Commission (and the NCAs) to go a step further in 
its/their ex post enforcement activity.  
 
This section and the next sections are aimed at showing how functional 
separation became a model of reference for new ex ante rules in the electronic 
communications sector as per Directive 2009/140/EC, but also how, after 
seven years after its implementation there are still some concerns on its 
effectiveness. 
 
In the United Kingdom, Openreach was the solution adopted on the basis of a 
particular form of commitments, the so-called ‘undertaking in lieu of market 
investigation’ as per Section 154 of the United Kingdom EA02429. Section 154 
is the tool that in 2005-2006 provided the legal basis for the undertakings 
negotiated between the UK competition authority competent for 
communications, OFCOM, and the British incumbent of communications, 
British Telecom Group, which led to the functional separation of the access 
division of BT Group. The undertakings proposed by British Telecom were 
accepted by OFCOM, and were aimed at addressing serious concerns of 
potentially abusive conduct carried out over the years by British Telecom in 
the market for access to infrastructure of telecommunications (in particular to 
the local loop) vis à vis the competitors–new entrants (or would-be new 
entrants). 
 
                                            
 
429 For an extensive explanatory analysis of the Enterprise Act 2002, see ‘Enterprise Act 2002, 
The New Law of Mergers, Monopolies and Cartels’, T. Frazer, S. Hinchliffe and K. George, 
The Law Society publishing, 2003. See also the Competition Commission’s guidelines on 
Market Investigation references, June 2003, CC3. The Competition Commission in April 2011 
sought comments from stakeholders on those sections of the working-draft that had by that 
time been extensively developed. New guidelines were published in April 2013 (CC3, revised). 
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The undertakings signed by British Telecom before OFCOM in 2006 led to the 
creation of a new division within the group called ‘Openreach’. The creation of 
a separate division dealing with the negotiation of new access contracts 
between the incumbent and the competitors can be considered the first 
example in Europe and in the electronic communications sector of ‘functional 
separation’.  
 
Chapter 3 of the Enterprise Act, Enforcement, sub-section ‘Undertakings and 
orders’, establishes the legal tools for the so-called ‘market investigations’ 
carried out by the Competition Commission, as provided by Section 131 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002. 
 
It is worth recalling part of Section 154 of the Enterprise Act 2002: 
 
‘ [..]The OFT may, instead of making such a reference [to the 
Competition Commission] and for the purpose of remedying, 
mitigating or preventing: (A) any adverse effect on competition 
concerned; or (B) any detrimental effect on customers so far as it 
has resulted from, or may be expected to result from, the adverse 
effect on competition; accept, from such persons as it considers 
appropriate, undertakings such action as it considers 
appropriate. (3) In proceeding under subsection (2), the OFT shall, 
in particular, have regard to the need to achieve as 
comprehensive a solution as is reasonable and practicable to 
the adverse effect on competition concerned and any 
detrimental effects on customers so far as resulting from the 
adverse effect on competition. In proceeding under subsection 
(2), the OFT may, in particular, have regard to the effect of any 
action on any relevant customer benefits of the feature or 
features of the market concerned […]. 
 
Before analysing in depth the meaning of Section 154 EA02, this article must 
be read in conjunction with Section 131 EA02 ‘Making references’ (Chapter 1 
– Market investigation references). At paragraph 1, it establishes that:  
 
‘The OFT may, subject to subsection (4), make a reference to the 
[Competition] Commission if the OFT has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that any feature, or combination of features, of a market 
in the United Kingdom for goods or services prevents, restricts or 
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distorts competition in connection with the supply or acquisition of 
any good or services in the United Kingdom or a part of the United 
Kingdom […]’. 
 
If the investigated party does not propose undertakings in lieu of reference 
under Section 154 EA02, and a reference to the Competition Commission is 
made by the OFT, the Competition Commission has to decide whether 
competition is prevented, restricted or distorted. If this is the case, the 
Competition Commission decides which action should be taken to remedy the 
adverse effect on competition or any detrimental effect on customers resulting 
from it (i.e. higher prices, lower quality or less choice of goods or services, or 
less innovation in relation to goods or services in market in the UK)430. 
 
The Competition Commission’s reference is an exceptional tool in the hands of 
the competition authorities (OFT and CC, that will merge from 1st April 2014 to 
create the Competition and Markets Authority) to deal with situations that may 
escape to the customary application of the CA98 Prohibitions. A market 
investigation reference can be considered the preferable tool to address ‘wider 
competition concerns than those which could be addressed by a CA98 case, 
and might, therefore, be a better way of proceeding’431. By its very nature, it is 
a tool particularly suited to deal with anti-competitive issues determined by the 
particular features of an entire market or by the conduct or structure of a 
number of undertakings432.  
 
The ‘undertakings in lieu of’ reference represents a third way that will attract 
attention in future, especially in consideration of its capacity, as a tool of 
                                            
 
430See point 1.11 of the March 2006 OFT Guidelines on the market investigation reference, p 
4. 
 
431OFT Guidance, March 2006, point 2.5, p 7. 
 
432’The OFT might decide to make a market investigation reference when there has been an 
abuse of a dominant position and it is clear that nothing short of a structural remedy 
going beyond what is appropriate under CA98 would be effective in dealing with the 
consequential adverse effect on competition. This position will be reviewed in the light of 
changes to CA98 arising from the implementation in the UK of the modernisation of EC 




competition policy, to be flexible and potentially tailored to a specific case433. It 
is possible that the Competition Commission market investigation will show 
that the conduct amounted to an abuse of a dominant position prohibited 
under Article 102 TFEU; at the end of an investigation phase the Competition 
Commission might impose remedies under the EA02, including functional and 
even structural separation.  
 
The market structure will be one of the key points that the Competition 
Commission (and, before the reference, the OFT) will investigate. Another 
important structural feature considered by the Competition Commission is the 
level of ‘vertical integration’ of the investigated companies. Vertical 
integration may often be efficient or pro-competitive, but can easily turn into an 
anti-competitive aspect since this feature can lead to foreclosure of non-
integrated competitors for a significant part of their market either by refusing to 
supply or to deal with them, or by discriminating against them through pricing.  
At the end of a market investigation, the Competition Commission will choose 
the best remedy to address competition concerns. In so doing, the 
Competition Commission will take into consideration two factors: costs and 
proportionality434. The Commission will also explain how the remedies may 
positively impact on consumers. 
 
The remedy will be either directed at the adverse effects of a market feature 
on competition, or at the detrimental effect on consumers. In other words, it 
will either address the reason for the anti-competitive effects, or the 
consequences of the market feature that created the anti-competitive effect. 
 
Another important aspect is the effectiveness of the remedy to be chosen. 
The Commission has a wide range of options. Remedies can be aimed at 
modifying the structure of the market, i.e. requiring the divestiture of a 
business or assets to a newcomer or to an existing, but smaller competitor; 
another option might be to keep focusing on the market feature, adopting less 
                                            
433 ibid, point 2.12, p 9. 
 




intrusive remedies (i.e. the company may undertake to enact behavioural 
measures, for instance removing barriers to entry or lowering the switching 
costs). The Competition Commission, in doing so, will also establish whether it 
is directly competent to adopt the best remedy, or whether it is advisable to let 
a specific market regulator (for example OFCOM, OFGEM ) adopt the most 
suitable remedy. 
 
This preamble explains how the investigation triggered by the OFT in 2005, 
with respect to the electronic communications sector, led to the signature of 
the undertakings by British Telecom. The investigation was transferred to 
OFCOM being the entity directly competent ratione materiae. OFCOM 
identified several market features that had materially slowed down the 
competitive process in the downstream market of access to the infrastructures, 
especially the access to the last-mile. OFCOM also identified bottle-necks and 
the risk of discrimination carried by British Telecom with respect to the access 
to its own infrastructure by competitors, in particular providers of voice 
telephony and broadband access to internet.  
 
British Telecom agreed to negotiate ‘undertakings in lieu of reference’, that 
led, in September 2005, to the signature of a proposal of undertakings mainly 
dealing with the creation of a separate division, within the same group (BT 
Group), responsible for the access to the last mile: Openreach, the new 
division created in January 2006435.  
 
Features of this procedure will be analysed further in Chapter VI, and 
compared with other remedies, namely with structural separation.  
 
                                            
 
435 The fundamental document is the ‘undertakings’ signed by BT with OFCOM. See the 
Undertakings given to OFCOM by BT pursuant to the Enterprise Act 2002, 22 September 
2005, at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/telecoms/policy/bt/btundertakings.pdf. It 
must be read in conjunction with the OFCOM’s Final statements on the Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002, 22 





In the next chapter I will show how the extreme outcome of structural 
separation that appeared buried by jurisprudence and the doctrine as 
exemplified by the AT&T case of 1984, is a viable argument to be used when 
dealing with network-related anticompetitive conducts also at national level.  
 
 
5.5.  Advantages of functional separation in the UK experience with   
Openreach. 
 
The undertakings signed by British Telecom with OFCOM represent the 
cutting-edge of a long process of regulation aimed at protecting and enhancing 
competition and therefore, competitiveness in the communications markets in 
Britain. The United Kingdom is today characterised by the presence of a high 
number of communications operators. Briefly, in the market of fixed telephony 
British Telecom can be listed alongside a relevant number of competitors: 
Cable & Wireless, COLT, Easynet Ltd, Global Crossing UK, Gamma 
Telecommunications, Geo, Kingston Communications, NTL-Telewest, Thus, 
Your Communications. These main operators were joined by 370 ‘wholesale 
line rental’ operators and Local Loop Unbundled operators (the twelve main 
fixed telephony operators, plus Carphone Warehouse/AOL UK, Pipex, Orange 
UK, Tiscali UK, Cable & Wireless, NTL-Telewest, Easynet for one million lines 
in total)436. 
 
In the last decade, the main issue for operators in the electronic 
communications market was how to gain access to the existing infrastructure 
without suffering potential or actual recurrent forms of price-discrimination, 
direct or indirect refusal to supply, predatory or excessive prices and, more 
recently, forms of margin squeeze. The ‘Framework Directive’ tried to prevent 
access-related abuses through the above-mentioned SMP obligations. 
However, the UK example of functional separation negotiated in 2005 with 
OFCOM demonstrated the possibility of an alternative remedy with respect to 
traditional ex ante tools.  
                                            
 
436 Data presented by J. Taylor, BT Global Services, in her presentation ‘Openreach – an open 





As we have seen above, the main concerns that led to functional separation in 
the UK were the following: the monopolist was not investing in terms of 
innovation as there was no incentive to take risk; the control (ownership) of the 
fibre to cabinet or to premises arrangements appeared to be used as an 
excuse for a form of ‘re-monopolisation’; the incumbent (BT) would have rolled 
out the so-called ‘21 CN’437 (the New Generation Network, or ‘NGN’) knowing 
that it would have been regulated and functionally separated by the core of the 
Group. 
 
The EU directives and the NRAs had the common target of granting a non-
discriminatory, transparent, cost-oriented access for any competing operators. 
However, competition in UK was evidently restricted in at least two markets: 
the wholesale markets (i) for access to the network and (ii) of backhaul 
services. This factor was particularly evident if one considers that the 
incumbent had substantial wholesale market power and was a vertically 
integrated provider with a presence in directly-related retail markets. 
 
 
The peculiar characteristic of the electronic communications operator, 
controlling the wholesale provision and the downstream businesses at the 
same time, led OFCOM to embark on an action calling into question BT’s 
ability to carry out potentially discriminatory behaviours. The chronology of 
recurrent abuses carried out by BT leveraging its dominant position in the 
upstream market or in the control of the access to the core-infrastructure 
forced OFCOM to identify the best remedy to pave the way for the creation of 
the New Generation Network to be deployed in UK from 2006 onwards. 
 
OFCOM’s Telecommunications Strategic Review of 2004 played a crucial role. 
The conclusion reached at the end of that review could lead to a reference to 
                                            
 
437 Network of new generation for the 21st century, http://www.btplc.com/21CN/),  explanatory 






the Competition Commission on the basis of the Enterprise Act 2002. The 
outcome at that early stage was unpredictable, but one of the hypotheses was 
that the Competition Commission could opt for BT’s structural separation. BT 
therefore decided to negotiate ‘undertakings in lieu of reference’, which had 
finally signed on 22 September 2005 and implemented in January 2006 with 
the creation of a separate division438. The undertakings focus on access 
bottlenecks; they outline the creation of a functionally separate entity, i.e. a 
separate access division439; they are based on the principle of ‘equivalence of 
inputs’; they outline the operational separation, transparency of negotiation 
and separation of the systems; the new entity must have independent 
oversight, and enforcement mechanisms are also foreseen. 
 
Figure no. 7 shows the assets of Openreach and how the undertakings in lieu 
of reference materially impact over the functions of British Telecom Group.  
 
                                            
438 For an overview on the creation and functioning of Openreach as a separate division of BT 
Group, see the clear memorandum published by OFCOM, at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/telecoms/policy/bt/overview.pdf 
 
439 The main operational characteristics of Openreach can be outlined as follows: equivalence 
of input to access bottlenecks; same services available to all and equally used by incumbent in 
downstream markets; forceful, and transparent, non-discrimination obligations; equality of 
access to information and product development; clear boundaries between upstream and 
downstream divisions; effective, transparent and public accounting separation obligation; 






Figure 7 - Openreach assets440 
 
As shown in the picture, Openreach is a company still part of the BT Group but 
functionally separated from BT Wholesale, BT Global Services and BT Retail, 
thus aimed at facilitating access by third party operators to BT’s infrastructure, 
in particular the part of infrastructure between BT Wholesale Core nodes and 
local loop ‘backplate’ of NTE. It is a newly created separate entity, with its own 
headquarters, distinct brand and about 30,000 employees. It controls and 
operates the duct, fibre, copper and other non-electronic assets in BT’s access 
and backhaul networks (the part of the network mainly responsible for the 
above-mentioned ‘access bottlenecks’). It provides management, sales and 
service management for significant market power (SMP) products delivered 
over BT’s access and/or backhaul networks–bottleneck products. Obviously 
the financial accounts are also kept separate. 
                                            
 
440 Figure excerpted from a non-confidential document distributed by J. Taylor, a BT Global 




One of the most interesting features of Openreach management is the fact 
that its board of directors reports441 directly to the Chief Executive Officer of 
BT, while the ‘compliance oversight’ rests with the main BT PLC board through 
a separate entity supervising the Openreach board, without interferences by 
wholesale, retail or global services boards. 
 
Any breach of undertakings can lead to three different measures. In particular, 
OFCOM can adopt simple ‘directions’ or seek a judicial enforcement of the 
undertakings; in the event of continued violation of the undertakings, OFCOM 
can also decide to refer BT to the Competition Commission (one of the 
outcomes being the structural separation of the network); third parties can also 
trigger civil actions for damages. 
 
A key concept of the undertakings signed between BT and OFCOM is the so-
called ‘Equality of Input’. Equality of input is more than ‘non-discrimination’. It 
means ‘same ordering system’, ‘same ability to influence’, same prices, same 
terms and conditions, same services and same access to commercial 
information. 
 
Equality of Input has been achieved through the creation of an ‘Equivalence 
Management Platform’ (‘EMP’) for the Unbundling of the Local Loop (ULL), 
specifically created on 30 June 2006. According to the EMP, all the fault 
repairs, dialogue services capability and other management discussions are 
conducted through a single interface for all the operators, including BT. BT’s 
new wholesale orders now use the same Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) 
products on the same terms as the rest of the industry. 
 
As a consequence, if the number of unbundled lines in November 2006 were 
one million in the entire UK, in the aftermath of the signature of the 
undertakings Openreach began processing 30,000 new LLU orders every 
week, to the point that in a few years more than twenty new LLU 
                                            
441 So-called ‘management reporting’ in the undertakings. 
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communications players were able to provide unbundled services from almost 
1,000 local exchanges across the UK. 
 
The new scenario determined by the BT undertakings has increased clarity for 
the operators, reducing the risk of bottlenecks, enhancing the interest of 
investors in the Next Generation Networks and has ultimately fostered 
innovation and growth. The competition is now more infrastructure-oriented 
than simply product-service oriented. 
 
The Communications Providers (‘CP’) are in general optimistic and favourable 
about the impact of Openreach on the UK scenario. OFCOM noticed that the 
creation of identical conditions of access to the local loop through Openreach 
has stimulated competition providing new services and products through the 
same network, increasing the number of opportunities for the operators.  
 
If one looks at the aggregate data in terms of voice and mobile telephony in 
United Kingdom, as well as in terms of broadband penetration, the last decade 
can be considered positive. Looking at a recent OFCOM’s report now 76 per 
cent of household are connected to the Internet (25 per cent in 2000) with 
peaks of household penetration up to 89 per cent of superfast broadband 
availability in the Greater London Authority in 2013442. The landline penetration 
partially dropped from 93 per cent in 2000 to 81 per cent in 2011, in favour of 
more mobile communications; but in change now 93 per cent of houses have 
multi-channel digital TV, in comparison to 36 per cent in 2000; 60 per cent of 
households owns an HD-Ready TV (but only 50 per cent claim to receive 
HDTV channels)443. 
 
                                            
442 See maps.ofcom.org.uk\broadband, accessed on the 30.10.2013. 
 
443 Communications Market Report 2011 (August 2011), available at the OFCOM website: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-
reports/cmr11/uk/. It provides very detailed information on the state-of-play of landline, mobile 




More interesting data come from the broadband penetration. As the August 
2011 OFCOM’ report on the state-of play of communications in United 
Kingdom says 
 
‘by May 2011, around 500,000 households had adopted superfast 
broadband, with a headline speed of 30Mbit/s or higher, with a 
fivefold increase from 2010. 57 per cent of households are now 
passed by superfast broadband, either through Virginia Media’s 
cable service or BT’s Infinity product. Satisfaction with superfast 
broadband is high, with 80 per cent saying they are satisfied with 
their previous broadband service), and a third (33 per cent) saying 
download speeds exceeded their expectations. ’444. 
 
All these factors encourage to believe that in a highly regulated country as the 
United Kingdom, with an efficient legal enforcement system, the model of 
functional separation seems to deal efficiently with the set targets: (i) to grant a 
level playing field of competition for the competitors; (ii) to ensure a high level 
of consumer welfare in the short-medium term.  
However, as I will discuss in the next section, still the UK electronic 
communications sector is not perfectly competitive even after functional 
separation of the incumbent. Similarly, in the energy sector functional 
separation functional separation as per the Energy Sector review 2007 was 
not seen as the panacea.  
 
 
4.6. Functional separation: criticisms 
 
The adoption of functional separation as a remedy to favour network-based 
competition has not been immune to criticism.  
 
Some criticisms can be applied to both functional and structural separation; 
others are specific to one or the other form of separation.  
 
                                            
444 OFCOM’s press release announcing the publication of the Communications Market Report 





Economists, in particular, argue that breaking a vertically-integrated business 
up into two or more divisions leads to inefficiencies and higher costs445.  
 
The main criticism to functional separation is that the regulator needs to 
monitor the creation of two divisions carefully, ensuring that it is effective and 
not just a ‘cover-up’, leaving the decisional process with respect to network 
access tariffs (the most obvious example) untouched. Therefore the scope for 
heavy regulation remains intact.  
 
Functional separation is also not definitive. Theoretically the two divisions (for 
instance, the ‘wholesale’ and ‘access’ divisions) may merge again in the 
future, if the remedy so provides; in this respect only (ownership) structural 
separation can be considered definitive.  
 
Furthermore, the difference between the various divisions of a company will 
blur if we consider the technological evolution. For the time being the backhaul 
and transport network division is separated by the  network access division 
(dealing for instance with the so-called last mile) , while in a post-NGN network 
scenario the difference between the first and the second type of network will 
disappear, the only real difference being the difference between the retail 
services division and the division operating the NGN network446 (in the last 
chapter I will show how in Australia this form of separation will materially take 
place from 2018).  
 
If this difference between backhaul/transport network division and access 
network division is blurred, functional separation of these two divisions might 
not be the most effective solution adopted by the competition authorities. 
Instead complete structural separation between network division, on the one 
hand, and services division, on the other hand, could be the suitable solution.  
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Functional separation for instance found some opposition in Sweden. The 
survey launched by the Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency in 2007 
(at the beginning of the Telecoms Package Review) investigated whether the 
preconditions to introduce functional separation as a remedy existed in 
Sweden. They found that the buy-sell relationship between TeliaSonera and 
the wholesale customers was not really working. The Swedish Telecoms 
Agency proposed to introduce legal and functional separation to rectify the 
competition’s distortion caused by the vertical integration of TeliaSonera, 
going beyond the simple functional separation of Openreach. The public 
consultation launched by the Swedish agency found TeliaSonera reacting 
quite aggressively, proposing to create a new division managing both the 
copper and fibre infrastructure, dealing on equal terms with both retail and 
access services. It rejected the proposal of functional separation arguing that it 
would have gone against its constitutionally protected rights to full ownership. 
Nevertheless the Swedish government approved a bill introducing ‘Functional 
separation for better broadband competition’ from 1 July 2008, therefore 
anticipating the European Directive 2009/140/EC447. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the process of implementation of milestones linked to 
the creation of Openreach as a separated division also passed through 
difficulties. The most recent report (2013) published by the Equality of Access 
Board (‘EAB’) of British Telecom on the state of implementation of the 
undertakings accepted by BT when created Openreach, shows that there are 
numerous outstanding issues to be solved448. 
 
EAB found nine serious breaches of the undertakings, some of which are 
highlighted below.  
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The EAB report points out that migration acceptance codes had been provided 
to BT Retail but not to other communications providers; customers’ 
confidential information had been disclosed to the less regulated part of BT 
Wholesale business; BT found that BT Wholesale had set up a site on BT’s 
intranet to trial a new means of informing the industry of small scale network 
incidents, accessible to BT Retail staff, but not by other communications 
providers; information was accidentally forwarded to BT Retail putting them in 
a competitive advantage vis á vis other communications providers; there was 
a disclosure of BT Wholesale customer confidential information to BT Retail; 
the ‘90% target’ of migration of customer records to separate systems was not 
met (deadline missed)449. Another critical aspect detected by the EAB is that 
Openreach inappropriately shared commercial information with BT Wholesale 
(in particular, the paper described a new technology, and was sent by email to 
BT Wholesale ahead of a briefing to industry)450. 
 
The majority of the infringements are related to the exchange of information 
between BT Wholesale and Openreach451, somehow limiting the effectiveness 
of the separation or slowing the process of separation. On a positive note, BT 
management reacted promptly in trying to address the problems described.  
 
The adoption of functional separation as a regulatory remedy (under art. 13 
a(2)(c) of Directive 2009/240/EC) therefore requires careful evaluation of the 
disadvantages that it can entail. One of the most obvious disadvantages is 
common to other behavioural remedies, and is the significant increase of the 
workload on the regulatory authority. The authority has to establish what part 
of the incumbent has to be functionally separated (the network division, the 
access division, the wholesale division, fixed telephony services division). This 
disadvantage can be nevertheless compensated by the reduction of abuses 
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that the same authority will have to deal with in the future452. Another 
disadvantage is for the same incumbent: in a post-functional separation 
scenario the incumbent has to elaborate new processes and steps between 
the separated entity and the retail arm453. The incumbent will incur in high 
organisational costs.  
 
Part of the economic literature argues that functional separation may have an 
adverse impact on the incentives to invest in the network, both for the 
incumbent and for the alternative operators (the incumbent will focus on profits 
made with the wholesale operations, while alternative operators have all the 
interest to lease the access network without investing in upgrading the 
network).  
 
Such an adverse effect could be compensated with ex ante access prices, set 
a level to represent a sufficient incentive for the incumbent to ‘climb the ladder 
of investments’454.  
 
The two key factors that will lead the Commission to approve functional 
separation as an ex ante remedy in the electronic communications sector are 
the (i) impact on competition and (ii) impact on consumers. In both cases it will 
be particularly difficult for the Commission to foresee whether the remedy will 
boost competition and will enhance consumer welfare. Therefore functional 
separation will be chosen as the optimal remedy only when any other ex-ante 
remedy will have proven to be largely unsuccessful455.  
 
Looking at Chapter III, in the energy sector functional separation was the first 
model of separation adopted as an ex ante remedy. Nevertheless, after four 
years of functional separation the European Commission in 2007 launched the 
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Energy Sector Enquiry in order to allow the third parties (and the European 
electricity and gas incumbents) to express their views on the effectiveness of 
the remedy.  
 
The criticisms led to the adoption of a new set of directives in 2009 leading to 
structural (ownership) separation of the retails arms from the divisions 
controlling access to the relevant parts of the network, as the only way of 
completely eliminating any incentive to discriminatory behaviour on the part of 
the incumbent operator456.  
 
In France, for example, in 2000 an electricity transmission system operator 
was established that was operationally and functionally independent from EDF 
(the incumbent) on the basis of Directive 96/92/EC that opened up the 
electricity industry to competition. This step was followed by the functional 
separation of EDF’s distribution business, on the basis of French law 9 august 
2004, modelled on Directive 2003/54/EC. The third step is now structural 
separation, on the basis of the new set of directives adopted in 2009 (the so-
called ‘Third Package’ of European Energy Sector Liberalisation Directives), 
preceded by the 2007 Energy Sector Enquiry (while at enforcement level the 
European Commission accepted commitments leading to structural separation 
of part of the network for E.ON (2008), RWE (2008) and ENI (2010).  
 
The point is that functional and legal unbundling as introduced in the energy 
sector by the ‘Second Package’ according to the finding of the Sector Enquiry 
did not work as it was expected457.  
 
It is worth remembering the main concerns identified by the Energy Sector 
Enquiry (2007) with respect to the persistence of vertical foreclosure effects 
even after functional unbundling of gas and electricity operators, since the 
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same vertical foreclosure effects tend to be present in the electronic 
communications sector (even in the presence of ex ante regulatory measures 
and, for certain respects, after functional separation). 
 
The main critics against functional and legal unbundling in the energy sector 
were that market concentration was still untouched. Quoting from the Energy 
Sector Report  
 
‘at the wholesale level, gas and electricity markets remain national 
in scope, and generally maintain the high level of concentration of 
the pre-liberalised period. This gives scope for exercising market 
power’458. 
 
Even though today in the electronic communications sector (almost 20 years 
after the beginning of the liberalisation process), we find lower levels of 
concentration than the levels identified in 2007 by the Energy Sector Enquiry in 
the electricity generation market and gas distribution market in the main 
European countries, still companies such as Deutsche Telekom, British 
Telecom (after functional separation) or Telecom Italia (after its attempt at 
functional separation) own very large market shares.  
 
Another impediment to functional separation in the gas and electricity sector 
from the Energy Sector Enquire is the persistence of vertical foreclosure. The 
report says  
 
‘The current level of unbundling of network and supply 
interests has negative repercussions on market functioning 
and on incentives to invest in networks. This constitutes a 
major obstacle to new entry and also threatens security of 
supply’459. 
 
Another criticism to functional unbundling in the energy sector is the fact 
that the expected European market integration remained ‘on paper’. The 
                                            






Energy Sector Enquiry, for both the gas and the electricity sectors, notes 
how  
 
‘cross-border sales do not currently impose any significant 
competitive constraint. Incumbents rarely enter other national 
markets as competitors. Insufficient or unavailable cross-
border capacity and different market designs hamper market 
integration’460. 
 
In electronic communications, we can say that functional separation in the 
United Kingdom did not lead to an increase of European cross-border 
sales.  
 
As per the gas sector, we could argue that ‘available capacity on cross-
border import pipelines is limited. New entrants are unable to secure 
transit capacity on key routes and entry capacity into new markets’ and ‘in 
electricity, integration is hampered by insufficient interconnector capacity 
and a lack of adequate incentives to invest in additional capacity to 
eliminate long-established bottle-necks’461. 
 
A further criticism of functional separation in the energy sector in 2007 
ranged from a lack of transparency (‘there is a lack of reliable and timely 
information on the markets’) to difficulties with price formation (‘more 
effective and transparent price formation is needed in order to deliver the 
full advantages of market opening to consumers. Many users have limited 
trust in the price formation mechanisms, while regulated supply tariffs 
below market prices discourage new entry’).  
 
In a direct analogy with the electronic communications sector, the focus 
of the Energy Sector Enquiry spots competition obstacles also within the 
downstream markets: ‘competition at the retail level is often limited. The 
duration of retail contracts for industrial customers and local distribution 
                                            






companies can have a substantial impact on the opportunities for 
alternative suppliers to successfully enter the market’462.  
 
The experience of functional and operational unbundling in the energy 
sector over the past few years should provide sufficient evidence to argue 
that it might not be sufficient to create the pre-conditions for the 
realisation of a ‘level playing field’ of competition in the electronic 






Chapter IV is a key chapter in answering the ‘research question’: what is the 
best remedy to address ‘vertical integration–related’ competition concerns?  
 
It is divided into two parts: the first dealing with cases of margin squeeze 
conducts from European Commission practice and the European Courts’ 
jurisprudence. Some of these cases have contributed to the evolution of the 
‘essential facilities’ doctrine in recent years and to the extension of competition 
law enforcement by the European Commission: Deutsche Telekom463, 
Wanadoo Interactive (France Telecom)464, Telefónica465 and TeliaSonera466. 
 
Analysing these cases I argued that fines probably were not sufficient to deter 
the former incumbents of the main European countries from abusing again in 
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463 Commission decision Deutsche Telekom [2003] OJ L263/9; on appeal, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom and Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom. 
 
 
464 Commission decision Wanadoo Interactive of 16 July 2003. On appeal, Case T-340/03 
France Télécom and    Case C-202/07 France Télécom. 
 
465 Commission Decision Telefónica, appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 
Telefónica (judgment on the 29 March 2012).  
 
466 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (TeliaSonera) of 17 February 






the future. To demonstrate my argument I considered the fines imposed 
comparing them with the total annual turnover of the company (of the year 
preceding the decision) or with the annual turnover generated in the relevant 
market where the abuse was made.  
 
In both cases it was easy to show that the fines amounted to an infinitesimal 
part of the turnover of the group or of the company concerned. Therefore, 
fines for infringements having serious anticompetitive foreclosure effects such 
as margin squeeze or refusal to supply result to be not a serious deterrent for 
the companies. 
 
In the second part of this chapter I looked at functional (operational) 
separation as firstly applied in the Deutsche Post decision in 2001. I then 
looked at how functional separation was the remedy, applied on the basis of 
undertaking in lieu of reference to the Competition Commission, in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
The British experience leading to the functional separation of British Telecom 
in 2006 and the creation of a separate access division called Openreach was 
considered so successful to be adopted as a model of reference during the 
process of reform of the Telecommunications Package 2000, to the point that 
functional separation was adopted as a new ex ante remedy by Directive 
2009/140/EC. 
 
In this chapter I have also indicated that Openreach’s functional separation still 
encounters some difficulties seven years after its implementation.  
 
At the same time I have recalled the weaknesses that the Energy Sector 
Enquiry detected in 2007 with respect to operational unbundling in both the 
gas and the electricity sector.  
 
These two sets of criticisms with respect to functional separation, associated 
with the argument that it is possible to rise against pecuniary fines in dealing 
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with abuses having anticompetitive foreclosure effects, led me to consider 
whether structural separation should now be seen as a suitable remedy.  
 
As I will discuss in the next chapter negotiated solutions such as commitments 
in the last few years in the energy sector led not only to behavioural solutions 
but also to more invasive, intrusive, ownership-separation oriented, measures. 
 
The E.ON Electricity, RWE and ENI cases show that the Commission at least 
in the energy sector is ready to adopt structural decision, applying the 
principles of proportionality and necessity in their entire extension.  
 
It is possible to see these cases as part of a trend the power of which cannot 
be underestimated. The Commission, as a watchdog imposing (i) serious fines 
and (ii) behavioural remedies seems now to be more favourable to more 
structural, ownership oriented, solutions.  
 
If it is true that the Commission (and, a fortiori, the NCAs and sectorial 
regulators with enforcement prerogatives) may adopt structural solutions on 
the basis of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC, it is now important to establish 
which further tests have to be put in place to opt for more draconian remedies.  
 
In chapter VII (after having looked at the US experience in the AT&T case) I 
will discuss how the enforcer, before choosing the most suitable remedy, 
should be called to carry out a (i) competition law test and a (ii) 
cost/opportunity test (or ‘economic efficiency of the remedy’ test).  
 
If these tests are satisfied, structural separation could be applied as a 
potentially suitable remedy, bearing in mind that structural separation should 
be applied in such a way as not to represent a mere ‘shift of market power’ 
from one company to another (for instance by transferring the ownership of the 
network to a competitor, allowing the purchaser to provide the same electronic 





Alternatively, I will discuss (and conclude) how the threat of divestiture may 
represent a serious deterrent that may lead the incumbent to offer functional 





































Effects on competition of exploitative and exclusionary abusive 






A logical preliminary step is to demonstrate not only that some abuses in 
vertically-integrated network firms are similar, but also that the effects on 
competition for the same type of abuses can be considered identical.  
 
If the abuses and the anticompetitive foreclosure effects are identical, for the 
same category of abuses (the so-called exclusionary conducts of the 
Guidance Paper 2008), there is good reason to believe that structural 
remedies such as divestitures of relevant parts of the network as enacted with 
respect to electricity generation and transmission, or gas transformation, 
transmission and distribution could be also applied to the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
Once identified the similarities of the exclusionary conducts in both the 
electronic communications sector and in vertically-integrated firms in the 
energy sector (chapters I and II), and the analogy in terms of vertical 
foreclosure anticompetitive effects in both sectors, I can argue at least on a 
legal point of view, and on the basis of the current practice of the Commission, 
structural separation could theoretically be imposed also in the electronic 
communications sector, in particular when the exclusionary effects are the 
same. More difficult will be to demonstrate that structural remedies applied in 
the energy sector effectively led to more competition and to higher consumer 
welfare (lower prices, enhanced quality of the service). But the fact that in two 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand the competition authorities 
decided to impose structural remedies to enhance competition (Chapter VIII) 
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should constitute a good argument in showing that in those countries the 
structural remedies are already considered beneficial.  
 
At that point I should be in condition to conclude that structural separation 
could be suggested also for the electronic communications sector, in the 
presence of similar types of exclusionary abuses with the same impact in 
terms of consumers’ welfare. 
 
A few examples may help to clarify this aspect.  
 
In the energy sector467, the recent sector inquiry, launched on the basis of 
Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003/EC, reached the conclusion that energy 
markets in the EU were still not open to full competition, despite the 1990s 
directives that in both gas and electricity markets were aimed at increasing 
prices transparency and fairness468, but also at facilitating the transit of gas 
and electricity between Member States469.  
 
The 2007 survey concluded that cross-border integration and cross-border 
competition was still embryonic; particularly with regard to insufficient 
unbundling of network and supply activities.  
 
The European Commission adopted in 2009 a new package of legislative 
measures (the so-called ‘third package’ of energy legislative proposals 
adopted in September 2007)470, preceded, since 2007, by numerous 
                                            
467 M. Pollitt, ‘The arguments for and against ownership unbundling in energy transmission 
markets’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy, 704-713, available at 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/194717/0737%26EPRG071
4.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on the 20 September 2013. 
 
468 R. Whish-D. Bailey, cited, p 989 ff. See Council Directive 90/377/EEC, OJ [1990] L185/16 
(gas) and Council directive 90/377/EEC, OJ [1990] L185/16 (electricity). The second wave of 
reform dates 2003: Council Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ [2003] L 176/57 (gas) and Council 




470 Regulation 714/2009/EC on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity, OJ [2009] L 211/15; Regulation 715/2009/EC on conditions of access 
to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ [2009] L 229/29; Directive 2009/72/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ [2009] L 211/55 and 
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investigations for alleged violation of Art. 102 TFEU. In certain cases the 
proceedings led to commitments that entailed structural measures to address 
the Commission’s concerns. Some commitments were purely behavioural471, 
as in the 2007 Distrigaz case. However in others the Commission accepted 
commitments whose nature was structural (cases E.ON472, RWE473 and 
ENI474). 
 
Considering the similarity in terms of vertical integration between the electronic 
communications and energy sectors, if the effects of this type of 
anticompetitive behaviours (exclusionary conducts) can be considered similar, 
then also the remedies could be in principle suggested for both sectors. 
 
 
5.2. The Energy Sector Enquiry 2007 and the concerns expressed with 
respect to vertical integration in the energy sector.  
 
The Energy Sector Enquiry of 2007 is adamant on the impact that vertical 
integration has in determining vertical foreclosure. Para 449 of the 
Enquiry expressly stresses as they can empirically demonstrate such an 
anticompetitive effect 
 
                                                                                                                              
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal natural gas, OJ [2009] L 
211/94. 
 
471 See the Case Distrigaz, published on the 5 April 2007, in which the company substantially 
offered to 70% of the gas sold to industrial entities will go back to the market every year, and 
time limitations for the exclusivity of the contracts signed up to five years (see Summary of 
Commission Decision of 11 October 2007 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty (Case COMP/B-1/37.966 — Distrigaz), [2008] OJ 2008/C 9/05. 
  
472 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ 
C36/8 of 13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
473Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf.   
 
474 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010 (2010/C 352/10), 





‘Vertically integrated electricity companies have traditionally been 
active in generation, network and retail activities. This chapter [of 
the Sector Enquiry] assesses the effects of this vertical integration. It 
starts with vertical integration of generation and retail activities and 
continues with vertical integration of network and supply activities. 
The Sector Inquiry confirms that both forms of vertical integration, 
whilst also bringing about certain economic benefits, have adverse 
effects for the liberalisation process. The magnitudes of these 
adverse effects are empirically assessed’.  
 
The electricity market part of the Energy Sector Enquiry concludes475 that  
 
‘[In addition to excessive bidding] large operators can push up 
prices by withdrawing capacity476. In that respect, it appears 
that load factors of generation units have increased over time 
in Germany and in France suggesting higher efficiency levels 
and a tighter supply/demand balance’.  
 
With respect to Germany and France, in particular, the Enquiry pointed out 
how significant generation capacity – most of it with low marginal costs – had 
been systematically withdrawn477 despite the slowly increasing demand. 
Also, certain plants with rather low marginal costs did not operate fully at all 
times478. 
 
The Energy Sector Enquiry had clearly identified the impact that withdrawal of 
wholesale capacity had on prices, showing the anticompetitive foreclosure 
effects that the allegedly abusive conduct carried out by E.ON, to make an 
example, could have had.  
 
In terms of prices, the withdrawal of wholesale capacity determined an 
increase of prices, as shown by the chart479 
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476 Emphasis added. 
 
477 Emphasis added. 
 
478 Emphasis added. 
 
479 Figure from P. Hellström, F. Maier-Rigaud, F. Wenzel Bulst, Remedies in European 






In the picture it is shown how the reduction of capacity (as a consequence of 
capacity withdrawal) in a hypothetical market, equal to the reduction of energy 
production generated by a coal plant, determines an increase of price from px 
to px+1, considering the demand of energy as vertically rigid.  
 
The Energy Enquiry Report is adamant in linking level of concentration, 
insufficient unbundling and, consequent, vertical foreclosure with the 
maintenance of prices above the equilibrium price in the presence of more 
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competitors with their own energy production facilities480. It clearly states that 
‘the current level of unbundling of network and supply interests has negative 
repercussions on market functioning and on incentives to invest in networks. 
This constitutes a major obstacle to new entry and also threatens security of 
supply’481. The lack of new entries ultimately preserves the status quo. Cross-
border competition is kept to a minimum. The national champions, incumbent 
of energy production from one Member State, rarely ‘cross the border’ to sale 
their own electricity and gas abroad, therefore the competitive pressure on the 
national incumbent is kept to a minimum, hampering market integration as one 
of the key-pillars of the European Union.  
 
Before analysing the remedies that the European Commission had already 
identified in 2007 to address the concerns linked to the structural features of 
the energy market in Europe, it is worth mentioning some of the comments of 
potential new-entrants who contributed to the preparation of the Energy Sector 
Enquiry.  
 
They are univocal in showing how the anti-competitive foreclosure effects 
seem directly linked to structural and behavioural factors.  
 
In the gas distribution sector, for instance, some responses to the 
questionnaire distributed by the European Commission showed that in 2007 
the wholesale market was poorly functioning, making difficult for competitors to 
access the gas to be distributed.  
 
In Italy, a number of respondents highlighted the lack of import capacity by the 
national incumbent, ENI. In Germany the respondents pointed out not only the 
difficulties related to the network capacity, but also the difficulties arising by 
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the booking capacity, thus identifying a combination of structural and 
behavioural obstacles482. 
 
The conclusion reached by the Energy Sector Enquiry for the gas sector was 
quite clear. It stressed how ‘access to gas for new entrants is essential for the 
future development of European gas competition’483, and how access to gas 
capacity can be granted through three ways: imports, domestic production and 
wholesale trading. Focusing on the first and third forms of access to gas 
capacity, it is evident why the Commission decided to target vertical 
integration with a combination of behavioural and structural remedies in order 
to bring anticompetitive vertical foreclosure to an end.  
 
On a legislative point of view, it must be remembered that the Energy Sector 
Inquiry was fundamental to introduce new forms of unbundling, going a step 
further with respect to the forms of separation envisaged, for instance, in the 
2nd Gas Directive484, such as legal and functional unbundling to resolve the 
conflicts of interest or the risk of non-discriminatory access to the gas 
transportation and distribution networks485.  
 
The 3rd package of liberalisation measures introduced at regulatory level the 
possibility of ownership unbundling. In particular, Directive 2009/72/EC, article 
9 (‘Unbundling of transmission systems and transmission system operators’), 
established that in the electricity production sector transmission, generation 
and supply should now belong to separate entities 
 
‘[T]he same person or persons are entitled neither: 
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483 Ibid, p 46. 
 
484 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in the natural gas and repealing directive 
98/30/EC, OJ [2003] L 176, 57-78. 
 
485 A. Ming-Zhi Gao, ‘The Third European Energy liberalization package: does functional and 
legal unbundling in the gas storage sector go too far’, (2009) Vol10 issue no. 1 Competition 




(i) directly or indirectly to exercise control over an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of generation or supply, and 
directly or indirectly to exercise control or exercise any right 
over a transmission system operator or over a transmission 
system; nor 
(ii) directly or indirectly to exercise control over a 
transmission system operator or over a transmission system, 
and directly or indirectly to exercise control or exercise any 
right over an undertaking performing any of the functions of 
generation or supply […]’486. 
 
The position adopted with respect to the gas sector was similar. The 
Directive 2009/73/EC (article 9) establishes that 
 
(a) each undertaking which owns a transmission system acts 
as a transmission system operator; 
(b) the same person or persons are entitled neither: 
 
(i) directly or indirectly to exercise control over an 
undertaking performing any of the functions of production or 
supply, and directly or indirectly to exercise control or 
exercise any right over a transmission system operator or 
over a transmission system; nor 
(ii) directly or indirectly to exercise control over a 
transmission system operator or over a transmission system, 
and directly or indirectly to exercise control or exercise any 
right over an undertaking performing any of the functions of 
production or supply […]’487. 
 
In other words, at regulatory level, in the energy sector was 
established that, for instance, the transmission assets could not be 
allowed to be controlled by the same vertically integrated company 
dealing with the supply business488.  
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These legislative measures represent a courageous step in the 
process of liberalisation of the energy sector, considering that the 
Commission was aware of the costs and risks of ownership 
unbundling489, and had favoured in 2003 milder forms of unbundling 
(such as functional and legal unbundling).  
 
The outcome of the Energy Sector Enquiry (and the third-parties 
responses in particular) as well as the first cases of commitments in 
the energy sector (case E.ON) played a key role in encouraging the 
Commission to adopt more invasive regulatory tools to favour 
liberalisation and enhance competition490. 
 
 
5.3.  Analysis of other energy sector cases: anticompetitive foreclosure 
effects of vertical integration in the energy sector.  
 
In the aftermath of the Energy Sector Enquiry 2007 the European Commission 
launched a number of investigations in both the gas and electricity sectors. 
Some of them will be analysed more in depth in the following chapters 
because they provide examples of decisions aimed at addressing exclusionary 
conducts though commitments more structural than behavioural in nature. I 
will now focus exclusively on the anticompetitive foreclosure effects arising 
from some of these cases, exclusionary effects that could be considered 
similar to the exclusionary effects determined by some types of conducts of 




                                            
489 In 2003 the Commission expressed its view, favouring a case-by-case approach 
considering the high costs of functional and legal unbundling, as can be seen in the European 
Commission Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on 
the internal market in electricity and natural gas: The unbundling regime, 16.1.2004, p. 1. 
 
490 On the pros and cons of structural separation in the energy transmission sector see Pollitt, 
cited, above. Against structural separation is A. Ming-Zhi Gao, cited, in favour of the 
strengthening of functional and legal unbundling.  
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(i) Exclusionary effects in the E.ON case (commitments decision 
published on the 12.06.2008).  
 
In the E.ON case of 2008 the anticompetitive foreclosure effects of the abusive 
conducts identified by the European Commission were of four different types. 
The Commission found that E.ON allegedly abused of its dominant position on 
the German electricity wholesale market (i) ‘by withholding available capacity 
(for instance deliberately not offering for sale the production of certain power 
stations which was available and economically ration), with a view of raising 
electricity prices to the detriment of consumers’491; (ii) E.ON would have 
also deterred third parties from making new investments in electricity 
generation; (iii) it would have also abused in the market of the ‘secondary 
balancing energy’ in the E.ON network area, by favouring its own production 
affiliates, therefore ‘passing increased costs on final consumers’492 and 
(iv) by impeding power producers from other Member States from selling 
balancing energy493.  
 
Looking at the anticompetitive foreclosure effects, in line with the criteria set in 
the Guidance Paper (para 19), establishing that the aim of the Commission 
enforcement in relation to exclusionary abuses is to make sure that ‘dominant 
undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their 
competitors in an anti-competitive way’494, it is evident that the Commission 
aimed at obtaining commitments (entailing structural separation, or 
divestitures) from E.ON having identified not only a number of well-defined 
objective abuses (for instance, for withholding available capacity, as a form of 
flat refusal to supply), but also potential foreclosure effects in the various 
conducts investigated.  
                                            
491 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission market tests commitments proposed by 
E.ON concerning German electricity markets’, MEMO/08/396, press release of 12 June 2008, 
accessible at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-396_en.htm. Summary of the 
commitments decision was published in the EU Official Journal on 12 June 2008 (2008 
C146/09) and is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases. 
 
492 ibid.  
 
493 Emphases added. 
 





This is particularly evident in the reluctance shown by E.ON in offering 
wholesale available capacity to competitors in order to keep prices for the final 
consumers higher. Similarly, the second abusive conduct, aimed at 
discouraging new investments to create new power generators, also had an 
evident anticompetitive foreclosure effect, since less energy produced meant 
less wholesale capacity available for the competitors, ultimately artificially 
keeping prices for the final consumers high.  
 
Similar comments on the anticompetitive foreclosure effect of E.ON can be 
made with respect to conduct (iii) and (iv) listed at the beginning of this 
section. All behaviours that led the European Commission to discuss with 
E.ON the possibility of divesting part of their production capacity, therefore 
adopting a commitments decision entailing forms of structural vertical 
separation.  
 
In February 2008 the European Commission hailed the proposal made by 
E.ON to undertake structural reforms (divestitures) to increase competition. 
E.ON offered to sell its electricity transmission system network to an operator 
which had no involvement with the electricity generation and/or supply 
businesses, also committing to divest 4800 MW of generation capacity to 
competitors495. 
 
The European Commission suspected that the high prices in the electricity 
market in Germany could be linked to the artificially reduced wholesale 
capacity available, as can be found in the sector inquiry report of 2007496: 
 
‘Generators, due to the characteristics of electricity markets, may 
also be able to influence prices through withdrawals of physical 
capacity. This can be done by fully withdrawing a plant or, more 
discreetly, by making it produce at less than its capacity (partial 
                                            
495 European Commission press release MEMO/08/132 of 28 February 2008.  
 








(ii) Exclusionary effects in the RWE gas foreclosure case (commitments 
decision published on the 26 November 2008)  
 
In the RWE case498 the Commission found that the company had possibly 
been carrying out abuses as per Article 102 TFEU through refusal to supply 
and margin squeeze on the German gas transmission markets. An analysis of 
the decision shows that the preliminary assessment made by the investigation 
unit of the Commission took the view that RWE’s gas transmission network 
could be considered as an essential facility ‘since access to it was objectively 
necessary to carry out business in the gas supply markets within RWE’s grid 
areas’499. In particular the Commission found that the company dealing with 
the access to the gas transmission network, RWE TSO, refused the access to 
its network through specific strategies of its management, trying to keep the 
transport capacities on its own network for itself500 (the analogy with similar 
conducts in the electronic communications is particularly evident). The 
competitors found it particularly difficult to access to the downstream markets 
since RWE had booked almost the entire capacity on its transmission network 
on a long term basis, behaviour that contrasts with the demand of third-party 
customers for transmission capacity on RWE’s network501. The effect of such 
a conduct was that third party shippers represented only a fraction of the 
transports on RWE’s transmission grid, and could not compete in an ‘effective 
manner in the downstream supply business’502.  
                                            
497 See Electricity Sector Enquiry, page 146, point 437. 
 
498 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf.  
 
499 ibid, point 4.3.1, para 22. 
 
500 ibid, para 24. 
 
501 The Commission was able to demonstrate that the demand of third transport customers 
was largely higher than the offered capacity. 
 





The second conduct ascertained by the Commission was that of a possible 
abuse by way of a margin squeeze. The Commission found that RWE  
 
‘may have intentionally set its transmission tariffs at an artificially 
high level in order to squeeze RWE’s competitors’ margins. Such a 
behaviour has the effect of preventing even an as efficient 
competitor to compete effectively on the downstream gas supply 
markets or limiting competitors’ or potential entrants’ ability to 
remain in or enter the market’503. 
 
The conduct described has strong analogies with the margin squeeze 
practices recorded in the most important decisions of the European 
Commission in the electronic communications sectors. The anticompetitive 
effect is the same, if we look at the words used (‘effect of preventing even an 
as efficient competitor to compete effectively on the downstream […] market 
[…]’504) as well as the effect of excluding existing competitors that are forced 
to leave in the short run.  
 
The conduct in particular consists in setting the transmission tariffs in such a 
way to be ‘even higher’ for the competitors (section ‘Asymmetric cost elements 
disadvantaging competitors’ of the decision505). The asymmetry consisted in 
applying part of the network tariff exclusively to third party users, indirectly 
offering a scheme of rebate for the incumbent.  
 
Interestingly, the Commission decision here points out an ‘asymmetric effect of 
the already elevated network access costs’ forcing the downstream 
competitors to abandon the market.  
 
As stated in the decision ‘the effect of the balancing regime was not limited to 
the actual high payment for imbalances. Already the mere risk506 of very high 
                                            




505 Ibid, paras 33ff. 
 
506 Italics in the decision. 
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penalty fees may have caused many competitors to abstain from attempts to 
submit offers to downstream customers’507.  
 
In addition to this, the RWE mentions the effect of the anticompetitive 
practices on the intra-European trade, where the Commission concludes that 
the behaviours were capable of affecting trade between Member States, 
‘notably by affecting import and export flows or hindering foreign competitors 
from competition with RWE within its grid area508‘.  
 
Here the analogy with the effect that similar exclusionary conducts can have 
on the intra-European trade in the electronic communications sector is 
particularly evident.  
 
On the basis of the competition concerns expressed by the European 
Commission, RWE proposed to ‘divest its current German gas transmission 
system business to a suitable purchaser which must not raise prima facie 
competition concerns’509.  
 
The decision is particularly important, because RWE offered to divest the 
entire high-pressure gas transmission network for approximately 4000 KM, 
plus auxiliary equipment necessary for the operation of the transmission 
network and intangible assets necessary for the operation of the transmission 
network.  
 
The same decision defines the measure accepted as a structural remedy, 
underlining that it ‘does not only oblige RWE to behave in a certain manner, 
but consists in the divestment of its gas transmission activities, which 
effectively removes the possibility for RWE to engage in infringements of the 
same type’510.  
                                                                                                                              
 




509 ibid, para 38. 
 




The decision is particularly relevant because it shows the complexity of the 
decisional process, bearing in mind not only the efficacy of the measure, but 
also the necessity of accepting the proposal of a ‘clear-cut’ structural remedy 
rather than a potentially insufficient behavioural remedy. 
 
This conclusion must be borne in mind whilst discussing the difficulty of 
choosing the most suitable remedy to deal with network-related abuses in the 
electronic communications sector.  
 
The doctrine stressed how this decision was not directly linked to the political 
negotiations on the 3rd Energy Package, but was inspired by the conclusion 
reached by its Energy Sector Inquiry, showing the importance that sector 
inquiries as per Art. 17 of the Reg. 1/2003/EC should be particularly welcome 
not only to define the ‘state of play’ of competition in a specific sector, but also 
what might be the most suitable remedy511.  
 
 
(iii) Exclusionary effects in the GDF foreclosure case (commitments 
decision published on the 26.06.2009) 
 
Similar exclusionary conducts were detected in the Gaz de France (GDF) 
commitment decision512 of 2009. In its preliminary statements the European 
Commission stated that the company, dominant in the gas import and supply 
markets in each of the balancing zones of the GRTgaz transport network513, 
could have abused its dominant position by foreclosing for a long period 
access to gas import capacity in each of the balancing zones of its network. 
Such a restriction for the Commission was a result of ‘long-term reservation of 
                                                                                                                              
 
511 O. Koch, K. Nagy, I. Pucinskaite-Kubik, W. Tretton, The RWE gas foreclosure case: 
another energy network divestiture to address foreclosure concerns’, in (2009) no. 2 Antitrust 
Policy, 34.  
 
512 Commission Decision Gaz de France (GDF) COMP/39.316 of 3 December 2009. 
 




most of the import capacity in the balancing zones, the determination of 
reception capacity and the procedures for allocating long-term capacity, and 
the strategic limitation of investment in additional import capacity’514. Though 
formally disagreeing with the conclusion of the preliminary assessment put 
forward by the Commission, GDF nevertheless proposed various 
commitments that can be considered behavioural. For instance, GDF offered 
to release to third parties firm, long-term capacities at the GRTgaz pipeline 
entry points; that would release to third parties equivalent upstream transport 
capacities515. As in similar decisions, the Commission accepted the proposed 
commitments on the basis of the principles of necessity and proportionality516. 
However, it is worth noting that the same Commission defined the type of 
behavioural commitments has having ‘an important structural effect’ on the 
ability of other shippers to gain access to the gas supply markets517. The 
importance of this decision is to show how behavioural remedies can have an 
added structural effect (their impact is equivalent to a structural divestiture), 
without the material change of ownership of the infrastructure or part of it.  
 
In terms of anticompetitive effects of the described alleged abusive behaviour, 
the Commission pointed out the foreclosure of access to the supply market for 
competitors, with a reduction of quantity of gas supply and an increase of the 
final price for consumers.  
 
The Commission showed that it was prone to adopt remedies with a structural 
effect (or impact), even adopting what would be considered a behavioural 
remedy as per Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003. 
 
In line with the finding of the Energy Sector Inquiry, in this case the 
Commission tried to reduce the impact of vertical foreclosure. By accepting the 
commitments offered by GDF the Commission aimed at reducing the duration 
                                            
514 Ibid, paras 24 and 25.  
 
515 Ibid, paras 42-50. 
 
516 Ibid, paras 63 ff. 
 




of long-term contracts, one of the main causes keeping the final prices of gas 
consumption artificially high. Though the Energy Sector Inquiry acknowledged 
that the sector’s secondary legislation deriving from the Second Gas 
Directive518 had considerably opened the gas supply market, it expressed its 
concerns thus  
 
‘the longer the duration of the contract, the greater the loss of scope 
for competition during its life. Furthermore, with concentrated 
markets, foreclosure through long-term contracts is a particular 
concern. For competition to develop, new entrants and existing 
competitors seeking to increase their market share must have the 
possibility to purchase the gas they require, to gain access to 
network and storage capacity and to contract with customers.’519. 
 
If the Second European Directive clarifies that ownership divestiture to 
favour unbundling of the transmission network is not the target of the 
directive (Art. 9)520, the Sector Inquiry of 2007 expressed substantial 
concerns about the process of liberalisation, and pointed out as the rigidity 
of control over the network by the vertically-integrated national incumbent 
was still an important factor of anti-competitive vertical foreclosure.  
 
The GDF decision seems to be an important step forward in the adoption 
of a remedy that, though behavioural in form, has a structural effect as per 
the same definition given by the European Commission. A further move 
towards the adoption by the Commission, in its role of enforcer, of 
structural remedies when dealing with exclusionary conducts with 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects521.  
                                            
518 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
98/30/EC, in OJ [2003] L 176/57. 
 
519 Energy Sector Inquiry, cited, paras 118 and 119. 
 
520 Art. 9 of the Second European Gas Directive: ‘Where the transmission system operator is 
part of a vertically integrated undertaking, it shall be independent at least in terms of its legal 
form, organisation and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission. 
These rules shall not create an obligation to separate the ownership of assets of the 
transmission system from the vertically integrated undertaking’ (emphasis added). 
 
521 I will discuss more in depth the personal opinion expressed by Dr Oliver Koch, deputy head 
unit at the DG Energy, on the 5 June 2013 in his presentation on ‘Creating competitive energy 
markets through joint enforcement of energy regulators and competition authorities’ (see 
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(iv) Exclusionary effects in the ENI case (commitments decision 
published on the 05.03.2010) 
 
The E.ON cases must be analysed in conjunction with the commitments 
undertaken by the Italian company ENI two years later that led to another form 
of structural intervention in order to address the Commission’s competition 
concerns.  
 
The proceedings were closed on the 29 September 2010 through the 
acceptance by the European Commission of commitments as per Art. 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003/EC522. ENI was suspected of having abused its dominant 
position through systematic constructive refusal to supply in its international 
pipelines transporting gas into Italy through three different networks, TENP, 
Transitgas and TAG523.  
 
As per the Commission’s decision, the ‘systematic and constructive refusal to 
supply strategy might have reduced ENI’s competitors’ opportunities to 
transport gas into Italy in its international network’524. The Commission points 
out that the constructive refusal was carried out by ‘hording capacity, by 
offering it in a less attractive manner and by strategically limiting investments 
in additional capacity’525. The Commission in other words found that ENI’s 
behavior was aimed at discouraging competitors from using its network, and 
limiting the capacity (and the downstream provision of gas to end consumers) 
in order to avoid to increase competition, in full analogy with the refusals to 
supply already identified in the electronic communications sector. 
                                                                                                                              
presentation accessible at http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/2106186.PDF, 
final slides in particular). The Author expressly suggests that the Competition Authorities 
(primarily the European Commission) should be entitled to adopt structural remedies, in line 
with the most recent commitments decisions (E.ON, ENI, RWE).  
 
522 Summary of the Commission decision ENI of 29 September 2010, relating to a proceeding 
under Article 102 TFEU […], Case COMP/39.315 ENI (2010/C 352/10), [2010] JO C352/8 (23 
December 2010), para 5. 
 
523 The TENP/Transitgas pipelines allows to import North European gas to Italy through 
Germany and Switzerland; the TAG pipeline allows to import gas from Russia to Italy. 
 
524 Commission decision, ENI, cited, para 6. 
 





The commitments signed with ENI have a structural nature. They are aimed at 
obliging ENI to remove the competition concerns through a series of 
divestitures of its stakes in the network in favor of the competitors. The 
Commission stresses that structural commitments are necessary because ‘no 
behavioral measure would be as effective as the divestment of ENI stakes in 
the [network] to remove the concerns expressed’. The commitments decision 
says that ‘[a]bsent this structural remedy, the incentives for a vertically 
integrated gas company to further adopt the alleged anti-competitive behavior 
would not have been removed, resulting in a risk of not effectively bringing the 
alleged infringement to an end’526. 
 
This case is particularly relevant to support the idea that in the presence of 
recurrent network-related abuses with a structural nature, only a structural 
remedy can be successful to grant not only the removal of the main reason of 
the abuse (the exclusive control of the access to the network) but also to adopt 
a forward-looking approach that may lead to real innovation, growth and 
development of the interested markets. In the ENI case the commitments 
decision led to divestiture of the ENI stakes in the three interested networks 
across Italy and Europe. But it should be also able to pave the way to 
investments that had been delayed by the incumbent with the aim of 
discouraging access and, therefore, further competition on the network.  
 
ENI’s management orientation of hindering further competition is clearly stated 
in many parts of the Commission’s decision. After having stressed that the 
import of gas from Russia to Italy represents a huge portion of the entire gas 
consumption in the entire European Union527, the Commission points out as 
the refusal to supply 
                                            
526 ibid, para 11. See by F. Maier‑Rigaud, F. Manca, Ulrich v. Koppenfels, ‘Strategic 
underinvestment and gas network foreclosure – the ENI case’, (2001) 1 Antitrust, p 18ff, 
accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2011_1_4_en.pdf 
 
527 ibid, para 37: ‘Gas consumption in Italy is one of the highest in the European Union, with 
national demand in 2007 (of about 85 bcm) exceeding 15% of total consumption in the EU. Of 
this, around 87% (or around 74 bcm) constituted imports, thereby demonstrating the particular 




 ‘[…] relates to a product or service that is indispensable to the 
exercise of a particular activity on a downstream market’ and ‘[…] is 
likely to lead either to the elimination or the prevention of the 
development of effective competition on the downstream market 
resulting in consumer harm’528.  
 
The Commission declares that having established that ENI ‘may’ have 
systematically reduced ‘access to capacity’ for third parties on its gas transport 
infrastructure in Italy, and deliberately, to use its own words, ‘understated the 
capacity that was technically available to third party customers’529. The aim of 
this being the exclusion of new entrants or of limiting the quantity of gas to be 
transported in Italy in order to hinder competition, with evident detriment to 
final consumers (the price of gas for end-users in Italy being one of the highest 
in the European Union).  
 
The evidence gathered during the first inspections carried out by the 
Commission in ENI’s premises showed that ENI was aware of the necessity of 
making new investments to further develop the network. Among the evidence 
gathered it emerged that ENI had also refused the co-operation of its 
competitors that proposed to invest money in ENI’s network to innovate the 
infrastructure and to increase capacity. Quoting from the decision 
 
‘ENI did not even gauge capacity demand from third party shippers, 
for instance via ‘open season’ procedures, and also neither 
explored the willingness of third parties to commit financially to an 
expansion project nor explored specific co-financing offers made by 
some shippers’530. 
 
The Commission denounced the constructive refusal to supply under its multi-
faceted reality, not only for ENI’s refusal to give access (or, obstruct access) to 
                                                                                                                              
and TENP/Transitgas pipelines account for more than 50% of gas imports– respectively about 
30% and 20%–and are indispensable for the import of gas from Northern Europe and Russia’. 
 
528 Ibid,  para 40, points (i) and (ii). 
 
529 ibid, para 45. 
 
530 ibid, para 57. Emphasis added.  
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competitors, but for ENI’s refusal to accept cooperation with competitors, in 
terms of financial aid to develop a new infrastructure.  
 
This cooperation, in competition law terms, might turn into a situation that 
might encourage collusion, in terms of price fixing and market sharing, in 
violation of Article 101.1. But the Commission in this decision seems to let 
prevail the concerns for future innovation and growth.  
 
 
5.4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter is aimed at completing the analysis of cases regarding vertically-
integrated firms with an eye to the anticompetitive foreclosure effects that 
exclusionary conducts can have. I decided to focus on the energy sector 
considering the similarity of the anticompetitive effects with the electronic 
communications sector (looking, for instance, at the consequences in terms of 
consumer welfare of refusal to supply at wholesale level). Other vertically-
integrated industries could be taken into consideration (in the postal sector I 
will analyse the decision Deutsche Post of 20 March 2001531 in which the 
Commission ordered Deutsche Telekom the creation of a legal separated 
entity for business parcel services), but the peculiarity of the energy sector is 
the fact that in both gas and electricity markets recent directives were adopted 
introducing forms of structural unbundling as an ex-ante remedy to favour the 
process of liberalisation.  
 
It represents a step further with respect to the previous chapters, because it 
shows how in the last few years the European Commission for the first time 
has been prone to adopt a number of commitments decisions in the energy 
sector, in which both behavioural and structural measures (such as 
divestitures) were adopted, anticipating already in 2008 the changes in the 
regulatory scenario represented by the 3rd energy package (2009).  
                                            







In chapter III I analysed the different perspective, at regulatory level, adopted 
by the European Commission with respect to the electronic communications in 
the same years, favouring functional remedies rather than structural. That 
chapter is a key element of the thesis in showing the nature of functional 
remedies. 
  
On the contrary this chapter is particularly important because shows how in 
three fundamental cases, E.ON (2008), RWE (2008) and ENI (2010), the 
commitments decisions looked at the gravity and seriousness of the 
anticompetitive effects of the exclusionary conducts carried out by the national 
incumbents in Germany and Italy, not only in terms of increased (or excessive) 
prices for the final consumers, but also in terms of limited investments to 
innovate the infrastructures (ENI, in particular).  
 
In other words, the importance of these decisions is in the fact that they show 
how the European Commission, after having promoted the Energy Sector 
Inquiry in 2007, was able to identify not only short-run competition concerns, 
represented by the pathology of high prices in the gas and electricity sector, 
but also the impact, the anticompetitive foreclosure effect, that some 
exclusionary conducts, such as network underinvestment (in the ENI case), 
could determine in the long-run, opting for more radical remedies.  
 
The analysis (i) of the various cases in the electronic communications sector, 
(ii) of the position adopted by the Commission and by the European Courts in 
sanctioning the electronic communications operators with fines even in the 
presence of ex-ante regulation as in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica 
cases, and (iii) of three commitments decisions in the energy sector that 
accepted the proposal of ownership separation by the electricity and gas 
incumbents in major European States, confirm that the Commission at least in 
principle is fully entitled to stretch the provision of Article 7 of Regulation no. 
1/2003/EC up to the  point  of imposing structural remedies also in the 




The next three chapters will discuss how this solution has been considered 



























































With respect to the structural separation of AT&T, over the last decade the 
economic-efficiency oriented approach of the Chicago School raised strong 
doubts about whether structural separation can be considered a suitable 
remedy to address competition concerns532.  
 
The creation in 2003 of the new telecoms regulatory authority, OFCOM, and 
the implementation of the new European Directives of the ‘Telecom Package 
2000’ in the United Kingdom, led OFCOM to announce its intention to hold a 
review of the telecommunications market by 2004. The perception that BT had 
abused its dominant position in the wholesale market to enhance its retail 
competitiveness533 triggered a search for the best remedy to address the 
competition concerns. The background scenario was that of widespread 
criticism with respect to structural separation as imposed on AT&T in 1983 in 
the US534. However, at the same time the OECD had published in 2001 its 
                                            
532 One of the most critical scholars of competition law in the US is Robert W. Crandall. 
Against structural separation in the telecommunications sector, and very critical with respect to 
AT&T’ break-up, see ‘The remedy for the ‘bottleneck monopoly’ in telecoms: isolate it, share it, 
or ignore it’, (2005) Vol. 72 no.1 University of Chicago Law Review, 3-25. More open to 
various approaches is Prof. Martin Cave, who inspired the functional separation of BT and the 
creation of Openreach’s division: see in particular Martin Cave, Six Degrees of Separation – 
Operational Separation as a Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation, (4th 
quarter 2006) no. 64 Communications & Strategies, p 89 ff, and Martin Cave and Chris Doyle, 
Network separation and investment incentives in telecommunications, (2007) University of 
Warwick, MEC1521, paper accessible at 
http://www.kigeit.org.pl/FTP/ap/sot/07_11_12_podzial_2.pdf. 
 
533 J. Wilsdon and D. Jones, The politics of Bandwidth – network Innovation and Regulation in 
Broadband Britain, (2002) London, Demos. 
 
534 See Robert W. Crandall, After the Breakup – U.S. Telecommunications in a More 
Competitive Era, The Brookings Institution, Washington D. C, 1991. Against structural 
separation was also Michael H. Ryan, ‘Structural Separation: A Prerequisite for Effective 
Telecoms Competition?’, (2003) issue 6, European Competition Law Review, 241ff. Leonard 
Waverman and Kalyan Dasgupta, ‘Mandated Functional Separation: Act in Haste, Repent in 
Leisure?’, (2007), available at www.etno.be express concerns vis á vis both structural and 
functional separation, and are more in favour of price cap policies.  
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report on vertical separation, arguing that structural separation could be still 
considered as a suitable remedy not only in the energy but also in the 
telecommunications sector.  
 
The telecoms market review (2004) led to the publication of two consultation 
documents, identifying three possible options to enhance competition in 
electronic communications in the UK: one was based on deregulation; a 
second option was to trigger a market investigation reference under the 
Enterprise Act 2002 to the Competition Commission, and the third was to 
negotiate undertakings with the incumbent, BT, aimed at creating ‘real equality 
of access’ through behavioural measures535.  
 
As soon as OFCOM announced that it was ready to launch a consultation in 
June 2005, to determine whether it should accept the undertakings offered by 
BT to bring an end to the strategic review, BT preferred to avoid triggering the 
reference for market investigation by the Competition Commission, as per the 
Enterprise Act 2002, and agreed to give a number of enforceable 
commitments leading to the operational/functional separation of the group; the 
creation of Openreach as a new division dealing with the access to the ‘last 
mile’. In other words, by negotiating the undertakings in lieu of reference, 
OFCOM and BT were able to avoid the market investigation and the risk that 
the Competition Commission would have ordered more draconian remedies. 
 
In other words, an efficiency-oriented, costs-oriented, non-structural, remedy 
was adopted536 even though, at least theoretically, also a structural remedy 
could have been proposed.  
 
                                                                                                                              
 
535 See J. Whalley & P. Curwen, Is Functional Separation BT-Style the Answer?, Univeristy of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow, published (2008) no. 71 Communications & Strategies, 145ff. 
accessible at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/15424/1/CS71_WHALLEY_CURWEN.pdf. See in 
particular p 1148-150. 
 
536 For the modalities of functional separation of BT, see OFCOM, ‘Undertakings given to 
Ofcom by BT pursuant to the Enterprise Act 2002’, Section ‘Separation of Upstream and 





As I will discuss in a while, a structural remedy in the electronic 
communications sector had been imposed in the AT&T case only in 
1982/1984 in the US and even though the doctrine was divided before and 
after the ‘break-up’, a positive outcome in term of increased competition was 
overall recorded. 
 
The AT&T ‘break-up’ substantially was a form of local vertical structural 
separation aimed at containing the monopolistic position of AT&T537, while in 
the BT/Openreach case the main issue at stake was the discriminatory 
conduct held by the access division with respect to new entrants at wholesale 
level. 
 
The AT&T experiment was not as disastrous as many observers, inside and 
outside the US government has feared before the break-up, in terms of 
degradation of quality of service, diminution of the reliability of communications 
services vital to national defence, and loss of profit for shareholders538. 
 
According to W. Kovacic, for instance, most commentators concluded that the 
net effects of the AT&T consent decree (at the basis of the ‘break-up’) were 
positive539. From the conclusion of a paper by Crandall (in 2012) 
 
‘The Reagan administration's record on telecommunications has 
been remarkable. The breakup of AT&T and the attempt to bring 
some rationality to telephone pricing will surely look better and 
better in the coming years. Competition in telephone equipment 
and services are growing rapidly. Equipment prices are falling. 
With private users free to choose among various equipment 
suppliers and service venders, service offering are proliferating. It 
                                            
537 W.E. Kovacic, cited, p 1302. 
 
538 Ibid, 1303. 
 
539 The literature on this specific aspect is vaste. See among others P. Huber, The Geodesic 
Network ‘1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry’, US DoJ, 1987, 1.20-.35, 
reporting positive comments in term of enhancement of efficiency after the AT&T break-up. 
Negative comments from P. W. MacAvoy – K. Robinson, ‘Loosing by Judicial Policymaking: 




is no accident that Japan and the United Kingdom are now 
following our lead in telecommunications policy’540. 
 
AT&T management desisted after a while, and preferred settlement and 
accepted the break-down of its vertically-integrated local operating systems 
rather than risking being fined with treble the damages for anticompetitive 
conduct. 
 
The divestiture was facilitated by the pre-divestiture structure at regional, local, 
level of AT&T. Since the entire structure of the Bell system was a product of 
regulation and public intervention, ‘there were fewer concerns that the decree 
would sacrifice economic performance by tampering with market structures 
that had emerged through a natural, market-driven search for superior 
efficiency’541. Even the companies that succeeded to AT&T as well as their 
shareholders benefited from the relaxation of the regulation that followed the 
break-up. 
 
The case is particularly interesting, and can be considered a key point of 
reference for the aim of the present thesis, since it shows the difficulty of 
combining the action and the aims of the regulatory authority with the 
achievement of a fully competitive scenario, when inefficiencies of the 
administrative bodies, on the one hand, and the strategic subtleties of 
corporate management, on the other hand, indicate that a draconian remedy 
would be preferable. 
  
To understand the AT&T case, one has to distinguish the ‘inter-city’ traffic 
(national and international) and the ‘intra-city’ traffic (or local and state traffic) 
within the US. The increase in importance of other technological platforms 
(such as those based on digital, satellite and microwave technology), eroding 
the traditional cable/wire circuits presence of AT&T, must be borne in mind 
too. On the same level, the development of a wide range of high tech 
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541 W. E. Kovacic, cited, 1303. 
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products, such as ‘wireless telephones, answering machines, automatic 
diallers and switchboards for connection by customers into the Bell network or 
for purchase by the local Bell operating companies’ should be taken into 
account542. All these products, combined with new technologies, brought a 
direct challenge to the natural monopoly of AT&T. Local companies could 
provide the same services of AT&T at lower costs, reflected in prices, 
facilitating interconnection by customers into the Bell network. 
 
AT&T fiercely tried to obstruct the presence of competitors, in particular MCI. 
The formerly State-controlled company also tried to obstruct the provision of 
new services (such as digital business data transmission networks), alleging 
that it was financially and technically impossible to put in place different 
industrial policies543. AT&T tried to obstruct the interconnection of ‘interlopers’ 
lines’ with its local distribution facilities. In fact AT&T was in a position to 
provide long distance services with lower prices in comparison to intra-city 
services.  
 
The FCC suspected that AT&T was breaching Federal antitrust laws. MCI 
finally filed a formal antitrust complaint with the Department of Justice in 1974 
for breach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the MCI Communications Corp. 
v. American Telephone & Telegraph (‘AT&T’)544 case that resulted by the 
complaint, MCI claimed that AT&T had illegally refused interconnection to the 
fixed voice network owned by AT&T on a national basis through its 
subsidiaries, the Bell Operating companies, by charging excessive prices for 
the interconnection to the local exchanges carriers or simply impeding MCI the 
access to the Bell’s local network. MCI stated that such interconnection would 
have been necessary to provide international telephony services in 
competition with AT&T. The Court accepted MCI’s position, stating that:  
                                            
 
542 F.M. Scherer-D. Ross, cited, ch ‘Antitrust Policy Towards Monopoly Market Structures’, p 
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543Antitrust investigations showed that the AT&T internal staff had reached completely different 
conclusion. 
 
544MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-3 (7th Circ., 





‘A monopolist’s refusal to deal under these circumstances is 
governed by the so-called essential facilities doctrine. Such a 
refusal may be unlawful because a monopolist’s control of an 
essential facility (or ‘bottleneck’) can extend monopoly power from 
one stage of production to another, and from one market into 
another. Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling 
an essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on 
non-discriminatory terms’545.  
 
Therefore, the Court affirmed in particular that the refusal to provide access 
would be illegal when  
 
1. An essential infrastructure is controlled by the monopolist;  
2. The competitor requiring the interconnection is not able, practically or in 
reasonable terms, to duplicate the infrastructure;  
3. There is a clear denial to provide the access to the infrastructure;  
4. The access to the infrastructure must be technically available.  
 
The FCC suggested that AT&T used part of the profits made on long distance 
services to reduce the local rates, as well as encouraged a common identical 
rate policy in highly and sparsely populated areas. The possibility of using new 
technologies (cheap new switches, etc.) allowed further competitors to operate 
in the most profitable areas of AT&T, which was, however, called to grant the 
universal service in less populated areas, and in inter-city traffic (links between 
smaller cities).  
 
AT&T management did not know whether it would have been better to keep 
interconnection prices high, losing those profits that it would have used to 
subsidise the local and low-level traffic; or to keep interconnection prices low, 
losing part of the revenues used for cross-subsidisation (an alternative being 
that of reducing the costs).  
 
                                            




Even though AT&T judicially challenged the government’s conclusions that 
AT&T had abused its dominant position, district judge Harold Greene 
‘concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the Bell System has violated 
the antitrust laws in a number of ways over a lengthy period of time’546. 
Interestingly, the judicial part of the investigation demonstrated that the 
regulatory burdens had been partially responsible for reinforcing the dominant 
position of AT&T547. Judge Greene demonstrated that the FCC ‘may 
realistically be incapable of efficiently regulating a company of AT&T size, 
complexity, and power’548. 
  
In order to avoid the pecuniary fines (treble damages), in 1984 AT&T accepted 
to divest  its seven local Bell operating companies549, a vertical separation of  
the nation-scale operator ‘into smaller network, each connected to a group of 
consumers (such as the splitting up of an incumbent company into several 
regional companies, each providing local services to a group of consumers)’ 
550, to use the same words of the 2001 OECD Report on structural separation 
based on the analysis of the most important cases of the previous decades.  
 
The vertical structural separation of AT&T has to be taken into consideration 
not only as the first case of antitrust remedy imposed by the judicial authority 
in the telecommunications sector, but also because it provides a rare natural 
experiment that allows us to compare the conduct of separate companies and 
                                            
546 U.S. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. et al., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1381 (1981) 
 
547 See R.H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox (Free Press, 1978) p. 347. In particular, the Author 
states ‘Predation by abuse of governmental procedures presents an increasingly dangerous 
threat to competition [with] almost limitless possibilities’. 
 
548 U.S. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. et al., 524 F. Suppl. 1336, 1359 (1981). 
 
549 An arbitration jury in Chicago liquidated the damages suffered by MCI for indirect refusal to 
supply by AT&T in $ 1.8 billion. The seven local Bell operating companies ‘born’ from the 
break-up were: Ameritech, Pacific Telesis, South-Western Bell Corporation, BellSouth, U S 
West, NYNEX and Bell Atlantic. 
 
550 OECD, Report on ‘Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition’, Paris, 2001, p 44. As I will 
discuss infra, this form of separation is one of the three possible options in the 
telecommunications sector as identified by the OECD Report’ experts, the other two being the 
separation of non-competitive parts (‘last mile’) from the competitive parts (long-distance 
services) and the separation of the operators on the basis of the technology used (for 




vertically-integrated companies in the same market551. In other word, it 
provides an empirical test of the competitive scenario in the aftermath of 
structural separation of a vertically-integrated communications operator (such 
as AT&T).  
 
This unique coincidence happened because, after the break-up from AT&T, 
the regional Bell companies were only allowed to provide state-wide services 
and not long-distance services. Only GTE (also previously part of the AT&T 
‘galaxy’) was authorised to remain vertically-integrated with the long distance 
network, operating in direct competition with the ‘Baby Bells’ at local level, but 
also providing long-distance communications services.  
 
After the 1996 Telecommunications Act came into force, the long-distance 
operators could operate at local level in direct competition with the local 
operators, therefore AT&T triggered negotiations with the Baby Bells and with 
GTE. Empirical evidence showed that access negotiations by AT&T with (still 
long-distance network vertically-integrated) GTE took longer and were not 
always successful, in comparison with the negotiations at local level with the 
Baby Bells. GTE was systematically more aggressive, and entry in regions 
serviced by GTE was systematically lower552. 
 
The reasons for such a difference of behaviour were investigated on the basis 
of empirical data by the researcher Federico Mini, an economist, at 
Georgetown University. Firstly, he found that after the AT&T’s break up, 
AT&T’s negotiations for interconnection agreements with the Bells companies 
were successful in 20 States out of 22, while failed in 10 States out of 22 with 
GTE. Similarly, the incumbent GTE, was systematically more aggressive: GTE 
offered higher prices for residential service in 12 out of 18 States, and a higher 
price for business service in 13 out of 18 States; GTE offered a discount off 
the retail price of residential service of $ 1.20, while the Bells offered, on 
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552 ibid. The findings are based on a paper of Federico Mini, ‘The role of incentives for opening 
monopoly markets: comparing GTE and BOC cooperation with local entrants’, (2001) vol. 




average, a discount of $ 1.98. Similar conclusions were reached looking at the 
number of days required to close an agreement with GTE and with the Bells, 
substantially higher in the first case.  
 
The explanation that Federico Mini gave was two-fold. On the one hand, the 
1996 Telecommunications Act gave the possibility for the local Bell companies 
to get long-distance service licences if they would have favoured local access 
(new entries) in the local market. Therefore the ‘carrot’ was counterbalanced 
by their acceptance to negotiate new interconnection agreements (the ‘stick’).  
 
On the other hand, GTE, being vertically-integrated with the long-distance 
network, was less interested to open its local market to a potential competitor 
on the long-distance services, such as AT&T. The risk was to lose not simply a 
local distance customer but rather a customer served both at local and long 
distance level. 
 
The study is particularly interesting because it is based on the analysis of ex 
post (post break-up) incentives for two sets of companies, integrated and non-
integrated with the long distance network. The empirical study definitively 
looks in favour of vertical separation, as a factor determining more 
competition, with less incentive to resist new entries. In other words, the same 
rationale that a few years later, in 2009, the European Commission adopted to 
mandate structural separation in the energy sector or to negotiate the 
commitments discussed in Chapter III of the thesis. 
 
The main hope of the judges in the AT&T case of 1983-84 was that the 
artificial creation of a competitive scenario could liberate the ‘invisible hand’ of 
Adam Smith’s where the regulatory authorities had failed553. The result of the 
above-mentioned study seems to confirm that the judges were right.  
                                            
553 AT&T from 2004 renounced to provide phone services for resident users. On 31 January 
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The next section provides a discussion of how, during the past decade, part of 
the doctrine, influenced by the economic-efficiency oriented Chicago School, 
claimed that such an invasive intervention by the Courts as in the AT&T case 
had to be mitigated, in particular because structural separation of the network 
would have discouraged further investments and innovation, on the one hand, 
and determined costly restructuring of the incumbent, on the other554.  
 
The case Verizon v Trinko can be taken as an example of a resistance to the 
adoption of enforcement remedies by the judiciary, when the communications 
authority appears to be best positioned to adopt the most suitable remedies, 
with the aim of preserving the contractual autonomy and independence of the 
incumbent.  
 
These criticisms of the application of the essential facilities in Europe are 
certainly well grounded, but cannot be shared in their entirety. With respect to 
the essential facilities doctrine, the European scenario appears quite different, 
less prone to leave the national regulators, for instance, to decide what ex 
ante remedy is best positioned to ensure a ‘level playing field’ of competition. 
The Commission retains a large margin of discretion in deciding when access 
to an essential facility can or cannot be mandated. 
 
The Commission in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica margin squeeze 
decisions restated the supremacy of antitrust enforcement over the regulatory 
ex ante intervention, as I argued in Chapter II and IV where I showed how the 
Commission and the European Courts rejected DT and Telefónica arguments 
that local access tariffs had been approved or established by the national 
regulators (therefore, could not favour anticompetitive practices).  
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If the regulator approved tariffs that ultimately led the competitors to leave the 
market, there is no reason to impede the intervention of the European 
Commission. 
 
A similar approach was adopted by the Commission in the energy sector. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, the seriousness of the exclusionary effects 
of the anticompetitive conducts carried out by E.ON, ENI and RWE, led the 
Commission to accept commitments that de facto led to structural separation.  
 
This approach was in line with the criticisms made by the Energy Sector 
Inquiry 2007 that ultimately led to the review of the Second Energy Sector 
Package, reformed in 2009 with the expression provision that both in the gas 
and in the electricity sector the ownership of the generation plants had to be 
separated from the distribution/transmission network.  
 
Dr O. Koch (deputy head of unit at the DG competition, in charge of the energy 
sector) in a presentation given in Athens in June 2013 reaffirmed the 
supremacy of competition law over the regulator activity. With respect to the 
importance of creating a competitive energy market in Europe through the 
cooperation of regulators and competition authorities, stressed the concept 
that where regulators do not adopt measures that prevent or deter abuse of 
dominant position (such as refusal to supply, excessive prices, margin 
squeeze), the competition authorities through their enforcement activity have 
to take action555. In other words, he very clearly confirmed the supremacy of 
European Competition law over the regulatory activity, also in terms of 
remedies (behavioural and also structural) that can be adopted to create a 
‘level playing field’ of competition.  
 
He underlines how it may happen that regulators (for instance in the energy 
sector, but similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the 
communications sector) may have insufficient competencies or independence, 
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while competition law could be more efficient, applied faster and with stronger 
investigative powers.  
 
The most important consequence from this reasoning, in favour of the 
supremacy of competition enforcement over the sector regulator’s activity, is 
that the Commission can also use the tools established by Art. 7 of Regulation 
no. 1/2003/EC. Not only fines or behavioural remedies, but also structural 
remedies, would be applicable under EU law.  
 
 
6.2. What lesson can the EU learn from the AT&T experience? Structural 
separation in the energy sector. 
 
If we look at the doctrine most favourable to the approach indicated by the US 
Supreme Court in the Verizon v Trinko case, in favour of direct intervention of 
the regulatory authorities, there are scholars that admit that where the 
regulator is reluctant to intervene the enforcement authorities should take 
action.  
 
Geradin in 2004 admits that ‘as the Commission has done in the majority of 
cases it initiated in the telecommunications sector, it should transfer the case 
to the NRA(s) to have them take a decision on the basis of the sector-specific 
legislation. Such a transfer [of authority] should, however, only take place 
when the Commission is confident that the matter will be sufficiently 
addressed by the NRA(s) on the basis of sector-specific rules. This apparently 
was not the case in Deutsche Telekom where the Commission investigated 
the case, adopted remedies, and imposed a penalty’556. 
 
Similar conclusion can be inferred from the recent preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in the Prezes Urzedu Ochrony Konkurencji I 
                                            




Konsumentow v Tele 2 Polska sp. z o.o. case557, where the Court reaffirmed 
that the national competition authority can adopt a decision in which it decides 
that there are no grounds for action on its part, but cannot adopt a decision 
stating that Art. 102 TFEU has not been infringed: ‘[e]mpowerment of NCAs to 
take decisions stating that there has been no breach of Treaty provisions on 
abuse of a dominant position would call into question the system of 
cooperation established by Regulation 1/2003 and would undermines the 
power of the Commission’558. In other word, the Commission and the 
European Courts’ competence in ascertaining an infringement of Art. 102 (and 
in adopting the optimal remedy) cannot be affected by a decision adopted at 
(competition law or regulatory) national level. 
 
Similar conclusion can be reached also looking at the Telefónica case559, 
where the Commission decision also took into consideration the role played by 
the Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (‘CMT’) in establishing 
the ‘cost model’ on which Telefónica should have set the wholesale access 
prices for its competitors, arguing that the calculations based on estimates 
rather than on historical data had to be considered ‘not appropriate’, to use the 
same words of the judgment of the General Court in March 2012, substantially 
upholding the Commission Decision560.  
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558 See press release of the European Court of Justice 42/11 and para 32 of the judgment: ‘It 
follows […] that a national competition authority cannot take a decision stating that there has 
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559 Summary of the Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 
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appeal at the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12. 
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basis of information provided with by the company in October 2001 and (ii) those estimated 
costs are significantly lower than Telefónica’s historical costs and lower than the costs 
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The General Court561 confirmed that the Spanish incumbent had abused of its 
dominant position through a margin squeeze practice relying on the calculation 
of costs made by the Spanish regulator based on estimates rather than on the 
actual costs of the company. The Court reaffirmed in its judgment the duty by 
the incumbent to comply with European competition law: 
 
As regards the role of ex ante regulation, the Court confirms the 
position taken in the Deutsche Telekom judgment […] that national 
legislation concerning telecommunications– in this case, 
compliance with the decisions taken by the national telecom 
regulator CMT on the basis of the regulatory framework – does not 
release dominant firms from their obligation to respect EU 
competition law. In any event, Telefónica had sufficient discretion to 
determine its pricing policy. Importantly, the Court confirms that 
Telefónica must have known that the regulator never examined the 
existence of a margin squeeze in relation to the regulated regional 
wholesale access product on the basis of the actual costs of the 
undertaking, but rather on the basis of estimates which had not in 
actual fact been confirmed by the developments of the market’562. 
 
The General Court is adamant in stating that ‘the existence of that measure 
therefore has no effect whatsoever on the powers which the Commission 
derives directly […] from Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 to find 
infringements of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC’563 and in reaffirming that the 
Spanish regulator (CMT) is not a competition authority but a regulatory 
authority with no powers of enforcing competition law564. The General Court 
                                                                                                                              
also sect. 1.4. of the mentioned decision (para 499: ‘Therefore, the costs indicated in the 
model implemented by the external consultants are not those that were effectively incurred by 
the company but only estimates on the basis of information relating to a network with a 
capacity of […] lines’). The Commission therefore found that Telefónica set its wholese access 
price at such a level to put in place a margin squeeze conduct.  
 
561 Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, 
judgment on the 29 March 2012. 
 
562 Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, 
press release of the General Court, Memo 12/233 of 29 March 2012. 
 
563 Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, 
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underlines how the Commission cannot be bound by a decision taken by a 
national authority pursuant to Art. 82 EC and expressly recall the fundamental 
judgment, on this particular aspect, Deutsche Telekom v Commission565 
affirming how the incumbent has a duty to comply with competition law even 
though the national sector regulator set wholesale or retail prices that per se 
would lead to a margin squeeze practice. 
  
Therefore, even the supporters of the ‘regulatory’, economic-efficiency 
oriented, approach, have to admit that, when competition law is at stake, the 
Commission is indeed the ‘best positioned’ authority to adopt the most suitable 
measure to create a ‘level playing field’ for competition, the ‘measure’ being a 
pecuniary fine, or a structural or behavioural remedy as per Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003.  
 
Looking back to the US experience, the AT&T precedent of structural 
separation has been severely criticised over the years. Doctrine mainly 
influenced by the Chicago School could not see with favour State (judiciary) 
intervention in the economy, the adoption of a remedy costly and potentially 
disruptive.  
 
In 1991 Robert W. Crandall published ‘After the Breakup’566, and more than a 
decade later a seminal article with J. Gregory Sidak, in which the negative 
aspects of AT&T’s break-up were analysed, and the same structural 
separation as a remedy was put in doubt, as costly and ineffective567. The 
article by Crandall-Sidak is focused on the suggestion made in 2001 to policy 
makers by the CEO of AT&T to adopt mandatory structural separation of the 
incumbent local exchange carriers (‘ILECs’), putting the wholesale and retail 
division in structurally separated divisions, in order to allow the so-called 
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competitive local exchange carriers (‘CLECs’) to countervail the 
anticompetitive strategies put in place by the ILECs.  
 
Crandall and Sidak have no doubt that such a mandatory structural separation 
‘would harm consumer welfare and reduce resources for investment by 
facilitating an anticompetitive strategy by the ILECs’ largest rivals to raise the 
ILECs’ costs of providing local telecommunications services’568. In line with the 
idea of ‘consumer welfare’ imperative and of short term economic efficiency, 
echoing two concepts of the Chicago School.  
 
The question is whether, at European level, competition law enforcers can go 
beyond short term consumer welfare or rising costs issues, looking at 
structural separation with a different eye, for instance putting first the 
‘deterrence effect’ that such a measure could have, or looking at the possibility 
of negotiating commitments with behavioural nature (combined or not with 
structural remedies) to address the competition concerns, on the example of 
the commitments negotiated in recent years in the energy sector (chapter III).  
 
Crandal and Sidak use economic efficiency arguments in showing that ex-ante 
regulation is best positioned to address competition concerns than an ex-post, 
invasive, draconian remedy such as structural separation. They consider, for 
instance, the ‘substitution effect’ that cable telephony (on cable television 
network) and wireless telephony have been playing in the last decade, in order 
to show that the decline in revenues of the CLECs in the US could be 
demand-side determined more than by the ILECs abusive behaviours569. 
Similar considerations can be made with respect to the cable (broadband) 
communications: ‘looking to the future, cable companies offer another method 
of substitution away from the ILEC as provider of network access. The 
combination of Internet protocol telephony with instant messaging technology 
has the potential to create an Internet-based alternative to the ILEC 
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network’570. In 2002 the two authors correctly identified one of the main factors 
of erosion of the CLECs’ turnover erosion for fixed telephony, showing that the 
problem of survival for the competitors would have not been solved through 
mandatory structural separation. 
 
Continuing the discussion around economic efficiency, the authors argue that 
behavioural remedies could deal with the restriction of competition issues in a 
more efficient way571. They argue that the costs of mandatory structural 
separation are likely to go beyond the benefits, and support the idea of 
adopting behavioural remedies in order to achieve the same goal in a less 
costly way.  
 
The negative aspects that they identify are well-known. Separation would 
create difficulties of coordination of investments and hamper the production 
decision process; making it more difficult to identify the accountability for 
product quality, tougher to offer ‘bundled’ communications services, lead to 
dispersion of ‘indivisible’ and intangible assets (such as customers’ loyalty), 
and have very high enforcement costs572. All these criticisms are logical and 
empirically well-grounded. However, the same authors confirm that even in the 
US the hypothesis of mandatory structural separation at the heights of the 
Chicago School’s economic efficiency imperative, it was not a priori excluded 
as a remedy to increase network competition, to countervail the power of the 
ILECs or, at least, to represent a serious deterrent.  
 
The authors underline how various types of separation can be proposed in the 
electronic communications sector: two structural forms of separation and one 
that should be rather defined functional573. According to the authors, the first 
type is the ‘divestiture of the retail service division from the wholesale network 
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division’574. A second form of structural separation is put in place when ‘one 
company owns and operates the telecommunications network, while other 
companies provide the services to end users’575 (I will discuss in the last 
chapter how this form of structural separation is that at present under 
implementation in the Australian telecommunications, where the company 
ruling the network, publicly funded, will be separated by the company 
providing electronic communications services). A third form, functional 
separation, ‘requires the incumbent local exchange carriers (‘ILECs’) to form 
separate divisions that interact at arm’s length’576. 
 
The 2002 Crandall-Sidak’s seminal article is particularly important because the 
conclusion is that in the balance of the advantages and disadvantages of both 
structural and functional separation should lead the competition and regulatory 
authorities to be more inclined to favour pro-competitive solution based on 
functional separation.  
 
They argue that  the Competitive Telecommunications Association 
(‘ComTel’)577 and the OECD in 2001, arguing in favour of structural separation, 
taking the AT&T break up as a successful model of antitrust intervention, 
somehow idealised the final outcome.  
 
A study presented in 2001 by ComTel states 
 
‘Opening the local network to competitors is unquestionably 
complex, but the magnitude of the problem has grown exponentially 
because the entity responsible for implementing non-discriminatory 
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access is itself the sole beneficiary of the exclusive access that 
exists today. The past five years have shown that attempting to 
overcome these incentives through a series of regulatory orders-
reached only at the conclusion of protracted and expensive 
litigation- is not producing the necessary results. Indeed, the 
competitive sector of the telecommunications industry is in serious 
jeopardy as several CLECs have declared bankruptcy, missed 
revenue targets, curtailed entry into new markets and laid off 
employees. Moreover, these impacts are not limited to CLECs (and 
their customers); these effects are also being felt upstream with the 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment themselves’578. 
 
The CompTel’s study quored by Crandall and Siday points out that the two 
main abusive conducts put in place by the ILEC were based on (i) preferential 
treatment by the ILEC of its own retail operations when providing network 
access and (ii) insufficient discounts offered by the ILEC when selling its 
wholesale services to the CLECs579. 
 
The solution proposed by CompTel, structural separation, would ‘place the 
ILEC’s retail operations in the shoes of a CLEC-ordering Unbundled Network 
Elements (UNEs), establishing customers’ accounts, and incurring UNE 
charges just like any other provider’580. 
 
Similarly, the OECD, in its 2001 report ‘Structural Separation in Regulated 
Industries’581 lists six remedies that would increase competition, and among 
them ownership separation (structural separation of the ILEC’s wholesale and 
retail divisions, the firs type of structural separation identified by Crandall and 
Sidak) and horizontal divestiture (separation of the ILEC into smaller, vertically 
integrated carriers, including part of the network and part of the service 
provision company, as in the 1982 AT&T break-up) were strongly 
recommended. The OECD, furthermore, promoted further separation between 
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local fixed wire services from mobile and broadband services, though 
admitting that separation of the various services may slow down research and 
innovation582.  
 
Crandall and Sidak focus on the first type of structural separation (‘divestiture 
of the retail service division from the wholesale network division’) and, on the 
basis of empirical evidence gathered over the years, reach the conclusion that 
the structural separation solution was not advisable. 
 
They take the example of Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (‘PUC’) 
proposal of structural separation on Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania in 2001, to 
show that the same Commission decided that it was too complex and would 
have required conduct remedies583. In September 1999 the PUC had 
instructed Verizon to structurally separate its wholesale operations from its 
retail operations, as not only the most efficient tool to ensure local service 
competition, but also necessary to accomplish full competition584. Even though 
the Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court upheld the PUC’s plan of structural 
separation, with Verizon failing to demonstrate that structural separation would 
have been ‘unreasonably costly, unduly burdensome, or confiscatory’585, later 
in 2001 the same Pennsylvania PUC ‘acknowledged in its March 2001 Opinion 
and Order that either full or functional separation would require substantial 
implementation costs and complementary behavioural remedies, and that 
neither would reduce regulatory oversight: ‘Anything less than full structural 
separation would require continuing regulatory oversight, even though part of 
our goal in deregulating the industry is to reduce oversight. However […], even 
with the implementation of structural separation of Verizon’s wholesale and 
retail arms, no less regulatory oversight than that currently prevailing will be 
                                            
582 OECD report, 158-167; Crandall-Sidak, cited, 344. 
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required to ensure compliance’586. Iconic is what Commissioner Terrance J 
Fitzpatrick in that occasion said: ‘[structural separation] didn’t look like as 
much of a silver bullet when we looked at the details of it’587. 
 
The PUC in that circumstance opted for a combination of functional and 
structural separation, mandating the functional separation of the wholesale 
and retail divisions of the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (‘ILEC’) in a way 
that ‘provides for non-discriminatory access to its wholesale division by all 
CLECs’588. Secondly, the PUC ordered the ILEC to ‘create an advanced-
services affiliate, separate from the retail division of its business’589. In other 
words, the Pennsylvania PUC’s decision ‘to impose a full complement of 
behavioural remedies in conjunction with functional separation demonstrates 
that it was not confident that such separation would quickly diminish the need 
for regulation’590. The Pennsylvania PUC dismissed its own project of 
structural separation of the ILEC as the ‘most efficient tool to ensure local 






Looking at the US experience, it can be said that in the last thirty years the 
tendency of the Courts has been that of limiting the level of intervention of the 
antitrust authorities in the economy. Scholars of the Chicago School, in 
                                            
586 Structural Separation of Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Retail and Wholesale Operations, 
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particular, in line with the concept of not undermining economic efficiency and 
short term consumer welfare with excessive State intervention, heavily 
criticised, ex post, the  draconian approach that led to the structural separation 
of AT&T, advocating less invasive remedies, such as the recourse to ex ante 
measures (for instance, reviewing the tariffs system in dealing with access-
related abuses, as suggested by Crandall-Sidak in their seminal article against 
structural separation), or to ex post enforcement based on pecuniary fines or 
behavioural remedies.  
 
If the AT&T case of 1983/84 represented the most interesting case of 
structural separation aimed at enhancing competition ever recorded in the 
telecommunications sector, the US antitrust jurisprudence in the following two 
decades went in a completely different direction.  
 
The 2001 OECD Report on ‘Restructuring public utilities for competition’592 
took the AT&T case as one of the possible forms of structural separation593, 
and proposed this form of separation of the incumbent into regional operators 
as one of the most effective technique for promoting competition between rival 
vertically-integrated networks. The Report underlines how as a consequence 
of that break-up, today ‘the US telecommunications regime is currently one of 
the most competitive in the world’594.  
 
However, the difference of approach between the US antitrust authorities (in 
the public utilities sector in particular, demanding to the regulators the 
adoption of the most suitable remedy, as shown by the Supreme Court 
                                            
592 OECD report ‘Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition’, 2001, p 44. 
 
593 The OECD Report 2001 lists three types of structural separation: (a) separation of network 
operators into smaller networks, each connected to a group of consumers (such as the slitting 
up of an incumbent company into several regional companies, each providing local services to 
a group of consumers; (b) separation of the non-competitive parts of network operators 
(particularly, the ‘last mile’ of the connection to the customer) from the competitive parts (such 
as long-distance services), and (c) separation of network operators on the basis of technology 
used to connect to consumers (such as the separation of local telecommunications companies 
based on copper-wire from companies using cable TV networks or those using cellular 
services). 
 
594 Ibid, p 44.  
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judgment in the Verizon v Trinko case) and the EU enforcers, in the last 
decade has become particularly relevant.  
 
However, several antitrust scholars in the US, in particular those in line with 
the economic-efficiency based Chicago’s School (Milton Friedman, but also 
Richard Posner and Robert Bork) argued that the State should not interfere 
with the natural evolution of a successful and efficient company. It was held 
that consumer welfare, in particular, would be unnecessarily harmed should 
the antitrust authorities protect or preserve the existence of a not ‘as efficient’ 
competitor.  
 
The question is whether more radical remedies might be imposed to address 
competition concerns, and to see whether from the US experience, but also 
from the most recent commitments experience in the energy sector analysed 
in Chapter III, any lesson can be learnt by the European Commission with 
regards its future enforcement activity in the electronic communications sector. 
 
In other words, the European Commission (or NCAs) has (have) shown 
readiness to impose fines that may constitute a serious deterrent for the 
incumbent. But the question now is whether the Commission is ready for more 
invasive remedies, such as structural separation; and if so, when and in what 
circumstances.  











                             CHAPTER VII 
 
Doctrinal divisions vis á vis functional or structural separation 
to deal with vertical foreclosure effects. 
 
 
7.1      Introduction 
 
This chapter tackles the discussion about vertical separation in the electronic 
communications sector, in its two main forms functional and structural, and will 
argue how mandatory structural separation under certain conditions could be a 
possible option. 
 
After having seen in the previous chapter the US approach to structural 
remedies, and the important case-study of AT&T as the most clear sample of 
structural separation in a vertically-integrated company dominant in the 
electronic communications sector, the focus now shift on how the doctrine  
theorised answering the difficult question: what remedy is best positioned to 
address competition concerns? Among the various forms of separation, what 
is the most suitable? 
 
I have discussed in the previous chapter how in the last decades the 
hypothesis of adopting structural remedies in the electronic communications 
sector, at least at US level, lost the favour recorded in the 1980s.  
 
The Harvard School advocates in favour of antitrust intervention to deal 
market structure hindering competition, and how separation may actually 
reduce the structural competitive advantage that the incumbent may have in 
the market. The Chicago School, looks instead at economic efficiency 
reasons, is generally keener to adopt less invasive solutions and put 
behavioural remedies on top of the competition enforcement agenda, only if 




This chapter starts with the position that the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) recently took in a Recommendation 
on structural separation adopted on the 13 December 2011 (published in 
January 2012), showing how, at inter-governmental level, the position 
changed in the last decade, in favour of ‘á la carte’ enforcement solutions, 
departing from the position expressed in 2001, more favourable to structural 
separation.  
 
It is a very useful document that, alongside with a Report on structural 
separation published at the same time, stresses how the choice of the most 
suitable form of (horizontal or vertical) separation should follow a case-by-case 
approach, on the basis of the evaluation of two main factors:  
 
1. The advantages and disadvantages that the separation may determine 
in competition terms;  
2. The costs and benefits that the separation may determine.  
 
If this two-fold approach is correct, I am prone to add a third, decisive, factor to 
be borne in mind in favour of structural separation: the importance of 
deterrence. The threat of structural separation could be dropped at a later 
stage (for instance while negotiating commitments), finally adopting 
behavioural-based solutions.  
 
The current ‘case-by-case’ position of the OECD represents an evolution of 
previous findings encapsulated in the OECD Report 2001and in the interim 
report of 2006.  
 
After having discussed the evolution of the OECD approach, I will analyse the 
current position of the doctrine, both at legal and economic level.  
 
Among various authors, Prof. Martin Cave played a decisive role in the United 
Kingdom in explaining how ‘replicability’ of infrastructures is of paramount 
importance to boost network-based competition, going beyond the pressure on 
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the local access incumbent to open its network (i.e. through ex ante regulatory 
tools), or through mandatory divestiture of the network (through ex post 
enforcement tools). Martin Cave’s ‘ladder of investments’ scheme595 
influenced the current debate at European level on access to networks, in 
addition to the influence that OECD reports on separation might have had on 
regulators and competition authorities. All these positions were kept in 
consideration during the debate preceding BT’s functional separation and the 
creation of the separate access division, Openreach596.  
 
In this chapter I I will also make reference to recent experiences such as the 
creation of Openreach as a separate division within BT’s group for the 
electronic communications sector, and to the commitments decisions in the 
cases EO.N597, RWE598 and ENI599 in the energy sector that led to structural 
separation, as discussed in Chapter III.  
 
After a short analysis of the OECD position on functional and structural 
separation, the following sections highlight the reasoning behind the choice of 
functional separation rather than structural separation when British Telecom 
                                            
595 M. Cave, ‘Six Degrees of Separation, Operational Separation as a Remedy in European 
Telecommunications Regulation’, in (2006) no. 64 Communications & strategies, 89ff. See 
also M. Cave and C. Doyle, ‘Network separation and investment incentives in 
telecommunications’, (2007) University of Warwick, MEC 1521, 1-32. 
 
596 See in particular OECD, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition, (2001) Competition 
Law and Policy, 1-95; OECD, Competition and Regulation Issues in Telecommunications, 
(2002) Competition Law and Policy; OECD, Report on Structural Separation, (2006) Vol. 8 
no.2 Journal of Competition Law and Policy, 1-65; OECD, OECD Report 2011 ‘Report on 
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negotiated the undertakings that led to the creation of Openreach as a 
separated division within the same group. The section on Openreach is aimed 
at clarifying the advantages and the disadvantages that functional separation 
entails, and is preparatory to next conclusive chapter, focused on the 
advantages and disadvantages of structural separation, on the basis not only 
of the AT&T case discussed in the previous chapter, but also looking at the 
remedies adopted with respect to the energy sector and to a recent case of 
structural separation adopted in Australia dealing with the national incumbent: 
Telstra. 
 
The last section contains conclusive remarks on structural separation and an 
analysis of the doctrine of Martin Cave on ‘degrees of separation’, opening the 
path to a new approach towards structural separation, as a remedy that can 
be considered to be the most convincing form of deterrent that the enforcer, 
the European Commission, can put forward in exercising its prerogatives on 
the basis of Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC. 
 
 
7.2. The OECD position in the last decade. From the 2001 
Recommendation on structural separation to the 2011 Report and 
amended Recommendation. 
 
In 2001 the OECD issued a ‘Recommendation [of the Council]600 on structural 
separation in regulated industries’ stating that policies aimed at boosting 
competition can be broadly divided in two types: (i) those primarily addressing 
the ‘incentives of the regulated firms’ (such as vertical ownership separation), 
called ‘structural policies’, and (ii) those primarily addressing the ability of the 
regulated firms to deny access (for instance, imposing access separation), 
which may be called ‘behavioural policies’. 
 
In 2001 the OECD forum recognised that ‘structural’ policies, though the most 
difficult to adopt, could be the most suitable. Later in 2011 the same forum 
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admitted that in certain circumstances ‘behavioural’ remedies (accounting 
separation, functional separation) may play a useful and important role in 
supporting certain policies such as access regulation’, somehow modifying the 
approach held one decade earlier601.  
 
On the one hand, the decision-making process in favour of a structural remedy 
in regulated industries often requires high-profile and sensitive trade-offs, 
independence from the regulated industry, high expertise, and transparency in 
assessing the competitive effects. On the other hand, behavioural remedies 
may not entirely eliminate ‘the incentive of the regulated firm to restrict 
competition and therefore may be less effective […] at facilitating competition 
than structural remedies’602. 
 
In 2001 the OECD recommended603 the ‘[…] Member States [to] carefully 
balance the benefits and costs of structural measures against the benefits and 
costs of behavioural measures’, considering the costs and benefits in terms of 
‘effects on competition and effects on the quality and cost of regulation; the 
transition costs of structural modifications, and the economic and public 
benefits of vertical integration, based on the economic characteristics of the 
industry in the country under review’. It also stressed that the benefits and 
costs to be balanced should be those recognised by the relevant agencies 
including the competition authorities, based on principles defined by the 
OECD’s member country604.  
 
The OECD Recommendation 2001 and the related OECD report of the same 
year on ‘Restructuring public utilities for competition’605 (the ‘OECD Report 
2001’) paved the way for a new theoretical approach towards pro-competition 
remedies by both regulatory and competition authorities.  
                                            













The OECD Report 2001, in particular, stressed how on a ‘case by case’ basis 
the authorities have to carefully balance the advantages and the 
disadvantages, both in competition law terms and in economic terms, of any 
remedies that they might be tempted to recommend or to impose.  
 
Interestingly, it stressed how behavioural or functional remedies should be 
seen in conjunction with the implementation of further actions, since no 
remedy is sufficient per se. An excerpt from the conclusion can clarify this 
approach:  
 
‘Policy makers have a variety of tools for promoting and 
protecting competition in utility industries. It is possible to 
broadly rank these approaches in order of preference. 
[Accounting separation or corporate separation] affect neither 
the incentives not the ability of the regulated firm to act in an 
anti-competitive manner. Although these forms of separation 
have merit in supporting other approaches, they cannot be 
used as stand-alone techniques in their own right’606. 
 
Without expressly suggesting or recommending more invasive forms of 
separation (for example vertical structural separation) the OECD Report 2001 
considered that  
 
‘the most appropriate form of separation in any given industry will 
depend on a variety of factors which must be balanced. These 
factors include the magnitude of economies of scale from 
integration, the one-off costs of separation, the benefits of and 
scope for competition and the public policy objectives for the 
industry in question’607. 
 
It is worth recalling the submission of the French government to the OECD in 
preparation of the OECD Report 2001. It underlined how  
 
                                            






‘In this context, structural measures, which are likely to involve 
dismantlement of sizeable economic enterprises, demand delicate 
and complex trade-offs. While vertical integration must not harm 
competition, it is also necessary to take into account the efficiency 
gains and the benefits from universal service [that might arise from 
integration]. Conversely, disintegration may increase the transaction 
costs borne by the consumer. For this reason it is not appropriate to 
adopt a dogmatic position but rather, to consider the benefits and 
costs of separation on a case-by-case basis’608. 
 
First of all, the OECD Report 2001 identifies the tools for protecting and 
promoting competition, applicable to all the regulated industries (electronic 
communications, energy, railways, postal sectors) distinguishing the so-called 
(i) ‘access regulation’ from (ii) ‘ownership separation’, (iii) ‘club ownership’ and 
(iv) ‘operational separation’609.  
 






Terms and conditions of access are 
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Figure 7.1: Access Regulation (source: OECD Report 2001, p 12) 
 
 
The regulator intervenes to fix the prices of access to the non-competitive 
activity, i.e. the access to the infrastructure (‘the regulator sets these terms 
and conditions to facilitate competition downstream between rival firm and the 
competitive component of the integrated firm’610).  
 
But what if the regulatory approach (as in the case Deutsche Telekom or 
Telefónica where the incumbent put in place margin squeeze practices even 
applying the tariffs set by the German telecoms regulator), does not work?  
 
The possibility offered now by Directive 2009/140/EC in the electronic 
communications sector is functional separation; in the energy sector since 
2009 the alternative is structural, ownership separation.  
 
The OECD Report 2001 had already foreseen these two possibilities. The 
following figures depict how both ownership separation and club ownership 
work.  
 
The first (ownership separation) is implemented through the vertical separation 
of the non-competitive activity and the competitive activity: ‘under this 
approach the owner of the non-competitive part has no incentive to 








                                            
610 ibid, p 11. 
 
























Figure 7.2: Ownership Separation (energy sector, for instance, cases 
E.ON, RWE and ENI) (source: OECD Report 2001, p 13) 
 
This form of separation has one main advantage: it removes the incentive to 
discriminate downstream competition. The main disadvantage would be the 
potential loss of economies of scope from integration.  
 
This form of separation (for instance company controlling the network and 
company/ies controlling the services) is the most suitable at European level, 
considering that the AT&T form of separation (also called ‘club ownership 
separation’), dividing the group into local vertically-integrated companies can 
be considered equivalent, in size, to the co-existence of vertically-integrated 















With regards club ownership separation, the network of one vertically-
integrated company is structurally separated on a local basis, preserving, in 
scale, vertical integration services/network (example: the creation of the ‘Baby 
Bells’ after the AT&T’s break-up). 
 




















Figure 7.3: Club ownership separation (case AT&T) (source: OECD 
Report 2001, p 13) 
 
 
A fourth form of separation suggested by the OECD Report is the ‘operational 
separation’. It is also described as a hybrid of the previous three forms of 
separation, depending on the body which assumes the control of the non-















competitive component (network)612. Therefore, if the governance is in the 
hands of the regulator, it is equivalent to regulatory separation (access 
regulation); if the governing body has representatives of the downstream firms, 
can be compared to joint or club ownership separation.  
 
This approach takes this form: 
 
 
Control (but not ownership of the 
non-competitive component is assumed  












Figure 7.4: operational separation (source: OECD Report 2001, p 15) 
 
This form of ‘operational separation’ or ‘operational unbundling’ was adopted 
in the electricity industry in the US. The Federal Trade Commission defined 
this form of operational separation as follows:  
 
‘[it] has taken the form of an entity independent of the [electricity] 
utility operating the transmission and distribution grids to ensure 
open access and transparent pricing, although the monopolist 
retains ownership of the physical assets. The operational 
unbundling plan may work to preserve economies of vertical 
integration, internalise loop flow externalities (caused by the fact that 
electricity does not follow a contract path, but rather the path of least 
                                            












resistance), and assure transparent investment signals for potential 
investors while eliminating the strategic opportunities of the 
monopolist to subtly favour its own generation capacity’613. 
 
As per the OECD Report 2001 operational separation (or ‘unbundling’) is that 
adopted in the US electricity industry. In electronic communications sector the 
OECD Report 2001 identifies a more complex form of separation: separation 
into reciprocal parts. The benefits for competition arise from the possibility of 
interconnection between the incumbent’s network and other networks, adding 
to the traditional economy of scale of the incumbent’s network the demand-
side economy of scale of the consumers, prepared to pay more to be 
connected to a network on which they can contact more people614.  
 
The scheme of separation into reciprocal parts is as follows: 
 
Network effects create mutual 
benefits from interconnection  













Figure 7.5: separation into reciprocal parts (source: OECD Report 2001, p 
17) 
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judiciary US of representatives, 28 July 1999. 
 
















The pro-competitive effects of this form of separation are linked to the 
modification of the difference of bargaining weight (or power) of the traditional 
incumbent. When the incumbent has a large network, it is easier to obstruct 
the interconnection negotiations with a small new entrant. The OECD Report 
2001 points out that  
 
‘if the incumbent expects that the customers of the entrant will return 
to the incumbent’s network in the event that the two companies fail to 
reach an interconnection agreement, the entrant will have relatively 
little ability to affect the terms demanded by the incumbent. On the 
other hand, in the case of two large established networks competing 
for the same group of customers for which each could not be sure to 
expand (or even survive) in the event of failure to reach an 
interconnection agreement, each firm can use the threat to call off 
negotiations as a real discipline on the terms and conditions that are 
offered’615. 
 
Through the (reciprocal) vertical structural separation of the non-competitive 
assets (the network), ‘whenever the customers of the downstream competitive 
activity value being connected to more than one non-competitive activity and 
when competitive and non-competitive activities are integrated into a series of 
vertical firms, each firm can be made better off by negotiating reciprocal 
access to the non-competitive activities of another firm’616. Here the threat for 
the incumbent is evident: if its network is structurally ‘limited’, and can be 
completed only providing its services on the network of its competitors, it will 
be impossible to withdraw from negotiations. The regulatory intervention will 
not be required anymore. 
 
If these are the main forms of structural separation foreseen by the OECD 
Report 2001, functional separation (separation of different services into 
different divisions of the same firm, under different management) was seen as 
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a residual possibility, entailing a reduced level of intervention by the 
authority617.  
 
It is important to point out that the OECD published a second report on 
structural separation in 2006618. While it re-affirmed the benefits/costs 
dichotomy of the various forms of separation, it showed a very careful 
approach with respect to structural separation of the local loop, underling that 
in the United Kingdom, for instance, OFCOM preferred to accept undertakings 
that led to the creation of Openreach as a functionally separated legal entity 
within the same telecoms group.  
 
Even though it showed that functional separation was prevailing at academic 
and institutional level, nevertheless the OECD Report 2006 still underlines 
some clear benefits of structural separation619 
 
 Separation limits the needs for certain regulations that are difficult, 
costly and only partially effective; 
 Separation may stimulate innovation and efficiency in the competitive 
services; and,  
 Separation helps to eliminate cross subsidisation. 
 
On the other hand, the costs of structural separation, for the OECD Report 
2006 would be 
 
 Separation forces a loss of economies of scope from integrated 
operation; 
 Transaction costs for consumers increase;  
 Direct costs of separation can be high; 
                                            
617See the position adopted by Crandall and Sidak in 2002 in their seminar article ‘Is structural 
separation of incumbent local exchange carriers necessary for competition?’ discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
 
618 OECD, Report on Structural Separation, (2006) Vol, 8(2) OECD Journal of Competition 
Law and Policy 1-65 (‘OECD 2006 Report’). 
 




 System reliability may fall when investments are not made jointly; and 
 Accountability for interface problems may be difficult to assign.  
 
At least one forum, represented by the Telecommunications and Information 
Service Policies (‘TISP’), filed a submission620 to the OECD Report 2006 in 
which suggested that ‘the potential benefits of ownership separation, such as 
reduced regulation and stimulation of innovation, may not apply in the case of 
the local loop’621.  
 
The positions cited above are partially accepted by the most recent OECD 
Report 2011 on structural separation622 published in conjunction with the 
amendments to the OECD Recommendation 2001623 on structural separation 
in regulated industries, adopted on the 13 December 2011.  
 
The OECD Report 2011 states that ‘structural separation is a remedy of 
continued relevance, which can both advance the process of market 
liberalisation and address some of the difficulties inherent to behavioural 
remedies and more complex and intensive sector regulation […]. 
Nevertheless, structural separation may not be necessary or appropriate in all 
industries or markets [and] the impact of structural separation or the lack 
thereof on corporate incentive to invest in the network industries has become 
                                            
620 The ‘TISP’ Report was declassified by the ICCP Committee in October 2003. 
 
621 OECD 2006 Report, p 30. See in p 31 the position of the TISP. The 2003 TISP report with 
respect to structural separation of the local loop concluded that ‘vertical separation is a 
significant intervention in the market place with substantial and […] irreversible costs. 
Seemingly simple in concept, structural separation of the local loop is in practice complex with 
uncertain outcomes and many questions to be answered. The benefits of structural separation 
of the local loop are uncertain while the costs are certain and appear potentially large […]. 
Only if regulatory authorities can show that the benefits are in excess of the costs, and that 
alternative regulatory approaches, would not work, should consideration be given to the 
structural separation of the local loop (OECD, 2003b, p.32)’. 
 
622 OECD, ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, OECD pub. 2012, p 10 (fn 6) 
(‘OECD 2011 Report’), accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf. 
 
623 OECD Recommendation 2011 on structural separation in regulated industries, C(2011) 135 






a prominent issue’624. To conclude; ‘the choice of structural versus behavioural 
measures, in a given set of circumstances, therefore remains a matter that 
requires careful evaluation’625. 
 
The Report stresses how at European level during the 2001/2011 decade 
there have been many successful examples of functional and structural 
separation. Some of them have been discussed in previous chapters, 
implemented on the basis of voluntary commitments (or undertakings, in the 
UK experience)626: to make a few examples, BT’s functional separation in 
Chapter IV and structural separation of E.ON, RWE and ENI mentioned in 
Chapter V. 
 
It also underlines that functional and ownership (divestiture) vertical separation 
was implemented in various Member States with respect to the electricity and 
gas sectors; while in the electronic communications markets vertical functional 
or structural separation ‘is presented as an exceptional measure for 
implementation only in cases of persistent market failure’627. The most 
interesting new aspect of the OECD Report 2011 is that it stresses how, 
before choosing structural separation as a remedy, the regulatory or 
competition authorities should bear in mind the ‘trade-off between efficiency 
and competition’628. In other words, whilst there is a vast literature that shows 
that profit-maximising vertically-integrated firms make efficient decisions, there 
are also arguments that underline how a bottle-neck monopoly can create 
major problems for competition. 
 
This dichotomy, competition versus efficiency, can be considered the main 
obstacle to support the opportunity of structural separation in vertically-
integrated telecommunications companies. The OECD 2011 Report stresses 
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that in any case in which structural or functional separation had to be decided 
the authorities faced the issue ‘whether separation measures will impact 
negatively on investment incentives’629. 
 
The OECD Report 2011 also underlines how, on the one hand, behavioural 
remedies are by their very nature more respectful of proportionality and of the 
rights of the parties, and are obviously more flexible, since they can be tailored 
to the specific conducts that need to be addressed. On the other hand, they 
tend to be too weak vis à vis highly concentrated industries and require 
monitoring by a large amount of people and resources.  
 
Structural remedies are the most ‘effective’, in legal terms. Once adopted they 
can only with difficultly be brought to the status quo ante, therefore they do not 
require high monitoring resources and can be put in place in the short term. 
However, they might have high transactional costs; they can be inefficient, in 
economic terms; they could potentially damage third party and could interfere 
with the technological development of the company, whilst reducing the 
incentive to competition. 
 
If wrongly applied, they can recreate the same anti-competitive situation, 
simply changing the actor(s) in a specific market.  
 
 
7.3. A doctrinal approach: ‘replicability’ of telecommunications 
infrastructures or remedies on the existent infrastructure based on 
the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine? Cave’s ‘Ladder of investments’. 
 
I now need to tackle a crucial aspect: I need to look at the advantages and 
disadvantages that structural separation can have, before adopting my 
conclusions on what measure is the most suitable for the specific market and 
the undertaking under scrutiny.  If structural separation is imposed, what type 
                                            




of structural separation is more suitable in the electronic communications 
sector?  
With respect to this specific sector, the OECD Report 2001 identified three 
main forms of structural separation. Quoting from the OECD Report 2001, one 
form of separation is based on (a) ‘the separation of network operators into 
smaller networks, each connected to a group of consumers (such as splitting 
up of an incumbent company into several regional companies, each providing 
local services to a group of consumers)’ on the AT&T model; whilst another 
form of separation (b) is that of ‘the non-competitive parts of network operators 
(the ‘last mile’ of the connection to the customer) from the competitive parts 
(such as long-distance services)’630; and (c) a third form of separation involves 
‘the network operators, on the basis of technology used to connect to 
consumers (such as the separation of local telecommunications companies 
based on copper-wire from companies using cable TV networks or those using 
cellular services)’631.  
 
In chapter VIII we will look in more detail which of these three forms of 
structural separation could be taken as a model of reference in the EU system 
in the telecommunications sector. 
 
Before analysing the various options of structural separation, an important 
caveat needs to be borne in mind. Vertical separation of the network is a form 
of authoritative intervention in order to ‘artificially’ create the conditions for 
competition at network level. In reality, dealing with anticompetitive conducts 
with vertical foreclosure effects (for instance refusal to supply unbundled 
access to a network, or margin squeeze in the provision of wholesale access), 
the European Commission has first to establish whether the infrastructure is 
essential or, rather, replicable. 
‘Replicability’ of the infrastructures, on the one hand, and regulatory (and 
competition law) remedies, on the other hand, are in fact the two extremes of 
                                            
630 Separation of network from services. An example will be discussed in Chapter VIII, the 
Telstra case in Australia. 
 




an ideal scale through which access to an essential facility can be granted. 
The creation of competing separated networks, each of them providing 
electronic communications services, reciprocally interconnected, would create 
optimal condition of direct competition, to the point that regulatory intervention 
would not be required. In other words, replication of networks would create the 
conditions as per the model of separation depicted in figure 7.5, above.  
In 2004, the former European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen632 gave a speech 
focused on the necessity of ‘creating a predictable legal environment for 
competitive and innovative electronic communications in the European 
Union’633.  
For Liikanen competition was the key driver in delivering greater choice, 
quality, innovation and services at lower prices. The availability of networks for 
competitors might play, in certain cases, a key role. As per his words, ‘new 
entrants must be allowed to have access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
However, they must also continually strive to reduce this dependence 
wherever feasible’634.  
In other words, leveraging on the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine, it should always 
be possible to get access to the incumbent’s network; though, theoretically, 
the optimum should be the replication of infrastructures, boosting innovation 
(i.e. in term of capacity) in the long run. The recourse to the essential facilities 
doctrine entails the risk of discouraging further investments by the 
incumbent635.  
                                            
632 Former member of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and the 
Information Society.  
 
633 Public speech SPEECH/04/38, for the public hearing on remedies under the new regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services, Brussels, 26 January 2004.  
 
634 Ibid.  
 
635 The incumbent would find himself in the paradoxical and awkward position of investing 
huge amounts of money in innovating in infrastructures that would be ultimately shared with its 
own competitors. In Chapter II I examined the Commission decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315 
– ENI) where the Commission at para 57 of the decision underlines the lack of willingness by 
ENI to accept proposals from the third parties to co-financing investments to enhance the duct 
capacity: ‘[i]n fact, ENI did not even gauge capacity demand from third party shippers, for 
instance via ‘open season’ procedures, and also neither explored the willingness of third 
parties to commit financially to an expansion project nor explored specific co-financing offers 
made by some shippers’.  
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One of the key principles of competition in economic theory holds that in the 
medium run the dominant position will be eroded, and that today’s high market 
shares are not granted in the future, since new entrants will have strong 
incentives to enter the existing markets, where barriers to entry are not 
excessively high. Therefore, ‘replicability’ of networks (see here below Cave’s 
‘ladder of investments’) is one of the possible options, even though in the short 
and medium term is certainly the most expensive.  
However, if the ‘replicability’ of the network is not economically sustainable 
and affordable by the competitors, because the revenues would never cover 
the costs of the creation of the alternative network, the only alternative is to 
adopt remedies favouring the access to the network.  
As I discussed in Chapter IV, the remedies may be regulatory, but they are not 
necessarily successful (the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases show 
that even in the presence of an efficient national electronic communications 
regulator establishing ex ante the financial conditions for wholesale broadband 
access, the former incumbent can establish wholesale rates, through margin 
squeeze conducts, at such a level to force the competitor to leave the market).  
Alternatively, the Commission or the national competition authority may fine 
(as per Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003/EC) the former incumbent; or, on the 
basis of Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC it might impose behavioural remedies 
(see the Microsoft case, and the behavioural remedy imposed to deal with the 
refusal to supply abusive conduct). Going further, the competition authority, on 
the same legal basis, may decide to adopt a decision imposing a structural 
measure, i.e. imposing the ownership separation of the network. The samples 
of commitments I provided in Chapter V with the E.ON, RWE and ENI cases 
are exactly in this latter direction. 
In the European Union, dominant undertakings generally have control of fixed 
(and mobile) telephony infrastructure and of broadband facilities access. 
Downstream, the landscape is more fragmented and competitive. In fact at 
infrastructure level the incumbent faces two possible outcomes.  




One is that the incumbent in the fixed telephony will replicate its dominant 
position also at the broadband level, maintaining its dominant position in both 
markets.  
However, another possible outcome is that increasing effective competition in 
broadband, i.e. providing VoIP telephony, will eliminate the current voice 
telephony dominance, leading in the long-term to fierce competition in the 
provision of the same services and, potentially, also at infrastructure level 
(when the competitors raise enough profits to invest in their own 
infrastructures)636.  
An alternative could come from further investments in DSL technologies, but 
this requires long-term initiatives637. The European Regulatory Group 
(hereinafter, ‘ERG’)638, based in Brussels, deems that  
‘[…] new entrants can decide on their investment in a step-by-step 
way and can establish a customer base (critical mass) before they 
go to the next step of deploying their own infrastructure. In those 
areas where infrastructure-based competition is feasible, such 
interventions have as their long-term objective the emergence of 
self-sustaining effective competition and the ultimate withdrawal of 
regulatory obligations’639.  
                                            
 
636 See M. Cave (professor at the Warwick Business School, Warwick University) ‘Investment 
and competition in electronic communications services markets: lessons from Europe and 
elsewhere’, speech held at the EETT conference on ‘From Telecommunications to electronic 
communications’ in Athens, 28 March 2005.  
637 M. Monti, European Commissioner for Competition: ‘Competition would never be able to 
develop, in the short term, if entrants were not able to gain access to the incumbent operator’s 
network to start offering services. In order to reconcile access-based and facilities-based 
competition it is necessary to take account of the time dimension […]. European Commission, 
speech/03/604 ‘Competition and Regulation in the Telecom Industry The way forward’ ECTA 
Conference, Brussels, Conrad Hotel, 10 December 2003. 
 
638 The European Regulatory Group was created on the basis of the Commission decision 
2002/627/EC (2002/627/EC) of 29 July 2002 [2002] OJ L 200/38.  
 
639 Excerpt from a paper entitled ‘ERG Common Position on the approach to appropriate 
remedies in the new regulatory framework’, published by the ERG in November 2004, 
contained in M. Cave ‘Making the ladder of investment operational’, accessible at 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Publication.2916.html. See Commission decision 
2002/627/EC (2002/627/EC) of 29 July 2002 [2002] OJ L 200/38. The European Regulatory 
Group was created on the basis of the same decision.  
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This is what professor Cave calls ‘escalating the ladder of investments’. 
Competitors first should be allowed to penetrate a market largely controlled by 
the incumbent (for instance through functional separation). 
Cave’s ‘ladder of investments’ in broadband services can be schematised in 
the following manner: 
 
 
Figure 7.6 – Martin Cave’s ‘Ladder of Investments’ 
 
On the basis of empirical evidence, firstly feasible investment opportunities 
must be identified. Access to the incumbent infrastructures must be then 
encouraged, withdrawing or making less attractive the terms of such access 
as replication becomes practicable. Finally, regulatory tools must be modified 
and adapted to competition law tools. 
Leveraging their take-off market share, they should be then in a condition to 
create their own infrastructures, where replicable640.  




In Cave’s view, duplication of investments in those markets where the 
incumbent could easily cut the prices, undercutting the competitors, must be 
avoided641.  
 
7.4. The role of the legal (‘effectiveness’) and economic (‘efficiency’) 
tests in choosing the best remedy, within the boundaries of competition 
law.  
 
In recent years there has been wide debate on what remedy is the most 
suitable, with respect to merger remedies as well as with respect to Art. 102 
TFEU enforcement.  
 
Legal effectiveness means the capacity for a divested entity to remain a viable 
and effective competitor642, while economic efficiency measures the grade of 
efficacy of a proposed remedy pre-and post-merger; in other words, the 
effective impact that the remedy has on examined markets (in terms of level of 
prices, level of supply, survival of competitors, impact on the final consumers 
with respect to quality and level of prices). 
 
It is interesting to analyse and compare the remedies adopted in the presence 
of a proposed (or implemented) merger with the remedies that could be 
adopted in order to enhance the competitive environment in the presence of 
violations of Art. 102 TFEU (or adopted at the end of a ‘market investigation’ 
as per the UK Enterprise Act 2002). In fact, only taking into consideration both 
factors (effectiveness and efficiency of the remedies) it is finally possible to 
                                                                                                                              
640 ‘Replicability’, for M. Cave, is governed by the interaction of cost and demand conditions 
(costs: economies of scale and scope, degree to which costs are sunk; demand: growth 
projections of the final services and availability of competing infrastructures). 
 
641 As known, in the USA in 1980s the 1996 Communications Act authorised the access to the 
local network of the Bell Companies by the competitors. They installed their own switches 
(easily replicable) and leased the unbundled loops. Then the FCC allowed the incumbent 
(AT&T and MCI) to lease all the assets at discounted prices. The competitors where therefore 
forced to ask the FCC to repeal the authorisation. This factor in the end discouraged further 
investments. 
642 On the point see the excellent paper published by A. Tajana and P. Papandropoulos, ‘The 
merger remedies study: in divestiture we trust?’ (2006) Vol. 26(8) ECLR 443-354 (para 2.2). 
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decide which remedy will have the most suitable impact on a specific 
economic scenario.  
 
For a long time the European Commission has been arguing that only 
‘structural remedies’ can be really effective, considering the difficulties deriving 
from ex post monitoring of a behavioural remedy. In reality the most recent 
studies have largely re-habilitated behavioural, and less invasive, remedies to 
the point of having opted out of functional separation in the Directive 
2009/140/EC. Functional remedy, however, is directly linked with the idea of 
appointing a trustworthy monitoring trustee, both in mergers and in art. 102 
TFEU enforcement.  
 
Monitoring trustees are widely used figure heads (both at EU level, and at 
national level) and ensure that the ‘undertakings’ signed by the merging 
parties (or the party that has accepted to divest or to carry out a certain 
number of obligations to address the competition authority concerns) are 
effectively implemented. 
 
The Commission (or the national competition authority), as correctly noted by 
A. Tajana and P. Panadropoulos in their excellent article, may have a lack of 
expertise in a specific market643.Therefore, only a highly competent monitoring 
trustee could be a sufficient guarantee for the adoption of a less invasive 
remedy such as functional separation, sufficient to avoid a structural remedy 
also in Art. 102 TFEU cases. Whilst preserving the integrity of the company, it 
may grant that over a certain time-frame the competition concerns are duly 
addressed, through the adoption of the measures that the Commission or the 
National Competition Authority and Regulators may have suggested as urgent 
to make the market under review more competitive.  
 
                                            
 
643 A. Tajana-P. Papandroupolos, cited: ‘A third party, independent and with the necessary 
expertise, is needed to oversee the activities of the parties and effectively monitor compliance 




Leaving aside the effectiveness of the remedy, probably the most important 
aspect, still under-estimated, is the assessment of the economic impact of a 
long-term remedy (either structural either behavioural with a functional nature). 
 
Taking an economic perspective, a structural remedy might not be the most 
efficient. There is a possibility that if the undertaking is forced to divest, it will 
dismiss the less economically vital part of its business644.  
 
I have explained in various parts of the thesis that there are good reasons in 
favour of behavioural remedies, that may be more effective in those 
economies (in chapter IV I analysed both the advantages and disadvantages 
of functional separation, as a form of advanced behavioural remedy, in the 
Openreach experience) where the competition authorities work in combination 
with highly skilled Regulatory entities.  
 
Depending on the type of industry (certainly the utilities industries must be 
included in the number) behavioural remedies may turn to be less intrusive 
disruptive.  
 
US ‘Law & Economics’ scholars645 have for instance suggested that, when  
 
‘divestitures are not possible because they would deprive the 
merger from desirable cost savings, their proposal is to design a 
contract between the merging parties and a ‘contactor’ (third party). 
Under this contract, the merging parties would commit to paying the 
contractor a per-unit penalty for lowering production but would be 
paid a per-unit reward for increasing production’.  
 
In analogy with utilities, and with the communications sector in particular, a 
viable hypothesis is to foresee a panoply of incentives, paid by a ‘third entity’, 
as well as a number of financial penalties that would grant the effective 
                                            
644 M. Motta stressed the risk that ‘inappropriate divestments may actually facilitate collusion 
by restructuring an industry in a more symmetric way or multiply multi-markets contacts’. M. 
Motta, M. Polo, H. Vasconcelos, cited, p. 106. 
 
645 See Werben, Froeb, Tschantz, ‘Incentive Contracts as Merger Remedies’, Vanderbilt 




implementation of a number of behavioural remedies in order to avoid intrusive 
draconian remedies646.  
 
In 2000 US scholars such as Shelanski and Sidak, pending the United States 
v Microsoft647 proceedings for abuse of dominant position against Netscape, 
proposed a three-fold test to assess the validity of a proposed divestiture, in 
order to try to assess ex ante the impact that a (legally effective) remedy may 
have had in terms of economic efficiency648. For them the remedy (i) should 
produce a net gain in static economic efficiency; (ii) net gains in static 
economic efficiency should overcome potential losses in dynamic efficiency; 
(iii) enforcement costs should be taken into account. 
 
In the first case, the remedy is seen in the perspective of creating new 
competitors, or isolating an infrastructure that is finally opened up to multiple 
operators. The pro-efficiency gains might be evident. Then the antitrust 
authority must take into account the risks that ‘dynamic efficiency’ is 
jeopardised by the presence of multiple players, on the one hand, and by the 
risk of disruptions pending on the head of the separated industry (network), on 
                                            
646 On remedies in the merger policy, see also Vasconcelos and a number of recent studies in 
the US on the economic impact of merger remedies. In particular, see T. Duso, K. Gigler, B. 
Yuroglu ‘EU merger remedies: A preliminary Empirical Assessment’, Discussion Paper no.81, 
Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems, September 2005 accessible at 
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6638/papers/Duso.pdf. See also H. Vasconcelos ’Efficiency 
Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control’, (2010) Vol. 58(4) The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 742-766. 
 
647 The Judge T. Jackson in his conclusion filed on the 3 April 2000 at the US District Court of 
the District of Columbia acknowledged the attempt of monopolising by Microsoft and ordered 
as a remedy the separation of the company in two entities, one to produce the operating 
system, and one to produce other software components. It is famous the opinion expressed in 
his ‘findings of fact’ filed on 5 November 1999: ‘Most harmful of all is the message that 
Microsoft's actions have conveyed to every enterprise with the potential to innovate in the 
computer industry. Through its conduct toward Netscape, IBM, Compaq, Intel, and others, 
Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use its prodigious market power and immense profits to 
harm any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives that could intensify competition against one of 
Microsoft's core products. Microsoft's past success in hurting such companies and stifling 
innovation deters investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit the potential to 
threaten Microsoft. The ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly benefit 
consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft's self-
interest’. As known the judgment was partially overturned by the District Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case for consideration of a proper remedy under a more limited scope of 
liability. The case was ultimately settled and the separation was avoided. 
 
648 H.A. Shlansky and J.G. Sidak, ‘Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries’, (2001) 68 U. 
Chicago Law Review, 1. 
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the other. The enforcement costs of a structural remedy may also be taken 
into account and depending on the market conditions (type of industry), might 
be high or low. 
 
As Farrell and Shapiro discuss in their paper ‘Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and Information Technology’649, network effects may play a 
crucial role in deciding which remedy should be suggested. 
 
It must be said that authors like A. Tajana correctly stressed the risks that a 
draconian remedy may also have on third parties (shareholders, employees), 
and takes also into consideration the impact of ‘general interest’650. 
 
He pointed out how the Commission, or a national authority, rather than 
pursue the effectiveness of a legal remedy, should take into consideration the 
‘thermometer’ provided by economic, efficiency oriented, tests, which may be 
able to foresee the disruptions that a rather draconian remedy may cause.  
 
Finally it must be stressed that there are a limited number of studies on the 
impact of structural remedies in article 102 TFEU cases, because there are 





                                            
 
649 J. Farrell-Shapiro, ‘Intellectual Property, Competition, and information Technology’, 
Berkeley Competition Policy Centre Working Paper no. CPC-04-45, 2004. 
 
650 A. Tajana, Structural Remedies and Abuse of Dominant Position, TILEC Discussion Paper, 
Tilburg University, December 2005. These concerns raised by several parties. See R. Litan, 
R.G. Noll, W.D. Nordhaus and F. Scherer, Remedies Brief of Amici Curiae, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 27/4/2000, p 64. 
 
651 The main concern in Europe, since the creation of the early EEC, and until today, was the 





7.7. Potential advantages (and disadvantages) of structural separation. 
Cave’s ‘Degrees of Separation’: Conclusive remarks. 
 
‘I believe that the policy option of structural separation could answer 
many of the competition problems that Europe’s telecoms markets 
are still facing today. Perhaps we have to be as radical as 
regulators were in the USA in the 1980s to make real progress? Of 
course, we will have to find our own European solutions, adapted to 
the needs of our continent. But ‘a European way of structural 
separation’ is certainly a policy option that needs to be discussed 
intensively in the forthcoming months’.  
 
V. Reding, former European Commissioner for the 
Information Society and Communications, 2006 
 
 
The choice of the best remedy is far from simple and clear-cut. Reasons 
against structural separation come from the US experience in the AT&T 
structural separation of 1984 (i.e. for the re-creation of a monopolistic situation 
in the long-distance communications, or the creation of form of high-
concentration at regional/local level). The structural separation of railways in 
the UK that finally forced the State to purchase back the infrastructure 
company, RailTrack, is an argument often put forward against structural 
separation or divestiture of assets in vertically integrated industries.  
 
However, the idea of structural separation as a draconian remedy is in line 
with the idea of intervening directly at the source of potential unfair behavior. 
Structural separation, imposed as a remedy by the regulator on the model of 
the reform of electronic communications implemented in 2009, may be an 
answer to consumers (and competitors’) concerns652. This could be even more 
efficient and long lasting than any solution based on ex ante price control or, in 
certain economies, simple functional separation. Rather than focusing on the 
                                            
 
652 M. Cave ‘Six Degree of Separation, Operational Separation as a Remedy in European 




artificial compression of the final price, it would be preferable to allow 
competitors to enter the market therefore automatically forcing prices down. 
 
If functional (or even account) separation can end discrimination in wholesale 
or retail final prices, due in particular to the trust and reliability of the 
incumbent’s managers behavior, this form of separation may succeed. But if 
this outcome cannot be reached then structural separation might be the best 
remedy to suggest. 
 
Martin Cave, in his 2006 seminal article on the topic, identified two forms of 
potential discrimination carried out by the incumbent controlling the network: 
price and non-price discrimination. 
 
As mentioned above, accounting (and even functional) separation is aimed at 
granting ‘parity between transaction prices paid by competitors for access and 
accounting prices paid by the separated entity’s downstream affiliate’653. 
 
But non-price discrimination follows a different path, which requires remedies 
that are much more cogent and stringent than simple account separation654.  
 
It is sufficient to look at the conclusion reached in 2005 by OFCOM, and in an 
article by same author, with Correa and Crocioni (published in 2006), to see 
how the UK incumbent, BT, persisted for long time, in carrying out non-price 
discrimination mainly based on the provision of products such as ‘unbundled 
loops, wholesale line rental and bit-stream’, all products that are today 
provided by the separate entity Openreach. 
 
The question is whether functional separation is more efficient than other 
remedies, and whether in certain economic and historic contexts, as well as in 
                                            
653 ibid, 91. Interestingly, it must be said that in the presence of account separation, the final 
cost/price of access should be lower than in the absence of account separation, in 
consideration of the absence of average incremental costs calculated on the entire company 
business. 
 




the presence of technical/technological gaps, it is preferable to instead opt for 
the structural separation. 
 
Can structural separation be recommended in certain conditions? M. Cave 
identified a ‘ladder of separations’655, ranging from mere accounting separation 
to ownership separation (in whole or in part). The scheme he proposed is the 
following: 
 
Figure no. 7.8 - Separation options 
 
Ownership separation (in whole or in part) 
6 – Legal separation (separate legal entities under the same ownership) 
5 – Business separation with separate governance arrangements 
4 – Business separation with localised incentives 
3 – Business separation (BS) 
2 - Virtual separation  
1 – Creation of a wholesale division 
Accounting separation 
 
Figure no. 7.8. Source: M. Cave ‘Six Degree of Separation, Operational Separation as a 
Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation’ (2006) 64 (4) Communications & 
Strategies, 89 ff. 
 
 
Is it realistic to think that the first steps of the described ladder would be 
ineffective in those countries where a deeply rooted presence in the territory of 
a former State controlled incumbent would inevitably lead to interferences 
between the different divisions of the same company/group? If one climbs up 
the described ladder bearing in mind the very factual conditions of a specific 
economy, will see that almost all the prospective solutions would not be 
successful.  
 
Starting from accounting separation (with separate profit and loss balance-
sheets for each separate division, wholesale, retail, access), there is no 
                                            




guarantee of non-interference between the management of the separate 
divisions, as I showed in Chapter V (as I indicated discussing the recent report 
2013 issued by the Equality of Access Board on Openreach’s activity656). Even 
in trying to create a ‘level playing field of competition’ creating a ‘wholesale’ 
unit division, the efforts of the incumbent would disappear because of the 
‘absence of a clean target level of equivalence’ and ‘the fact that the 
incumbent’s network, IT system and business processes were broadly 
designed within the context of a fully integrated firm supplying end users 
directly, but not supplying access services to third parties’657. 
 
Another possibility outlined by Cave is ‘virtual separation’, i.e. the possibility of 
degrading the services offered to ‘internal customers’ or upgrading the 
services offered to external customers (i.e. alternatively downgrading or 
upgrading the speed of interconnection). Needless to say that the first aspect 
(downgrading) would be per se inefficient; the second is difficult to obtain 
without a constant monitoring of effective speed in the various 
regional/national areas. 
 
Coming back to forms of ‘physical separation’, the first possible form of 
separation consists of creating firewalls among the various divisions, 
physically separating premises, staff, operational support systems, labor force 
in general, brand, management information systems and above all, the 
strategies. The risk is that without effective ‘functional separation’, still the 
highest levels of management would coordinate their decision-making 
process, adopting agreed strategies (either price, or non-price oriented).  
 
The example given by professor Cave is that of a non-European incumbent 
that avoided making further investments to upgrade the network in order to 
make it non-viable for broadcasting services, in order to hinder the access to 
                                            
656 BT Equality of Access Board (‘EAB’), Annual Report 2013, published in November 2013.  
 
657 M. Cave, cited, 94. He also mentions the creation, in Australia, of an operational (structural) 
separation for the wholesale division that in 2006 was proposed by Telstra and accepted by 
the Government, dealing exclusively with access seekers. It will be implemented by 2018, and 
is discussed in the last chapter. For M. Cave this solution appears to be hill-equipped when 
trying to avoid discriminatory behaviours between ‘internal or external customers’ of the same 
company (existence of ‘institutional arrangements between them’, using Cave’s same words). 
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potential competitors already able to provide both telephony and broadcasting 
services658. 
 
The fourth type of separation identified by Cave may be achieved through 
targeted incentives to senior management. If the target for a manager is to 
maximise the group’s profits, and satisfy stakeholders to ensure career 
progress, it is obvious that only an incentive for the senior management of a 
specific division (for instance, of the ‘access division’) may counter-balance 
the incentive to promote the group’s interests. 
 
A similar target may be achieved by creating a division of the board where any 
executive-member of the group must be present (fifth form of separation, 
under Cave’s idea). Finally, the highest form of operational separation is that 
of creating a ‘separate board’ with ‘separate statutory accounts’.  
 
The here-listed operational (and account) separations rely on the existence of 
an effective and efficient regulatory and enforcement authority, or on the 
creation of an internal (of the company/group) entity aimed at supervising the 
effective separation.  
 
The question is: what would happen where regulatory bodies may not operate 
with that independence and effectiveness required by the importance of the 
economic and social interests at stake? 
 
Here the conclusion of M. Cave: 
 
‘the company [BT] now denies that it benefits in the UK from 
advantages of incumbency. Instead it sees as its key strategic 
advantage its ability first to succeed in a more symmetrical home 
market for corporate telecommunications services in Europe and 
the wider world, where it will face incumbents still enjoying, but 
                                            
 
658 A similar complaint was made to the Italian ENI for not having upgraded the gas/oil 
distribution network even though the clients (competitors in the retail market) had offered to 
financially contribute to the works required to increase the duct’s capacity (see European 
Commission Decision published on the 22 December 2010, accepting ENI’s proposal of 




about to lose, the fruits of continued discriminatory behavior659. 
Hence its incessant support for regulatory interventions, which draw 
down the benefit of incumbency elsewhere and create level playing 
fields everywhere. It is reasonable to suppose that the outcome of 
operational separation in the UK will be the joint product of 
regulation and this strategic shift’660. 
 
M. Cave seems to approve operational separation, taking into consideration 
the need for adjustments, which have been listed above. However the key 
factor of this architecture is the effectiveness of regulatory supervision.  
 
In the presence of historically weak (or weakened) regulatory powers, when 
the same regulatory powers may be influenced by a wide range of factors, 
structural (or ownership) separation seems to represent the most effective 
remedy, in particular where operators of other European countries might be 
interested in entering into a national or regional market and face undue 
resistance to competition from the former national incumbent.  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of functional or structural separation have 
been discussed in depth by the European Regulators Group (ERG)661. On the 
basis of the UK Openreach experience, ERG acknowledged that the account 
or administrative separation may not be sufficiently efficient662. This is why 
ERG promoted, on the basis of the UK experience in the Openreach case, the 
amendment of the EC Access directive. This was exactly the outcome 
obtained through Directive 2009/140/EC, introducing functional separation as 
an ex ante remedy.  
 
According to the ERG, the ‘equality of inputs’ is a key factor to create a level 
playing field for competition, and it had to be mentioned in Article 10 of the 
Access Directive. Furthermore, ERG wanted that the amended Directive would 
have provided for: (i) the obligation of separation for SMP undertakings that 
                                            
659 Emphasis added. 
 
660 M. Cave, cited, 99. 
 
661 In conjunction with IRG, Independent Regulatory Group. 
 




are vertically integrated, so as to avoid the ability to control and potentially limit 
or obstruct the access services for competitors; (ii) the obligation for SMP 
vertically-integrated companies to grant ‘equivalence of access’ in order to 
allow the same condition of access for its own commercial units/divisions and 
the retail units/divisions; (iii) the obligation to protect and control the stream of 
information detained by SMP vertically integrated companies, to avoid any 
form of illicit advantage by the use of ‘insider knowledge663. 
 
ERG acknowledged that in some European countries there was a 
constitutionally protected right to integration and non-dissolution of the 
undertakings by an external or authoritative input. 
 
Vivian Reding, European Commissioner for the Information Society, in a 
speech on 5 March 2007 in Brussels, confirmed that in line with the European 
approach held in the energy sector, measures which combine functional and 
structural separations of network and services had to be considered possible, 
showing, in line with the Energy Sector Inquiry 2007, to be in favour for a more 
radical approach664, punctually mirrored in the new set of directives adopted in 
2009 (discussed in Chapter IV). 
 
This approach was also in line with the OECD 2001 Recommendations (and 
the OECD Reports issued in 2001 and 2006), as confirmed by the 2011 
review, discussed at the beginning of this Chapter.  
 
The competition or regulatory authority is called to carry out a case-by-case 
approach, balancing (i) competition with (ii) (economic) efficiency reasons 
before choosing the most suitable remedy. 
 
Very serious competition concerns seem to be necessary (but may be not 
sufficient) to lead to the adoption of structural separation as a form of 
deterrent.  
 
                                            
663 Reasoning recalled the Decision AGCOM 208/07/CONS, Attachment B, p 98. 
 
664 ibid, p 99. 
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Deterrence could represent a valid reason to waving the tool of structural 
separation, bearing in mind that in a ‘game theory’, non-cooperative, scenario, 
threatening structural separation could ultimately lead to a rapid 
implementation of effective functional separation. 
 
This reasoning would not conflict with the wide range of enforcement activity 
authorised by Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC that the European 
Commission can put in place to reach the targets of the European treaties.  
 
In this respect, the drift with the US legal system appears clear. If that system, 
as demonstrated by the Verizon v Trinko case, favours  the regulatory 
approach when dealing with regulated firms (for instance in the energy and in 
the electronic communications sector), in the EU legal system the Commission 
has enforcement tools authorising both behavioural and structural measures in 
the presence of abusive conducts. We have discussed how until now 
structural remedies were never applied in the electronic communications 
sector, even though recently in the energy sector they were at the basis of a 
few Art. 102 commitments decisions. The next, conclusive, chapter will 
discuss why, how and in which form structural measures could be enforced or, 






             CHAPTER VIII 
 
Structural separation in the electronic communications: an option to be 
considered by the European enforcer. Conclusion. 
 
 
8.1.    Introduction. 
 
 
In the previous chapters I discussed how functional and structural separation 
was applied in the European context, in particular on the basis of Art. 9 Reg.  
1/2003/EC commitments (in Chapter V, I analysed the recent E.ON, RWE and 
ENI Commission’s decisions, leading to structural separation through 
divestiture of assets in both electricity and gas markets), undertakings on the 
basis of Section 154 EA02 in the United Kingdom (leading to functional 
separation of access services, and creation of a new access division, 
Openreach, within the BT Group)665 and as a consequence of competition 
enforcement activity (functional separation as a remedy, imposed in the 
Deutsche Post666 decision in 2001).  
 
The comparison between abuses and same anticompetitive foreclosure 
effects in the electronic communications and in the energy sectors suggested 
the idea that same ex post remedies (including the remedies based on Art. 9 
of Regulation 1/2003/EC commitments) could be in principle applied to both 
sectors. I also stressed how recent decisions and European Courts judgments 
in the Deutsche Telekom667 and in the Telefónica668 cases confirmed the key 
                                            
665 J. Whalley & P. Curwen, ‘Equality of access and local loop unbundling in the UK broadband 
telecommunications market’ (2008) 25 Telematics and Informatics 280-291. It provides an 
account of the initial phases of implementation of BT’s functional separation. 
 
666 Commission Decision Deutsche Post AG  (Case COMP/35.141) of 20 March 2001, [2001] 
OJ L125/27 
 
667 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9; on appeal, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, Case T-271/03, [2008] 
ECR II 477; before the ECJ, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, 
[2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
668 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), 
appealed at the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v 
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role that the Commission can play in selecting ex post remedies (fines, or 
functional and structural separation as per Article 7 of Regulation no. 
1/2003/EC) that can be imposed even in the presence of ex ante regulatory 
tools (such as price caps, or other ex ante remedies such as functional 
separation as per Directive 2009/140/EC). Therefore, in Chapter IV, I 
demonstrated how both pecuniary fines imposed on telecoms operators for 
access-related abuses, and functional separation in the Openreach example, 
were still far from sufficient to impede the recurrence of behaviours that could 
actually or potentially lead to abuses of dominant position, in particular with 
respect to access-related issues.  
 
In Chapter V I also considered the criticisms that emerged during the Energy 
Sector Review in 2007 to explain how between 2008 and 2010 the European 
Commission decided to negotiate forms of structural separation going beyond 
mere functional separation in both electricity and gas sectors. 
 
Outside Europe, in Chapter VI I analysed the AT&T case of local vertical 
structural separation on the 1980s and the criticisms that some scholars such 
as Crandal and Sidak expressed a decade ago against forms of structural 
separation in the electronic communications sector. I also discussed how in 
the last decade of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century, 
on the one hand, the approach of the US Supreme Court (in part influenced by 
the idea of economic efficiency deriving from the Chicago School), de facto 
avoided draconian measures even when, as in the Microsoft v Netscape669 
case, the pressure from the lower courts would have been in that direction (the 
Judge Jackson expressly requested the break-up of Microsoft in that case). 
On the other hand, the US Supreme Court underlined and confirmed the 
competence of the telecom regulator in access-related abuses of dominant 
                                                                                                                              
Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at 
the Court of Justice, Case C-295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 








position, as per the Supreme Court judgment in the Verizon v Trinko case670. I 
also argued that the AT&T case must be borne in mind as a precedent of 
structural separation in the electronic communications sector, but it is hardly 
applicable to the European scenario, considering that local fragmentation of 
networks (among Member States) in Europe is already a reality.  
 
Chapter VII analysed the position expressed by the OECD in 2001, 2006 and 
2011 vis á vis structural separation, showing how the OECD in its most recent 
report671 (2011) was less favourable to structural separation and more prone 
to suggest a ‘case-by-case’ approach. In that context, I discussed the different 
forms of functional (also called ‘operational’ by some scholars) separation, and 
the types of structural separation on the basis of the most recent experience. I 
focused on how, at the European level, some scholars recently analysed the 
problem of remedies to address competition concerns on the basis of their 
experience with horizontal and vertical divestitures as a merger remedy. I 
underlined how the mergers assessed by the European Commission pursuant 
to the European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR)672 may provide examples 
with respect to the best remedies to be adopted in order to get a merger 
cleared673.  
 
In this respect, the doctrine identifies two main tests on which the choice of the 
best remedy should be based: ‘legal effectiveness’ and ‘economic efficiency’. 
Similar tools can be used when the enforcer is called upon to choose which 
remedy and, within this category, which form of separation has to be enforced 
                                            
670 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 124 S. Ct. 
872, decided on 14 January 2004 by the US Supreme Court. 
 
 
671 OECD Report 2011 ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, OECD pub. 2012, 
accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf, to be read in conjunction 
with OECD Recommendation 2011 on structural separation in regulated industries, C (2011) 




672 Council Regulation (EC) no 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), in OJ L 024 of 29 January 2004 
 
673 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 [2008] OJ C267/01 (‘Merger Remedies 
Notice 2008).  
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as per Article 102 TFEU. I concluded that in choosing the best form of 
separation multiple factors need to be taken into consideration. Both functional 
and structural separation require that the competition authority establishes ex 
ante what the ex post scenario will be. Legal, competition law-based, and 
economic factors need to be considered both under the category of 
advantages and disadvantages. Econometric evaluations and economic 
projections play a key role in predicting not only whether the market will be 
more competitive or less concentrated (legal assessment) after the break-up 
but also whether wholesale and retail prices will go down or whether the costs 
will decrease or not. 
 
This chapter builds on all the previous chapters and is aimed at showing how 
structural separation not only is legally grounded (topic of the first chapters of 
the thesis) but also beneficial to competition.  
 
First of all, structural separation may represent a serious deterrent for the 
recurrent abuser. It may represent a preliminary step for a change of 
ownership of the network. However, under certain circumstances, the right 
form of structural separation (among the various options discussed in the 
previous chapter) in the electronic communications sector can also represent 
a valid option to increase competition: for instance in the case of (i) a 
separation between the network division and services division (as shown in 
the electricity market, in the E.ON case674, and in the gas market, in the ENI675 
and RWE676 cases) or the (ii) reciprocal non-competitive asset separation 
among parts of network (one of the applicable forms of separation at least in 
the largest EU Member States)677.  
                                            
674 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ 
C36/8 of 13 February 2009. 
 
675 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 
of 23 December 2010. 
 
676 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, 
Summary of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009. 
 
677 At the same time, considering the specific characteristics of  the electronic communications 
in Europe, where there are geographically fragmented markets, with national incumbents for 
each Member State whose dimension is equivalent (or smaller) to that of the ‘after break-up’ 




To show that structural separation can be considered beneficial to competition, 
in this chapter I will look at two very recent cases of structural separation in the 
electronic communications sector. Looking at the example of structural 
separation of the Australian incumbent, Telstra, I will discuss how it might be a 
possible option at European level. In addition to this I will analyse the 
structural separation of services and parts of the network in the New Zealand 
Telecom case.  
 
I will also discuss (although cautiously, given its recentness) the aftermath of 
divestitures in the energy sector in Europe on the basis of commitments (the 
ENI case, for instance, was implemented in 2011).  
 
I will conclude that structural separation represents the most evident 
expression of the enforcement capacity of the European Commission, above 
and beyond regulatory intervention. Such a radical form of intervention may be 
considered as a form of threat that may lead to the adoption of less invasive, 
cooperative, solutions, such as functional separation. Structural separation in 
theory may enhance competition as expected in the energy sector with the 
divestitures analysed in Chapter V, with a positive impact on prices and costs 
management.  
 
The solution adopted in Australia represents the most important model of 
structural intervention that the European Commission (and the NCA) could 
take into consideration. The national telecoms incumbent Telstra on the basis 
of the commitments in March 2012 signed with the Australian Competition and 
Customers Authority (‘ACCC’) aimed at progressively fully separate Telstra’s 
network by 1st July 2018. After a period of operational (functional) separation 
from 2006 to 2012, Telstra is currently putting in place a migration plan aimed 
at implementing the structural separation plan. The entire process of 
separation will be completed when the government  will take direct 
responsibility of the wholesale-only New Broadband Network from 2018, 
                                                                                                                              
separation into (local) sub-sections of the network as carried out in the US in 1982-1984, 




leaving the provision of advanced services (broadband services, for instance) 
and fixed telephony services to the incumbent in competition with other 
providers678.  
 
The most important conclusion is the fact that currently in some countries the 
concept of structural separation as a way of enhancing competition in the 
provision of services is attracting new interest, probably in consideration of the 
importance of the New Generation Networks in the electronic communications 
in particular, and the end of (often inefficient) State-controlled networks in 
other sectors (electricity, gas, oil transmission and distribution, to make a few 
examples).  
 
If this is true, structural separation should be suggested as an enforcement 
tool in the electronic communications as well, considering that until now it has 
been applied either as a complementary tool of merger control, or on the basis 
of commitments exclusively in the energy sector. 
 
 
8.2. From functional separation to structural separation in the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
Experience shows that functional separation as implemented in the United 
Kingdom with the creation of Openreach, as a functionally separated entity, 
represented only one of the possible forms of separation. It was tailored to the 
specific features of the company, to the alleged anticompetitive behaviours 
and to the features of the British market. 
 
After having analysed in Chapter VII the various possible forms of separation 
as identified by the OECD report 2001679 we can now look at (and compare) 
                                            
678 On 29 July 2011 Telstra submitted a structural separation undertaking and draft migration 
plan to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the basis of Sections 
577A and 577BDA of the Telecommunications Act 1997. After a supplement of negotiation, 
the ACCC accepted on the 27 February 2012 Telstra’s structural separation undertaking and 
approved the draft migration plan. On the 6 March 2012, Telstra’s Structural Separation 





three forms of separation: (teli) functional, (ii) structural (internal corporate 
separation) and (iii) ownership separation, starting with the Openreach 
experience in the UK, looking at the progressive passage from operational to 
full structural separation of the national telecoms incumbent in Australia 
(Telstra) by 2018, and at the also recent ownership separation in New Zealand 
(New Zealand Telecom).  
 
Functional separation represents a tighter form of operational separation, with 
the creation of internal ‘walls’ mainly hindering exchange of information within 
retail, wholesale and access divisions of the same company. The various 
divisions still belong to the same company, but each division acts as if it was a 
separate company. A very good synthesis: ‘they have to buy and sell services 
between each other in an ‘internal market’’680.  
 












Figure 8.1, functional separation of BT, United Kingdom (2006)681 
                                                                                                                              
679 OECD, ‘Restructuring public utilities for competition’, Report on Competition and 
Regulatory Reform, 2001, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/196
35977.pdf. 
680 See the overview on separation by lawyers P. Waters and O. Damian, ‘Separation 
regulation of dominant telecommunications operators in today’s legacy networks and 
tomorrow’s next generation networks. One separation model does not fit all – key design 
issues and lessons learned’, accessible at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/Separation-regulation.pdf, p. 2. 
 













Openreach, the access division, deals with the local network infrastructure, the 
fibre extension in local loop and the regional backhaul networks. It provides 
various services: ULLs services, ISDN, PSTN resale. On the other hand, BT 
Wholesale deals with (i) the electronics used on the network (including 
DSLAMS in local loop and regional backhaul network), (ii) all the other 
regulated services not provided by Openreach, and (iii) other most advanced 
communications services (e.g. wholesale local switched calls, layer 3DSL). BT 
Wholesale division, as shown in the chart, deals with its own wholesale 
customers and with BT retail customers, while Openreach provides access 
services to BT Wholesale division and to Wholesale customers on an equal 
footing. 
 
Matters developed differently in Australia. After a long debate682 about the 
opportunity of adopting structural separation as recommended by the 
Australian government since 2007683, in 2012 undertakings were signed by 
Telstra leading to structural separation of the company684. As per Telstra 
website,  
 
‘on 28 February 2012, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) accepted Telstra’s Structural 
Separation Undertaking (SSU) and draft Migration Plan. The 
SSU commenced operation on 6 March 2012, while the 
Migration Plan took effect from 7 March 2012. 
                                                                                                                              
 
682 Plans for structurally separate Telstra, the Australian incumbent, were discussed by a 
Senate committee since 2003. Telstra objected that structural separation would have led to 
class actions from shareholders. 
 
683 For the debate preceding structural separation of Telstra, see ‘Telstra Faces Enforced 




684 On 29 July 2011 Telstra submitted a structural separation undertaking and draft migration 
plan to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the basis of Sections 
577A and 577BDA of the Telecommunications Act 1997. After a supplement of negotiation, 
the ACCC accepted on the 27 February 2012 Telstra’s structural separation undertaking and 
approved the draft migration plan. On the 6 March 2012, Telstra’s Structural Separation 







The SSU fulfils two roles: 
 It commits Telstra to structural separation by 1 July 2018, 
through the progressive disconnection of fixed voice and 
broadband services from Telstra’s copper and Hybrid Fibre-
Coaxial (HFC) networks, while the New Broadband Network 
(NBN) is being rolled out [by the government685]; and, 
 
 It sets out the various measures which Telstra will put in place 
to provide for equivalence and transparency in the supply of 
regulated fixed network services to its wholesale customers 
and the supply of comparable services to its retail customers 
during the transition to the NBN’686. 
 
To understand how the Australian Competition & Consumers Commission 
(‘ACCC’) led the negotiations to the point of accepting undertakings leading to 
full structural separation (by 2018) of Telstra, it is important to consider that as 
per 1st December 2006 the company was subject to operational separation, 
forcing it to keep separate retail, wholesale and key network services business 
units687 (see, on this respect, M. Cave’s criticism in chapter VII).  
 
The Parliament of Australia however expressed serious concerns about the 
capacity of Telstra to grant full competition by simply implementing an 
operational separation scheme: 
                                            
685 Brackets added. 
 
686 Australian Competition Authority (ACCC), Structural Separation Undertakings offered by 
Telstra on the 23 February 2012, accepted by ACCC on the 28 February 2012, accessible at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Structural%20Separation%20Undertaking.pdf. An outlook 
of Telstra’s structural separation undertaking is available both on the website of Telstra 
accessible at http://www.telstrawholesale.com.au/structural-separation-undertaking/index.htm, 
and from the website of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
Particularly useful is the Telstra’s Structural Separation Undertaking Annual Compliance 





687 OECD Competition Committee, ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, p 109-





‘Telstra’s integrated position across all the telecommunications 
platforms has led to longstanding and widespread concerns that 
the existing telecommunications structure in failing consumers, 
businesses and the economy in general’688. 
 
Structural separation of Telstra (with the creation of a structurally-separated 
state-funded New Broadband Network) was conceived as a step further than 
functional (operational) separation.  
An excerpt from ‘Telstra’s structural separation undertaking – Annual 
Compliance Report 2011-2012’ issued by the ACCC clarifies how the 
government found that functional (operational) separation was not enough. 
This has to be borne in mind, since the same reasoning might be applied to 
the European scenario, within single Member States: 
 
‘In late 2010, the Australian Government introduced legislation 
which created a framework for reforming the telecommunications 
industry—effecting structural separation of Telstra by the 
progressive migration of Telstra’s fixed line access services to the 
wholesale-only National Broadband Network (NBN) as the NBN 
fibre is rolled out689. This reform recognised that Telstra, as the 
vertically integrated access provider to the ubiquitous copper 
network, operates at all levels of the supply chain and competes 
with the businesses that it supplies to. This has given rise to long 
standing competition concerns around Telstra’s ability and 
incentive to favour its retail business over other service 
providers accessing its network to the detriment of consumers.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the SSU, Telstra was subject to an 
operational separation framework which was intended to promote 
equivalence between Telstra’s wholesale and retail customers. The 
ACCC has previously publicly stated that the operational 
separation regime, and the ACCC’s limited role in investigating 
and reporting matters to the Minister, was largely ineffective in 
addressing Telstra’s ability and incentive to discriminate 
                                            
688 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 
Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer Safeguards) Bill 
2009. Explanatory Memorandum, p 8. 
 




against its competitors690. Upon the coming into force of the 
Structural Separation Undertaking (SSU) on 6 March 2012, the 
operational separation regime ceased to operate’691. 
 
 
The operational separation (for the period 2006-2012), preliminary to the 
structural separation of the NBN [New broadband Network] from Telstra’s 
wholesale and retail services, had been conceived in the ‘separation of the 
business units formalised through subsidiaries, so that each separated 
business unit is a subsidiary of a holding company rather than being an 
organisational unit within the one company. [A] common set of shareholders 
still owns the structurally separated subsidiaries’692.  
 
The chart that follows shows how operational (functional) separation (within 










                                            
690 Emphasis added. 
 
691 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), Telstra’s Structural Separation 
Undertaking – Annual Compliance Report 2011-2012, a Report to the Minister for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, with letter of 13 April 2013, accessible 
http://www.accc.gov.au/publications/telstras-structural-separation-undertaking. With respect to 
the instructions that the ACCC gives to Telstra in order to address competition concerns 
during the current migration period, see ACCC press release of 7 February 2013, ‘ACCC 




692 See the overview on separation by lawyers P. Waters and O. Damian, Separation 
regulation of dominant telecommunications operators in today’s legacy networks and 
tomorrow’s next generation networks. One separation model does not fit all – key design 
issues and lessons learned, accessible at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/wp-
















Figure 8.2, operational separation of Telstra, Australia (2006-2012)693 
 
 
In this case, the fixed network is operationally separated from the provision 
of services. Telstra Wholesale does not operate the infrastructure, but 
supplies all wholesale services. An intermediate entity, ‘network support’, 
deals with the ‘operations support systems’ (‘OSS’), and supports both 
retail and wholesale units. This first phase of operational separation can be 
compared to functional separation as per the BT’s Openreach model, and 
constitutes a preliminary step towards the current structural separation 
migration plan. During the phase of progressive structural separation 2012-
2018 the functional separation model de iure ceases to exist694. 
 
The interesting aspect of the Australian ‘restructuring plan’ launched in 
2011 is that the deployment of the New Generation Network (New 
                                            
693 ibid, 5. 
 
694 See from TelstraWholesale’s website, ‘High level summary of Telstra Structural Separation 
Undertaking and Migration Plan’, page 1, accessible at 
http://www.telstrawholesale.com.au/download/document/ssu-and-mp-briefing-summaries-
1.pdf. It expressly says that ‘consistent with the Government’s decision to frame structural 
separation as an alternative to functional separation for Telstra under the legislative scheme, 
the Interim Equivalence and Transparency measures in the Structural Separation 
Undertakings (SSU) do not constitute functional separation’. See in particular the detailed 














Broadband Network or ‘NBN’) is conceived through the creation of a new 
infrastructure directly deployed by a separate, government owned, 
company695, so that all the players are put on an equal footing in the future 
provisions of wholesale services, including Telstra. 
 
This shows that since the New Generation Network substantially differs, 
from a technological point of view, from the traditional fixed-line copper 
networks on which broadband services are provided enhancing bandwidth 
through ADSL technology, the model of functional separation as 
implemented in the British telecommunications with Openreach is 
considered insufficient and not applicable in the Australian context. The  
Australian competition authority has adopted structural separation as a way 
of favouring the intervention of the government to create a ‘New 
Broadband Network’ (the entire operation should be completed by 2018), 
so that Telstra ‘must not supply services to those premises [customers] 
using the  copper or HFC networks (other than pay TV services in the case 
of the HFC).Telstra will satisfy this commitments by progressively 
decommissioning its copper customer access network (‘CAN’) and HFC 
broadband service on an area by area basis as the NBN rolls out’.696 
 
The new characteristics of the NBN are: 
 
(a) It will be realised as the largest civil works projects for decades; 
(b) There is still uncertainly on the future demand of services that will 
be provided by the NGNs; 
(c) There will be a constant and substantial investment to upgrade the 
networks; 
(d) NGNs are layered, open standard networks, compared to the 
vertically-integrated technology of copper networks, barriers to 
                                            
695 Ibid, 12. 
 




entry at the connectivity layers are lower and there is limited 
technological capability to leverage between layers697. 
 
Therefore the role of regulation, with respect to NGNs, will be much more 
linked to the creation of incentives to develop new infrastructures, than to the 
application of the traditional regulatory tools to deal with access-related 
bottlenecks698. 
 
In the Australian scenario, matters are going in a different direction with the 
progressive passage from functional to structural separation. The ACCC first 
tried to implement functional separation within the Telstra group (separating 
wholesale and retail services, while still operating the traditional network). 
When it was clear that discrimination between its own retail customers and 
wholesale customers, was still taking place, the ACCC pushed for the 
signature of undertakings preliminary to the creation of a structurally separated 
entity, funded by the State, that will be the main New Generation Network on 
which Telstra will provide its wholesale services in competition with any other 
telecommunications operator.  
 
In this respect, the creation of the New Generation Network as a separate 
entity represents a measure that is set to avoid once for all any access-related 
anticompetitive conducts. Quoting from the mentioned ‘Telstra’s Structural 
Separation Undertaking (‘SSU’) - Compliance Report 2011-2012’  
 
‘[i]n introducing structural reform of the telecommunications industry, 
the government recognised that the ACCC would need stronger 
enforcement mechanisms that those under the operational 
separation regime to ensure transparency and equivalence. The 
SSU measures are a substantial improvement upon the previous 
operational699 separation framework and more effectively promote 
equivalence and transparency. The SSU provides for stronger 
enforcement mechanisms, which are particularly important for 
                                            
697 Ibid. 
 
698 Ibid.  
 




protecting competition and delivering outcomes in the interests of 
consumers and businesses, during the rollout of the NBN’700. 
 
 
Unfortunately, it is still premature to analyse quantitative data to see whether 
structural separation currently under implementation in Australia will have a 
positive impact on competition, prices and quality of the services provided. In 
that context the SSU were signed as a preliminary step towards the creation of 
a NBN, with the idea of putting Telstra and its competitors on a equal foot in 
the provisions of telecommunications services. Seen from a European 
perspective, it looks like the ACCC, suggesting complete structural separation 
by 2018, wants to create the pre-conditions for the realisation (mainly at 
government’s costs) of a New Generation Network. Considering that the new 
network is technically different from the traditional copper wire network, it 
allows the presence of more players over the same infrastructures, and should 
de facto represent an opportunity of growth and development for that country. 
 
It is important to note that during the implementation of the structural 
separation undertakings (also called the ‘migration plan’ phase) Telstra is 
under constant scrutiny by the ACCC. Regulatory tools such as price caps will 
be still put in place during the transitional phase. However some features of the 
undertakings can be directly enforced by the ACCC before the Australian 
Federal Courts, through remedies that range from ‘fines to compensation 
orders and any other orders that the Court considers appropriate’701. 
 
If the ultimate scope of the undertakings signed by Telstra is that of structurally 
separate its network by 1st July 2018 by progressively disconnecting fixed 
telephony services on its copper network and broadband services on its hybrid 
fibre-coaxial (HFC) network, migrating these services onto the (wholesale-only) 
NBN rolled out by the government, Telstra management is aware that during 
the transitional phase the objective of the undertakings is to ensure 
equivalence and transparency in how Telstra treats retails and wholesale 
                                            
700 Telstra’s USS Compliance Report 2011-2012, p 4. Emphasis added. 
 




customers of regulated services on the copper network702, a clear indication of 
the concerns raised by the ACCC during the phases of negotiation of the 
structural separation undertakings703. The incumbent recently showed that is 
confident to respect the roadmap set in 2012 with the ACCC, and will be able 
to complete structural separation by 2018704. 
 
The New Zealand Telecom experience is a third model of separation to be 
considered. They went a step further than in other jurisdictions, with the 
national incumbent de-merging into two listed entities: Chorus and Telecom 
New Zealand, with different share ownership705. 
 
In 2005 the New Zealand government launched a review of the 
telecommunications sector706, with a particular focus on broadband 
development. On the basis of the review, on December 2006 the government 
passed the ‘Telecommunications Amendment Act’ 707 requiring a ‘robust 
operational separation’ of the vertically-integrated, privatised 
telecommunications incumbent, Telecom New Zealand, into at least three 
business units, to provide wholesale, retail and local access services708. 
 
The operational separation proposed in 2006 envisaged three pro-competition 
targets: 
                                            




703 To follow the developments of the undertakings signed by Telstra before the ACCC, a 
useful link is http://www.accc.gov.au/regulated-infrastructure/communications/industry-
reform/telstras-structural-separation-undertaking. 
 
704 Supratim Adhikari, ‘Telstra ready to push on with structural separation’, Technology 




705 Waters & Damian, cited, p 5.  
 
706 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Stocktake Process, stakeholder Input and Supporting 
documents’ (POL/1/27/10/2/1), published on 20 April 2006. 
 
707 New Zealand, Telecommunications Amendment Act (No2) 2006. 
 
708 ibid, sect. 32, inserting a new Part 2A into the Telecommunications Act2001. See OECD 





(i) To promote competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end users of telecommunications services in New Zealand; (ii) to 
require transparency, non-discrimination, and equivalence of supply in 
relation to certain telecommunications services; and (iii) to facilitate 
efficient investment in telecommunications infrastructure and services709. 
 
Operational separation was implemented on 31 March 2008. Telecom New 
Zealand therefore comprised five customer-facing business units:  
 
(i) a retail unit providing fixed line, mobile and internet services to 
consumers and small and medium business customers; 
(ii) an operationally separate wholesale business unit providing next 
generation wholesale network products to service providers; 
(iii) an operationally separate unit that manages Telecom’s local 
access network;  
(iv) a specialised unit that provides technology services for lager 
business customers; and, 
(v) an Australian subsidiary providing telecommunications services 
in Australia’710.  
 
The model of operational separation of Telecom New Zealand was 









                                            
709 New section 96A of the New Zealand Telecommunications Act 2001. 
 
















Figure 8.3 – New Zealand MARK I operational separation model, preliminary 




In the chart Chorus represented the business unit managing the local network 
(not necessarily fibre-network), the regional backhaul networks (not the 
electronic equipment) and the information system to support Chorus’s services 
(but not to support shared services). The Telecom Wholesale, on the other 
hand, did not own assets, since these belong to the Network Units712. 
 
This process of operational (functional separation) finally resulted in ownership 
separation of the network from the core wholesale and retail business, 
bringing the monopoly of New Zealand Telecom to an end. On 30 November 
2011 the ‘de-merger’ process was complete, with Telecom New Zealand and 
Chorus becoming separate listed companies713 (in literature also referred as 
Telecom New Zealand 2 and Chorus 2): 
                                            




713Sarah Putt, After Structural Separation – New Zealand telecommunications a year after 
Telecom New Zealand and Chorus became separate companies, (ComputerWorld New 














‘On December 1, 2011 New Zealand telecommunications created a 
world first when the incumbent provider, Telecom, structurally 
separated and its network access division, Chorus, became a stand-
alone, publicly listed company’714.  
 
This is the sole case of (voluntary) full ownership structural separation already 
implemented that I was able to identify. As I will discuss later, on an empirical 
point of view, also in this case the time-window to assess whether in New 
Zealand structural separation led to (i) increase in competition, (ii) reduction in 
costs and (wholesale and retail) prices and (iii) enhanced quality of services is 
too short.  
 
In September 2010 structural (and ownership) separation of Telecom New 
Zealand was preceded by the launch of a sector inquiry by the New Zealand 
Ministry of Economic Development, on the basis of its ‘discussion document’ 
on ‘Regulatory implications of structural separation’715. 
 
The document states that the national incumbent announced (2010) its 
intention to consider structural separation through the demerger into two 
companies of its assets, within the framework of the Government’s ultra-fast 
broadband initiative716. The Ministry made clear that any change in the existing 
regulatory regime should have been consistent with the principle of ‘promotion 
of competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end-
users of telecommunications services within New Zealand’717, in the hope that 
‘the likely model of structural separation would lower barriers to entry at the 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10769994. See also 
Tom Pullar-Strecker, ‘Telecom split first in world’, Fairfax NZ News, 27 October 2011, 
accessible at http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/5858284/Telecom-split-first-in-world. 
 
714 Sarah Putt, cited, p 6. 
 
715 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Discussion document – Regulatory Implications of 










retail level, by removing incentives to discriminate against competitors who 
operate at the retail level. There is scope in these circumstances for removing 
regulatory provisions which deal with the interface between wholesale and 
retail levels of the market. However there would be some residual vertical 
integration between the network and the wholesale layers of the business, so 
some incentives to discriminate against competitors would likely to remain’718. 
 
The voluntary structural separation of the network company Chorus from its 
mother company Telecom New Zealand in reality was the only way to ensure 
that Telecom New Zealand could take part of the roll out of the new ultra-fast 
broadband (UFB) network mainly rolled out at government’s expenses. One of 
the main advantages for the mother company was to be ‘relieved’ by the 
sector regulations, while Chorus would have continued to control the local 
copper and fibre network, dealing with wholesale business complaining with 
the sector regulations719. 
 
Therefore, in the Telecom New Zealand voluntary structural separation 
example we face a combination of industrial strategy (make possible for 
Telecom New Zealand to be part of the roll-out of the New Generation 
Network (UFB) without controlling the existing network too) and of 
government’s support for what was considered a pro-competitive initiative720, 
also considering that Chorus would have continued to be subject to sectorial 
regulation. At the same time also Chorus, in the after break-up scenario, would 
have been allowed to participate to up to 70% of the new UFB, receiving de 
facto a (interest-free) loan from the government of NZ$ 929 million, to be 
repaid between 2025 and 2036721.  
                                            
718 Ibid, p 11. 
 
719 Sarah Putt, cited, pp 8-23. In May 2011 the managers of Telecom New Zealand announced 
that they would have been partner of the government’s UFB network (p 22).  
 
720 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Discussion document – Regulatory Implications of 




721 According to S Putt book, during the transitional phase preceding the complete roll-out of 
the UFB network, 99% of Chorus revenues still come from fixed telephony services provided 




In the first year from the break-up (November 2011/November 2012) 100,000 
households (urban users) have been already connected with the new ultra-fast 
broadband network722, demonstrating that structural separation did not cause 
disruption. 
 
For the purposes of the thesis, it is important to highlight here that in some 
highly dynamic OECD economies, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
structural separation in the electronic communications, in the form of 
separation of the network from communications services, was not considered 
a taboo and was adopted as a valid option by the respective competition 
authorities, sector regulators and governments.  
 
Even though the Australian and New Zealand scenarios are different under a 
competition law point of view (Telstra signed structural separation 
undertakings before the Australian competition authority as a remedy to 
enhance competition, while Telecom New Zealand voluntarily decided to 
break-up from its own network in order to be put in condition to strategically 
invest in the new generation network), they must be borne in mind as two 
examples that contradict the claims of inefficiency and impracticability of the  
structural remedy.  
 
 
8.3.  Functional or structural separation: two possible options also for 
the Italian scenario.  
 
In Italy the recurrence of network-related abuses, offers a good case to ask 
the question of whether high pecuniary fines (often substantially reduced after 
two levels of administrative court scrutiny) may represent a serious deterrent 
for national incumbents.  
 
The question is whether the electronic communications regulator ought to 
pursue a more invasive measure, such as functional separation, now possible 
                                            




under the Directive 2009/140/EC. Alternatively, is it possible to suggest that in 
the presence of recurrent abuses the national competition authority should 
adopt a more draconian remedy such as structural separation? If so, what type 
of structural separation would be most suitable among those discussed?  
 
The Italian Communications Authority (Autorità per le garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni, ‘AGCOM’) on 2 May 2007, launched a public consultation 
process723 in order to discuss the possibility of introducing into the Italian legal 
system structural or functional separation of the communications infrastructure 
at present still controlled by the incumbent. During the 2007 consultation 
process, the AGCOM pointed out that, as per AGCOM decision no. 
152/02/CONS of 2002, two set of provisions had been already introduced in 
the Italian legal system establishing (i) general measures to grant full 
application of the principle of non-discrimination; and (ii) specific duties (or 
remedies) for all the relevant markets. AGCOM claimed that in line with the 
fundamental targets of competition law at European level it had already 
established the ‘administrative separation’ of Telecom Italia, in order to 
facilitate non–discriminatory access to the network resources held by the 
dominant operator. However, mere accounting separation did not impede 
Telecom Italia from carrying out a series of (network) access-related abuses, 
sanctioned with pecuniary fines with a very low deterrence impact, considering 
the recidivism, as shown in Chapter IV of the thesis.  
 
AGCOM decision 208/07/CONS states that the Italian Competition Authority, 
before the adoption of the above-mentioned AGCOM decision no. 
152/02/CONS, had issued a non-binding opinion theoretically favourable to 
structural (company or ownership) separation. It actually stated that the best 
remedy would have been structural separation, since it would have produced: 
(i) the greatest fairness in the attribution of joint costs to the separate entities, 
facilitating the interpretation of the access rate to the infrastructure or for the 
provision of wholesale or retail services; (ii) the elimination of incentives to 
                                            
723 AGCOM decision no. 208/07/CONS of 2 May 2007 (entitled ‘Avvio di una consultazione 
pubblica sugli aspetti regolamentari relativi all’assetto della rete di accesso fissa ed alle 





continue anticompetitive behaviours, since the two legal entities (network and 
service provider) would have had two different and separate business 
targets724. The AGCOM decision 208/07/CONS, triggering the consultation 
process, pointed out that one of the most relevant forms of abuse is the 
possibility for vertically-integrated operators to lower (‘squeeze’) the 
competitors’ profit margins by raising the access cost or reducing retail prices. 
In both cases, it is difficult for the competitor to survive within the same 
market, since its profits are either cut by excessively high entrance costs 
(access price) or by excessively low retail prices725. 
 
The issue at stake here is whether functional separation would have been 
successful in the long term (i) in all those countries where the incumbent is 
prone to repeat the same type of abuse, (ii) in those countries where it can be 
demonstrated that administrative judiciary reviews routinely lead to a 
substantial reduction of fines imposed by the NCAs or (iii) where the difficulty 
of monitoring  ‘functional separation’ of the incumbent through the creation of a 
(truly) separated access division may put in serious doubt the effectiveness of 
the remedy (as we have just discussed in the Telstra case above). 
 
The main objective of the Italian Communications Authority today is to achieve 
enhanced facilities-based competition. The key problems are much the same 
as those existing at the beginning of the process of liberalisation:  
 
(i) dominance of the incumbent, Telecom Italia, in the fixed 
telecommunications wholesale and retail markets; (ii) the very high market 
share of Telecom Italia in the broadband services market726; (iii) insufficient 
                                            
724 Ibid, p 54-55. 
 
725 Ibid p 75. 
 
726 Here a substantial difference must be taken into account with the UK scenario: BT’s 
broadband wholesale market share is of just 27%: OFCOM, ‘The Communications Market 
2009’, August 2009. This is a factor that may justify a lower interest of BT to invest in the 
further enhancement of the New Generation Access network, and also a progressively 




(or, in some areas, non-existent) diffusion of broadband services; (iv) the large 
‘digital-divide’ for a significant share of Italian population727.  
 
The competitive scenario in terms of the fixed line network is nearly identical to 
that observed at the start of the liberalisation process. Amongst the most 
significant (and recent) instances of abusive conducts decided against 
Telecom Italia, it is useful to recall a case tackled by the Italian Competition 
Authority728 in which it was acknowledged that Telecom Italia, from 2001 to 
2003, abused its dominant position through margin squeeze conducts, in 
particular by offering low-price broadband services to public administration 
premises and business clients. Telecom Italia violated the principle of non-
discrimination and favoured its commercial divisions, damaging the 
commercial divisions of its competitors by charging excessive prices for the 
wholesale services (i.e. unbundling services)729. Similar conclusions were 
reached by an arbitration panel settling litigation between Telecom Italia and 
Fastweb730 in 2007. The panel ascertained that Telecom Italia had obstructed 
access to the local loop (ULL) in at least 10.000 cases between 2001 and 
2004. 
 
It must be noted that on 14 February 2008, pending the review/consultation 
carried out by the Italian regulator regarding the best remedy (functional v. 
structural separation) to deal with the access to Telecom Italia’s network, the 
management of the latter published the decision adopted by the board of 
                                            
727 AGCOM decision no. 208/07/CONS, p 80. 
 
728 Italian Competition Authority (AGCM), decision no. 13752, Case A351 – Abusive conducts 
of Telecom Italia, of 16 November 2004, in Bulletin no. 47/2004 of the Italian Competition 
Authority. 
 
729 It must be noted that also the Consiglio di Stato, the Italian highest administrative court, 
reached the same conclusions, as may be inferred reading the judgment of 10 February 2006, 
quashing the appeal judgment of the Administrative Tribunal (Tribunale Amministrativo del 
Lazio). In particular it recommended for the Italian Communications Authority to adopt new 
regulations underpinning the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
730 The litigation between Telecom Italia and Fastweb was settled through recourse to an 
arbitration panel chaired by prof. Guido Alpa on 27 January 2007 with the payment of EUR 60 
million by Telecom Italia to Fastweb for negligence in obstructing the unbundling of local loop 
in the period of time 2001-2004 for at least 11.000 clients. See press release issued by the 




directors to (spontaneously) implement in the following months a ‘form of’ 
functional separation. Telecom Italia created a separated division called ‘Open 
Access’ (clearly tailored on the Openreach model), within the Direction 
‘Regulatory & Network’ aimed at dealing with the access issues. In reality the  
‘separation’ proposed could be considered as an advanced form of 
‘accounting separation’ rather than a complete ‘functional separation’, since 
Telecom Italia’s ‘Open Access’ Division could not be considered functionally or 
legally separated from the parent company Telecom Italia. In the following 
months (11 December 2008) AGCOM accepted the ‘undertakings’ proposed 
by Telecom Italia and considered the creation of the separate division ‘Open 
Access’ in line with the European directives (in line with the obligations of 
accounting separation, neutrality, non-discrimination). In March 2011 Telecom 
Italia officially announced that the ‘Open Access’ division was fully 
operational731. However the measure appears to be still some way from 
addressing the competition concerns, and certainly does not interfere with the 
control of the network, and in particular, with the decision-making process with 
respect to new investments732. 
 
For the sake of completeness, in May 2009 the so-called ‘Caio Report’733 was 
published. It suggested various measures to enhance competition while 
helping innovation in the network. The measures in the report range from 
simple functional separation to structural separation, for certain respect 
anticipating the initiatives adopted in Australia and in New Zealand only a few 
years later (on the 1st December 2011 structural separation of Telecom New 
Zealand and Chorus, while on the 27 March 2012 in Australia Telstra’s 
                                            
731 On 9 March 2011 also the French competition authority announced that was in talk with the 
national French regulator (Autorité de Reglémentation des communications éléctroniques et 
des Postes, or ‘ARCEP’) aimed at functionally separating France Télécom’s network, on the 
model of the British Openreach. ARCEP had already anticipated this intention in an informal 
publication on its periodic newsletter (La Lettre, no. 55, April 2007). 
 
732 On the 25 July 2013, the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM) accepted the 
proposal of (functional) separation of the access network offered by Telecom Italia, alongside 
with the creation of an ‘Equivalence of Input’ (EOI) access mechanism. The next step is to 
launch a market study interviewing all the Italian telecoms operators. The press release is 
available at http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?message=visualizzadocument&DocID=11566. 
 
733 After the name of the manager, Francesco Caio, who presented the report to the Italian 




management signed the undertakings triggering the transitional phase leading 
to full structural separation by 1st July 2018).  
 
In September 2010 the President of the Italian Competition Authority734 
declared that he was not a priori against the intervention of the a State-
controlled financial entity (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti735) to create the New 
Generation Network structurally separated from the national incumbent, and 
that he would have been also theoretically favourable to the creation of a joint-
venture of Telecom Italia with its main competitors if the target was to bridge 
the digital divide of the country. Structural separation for the time being was 
not considered a viable option736, but was at least discussed for the first time 
with respect to one of the largest European telecoms players. 
 
In certain respects, the solutions considered in Italy mirror the solutions 
adopted both in Australia and in New Zealand analysed above. In both cases 
competition law concerns and the government’s agenda to innovate the 
communications infrastructure in these three countries (New Zealand, 
Australia and Italy) are behind the idea of infrastructure separation from the 
body of the telecommunications incumbent providing wholesale and retail 
services. The substantial difference is that in New Zealand and, by 2018, in 
Australia, structural separation is a reality, supported also by the competition 
authorities. 
 
                                            
734 Antonio Catricalà. I had the opportunity to discuss about this hypothesis with the former 
President of the Italian Competition Authority in October 2008 at the Italian Competition 
Authority, illustrating how a draconian remedy over the network (structural separation) could 
be theoretically combined with a subsequent joint take-over by competitors of the incumbent, 
also with the aim of investing in the creation of a NGN. In a different scenario, structural 
separation of its European network is what ENI proposed to the European Commission in the 
commitments accepted by the latter in September 2010. 
 
735 State-controlled entity partially funded by deposits collected by the Italian postal incumbent 
Poste Italiane Spa).  
 
736 See the report filed at the Italian Ministry for the Economic Development and at the Ministry 
of Communications on the perspectives of deployment of a electronic communications New 
Generation Network (‘Portare l’Italia verso la leadership europea nella banda larga, 
Considerazioni sulle opzioni di politica industriale Presentazione sulle conclusioni del progetto 




In the next section I will discuss what type of structural separation could be 
applicable at European level among those considered by the scientific 
literature, outlined in Chapter VII.  
 
 
8.4. Types of structural separation applicable to the European context. 
 
As discussed in Chapter VII, the four main forms of structural (ownership) 
separation, enforceable as per Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC, are  
 
1. Horizontal platforms separation (for instance, coaxial cable, fibre 
broadband, hybrid fibre-coaxial, mobile networks)737; 
2. Separation between the company providing wholesale and retail 
services and the company running the network (vertical), as per the 
Telstra’s and New Zealand Telecom examples738; 
3. Reciprocal network / services separation739; 
4. Vertical local separation (as per the AT&T model)740. 
 
From the analysis of the cases discussed in Chapter II/IV (abuses in the 
telecommunications sector) and V (abuses in the energy sector), and the 
various approaches to facilitate competition through intervention on the 
network, discussed in Chapter VII in particular, it is evident that the above-
listed solution no. 1 (horizontal platforms separation), would be better aimed at 
reducing the level of market concentration than at addressing a specific 
(access-related) abusive conduct. The separation of the various platforms into 
two or more companies, does not remove the problems deriving from vertical 
integration, such as the foreclosure effects discussed in Chapter II and IV. 
However, structural separation  of the various platforms simply breaks up the 
unity of the incumbent, but the alleged abuses of dominant position put in 
                                            
737 See Chapter VII, Sect. 3, and the OECD Report 2001, p 44. 
 
738 See Chapter VII, figure 7.2., ‘ownership separation’, from the OECD Report 2001. 
 
739 See Chapter VII, figure 7.5., from the OECD Report 2001. 
 




place through the control of the network simply ‘follow’ the new owner of the 
platform. 
 
The other three forms of structural separation are more relevant to answer the 
thesis’ question. From the analysis of the above-mentioned cases, both in the 
energy sector  and in the electronic communications sector, as well as looking 
at the above-mentioned case Telstra, the most suitable solution to remove the 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects appears to be structural (ownership) 
separation of the non-competitive part of the company (the network) from the 
competitive portion of the group (the provision of wholesale and retail 
services), in particular when operational (or functional) separation 
demonstrates of not being beneficial and effective (and without mentioning the 
inefficacy showed by the  system of price caps, on the basis of the 
Commission’s decisions and European Courts judgments in the Deutsche 
Telekom741 and Telefónica742 cases)743. 
 
For the time being in Europe the most evident examples of structural 
separation as a further step beyond functional separation are those adopted in 
the energy sector after the Energy Enquiry 2007, namely in the E.ON, RWE 
and ENI cases744, discussed in Chapter V. These are all cases of 
commitments negotiated with the European Commission and the main 
European energy players while the European Commission, European 
Parliament and European Council were negotiating or had just adopted the 
new pieces of legislation in the electricity and gas sector. In this respect the 
most recent reform of directives in the energy sector discussed in chapter V 
shows that also at regulatory level the European Union decided to go a step 
                                            
741 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), 
[2003] OJ L263/9   (14 October 2003). On appeal at the General Court, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche 
Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 
1495. 
 
742 Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6; Case T-336/07 Telefónica. At present on appeal at the Court 
of Justice, Case C-295/12. 
 
743 See the Telstra’s Structural Separation Undertaking discussed in the previous section.  
 




beyond mere operational or functional separation, adopting in 2009 the ‘third 
package’ of regulations introducing the possibility of imposing ownership 
separation at generation and transmission level in the electricity and gas 
sectors745. 
 
For completeness, reciprocal structural separation has to be mentioned, and 
might also be appealing, even though it could theoretically be implemented 
only in the largest Member States. The separation of the non-competitive 
assets (network) in two or more portions, with the cross-negotiation of 
contracts authorising the access to those parts of the network to provide the 
same services, should put the communications operators (former incumbent 
and competitors) on an equal footing.  
 
The fourth hypothesis, vertical structural separation leading, for instance, to 
the AT&T scheme, vice versa, does not seem applicable to the European 
reality. Local vertical structural separation of a vertically-integrated monopolist 
as in the AT&T case is simply not applicable to the European scenario 
because the plurality and fragmentation of the networks already reflect the 
national boundaries of the Member States. Only in a few, larger, States (for 
instance Germany, France or Italy) vertical break-up of the network into two 
parts would be economically viable and sustainable. 
 
In the next section I recall the effects that ownership separation have already 
registered, for instance in Germany, Italy and New Zealand in the energy 
sector, the only sector in which I found some empirical data.  
 
 
8.5.  Positive effects of structural separation in the energy sector.  
Examples of removal of vertical foreclosure effects. 
                                            
745 Regulation 714/2009/EC on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity, OJ [2009] L 211/15; Regulation 715/2009/EC on conditions of access 
to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ [2009] L 229/29; Directive 2009/72/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ [2009] L 211/55 and 







The analysis of cases discussed in the body of the thesis, both in the 
electronic communications and energy sectors, can help to reach some 
conclusion about the positive effects of structural separation in competition law 
terms.  
 
In the previous section I identified what forms of structural separation are more 
likely to be applicable in the European context: (i) break-up between services 
and network and (ii) reciprocal structural separation.  
 
In chapter VII I discussed the relevant literature and business practice that 
show the difficulties that can arise from an invasive remedy such as the 
structural ownership separation.  
 
However, if we look at the few cases in which structural separation took place 
in the energy sector, we observe that some positive effects have been 
recorded. In electronic communications the rapidly changing scenario, also in 
terms of technology with the creation of New Generation Networks, forms a 
convincing argument that a remedy such as structural separation is possible 
and advisable both on the basis of Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003/EC and on the 
basis of Art. 7 of the same regulation.  
 
At the level of Commission practice, I have extensively discussed in Chapter 
III how between 2008 and 2010 the Commission and national incumbents 
negotiated commitments entailing structural separation as a remedy aimed at 
enhancing competition. The separation between services and networks 
(infrastructure) is already a reality, and formed the basis of commitments 
decisions in three cases: E.ON in 2008, RWE in 2009 and ENI, in 2010. 
 
These three examples drawn from the practice are not isolated. They must be 
analysed in the wider framework of the process of regulation of the energy 
sector as a whole in the past decade. Those examples of structural separation 
on the basis of commitments were preceded by the Energy Sector Inquiry 
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(2007)746.  One of the main outcomes of the Energy Sector Inquiry was to 
collect proposals from several energy operators in Europe to address the 
competition concerns of the Commission. These proposal, encapsulated in the 
final report of the Energy Sector Enquiry showed that they were strongly in 
favor for ‘ownership unbundling as the most effective way of separating energy 
transmission networks from other stages of the energy value chain’747. 
Furthermore, if the Energy Sector Enquiry mainly focused on the restriction to 
competition at generation and transmission level, now the new frontier is the 
possibility of structural separation at distribution level also748.  
 
M. Pollitt goes a step further: taking the example of the electronic 
communications sector suggests that ownership separation of part of the 
electricity network can be beneficial to competition. Quoting from the 
conclusion of an article with comparative approach between electronic 
communications and energy sector, Pollitt argues 
 
‘(New forms of energy asset ownership) The emergence of 
innovative forms of ownership of electricity assets such as via local 
public–private partnerships or customer trusts (possibly facilitated 
by new types of energy company licences), based on carve-outs of 
local distribution assets and private wires, would reduce the need to 
regulate wholly privately owned network monopolies and mitigate 
the need to regulate long term contracts for locally produced 
electricity and heat services’749. 
 
However, for the time being the Commission has a more cautious viewpoint 
with respect to induce further divestitures in the energy sector: 
 
                                            
746 Impact Assessment, Accompanying Report to the DG Competition Report on Energy 




747 See P. Nillesen – M.G. Pollitt, ‘Ownership unbundling in electricity distribution: empirical 
evidence from New Zealand’, (2011) 38 Review of Industrial Organisation, 61-93.  
 
748 M. Pollitt - ESRC, ‘The arguments for and against ownership unbundling in energy 
transmission markets’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy, 704-713. A paper presented by the Electricity 
Policy Research Group of the University of Cambridge to OFGEM on the 7th August 2007. 
749 M. Pollitt, ‘Does electricity (and heat) network regulation have anything to learn from fixed 
line telecoms regulation?’, (2010) 38 Energy Policy, 1360–1371, at 1370. 
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‘[…] the benefits from further unbundling at the distribution level are 
not overwhelmingly higher than costs. Due to recent entry into force 
of the last liberalization date in a number of Member States, it would 
seem to be disproportionate to go a step further in forcing 
unbundling in this activity’750. 
 
In the energy sector there is a need to collect more empirical data before 
deciding to go a step further with structural separation of the electricity or gas 
networks, reaching the lower levels of the vertical production chain: distribution 
and retail.  
 
Here an example of distribution network unbundling occurred in New Zealand 
in the electricity sector in 1998 may provide some useful information for 
European observers. The forced ownership separation of the distribution 
networks in New Zealand already in 1998 represents at empirical level a case 
study that should be taken into serious consideration, particularly for its logical 
impact on the telecommunications sector, as it represents a serious challenge 
to what until very recently was considered an untouchable taboo: intervention 
in vertical integration of public utilities.  
 
A recent study made by professors Nillesen and Pollitt in Cambridge shows 
that forced break-up at distribution level (therefore, forced separation at 
ownership level of distribution and commercial activities from the ownership of 
the rest of the network) had positive aspects that outweigh the costs. These 
two authors went beyond a theoretical discussion and looked at empirical data 
in order to establish the economic consequences of ownership unbundling at 
the electricity distribution level. They looked at (i) the one-off transaction costs 
incurred by integrated utilities, (ii) the structural effect on unit distribution costs, 
and (iii) the development of competition in the retail market751. They gathered 
and analysed data from 1995 to 2007. It is interesting to study the method they 
used, because it could be applied to the communications sector, for instance 
                                            
 
750 European Commission, Impact Assessment, Accompanying Report to the DG Competition 
Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, 2007, Brussels, p 4.  
 
751 P. Nillesen – M.G. Pollitt, ‘Ownership unbundling in electricity distribution: empirical 





looking at the New Zealand Telecom example, where network/services 
ownership unbundling already took place. Unfortunately though, data from New 
Zealand Telecom separation are still too recent (separation occurred on the 30 
November/1st December 2011752). At the same time, the Australian telecoms 
operator (Telstra) ownership unbundling, with migration on the (separated) 
New Broadband Network of its services, will take place only from 2018, 
therefore no empirical test are applicable in this case.   
 
Looking at the electricity sector unbundling in New Zealand, Nillesen and 
Pollitt found that many scholars are still against structural separation, even 
looking at positive experiences. Bolle and Breitmoser753, for instance, keep 
suggesting that legal (functional) unbundling (separation) is superior to 
ownership unbundling for utilities in general. However they mainly look at 
allocative efficiency reasons and at the negative consequences of so-called 
‘double marginalization’, the duplication of costs between the formerly 
integrated incumbent’s separated businesses754. As Nillesen and Pollitt point 
out, such an approach is unrealistic. Among other arguments, the detractors of 
ownership separation do not take into account the increase of competition 
when businesses are unbundled755, nor other positive factors on an economic 
point of view.  
 
With respect to the risk of double-marginalisation, this requires the existence 
of a ‘one-part price’ (for instance, in the production chain of manufactures, to 
split the production chain means to duplicate the costs of some 
                                            
752 On 30 November 2011, Telecom demerged into two entirely separate, publicly listed 
companies; a retail services provider (Telecom) and a network services operator (Chorus). 
Structural separation of Telecom's retail business from the business (wholesale) that owns 
and operates the Fibre-To-The-Premise (FTTP) network was a pre-requisite for participation in 
the Government's Ultra-Fast Broadband scheme (UFB). Source: 
http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,8748,200633-1548,00.html. 
 
753 F. Bolle – Y. Breitmoser, ‘On the Allocative Efficiency of Ownership Unbundling’, European 
University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics, 




754 Nillesen – Pollitt, cited, 6.  
 
755 Joskow - Tirole, ‘Transmission rights and market power on electric power networks, RAND 




infrastructures). According to Nillesen and Pollitt, this is not the case in 
network service pricing, ‘where multi-parts pricing is practiced and marginal 
prices often equal marginal cost’756. These authors criticise the assumption 
that regulators only look at the reduction of prices:  regulators, through their 
intervention, can also induce actual productive efficiency savings, as a result 
of tighter price regulation (through ownership unbundling).  
 
The two authors analyse transmission unbundling also at European level. In 
the Netherlands by 1st January 2011 the government decided to put in place 
ownership separation (unbundling)  of the networks, for both gas and 
electricity: according to the Government, a separate network company would 
have been easier to regulate because inter-company relationships would be 
been removed (cross-subsidisation, for instance, would have become much 
more difficult if not impossible)757. 
 
As anticipated, it is worth reminding that a similar perspective is currently 
under discussion also at UK level in the electricity and gas sector. On the 27 
March 2014 the energy regulator, OFGEM, proposed a reference to the 
imminently created Competition and Markets Authority (operative since 1st 
April 2014) to investigate the energy market as a whole758,  in order to 
ascertain whether the  main energy players maintain barriers to effective 
competition through the control of their networks. OFGEM found that in the 
last few years in the UK the profits increased from £ 233 million in 2009 to £ 
1.1 billion in 2012 ‘with no clear evidence of suppliers becoming more efficient 
in reducing their own costs, although would be required to determine whether 
firms have had the opportunity to earn excess profits’759. The same Chief 
                                            
756 Nillesen-Pollitt, cited, 3-4. 
 
757 Nillesen-Pollitt, cited, 7, referring to the findings of various authors:  B. Baarsma, M. de 
Nooij, W. Koster and C. Weijden, ‘Divide and rule: the economic and legal implication of the 
proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply companies in the Dutch electricity 
sector, in (2007) vol. 3 (Energy Policy), 1785-94. Data collected from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs website in the Netherland (www.minez.nl).  
 







Executive of OFGEM, Dermot Nolan, in a recent statement declared that 
‘OFGEM believes a referral offers the opportunity to once and for all clear the 
air and decide if there are any further barriers which are preventing 
competition from bearing down as hard as possible on prices. The Competition 
and Markets Authority has powers, not available to OFGEM, to address any 
structural barriers that would undermine competition. Now consumers are 
protected by our simpler, clearer and fairer reforms, we think a market 
investigation is in their long-term interests760‘. 
 
On this respect it is premature to say whether the six main energy players risk 
to be forced to ‘break-up’761. However from different sources it appears that 
the argument has been tackled. A report presented by NGT762 analyses the 
current organizational and operational separation between the transmission 
and distribution network of the British National Grid, and suggests that 
structural separation should be mandated if ‘there are significant risks and 
there are inadequate alternative controls’763.The energy inquiry just launched 
will investigate (i) the price chain from production to the  end consumer (ii) the 
impact of vertical integration (iii) the influence of green policies on final prices 
(iv) the extent, if any, of inappropriate behaviour by any of the companies 
involved764. Among the possible conclusions of the inquiry there is a possibility 
that it will be ascertained that ‘there is a structural problem within the industry 
which requires the break-up of some or all the existing integrated companies 
so that retail operations are quite separate from production’765. 
                                            
760 Excerpt from OFGEM press release, see fn 754. Emphasis added, to underline the 
importance of long-term targets.  
 
761 The six companies that control 95% of the United Kingdom energy sector are: Southern 
Electrics (SEE), Centrica-owned British Gas, German-owned Npower, French-owned EDF, 
Spanish-owned Scottish Power and German-owned E.ON. SEE has just announced that will 
‘freeze’ the retail prices until 2016 (www.see.com). 
 
762 NGT (National Grid Transco Group) in 2014 published a paper on ‘Structural separation 
between transmission and distribution’, accessible at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/50241/7419-ngtpaperdisg12structuralseparation.pdf. 
 
763 Ibid, 8 (Summary). 
 
764 Source, Nick Butler, ‘A competition inquiry is right for UK energy’, Financial Times, 26 
March 2014. 
 




The most obvious positive effect in competition law terms is that separating 
the network ownership from the wholesale and retail activities (as seen in the 
Telstra case of structural separation, this form of separation is possible for 
both the energy and the telecommunications sector), is also removed the 
incentive to abuse for the dominant undertaking controlling the network, in 
particular with respect to third parties seeking access to the network in order to 
provide retail services in competition with the incumbent.  
 
Quoting from Nillesen and Pollitt’s paper 
 
‘[…] Separating ownership of the network and commercial activities 
will remove the incentive for the network operator to discriminate. 
Possible cross-subsidisation of commercial activities using the 
stable cash flows from the network business will also no longer be 
possible if the two activities have different owners. Separating the 
network business from the commercial activities will also remove the 
financing advantage of commercial activities relative to non-
integrated companies […]. Separating the two activities will remove 
the ‘holding discount’ and should unlock value by increasing focus 
and therefore the competitive drive. By separating the ownership of 
commercial [wholesale and retail] and network activities the 
contestability of customers will increase and is likely to benefit 
competition. This increase in competition can also spur innovation in 
the sector’766. 
 
These two authors also look at the positive impact in terms of quality of the 
service and also in terms of impact on the costs. The removal of cross-
subsidies and cross-financing in the distribution of energy will have a structural 
influence on costs767. Here the authors look at empirical evidence collected 
since the structural separation of New Zealand’s electricity distribution network 
and argue that the costs (and the prices) were reduced as a consequence of 
the break-up. 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
766 Nillesen-Pollitt, cited, 8. 
 




In New Zealand the structural reforms took place between 1998 and 2000, 
through the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998. It determined that (i) 
corporate separation of lines and energy businesses had to be achieved by 1st 
April 1999 and full ownership separation no later than 31 December 2003, (ii) 
the company ECNZ (electricity) was split into three competing state-owned 
generators (Genesis Power, Meridian Energy, and Mighty River Power), while 
(iii) the Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1999 came into force, 
to make possible the acquisition of new generation or retail assets768. 
 
The aim of Nillesen-Pollitt’s study was to measure in economic terms the 
impact of ownership unbundling in New Zealand. Technically, the same 
exercise that would be required to underpin hypothetical structural separation 
(in the two forms I suggested) in the electronic communications in Europe.  
 
They focused on three hypotheses: (i) impact on competition, (ii) impact on the 
quality of network, and (iii) impact on ‘one-off’ and structural costs769.  
 
First of all, the authors looked at the result of ownership unbundling in terms of 
increased competition. The main positive impact expected in terms of 
competition was the removal of potential financial (cross-subsidies) and 
structural (access restriction) barriers on the retail market. However, the 
authors admitted that in New Zealand’s electricity sector they could not rely on 
empirical data to ‘quantify’ the impact on competition.770  
 
 While the second hypothesis discussed by the two authors does not reach 
univocal conclusion, the analysis of the third hypothesis (‘as a result of 
ownership unbundling we expect one-off transaction costs but subsequently 
lower unit costs’771) is more interesting for the purposes of my thesis. Nillesen 
and Pollitt found that ownership unbundling led to an increase in focus within 
                                            
768 ibid, 18. 
 




771 Ibid, 28. 
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the network business and a reduction of possible cross-subsidisation of 
commercial activities. This appears as the most obvious positive outcome 
deriving from separation of network from services.  Similar conclusion can be 
drawn with respect to the electronic communications sector. 
With respect to costs, they looked at three factors: (i) so-called ‘one-off’ costs, 
(ii) structural costs and (iii) price-cost margins.  
 
In the first case, they found that the company bears the ‘one-off’ transaction 
costs associated with ownership unbundling (these can be easily identified 
also in the electronic communications structural separation). They also looked 
at the ‘unit operational costs’ for the distribution companies as an indicator of 
their efficiency. They found that they tend to decrease over time. Finally they 
looked at the price-cost margins in distribution as a measure to quantify the 
available profits for the network companies. Having assumed that in a more 
transparent market the price-cost margins will decrease to competitive levels, 
they found a decrease in price-cost margins for the sector after ownership 
unbundling. 
 
Their conclusions are particularly interesting. Overall they found that 
ownership unbundling could be considered positive for a good number of 
reasons, but not all the empirical data were univocal in relation to the various 
questions that they answered to build up their study.  
 
They found that the quality of the networks improved substantially over time 
and concluded that at least under a qualitative perspective:  
 
‘Ownership unbundling has been beneficial and has resulted in 
better performance. The network loss statistics show an increase 
during the brief increase in competition, suggesting increased 
switching and subsequent reconciliation issues’772.  
 
                                            




Similarly, they concluded that the ‘operation costs have decreased significantly 
as a result of unbundling773‘, finding that a 17 percent decrease in unit 







Figure 8.1 ‘Operational costs (NZ $) per kWh over time (2007 prices)774 
 
 
Their ultimate conclusion is that ‘empirical evidence […] does not provide a 
complete picture from which we can judge the success of ownership 
unbundling […], [h]owever, empirical evidence from New Zealand does offer 
some useful policy recommendations for distribution ownership unbundling’775.  
 
                                            
773 Ibid, 55. 
 
774 Ibid, 87. 
 




The most important lesson from the analysis of this study is the technique 
through which they approached the question: ‘what pro-competitive effects 
have structural unbundling?’, and how they proceeded to verify the 
correctness of their hypotheses.  
 
The same technique could be used to look to other sectors, in completely 
different contexts.  
 
I will now look at the consequences of structural unbundling in the energy 
sector in the last few years in Europe.  
 
 
8.6.   What lessons can be learned from structural unbundling in the 
energy sector for the electronic communications sector after the 
commitments E.ON, RWE and ENI? 
 
I need now to look at the impact that structural separation might have had in 
the three cases E.ON (electricity), RWE (gas) and ENI (gas) on the basis of 
the commitments negotiated with the European Commission in the last few 
years. Even though, as Nillesen and Pollitt concluded, we can only make 
comparison regarding different industrial and economic scenarios with 
extreme care, nevertheless it is worth trying to look at the impact that in 
Europe the adoption of structural remedies may have had in the energy sector. 
 
One of the cases discussed in Chapter V in the electricity generation sector 
was the commitments signed in 2008 in Germany between E.ON and the 
European Commission. These led to a number of divestitures that can be 
compared to those adopted in New Zealand and analysed in the previous 
section. Looking at the recent sector inquiry into electricity generation in 
Germany776, and following the same approach Nillesen and Pollitt adopted in 
                                            
776 Bundeskarellamt, Sector Inquiry into Electricity Generation and Wholesale Markets, Report 
in accordance with Section 32e (3) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition - 






examining the effects of structural unbundling in New Zealand, we can reach 
some interesting conclusions. 
 
The sector inquiry was launched in March 2009 by the German 
Bundeskartellamt in order to ascertain the situation regarding competition and 
the price-forming mechanism in the German electricity and electricity 
wholesale markets in 2007 and 2008. The enquiry represented the follow-up of 
proceedings carried out against many German electricity undertakings by the 
European Commission, proceedings that focused on the possibility of abusive 
withholding of capacity777. Proceedings involved E. ON, RWE (electricity) and 
Vattenfall. As discussed in Chapter III, only in the first case commitments were 
adopted in 2008, with E.ON committing itself to divest 5,000 MW of electricity 
generation capacity. In order to prepare the 2011 inquiry, the 
Bundeskartellamt carried out an extensive investigation, collecting data related 
to 80 undertakings, analysing 340 electricity generating units for 2007 and 
2008, equal to 93.6% of the total amount of electricity generated in 2007 and 
92.9% of the total amount generated in 2008778. The data collected provide a 
picture of the competitive scenario in the electricity generation and 
transmission at the time of the signature of E.ON’s undertakings (2008), and 
show how, in the following three years, competition in the German electricity 
generation and transmission market evolved. 
 
Taking the data as a starting point, I make the same hypotheses that Nillesen 
and Pollitt discussed in their analysis of the New Zealand electricity distribution 
sector after the break-up.  
 
Firstly, I take into consideration the impact that divestiture might have had on 
competition, looking both at the market power of the incumbent and at the 
abusive conducts after the ‘break-up’.  
 
                                                                                                                              
 
777 ibid, p 2. 
 




On this respect the German report states that the ‘results of the analysis of 
competition suggest that at least three undertakings in the German first-time 
sales market, probably even four, are in a position to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of their competitors, customers and ultimately of their 
consumers and to restrict competition on the first-time sales market’779. E.ON, 
RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW were all essential for meeting Germany’s 
electricity demand in a considerable number of hours. The report, however, 
admits that the market power of the four large generators declines in 2009 as 
a result of the reduced demand in the wake of the economic crisis and E.ON’s 
divested generation capacity. The report therefore confirms that at least an 
impact on market power can be recorded after the implementation of the 
E.ON commitments.  
 
With respect to the abusive conduct of capacity withholding, the report 
suggests that in the two years taken into consideration (2007 and 2008) the 
abusive practice was still ongoing. It underlines that, even though  
 
‘it cannot be proved that generation capacity was withheld to any 
significant extent on the basis of the data on power plant operations 
and on the cost situation of individual generating units […], the 
market structure continues to provide scope and an incentive to 
influence pricing through the unjustified withholding of capacity’780.  
 
The authors of the German electricity sector report admit that it might be very 
difficult to prove this kind of practices, since it would require the collection of 
extensive data on the operations of each of the 340 electricity generating units 
over very long periods, with checks on the information on the marginal costs 
subject to frequent variation. However, the overall conclusion is that ‘on the 
basis of these findings, various means may be taken to improve the 
competitive conditions in the electricity markets. This applies both in relation to 
improving the effectiveness of abuse control under competition law and with 
regard to market structure’781.  
                                            
779 Ibid, p 8-9. 
 
780 Ibid, p 19. 
 





With respect to the first point (more effective control on abuses and impact on 
competition), the suggestion of setting up a ‘Markttransparenzstelle’ at the 
German competition authority aimed at supervising the fluctuations of prices is 
an admission by the authors of the German report  that their sector inquiry had 
‘an exclusively retrospective analysis of the price-formation mechanisms in the 
electricity generation and wholesale markets that involves many difficulties on 
account of the special features of these markets; […] the validity of the data 
suffers from the fact that the undertakings are not always in a position to 
provide retrospectively the required data quality or to explain special features 
of power plant generation’782. 
 
Even considering the difficulty of gathering empirical data, for the 
demonstration of my thesis is useful the conclusion reached by two 
economists, Weigt and Willems783, in 2011 with respect to German electricity 
divestiture. Their theoretical models seem to confirm that the break-up, at least 
in the energy sector, had a positive impact on (i) consumer welfare and (ii) on 
prices and costs (the second and third hypotheses, respectively, that Nillesen 
and Pollitt made looking at New Zealand’s electricity sector divestiture). They 
simulated the market outcome in different divestitures scenarios. Firstly, they 
assumed that the assets are bought by new market participants (large utilities 
or foreign firms), increasing the number of total players. Secondly, the assets 
are assumed to be bought by fringe companies (several small companies, or 
‘Large Fringe scenario’)784.  
 
Applying these two theoretical models, they found that the second simulation 
(‘Supply Function’ model) predicts an increase of consumer welfare and a 
reduction of prices in Germany after the divestiture. 
 
                                            
782 ibid, p 20. 
 
783 H. Weigt – B. Willems, ‘The Effect of divestitures in the German Electricity Market’, 
Discussion Paper of the Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, (2011) 20-2011, 
accessible at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=114122. 
 




The two economists looked at the scenario preceding E.ON’s break-up (i.e. 
2006). Then, they made a first hypothesis: a divestiture with ‘6 Strategic 
Firms’, with a break-up of the dominant duopoly of E.ON and RWE (electricity) 
into four separate companies, each owning a half of the pre-divested 
company, respectively785. In this scenario six companies share the market of 
electricity.  
 
In the second scenario (Large Fringe scenario) the duopoly of E.ON and RWE 
is broken forcing them to divest half of their capacities786, but this time these 
being acquired by several small companies, with no buyer retaining significant 
market power. They showed that the HHI decreases from 2150 (2006 
scenario) to 1050 in the post break-up scenario with six firms, and from 2150 
to 700 in the large fringe scenario.  
 
They argued that since divestitures increase the number of firms and reduce 
the market share of the strategic companies, prices decrease. They found that 
overall, the average peak prices can be reduced by about 6 Euro per MWh in 
the ‘six firms’ scenario and by an additional 2 Euro per MWh in the ‘Large 
Fringe’ scenario. Quoting from the paper: 
 
‘The lower prices lead to an increase in consumer surplus and a 
reduction of producer surplus. In sum the first effect exceeds the 
second leading to an overall welfare increase for Germany. 
However, revenues for importers decline as both the amount they 
import as the price at which they sell, is reduced. Welfare abroad is 
therefore negatively affected by the divestures. […] Although the 
German welfare increase in the Large Fringe case is higher, this is 
offset by a larger welfare reduction abroad leading to nearly similar 
overall welfare effects in both cases’787.  
 
The conclusion of the study is that the reduction of the market concentration 
as a consequence of the break-up of the incumbents (E.ON and RWE) 
                                            








provides welfare benefits. They confirmed their conclusions by applying two 
different economic models: in both cases they empirically demonstrate that 





The analysis of cases  taken from various jurisdictions (United Kingdom, Italy), 
including the European Union approach expressed by the European Directive 
2009/140/EC, shows that functional separation, although difficult to implement 
and monitor, could have some positive aspects such as (i) preservation of the 
structure and allocative efficiency of the dominant undertaking, (ii) avoidance 
of the so-called ‘double marginalisation’ (e.g. the duplication of administrative 
and organisational costs) and could enhance (iii) consumer welfare in the 
short and medium term, in particular reducing the risk of lack of coordination 
among separated network and companies providing services.  
 
The British experience of functional separation (Openreach) was adopted in 
2009 as European benchmark of pro-competitive remedy in the electronic 
communications directives reform bearing in mind the risks that a more 
intrusive remedy could have determined.  
 
However, in this pro-‘functional separation’ scenario, the thesis tried to answer 
the question whether, among the antitrust remedies applicable to regulated 
industries, structural separation may also have a potential pro-competitive 
impact and be considered beneficial more in the long-run than in the medium 
or short-term.  
 
First of all, structural (ownership) separation can have a major deterrent effect. 
Deterrence might be sufficient per se to justify a draconian and invasive 
measure in the presence of recurrent network-related abuses. As seen above, 
as soon as the in the United Kingdom OFGEM referred (on the 27 March 
                                            




2014) the energy sector to the newly created Competition and Markets 
Authority for a market investigation (inquiry) that, among various possible 
outcomes, may lead to structural separation of the six operators, Southern 
Electrics (SEE) has announced that the retail prices will be ‘frozen’ until 
2016789, after having gathered exceptional profits in just three years between 
2009 and 2012. 
 
However, the most important outcome of structural separation mandated by 
the European Commission or by the National competition authorities would be 
that of stating with clarity that the enforcer, in the European legal system, has 
the ultimate word in ascertaining whether competition law was infringed, 
imposing a remedy that goes beyond the range of action of the regulator, a 
present entitled to impose either ex ante prices or functional separation as per 
Regulation 2009/140/EC. 
 
As discussed in the first chapters of the thesis, and in chapter II in particular, 
two important cases as Deutsche Telekom790 and Telefónica791 play a crucial 
role to show that the enforcer has more than a theoretical legal ground 
represented by Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC when called to enforce 
competition law. These two precedents show with clarity that the 
incumbent cannot rely on the measures suggested or approved by the 
regulators, such as price-caps (or mere functional separation, after the 2009 
telecommunications directives reform) to justify their exclusionary conduct and 
avoid the imposition of enforcement remedies (pecuniary fines in the 
mentioned examples).   
 
The legal grounds represented by the provision of Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003/EC and of the two mentioned cases should be analysed in conjunction 
with the examples of structural separation already adopted through 
                                            
789 Home page of www.see.com, accessed in 1st April 2014. 
 
790 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG, [2003] OJ L263/9; Case T-271/03 Deutsche 
Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche Telekom AG v 
European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
791 Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6; Case T-336/07 Telefónica. At present on appeal at the Court 
of Justice, Case C-295/12 
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commitments as per Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003/EC, contained in the 
Commission Decisions E.ON, RWE and ENI792 adopted between 2008 and 
2010 in the aftermath of the Energy Inquiry 2007. 
 
These legal premises have also an empirical pillar, showing that structural 
separation has been considered beneficial and positive by the national 
competition authority also in the electronic communications sector.  
 
I found two recent examples in Australia and in New Zealand.  
 
In Australia structural ownership separation of the telecommunications 
incumbent, negotiated through undertakings in March 2012, will be completed 
by 2018, with the Australian government engaged in creating a New 
Broadband Network, and Telstra, the incumbent, providing wholesale services 
in competition with other telecom operators. 
 
Similarly, even though voluntarily enacted, Telecom New Zealand break-up 
(30 November/1st December 2011), creating a separated publicly listed 
company Chorus (owner of the existing copper and fibre network), represents 
the first case of structural separation already put in place with the  aim of 
favouring the roll out of the new ultra-fast broadband network with substantial 
aid from the  government793. This case can provide empirical evidence in the 
next few years of the effects on competition of structural separation. 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the competition authority (or the regulator with 
competition law jurisdiction) should carry out an assessment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both functional and structural solutions.  
 
In order to make the correct choice, the sector regulator or enforcer should 
answer the question whether the abusive conduct to be prevented or 
                                            
792 E.ON, [2009] OJ C36/8; RWE, [2009] OJ C133/10; ENI, [2010] OJ C352/8.  
 
793 New Zealand, Telecommunications Amendment Act (No2) 2006, section 32, inserting a 





sanctioned  originated due to specific management choices and/or is linked to 
(or favoured by) structural deficits.  
 
An obsolete network, either for electronic communications, railway transport, 
electricity, or gas and oil transmission and distribution, for example, might be 
the first reason leading to abusive behaviours such as access (direct and 
indirect) refusal to supply. 
 
A structural remedy, if interpreted in a dynamic perspective, may offer 
advantages for the entire sector and for the economy of a country as a whole. 
The idea is to promote remedies that have a long-term value, shifting attention 
from the specific remedy to be applied (fine, functional or structural remedy) to 
the ultimate objective to be achieved. 
 
Most importantly, an intervention of the competition law enforcer going beyond 
the ‘éspace de manoeuvre’ established by the national regulator (in line with 
the recent positions adopted by the European Courts in the above-mentioned 
Deutsche Telekom794 and Telefónica795 cases) could find full legitimation in the 
practice of the European Commission and in the most recent case-law. The 
European jurisprudence confirms that  at least theoretically, the European 
enforcer and the NCAs can adopt the  remedy that they consider most suitable 
to address competition concerns and to create a ‘level playing field of 
competition’, going beyond the regulatory remedies, including the most 
advanced regulatory tool represented today by functional remedy as per 
Directive 2009/140/EC.  
 
In certain contexts, the network (either the main backbone or the local one) 
may turn out to be insufficient even if, ex principis auctoritate, access to 
competitors is mandated, and even in presence of reiterated pecuniary fines 
by the competition authority. In its enforcement powers the recent precedents 
                                            
794 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG, [2003] OJ L263/9; Case T-271/03 Deutsche 
Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; Deutsche Telekom AG v 
European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
795 Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6; Case T-336/07 Telefónica. At present on appeal at the Court 
of Justice, Case C-295/12. 
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in the energy sector show that the Commission could impose also structural 
remedies when dealing with network-related abuses. 
 
From an idea of European market in which competition policies have been 
inspired, in line with the principles of the Freiburg School, by the objective of 
facilitating the fair and competitive play among undertakings, the new 
centrality of the consumers’ welfare as both final user and European citizen 
may impose more forward-looking  pro-competition measures796. 
 
The experience from the energy sector shows that, in the last decade, the 
European Commission was prone to adopt both behavioural and structural 
remedies.   
 
Chapter III shows how the European Commission, during the reform of the 
Telecommunications Package Directive in 2007-2009, adopted the model of 
functional separation on the basis of the precedent represented by the 
creation of a separate division called Openreach within the BT Group as an ex 
ante model applicable now in the entire European Union territory. However, in 
Chapter V, I have also shown how in the last five years the European 
Commission has been negotiating commitments that led to structural 
(ownership) separation, particularly in the electricity (E.ON Electricity) and in 
the gas (cases ENI and RWE) sectors797, preferring behavioural remedies 
(E.ON Gas) only when they had been considered sufficient to address the 
competition concerns. In Chapter VI I took the AT&T case as the main 
example of structural separation in the telecommunications industry until 
today. However, I also argued that that example of local vertical structural 
                                            
 
796 I think here of the statement made by Professor C. Koenig of the Bonn University in the 
International Conference on State Aids held at King’s College London in November 2009 
underpinning the idea that broadband all over Europe should be considered a European Union 
citizen’s right implemented not just through the free play of market forces, or with the 
exceptional intervention of direct State Aids but expressly achieved through a European 
Directive or other primary European legislation. The conference followed of just two months 
the adoption by the European Commission of the Communication from the Commission 
‘Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of 
broadband networks 30 September 2009 (2009/C 235/04). 
 





separation it is only partially applicable to the European reality, considering 
that the geographic separation of the AT&T network actually coincides with the 
fragmentation of the various national networks in the Europe Union. Only in 
the major member States local vertical structural separation could be 
economically sustainable.  
 
Chapter VII was aimed at analysing on the basis of what questions (‘tests’) 
and legal and economic arguments the European Commission and the NCAs 
base the choice of the optimal remedy. 
 
Chapter VII also tackled the recently adopted OECD Recommendation (2011), 
published in 2012, concerning ‘Structural Separation in Regulated Industries’. 
The Report attached to the OECD Recommendation 2011 provided 
experiences from various OECD countries that showed how it is impossible to 
say a priori what remedy should be preferable. The OECD Recommendation 
2011 acknowledges that  
 
‘there are differences in the characteristics of industries and 
countries, differences in the processes of regulatory reform and 
differences in the recognition of the effectiveness of structural 
measures, behavioural measures and so on, and that such 
differences should be taken into account when considering 
structural issues’798.  
 
It also recognises that  
 
‘the degree of competition which can be sustained in the 
competitive complementary activities varies, but that when these 
activities can sustain effective competition it is desirable to facilitate 
such competition as a tool for controlling costs, promoting 
innovation, and enhancing the quality of the regulation overall, 
ultimately to the benefit of final users and consumers’799. 
 
                                            
798 OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Structural Separation in Regulated 
Industries, 13 December 2011 C (2011)135 and C (2011)135/CORR1, preamble. 
 




I agree even more with the conclusion reached by the OECD when, 
considering the pros and cons of behavioural (and, within this category, 
functional) or structural remedy, in both cases the costs and the benefits have 
to be assessed.  
 
The OECD therefore stresses that 
 
‘When faced with a situation in which a regulated firm is or may in 
the future be operating simultaneously in a non-competitive activity 
and a potentially competitive complementary activity, [OECD] 
Members should carefully balance the benefits and costs of 
structural measures against the benefits and costs of behavioural 
remedies’800 
 
Concluding that for ‘costs and benefits’ to be balanced the following should be 
taken into account: 
 
 effects on competition 
 effects on the quality and cost of regulation 
 effects on corporate incentives to invest 
 transactional costs of structural modifications and the economic and 
public benefits of vertical integration, based on the economic 
characteristics of the industry in the country under review. 
 
As discussed in Chapter VII, these criteria were applied by the European 
Commission in the cases mentioned in Chapter V (in particular, in adopting the 
commitments decisions at European level in the energy sector) , but also  in 
dealing with the choice of the best remedy when dealing with the clearance of 
a concentration operation. Similar approach was followed by the British 
regulator, OFCOM, when dealing with the undertakings signed by British 
Telecom that led to the creation of the separate division Openreach. 
 
The OECD reports also provide a useful overview of various forms of 
functional and structural separation in regulated industries, and in the 
                                            




telecommunications sector in particular. In Chapter VII I outlined the various 
forms of structural separation that could be applicable in the 
telecommunications sector in Europe.  
 
In that chapter I excluded the applicability of the ‘AT&T model’ of break-up, 
since it was  a form of structural separation tailored on the necessity to 
increase inter-State competition in the USA by breaking up, at local, State, 
level, the AT&T network. In Europe we can say that the post ‘break-up’ 
scenario is already a reality if we look at the plurality of national incumbents. 
 
Two other forms of structural separation were also discussed, both probably 
applicable at national level in Europe: (i) one leading to the break-up of the 
non-competitive part of the undertaking (the network) from the competitive part 
(the services); (ii) another leading to the break-up of the network in two parts 
on which both operators shall be put in condition to provide their services (as 
per the so-called ‘reciprocal structural separation’). 
 
The form of structural separation between network and services is at present 
the only one for which I found a relevant example in the divestiture of the 
network by Telstra in Australia that will be fully operational from 2018.  A 
similar form of divestiture was also voluntarily enacted in New Zealand.  
 
These two examples unfortunately do not provide sufficient empirical data to 
demonstrate that structural separation are having or will have a particularly 
positive effect in competition law terms. However, I used other available 
examples of structural separation, such as the distribution network divestiture 
in the electricity sector in New Zealand in 1998, and the analysis of the ex post 
effects of three cases of structural remedies in the energy sector in Europe 
represented by the E.ON, RWE and ENI commitments decisions801, to 
demonstrate that some positive effects in terms of enhanced competition, 
reduction of costs and prices, and enhancement of consumer welfare could 
be, at least partially, empirically demonstrated.  
                                            






The analysis of the Deutsche Telekom802 and Telefónica803 cases 
demonstrates that the European Courts recognise the supremacy of 
competition law provisions, and the possibility for the enforcers (Commission 
and NCA) to adopt sanctions (and behavioural or even structural remedies, as 
per Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC) even in the presence of regulatory tools 
(wholesale, retail or access rates pre-established by the regulators, in the 
here-mentioned cases). Similarly, also functional separation adopted on the 
basis of Directive 2009/140/EC, as a regulatory tool that might be imposed by 
the national telecoms regulator, could be ‘overtaken’ by more draconian 
remedies adopted by the enforcers. 
 
My contribution to this reasoning cannot go much further. It is aimed at 
avoiding dogmatism and taking a pragmatic approach in dealing with the 
electronic communications network, without excluding a priori that vertical 
structural (ownership) separation may lead to an outcome that might be more 
favourable for the final consumer in a long-term perspective than functional 
separation or the imposition of pecuniary fines in the short-run. 
 
Functional separation can reach crucial targets in the short-run: removal of the 
conditions that led to abusive practices, such as margin squeeze or refusal to 
supply, but also predatory pricing or excessive pricing. Vice-versa  a long-run 
perspective derives from (is directly linked to) innovation and enhanced 
technology, but these in certain conditions could be achieved only after 
structural remedies are adopted, as it is expected to happen in the Australian 
scenario when the new broadband network (NBN) will be rolled out with 
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     ANNEX I  
 
Article 7 of Framework Directive 2009/140/EC ‘Consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications’ 
(1) In carrying out their tasks under this Directive and the Specific Directives, 
NRAs shall take the utmost account of the objectives set out in Article 8, 
including in so far as they relate to the functioning of the internal market.  
 
(2) NRAs shall contribute to the development of the internal market by 
cooperating with each other and with the Commission in a transparent manner 
to ensure the consistent application, in all Member States, of the provisions of 
this Directive and the Specific Directives. To this end, they shall, in particular, 
seek to agree on the types of instruments and remedies best suited to address 
particular types of situations in the market place. 
 
(3) In addition to the consultation referred to in Article 6, where a national 
regulatory authority intends to take a measure which: a) falls within the scope 
of Articles 15 or 16 of this Directive, Articles 5 or 8 of Directive 2002/19/EC 
(Access Directive) or Article 16 of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service 
Directive), and b) would affect trade between Member States, it shall at the 
same time make the draft measure accessible to the Commission and the 
NRAs in other Member States, together with the reasoning on which the 
measure is based, in accordance with Article 5(3), and inform the Commission 
and other NRAs thereof. NRAs and the Commission may make comments to 
the NRA concerned only within one month or within the period referred to in 
Article 6 if that period is longer. The one-month period may not be extended. 
 
(4) Where an intended measure covered by paragraph 3 aims at: a) defining a 
relevant market which differs from those defined in the recommendation in 
accordance with Article 15(1), or b) deciding whether or not to designate an 
undertaking as having, either individually or jointly with others, significant 
market power, under Article 16(3), (4) or (5),and would affect trade between 
Member States and the Commission has indicated to the NRA that it considers 
that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single market or if it has 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with Community law and in particular the 
objectives referred to in Article 8, then the draft measure shall not be adopted 
for a further two months. This period may not be extended. Within this period 
the Commission may, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
22(2), take a decision requiring the NRA concerned to withdraw the draft 
measure. This decision shall be accompanied by a detailed and objective 
analysis of why the Commission considers that the draft measure should not 
be adopted together with specific proposals for amending the draft measure.  
 
(5) The NRA concerned shall take the utmost account of comments of other 
NRAs and the Commission and may, except in cases covered by paragraph 4, 
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adopt the resulting draft measure and, where it does so, shall communicate it 
to the Commission. (6) In exceptional circumstances, where a NRA considers 
that there is an urgent need to act, by way of derogation from the procedure 
set out in paragraphs 3 and 4, in order to safeguard competition and protect 
the interests of users, it may immediately adopt proportionate and provisional 
measures. It shall, without delay, communicate those measures, with full 
reasons, to the Commission and the other NRAs. A decision by the NRA to 
render such measures permanent or extend the time for which they are 
applicable shall be subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 
